

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CRIMEAN TATARS AND THE  
OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1578 - 1608, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE  
TO THE ROLE OF ĠĀZĪ ĠIRĀY KHAN

by

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## A B S T R A C T

Histories of the Ottoman Empire based on Oriental and Western sources have been written by outstanding scholars in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These histories trace the development of the Empire as a whole without giving too much consideration to the separate contributions of political entities or significant figures within the Empire. In short, the lacunae of Ottoman history must now be filled in by studies of the component parts of that history.

The Crimean Khanate is one such political entity which has attracted very little systematic study outside of Russia and Turkey. The Crimean Khanate maintained a significant position in the relations between the Ottoman and Russian Empires from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, during which time a change took place in the balance of power in Eastern Europe and Western Asia - a change generally to the advantage of Russia and at the expense of the Ottoman State.

The present study attempts to make a detailed survey of the relations of the Khanate with the Ottoman Empire and other foreign powers between 1578 and 1608 and, at the same time, to throw light on the institutions and political life of the Khanate by tracing the life of one of the most significant Khans of the Crimean Tatars, Ġāzī Girāy Khan II (1588-1608).

The note on sources discusses systematically the widely scattered sources pertinent to the study of the Crimean Khanate in the late sixteenth

and early seventeenth centuries. In the introduction the writer seeks to place the study in a sixteenth century Eastern European and Western Asian context, giving special attention to the Black Sea and the steppe environments of the Khanate. The first three chapters then describe the relations of the Khanate within the three principal orbits of its political activity, the Caucasus, the Steppe and Eastern Europe respectively, between 1578 and 1606; Chapter IV provides an evaluation of these far flung activities.



## P R E F A C E

The Transcription of names and places in the Slavonic Sources follow the English system as is referred to in the Note on Sources. In the case of the Transcription of Turkish words, the system as set forth in Volume One of the Turkish Islam Ansiklopedisi will be generally followed with two exceptions: in place of the Turkish "C" as the transcription for the Ottoman  $\text{چ}$ , the normal English "j" and, for the Ottoman  $\text{ج}$ , the English "j" with a circumflex ( $\text{^}$ ) will be followed. A slight variation of the Turkish transcription will be used for Persian spellings.

The geographic terminology, whenever possible, conforms to the spellings as given in the John Bartholomew edition of The Times' Atlas of the World (London, 1955-1959) in five volumes. In so far as it has been necessary to refer to Mongol names or terminology, the spellings used by George Vernadsky in his study, The Mongols and Russia (New Haven, 1953) have been followed.

I should like to thank Dr. Paul Skwarczynski and Dr. John Keep of the School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, London University and Professor Roger Savory of the University of Toronto for helpful suggestions which they have made during the preparation of this study. I particularly wish to thank Professor Bernard Lewis and Mr. Vernon Farry of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, for their tireless vigilance and encouragement during the preparation of this thesis and for the insight which they have given to me in the study of Islamic History.

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## A NOTE ON SOURCES

The sources for the history of the Crimean Tatars in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries are widely scattered. The most important of these materials may be divided into three main categories: Oriental Sources, written in Tatar, Ottoman, Persian and Arabic; Sources of Slavonic origin, written in Russian, Polish and Latin; Sources in the languages of Western Europe. Each group may be further subdivided into documents, chronicles, literary works, and, where applicable, epigraphy and numismatics.

### I. ORIENTAL SOURCES

1. Documents: The collection of 124 record books which were found by the Russians in the Archive of the Crimean Khanate at Akmesjid and which were subsequently removed to the Leningrad Library constitute a basic source for the history of the Crimean Khanate.<sup>1</sup> The Russian orientalist, V. D. Smirnov, described these documents, which commence in the middle of the sixteenth century and extend to the late eighteenth century. They contain records of judicial proceedings, governmental decrees, population statistics, financial matters and other documents,

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<sup>1</sup> H. Inalcik, art. "Giray", I.A., IV, 738.

either in extenso or in summarized versions.<sup>1</sup> While this collection appears to be of paramount importance for historians interested in certain aspects of the social and economic history of the Crimean Tatars, the Tatar and Ottoman documents preserved in the Ottoman, Russian and Polish archives of Istanbul, Moscow, and Cracow-Warsaw respectively, contain a vast quantity of materials upon which future studies of the diplomatic and political history of the Tatars will depend. Unfortunately, only a small portion of these documents has become available to scholars through publication in the original Tatar or Ottoman;<sup>2</sup> however, many of them may be consulted in printed versions of contemporary translations in various languages which actually accompanied the original documents or which were made in the respective foreign ministry upon receipt of the original.<sup>3</sup> For the period of the reign/ of Ġazī Girāy Khan II, the

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<sup>1</sup>V. D. Smirnov, Krymskoe Khanstvo pod verkhovenstvom otomanskoy Porti do nachala xviii veka (St. Petersburg, 1887), xxxiii; the same scholar has written a more detailed discussion of these record books, "Tatarsko-khanskies yarlyky iz kolletsii Tavricheskoy arkhivnoy kommissii" in the Izvestiya Tavr. Uchen Arkheolog. kommissii, Nr. 54 (1918). (not seen)

<sup>2</sup>See Smirnov, op.cit., i-xxxiv and Inalcik, loc.cit. for a listing of document collections other than the ones already mentioned. Recently a great amount of work has been done on the rich collections of Ottoman, Tatar and other oriental documents available in Polish depositories. The best indication of this activity is the recent publication, under the auspices of the Polish Academy of Sciences, of the first volume of the projected Katalog Rękopisów Orientalnych Ze Zbiorów Polskich (Catalogue des Manuscrits Orientaux des Collections Polonaises), entitled Katalog Dokumentów Turckich...1455-1672 (Catalogue des Documents Turcs), ed. by Zygmunt Abrahamowicz under the direction of A. Zayaczkowski (Warsaw, 1959).

<sup>3</sup>This is particularly true of the documents printed in the Lashkov and Hurmuzaki collections discussed below.

printed versions of several Tatar documents are available in the Materiali dlya Istorii Krymskogo Khanstva (Materiaux pour servir à la Histoire du Chanat de Crimée), published by V. Velyaminov-Zernov in consultation with H. Feyiz Khan. These documents, printed in St. Petersburg in 1864, were copied from the originals in the Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Moscow during the spring and summer of 1858 by H. Feyiz Khan, who was then a lecturer in the Tatar language at the University of St. Petersburg. Academician V. D. Smirnov criticized this collection in the introduction to his general work on the Crimean Khanate<sup>1</sup> on the grounds that H. Feyiz Khan had made some very bad errors while copying and that someone competent should have checked the documents before their publication. The Materiali ... include documents ranging from 926/1519-20 to 1155/1742-43. Th. Lashkov, an instructor in the Gymnasium at Simferopol', published his Pamyatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniy Krymskogo Khanstva s Moskovskim Gosudarstvom v XVI i XVII v.v. (Monuments of the Diplomatic Relations of the Crimean Khanate with the Muscovite State in the 16th and 17th centuries) (Simferopol', 1891). In his introduction he also criticized Professor Velyaminov-Zernov for leaving many gaps and for publishing the Tatar originals before the contemporary Russian translations, thus rendering the collection inaccessible to all but trained

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<sup>1</sup> Smirnov, op.cit., xxiv; the same author mentions that he has treated this question in more detail in a study entitled Sbornik nekotorykh vazhnykh izvestiy i ofitsial'nykh dokumentov kasatel'no Turtsii, Rosii i Kryma (St. Petersburg, 1831). I have not been able to consult this. For fuller details of this archive, see below pp. 27-31.

orientalists. Th. Lashkov's welcome addition filled many important gaps left by the Velyaminov-Zernov collection for the period 1474 to 1692. This new collection produced the original Russian translations preserved with the Tatar documents.<sup>1</sup> Here, as in the Velyaminov-Zernov collection, a number of sworn patents (Shertnaya Gramota) and other diplomatic papers from the time of Ġāzī Girāy come to light.<sup>2</sup>

Apart from the document collections of A. N. Kurat and Fevzi Kurdoğlu<sup>3</sup> for the earliest period of Crimean History, and the two volume compilation attributed to Nişānjī Ahmed, called Ferīdūn,<sup>4</sup> very few documents from the Ottoman Archives which are pertinent to the history of the Crimean Tatars are available to scholars outside Istanbul. As K. Holter indicated in his survey of the various document collections attributed to Ferīdūn,<sup>5</sup> the scope of the original collection is not known, but according to the account of the chronicler, Selānīkī, it was assembled

<sup>1</sup>As these documents derive from the same archival collection as the Materiali ... the Lashkov contribution is discussed with the Oriental documents.

<sup>2</sup>In addition to the Tatar documents which are listed in the references noted in F.N. 2, p. 8, Lashkov, in the introduction to his Pamyatniki... mentions others, for periods not pertinent to this study, published in the Zapiski Odesskogo Obshchestva Istorii i Drevnostey and in the Sbornik Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva.

<sup>3</sup>A. N. Kurat, Topkapī Sarayī Muzesi arşivindeki Altınordu, Kırım, ve Türki-stan Hanlarına ait yarlık ve bitikler (Istanbul, 1940) and F. Kurdoğlu, "İlk Kırım hanlarının mektupları," Belleten, Nos. 3 and 4 (1937).

<sup>4</sup>This has appeared in two editions, the first of which is somewhat larger than the second. Ahmed, called Ferīdūn, Münşā'at es-Selātin (Istanbul), 1264-5 and 1274-5), 2 vols.

<sup>5</sup>K. Holter, "Studien zu Ahmed Ferīdūn's Münşā'at es-Selātin," Mitteilungen des Oesterreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung, XIV, Ergänzungs-Band (Innsbruck, 1939).

(Affixer of the Seal)

by Ferīdūn when he was Nisānjī<sup>1</sup> and contained 1880 documents divided into 11 parts corresponding to the reigns of the sultans from which the documents were derived.<sup>1</sup> Of the documents published, almost all of those in Volume I and in Volume II, up to page 100, have been traced to a common source. K. Holter proceeded to prove the authenticity of many of the documents in the lesser known late 16th and 17th<sup>century</sup> sections<sup>2</sup> of volume II by comparing those which allegedly had been sent to the Holy Roman Emperor with actual copies found in the Archives of Vienna. J. Rypka<sup>3</sup> used a similar method to collate the Ottoman-Tatar letters of the Ferīdūn collection with the Goettingen collection of letters exchanged between the Porte and the Crimean Khans between 1054 and 1098/1644-1686.<sup>4</sup> Of the 37 letters Rypka considers, from the reign of Bayazid II to the end of the 17th century, eight letters belong to the period of Gāzī Girāy's active participation in Ottoman affairs. These letters Rypka considers to be authentic on the basis of style and other considerations. Only the problems of dating were not entirely solved by him. It is hoped that some contribution can be made towards their resolution in this study.

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<sup>1</sup>K. Holter, loc.cit., p. 429.

<sup>2</sup>That is, those items which could not possibly have been collected by Ferīdūn because most of them belong to the period after Ferīdūn's death (1583).

<sup>3</sup>J. Rypka, "Briefwechsel der Hohen Pforte mit den Krimchanen im II. Bande von Ferīdūns Münše'at," Festschrift Georg Jacob, ed. T. Menzel (Leipzig, 1932), pp. 241-269.

<sup>4</sup>Goettingen, Universitaets-Bibliothek, Codd. Turc. 29 and 30.



The last category of documents relating to the life of Ġazī Girāy consists mainly of letters, poetry and similar materials which are widely scattered in journals and Inṣā' collections, some of which are difficult to obtain. Professor Inalcik published a number of facsimiles and transcripts of documents in an appendix to his article on the Don-Volga Canal project.<sup>1</sup> Ahmed Refik's articles also provide important documentary support from the Istanbul Archives.<sup>2</sup> Some poems sent to Ġazī Girāy, Khan of the Tatars, appears in the "Munṣe'at of Muṣṭafā ibn Pīr Muḥammad, called Azmīzāde."<sup>3</sup> Fevziye Abdullah in the Islam Ansiklopedisi discusses the merit of Ġazī Girāy's literary productions. He mentions that other writings of the Khan can be found in the Ṣadīkī Tezkeresi, in the history by Muhammad Riza, and in the appendix to an article by Abdullahöglu Hasan Bey.<sup>4</sup> Lastly of some importance for this study are the poems of Ġazī Girāy - which appear in an article

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<sup>1</sup>H. Inalcik, "Osmanlı-Rus Rekabetinin Menşei ve Don-Volga Kanalı Teşebbüsü (1569)," Belleten, 46 (Ankara, 1943), pp. 349-402.

<sup>2</sup>A. Refik, "Dahr-i Hazar-Karadeniz Kānālī ve Ejderhān Seferi," TOEM VII (43) (Istanbul, 1333/1914-15) pp. 2-13 and "Ahmed Refik'in deniz meselesi," TOEM XVI (94) (Istanbul, 1926), pp. 261-275.

<sup>3</sup>C. Rieu, Catalogue of the Turkish Manuscripts in the British Museum (London, 1888) 96-97. K. V. Zettersteen in his Die Arabischen, Persischen, und Türkischen Handschriften der Universitäts-Bibliothek zu Upsala, Vol. II, p. 105, in addition to another copy of the Azmizade letter, mentions a letter to the Tatar Khan Ġazī Girāy II. (not seen)

<sup>4</sup>Art. "Giray," I.A., IV 789-790; H. Abdullahöglu, "Kırım tarihine ait notlar ve vesikalar - Gazi Giray'ın mektupları" Azerbaycan Yurd Bilgisi Mecmuası (Istanbul, 1932), issues 3-7. I have only consulted the letters and poems in Mehemmed Riza. For a fuller discussion of Mehemmed Riza, see below, p. 14.

by O. Burian.<sup>1</sup>

2. Crimean-Tatar Historical Writings: A number of Tatar and Ottoman and also some Arabic and Persian historical writings contain information relating to the life of Ġāzī Girāy Khan II.

It is quite evident that history writing and related forms of literary expression along traditional Islamic lines played an important part in the intellectual life of the Crimean Khanate.<sup>2</sup> From the sources available we know that these writings principally consist of calendars (taqvīn), collections (mejmu'a), histories (tārīh) and biographies (terjūme). In the case of Ġāzī Girāy, as mentioned previously, a portion

<sup>1</sup>O. Burian, "Bozuk Idareden Şikayetçi İki Şair," Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi IX (1950), pp. 675-681.

<sup>2</sup>Bursali Mehmet Tahir, in his Krīm Mū'ellifleri (Istanbul, 1335), 38 pp., has made a study of the principal Crimean writers. (not seen.)

of his poetry and personal diplomatic correspondence has also been preserved. As no Tatar chronicle written during the period of this outstanding Khan is extant, we are forced to rely on two Crimean authors who wrote at a later date, Mehemmed Riżā and 'Abd ul Ġaffār, for general details about the life of Ġāzī Girāy.<sup>1</sup>

Mehemmed Riżā (d. 1756), a muderris (teacher<sup>of the Islamic sciences</sup>) and kāzī (judge) in the Ottoman learned tradition, became nakīb al-eşraf (chief of the registered descendants of the Prophet Muhammad) at the Sublime Porte from 1752 to 1756. He wrote, about the year 1737, what is considered to be the most valuable of Crimean histories based on earlier Tatar, Ottoman and Persian sources.<sup>2</sup> His work covers the period from the accession of

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<sup>1</sup> Halīm Girāy, in the introduction to his history of the Crimean Khanate, Gülbün-u Hanan (Istanbul, 1327), lists eight Crimean sources from which he supposedly gathered information for his work. In fact, however, Prof. Inalcik (art. "Giray", I.A., IV, 738) considers his history to be largely a summary of Mehemmed Riżā. Likewise, the short Crimean history by Jevdet Pasa, Kırım ve Kafkas Tarihī (Istanbul, 1307) is largely a borrowing from Halim Giray. See, in this regard, F. Babinger, Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und Ihre Werke (Leipzig, 1927), p. 343. The anonymous chronicle first reported by A. Jaubert in 1819 (Paris, Bibl. Nat., Turc Mss. Suppl. No. 515) and translated into French by M. Kazimirski in the Journal Asiatique, 2nd Series, XII (1833), was considered by Jaubert to be a summary of Mehemmed Riżā (J.A., loc. cit.) pp. 329-428.

<sup>2</sup> Al Seb' al Seyyār fī ahbār mulūk al-Tātār (Kazan, 1832). This rather inadequate edition was published under the supervision of Mirza A. Kazembeg from Ms. Nr. 369 of the Oriental Institute, Leningrad. According to Smirnov, op.cit. xii ff., Mehemmed Riżā relied upon Nişānjī Paşā, Na'imā Çelebi, Mir Hwand, Vassif, Sekender, Abu'l Fedā, Hayrīzāde, 'Abdul Velī Efendī and Maşūdī. Riżā, according to Smirnov, also mentions, although apparently he did not see, the historical collection of Kaysunīzāde Nedā'ī Efendī, called Remmāl Hōja which Prof. B. Lewis believes to be the Tarih-i Şahib Girāy found in the Bibl. Natl. Suppl. Turc No. 164. For additional notes on Mehemmed Riżā, Cf., Inalcik, loc.cit. "Yeni vesikalar göre Kırım Hanlığı..." Belleten 8 (1944), pp. 186-191.

Mengli Girāy Khan I (871/1466) to the accession of Mengli Girāy II (1150/1737). For the period of the khanship of Ġāzī Girāy, it has many errors. No written source explicitly elaborates upon the connection of Meḥemmed Riza with the literary traditions of the Crimea. Smirnov, however, contends that this may be deduced from his circle of acquaintances, his knowledge of Crimean Tatar and other Eastern Turkish literature, and the style in which he wrote.<sup>1</sup>

The Tatar source 'Umdet al-ahbār composed by 'Abd al Ġaffār, called Kīrimī (d. ? ), about the year 1744, devotes much attention to the descendants of Juchi (son of Chingis<sup>Khan</sup>) and the history of the Crimean Khans down to the period of his own lifetime. The author draws upon a number of Arabic, Persian, Ottoman, and Tatar sources to which he gives credit in his introduction.<sup>2</sup> From his citation it is clear that 'Abd al Ġaffār drew upon several sources to which Meḥemmed Riza either had no access or did not accept. Kīrimī was a member of the 'Ulemā of the Crimea but, during the period when he composed this historical work (c. 1157/1744-45), he had been banished to the lonely fortress of Soğujuk

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<sup>1</sup>Smirnov, op.cit., x-xi, citing the Tārīh-i Subḥi (Istanbul, 1198) p. 212, also gives interesting information about the relation of Meḥemmed Riza to his patron Al Ḥajj Muṣṭafa Efendi, Re'īs al Kuttab.

<sup>2</sup>An autograph copy of the 'Umdet al Ahbār exists in the Istanbul Es'ad Efendi Library, Ms. Nr. 2331, 321 folios. See the extract of this work published by Nejib 'Aṣim in the Türk Tarihi Enjumeni Mejmū'asī, No. 85, Supplement 2 (1343) pp. 5-7. The sources of particular interest which Kīrimī used include: the Ottoman - 'Ali Efendi, Ḥusayn Hezārfenn, Lutfī Pāṣā, Suheyli; and the Tatar - Tārīh-i Dost Sultāni-i Uzbeği, Tārīh-u Abu (sic), Ṣaka'i Jengizi and the Jam'iyat-i Hayr ad-Dinzāde Muḥammad al Širini.

in Abkhazia.<sup>1</sup> Professor Inalcik of Ankara University previously noted the divergence of these two sources in his article discussing the establishment of Ottoman suzerainty over the Crimean Khanate.<sup>2</sup> The unavailability or complete absence of many of the Tatar manuscripts mentioned both by Meḥammed Rīzā and Kırımī make the final evaluation of these two sources difficult indeed.<sup>3</sup> One is led to suspect, however, on the basis of Professor Inalcik's tentative findings, that the excellent outline history of the house of Juḡi, found in Hezarfenn, who in turn borrowed heavily from Cenabī, is of prime importance for 'Abd al Ḡaffār's narrative also.

Other general histories of the Crimean Tatars which are known to be of importance, but which are unavailable for this study include the Tārīh-i Hānān-i Tātār ve Deşt-i Kioçāk by Rīzvānpāşāzāde 'Abdullah.<sup>4</sup> As

<sup>1</sup> 'Abd al Ḡaffār, T.T.E.M., loc.cit.

<sup>2</sup> H. Inalcik, "Yeni Vesikalara Göre Kırım Hanlığının Osmanlı Tabiliğine Girmesi ve Ahidname Keselesi," Belleten 8 (1944), pp. 186-191. Prof. Inalcik also makes the point that Kırımī apparently belongs to that group of historians who rely heavily on Cenabī's account of the Crimean Khanate.

<sup>3</sup> The only known Ms. of the Tārīh-i Dōst Sultān is in the personal library of A. Zeki Velidi Togan in İstanbul (Inalcik, art. "Giray", loc.cit.) The History of Remmel Hōja exists in a copy to be found in the Leningrad University Library Mss no. 488, ~~according to its Catalogue of Oriental Manuscripts; see Smirnov, op.cit., xii, N. 12, and Note 22 above.~~

<sup>4</sup> Located in Paris, Arsenal Bibl. Ms. No. 39. According to Von Hammer, Geschichte der Chane der Krim unter Osmanischer Herrschaft (Vienna, 1856), p.8, the author's father was Beglerbeg of Kaffa in 1616.

this work was a principal source for Joseph de Guignes' Histoire générale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mongols et des autres Tartares Occidentaux (Paris, 1756-58), relevant parts of the latter work have been consulted in the preparation of this study.<sup>1</sup> The Tārīh-Hānān, Dāgestān, Moskov, ve Dest-Kinçak written ca. 1736 by Kefevi Ibrahim, which was published by C. Seydahmed Kirimer,<sup>2</sup> was also not available. V. D. Smirnov quotes verbatim several passages from an anonymous work which he calls the "Short History" (Kratkaya Istoriya). He gained access to this work through the assistance of the famous Crimean journalist, Mīrzā Isma'īl Gasprinsky (Gaspīralī). This 126 page history, believed by Smirnov to have been compiled in the eighteenth century, consists of some obvious borrowings from Maḥammad Rīzā. Professor Smirnov, however, considers it to be a valuable independent source.<sup>3</sup>

3. Ottoman Chronicles: A number of Ottoman chroniclers treat the period encompassing the reign of Gāzī Girāy Khan II. These historical materials consist of a variety of types including Histories of Campaigns against the Infidel (Gazavātname), Biographical Histories in epic style of individual sultans (Shāhnāme), Calendars or Diaries (Rūznāme) and traditional Islamic histories (Tārīh).<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Inalcik, "Yeni Vesikalara Göre Kīrīm Hanlīgī..." loc.cit., 187, No. 8; Cf. also, de Guignes' own Survey of Sources, op.cit. I, xii ff. and III, 406 f.

<sup>2</sup>Bazarjik, Roumania, 1933.

<sup>3</sup>Smirnov, op.cit., xvi.

<sup>4</sup>For a discussion of these terms, consult A.S. Levend, Gazavātname (Ankara, 1956), p. 1 ff, and Babinger, op.cit., 3 ff., 163 f.

The Nusratname<sup>1</sup> of Muṣṭafa bin Ahmed, called 'Alī (d. ca. 1599), has provided basic information about the participation of Ġāzī Girāy in the campaigns of the Caucasus. 'Alī Efendī dedicated this work to his patron, Lālā Muṣṭafa Pasha, first commander-in-chief of the Caucasian front, whom he served as a personal secretary during the conquest of Georgia. This chronicle, which begins in Şeval, 985/January, 1578 and continues to Zu'l-Ḳa'ade, 987/January, 1580, is particularly important for the copious specimens of political correspondence which it contains - correspondence dealing mainly with the preparation and execution of the campaigns.<sup>2</sup> The extremely reliable and detailed fourth part of 'Alī's general world history, the Kunh al-Aḥbār, which relates the history of the Ottomans from the foundation of their dynasty to the accession of <sup>sultan</sup> Maḥammed III (1595), has not been accessible.<sup>3</sup>

Owing to the constant warfare during this period of Ottoman history, several shorter historical tracts and eulogistic works, many of which are in verse, appear. Of these, only the history entitled Şejā'atnāme written by Ōkçīzāde Maḥammed Pasha, called Asafī (d. ? ) has been accessible, owing to the large extracts and continual paraphrasing of this valuable work by 'Abd ur Raḥman Şeref. This versified history discusses in

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<sup>1</sup>London, Brit. Mus. Ms. Add. 22,011.

<sup>2</sup>Rieu, op.cit., 61-62; Babinger, Ibid., 126 ff.

<sup>3</sup>Rieu, 27-28; Babinger, Ibid.; I have consulted the Brit. Mus. Ms. No. Or. 7832, but have found it incomplete for the sultanate of Murad III.

considerable detail the events from the conquest of Tiflis in 1578 to the conquest of Tabriz in 1585.<sup>1</sup>

Seyyid Lukmān bin Seyyid Husayn (d. post-1601) who held the office of Şāhnāmejī from 976/1569 to 1005/1596, composed a general history of the Ottoman dynasty to the year 992/1584 entitled Mujmīl al-Tūmār, which, because of the detail it supplies for the first part of the reign of Sultan Murad III, is of considerable merit.<sup>2</sup>

Seyyid Abū Muḥammad Muṣṭafā bin Ḥasan, called Jenabī (d. 999/1590), in his general work in Arabic, Al I'lām al Zahīr fī Ahwāl al-Awā'il wa 'l Awāhir, included a history of the khans of the Golden Horde

<sup>1</sup> Abd ur Raḥmān Şeref, "Özdemiroğlu 'Osman Paşa," TOEM, <sup>IV/21-24 pp and V/25</sup> Nos. 21-25 pp. 1-12. \* Other works composed in eulogy of various individuals connected with the Caucasian War include:

- a) Abū Bakr ibn 'Abdullah, Özdemiroğlu 'Osman Paşa'nın Dağıstan ve Şirvan Seferleri (Istanbul, Millet Ktp., Emiri Ms. No. 366) 26 f.
- b) Rahimizade İbrahim Çavuş, called Harimi, Genjine-i Feth-i Gence (Istanbul Univ. Ktp. Ms. No. 2372) 159 f. - a work in rhymed verse dealing with Ferhad Paşa and the Georgian Campaign. The writer was a member of the Gurebā cavalry unit. Some quotations from this work appear in 'Abd ur Raḥmān Şeref, loc.cit., No. 25.
- c) Ta'likī-zāde Mehmed Şubhī, Murādname (Istanbul, Topkapı Revān ktp. ms. no. 1299) 59 f. - a description of the exploits of Ferhad Pasha and 'Osman Pasha during the Eastern campaign, by the Şāhnāmejī who succeeded Lukmān (see below).
- d) By the same author as (c), Gurjistan Seferi (Topkapı Revān Ktp. ms. no. 1300), f. 33.
- e) Şeyh Muḥammad Vefa'ī, Tevārīh-i Gazavāt-i Sultān Murād (Vienna, Nat. Bibl., ms. no. 1031) f. 175.

For further details, consult Levend, op.cit., 86 ff, and Babinger, Geschichtsschreiber, 116-117.

<sup>2</sup> London, Brit. Mus. ms. no. Or. 1135, which is described in Rieu, op.cit., 54 f. and Babinger, Geschichtsschreiber, 164 ff.



and of the Crimea from the reign of Batu until the year 1587. From the extract of this work available in the British Museum, it is clear that Jenabī relied on Ḥafīz Muḥammad Al Taşkendi, Şeyh Ahmad bin 'Arabşāh, Abū'l Fedā' and, for the period relevant to this study, the "'Ulemā'-i ehl-i Deşt" (Ulema of the peoples of the steppe). Jenabī spent most of his life as a muderris <sup>(~ teacher)</sup> in the leading medreses <sup>(schools for the study of Islamic Sciences)</sup> of the Ottoman Empire. His work was brief but highly concentrated and was, consequently, used repeatedly by most Turkish chroniclers who dealt with the history of the Kipçak steppe after him, notably Mehemmed bin Mehemmed el Edirnevi and Munejjimbāşī.<sup>1</sup> The work of Jenabī, however, was of little use <sup>for this study</sup> because it extends only to 1587.

The extremely factual and very valuable work, in diary style, by the Rūznamejī Muştafā, called Selānikī (d. ca. 1599), is concerned with the events of the period 1563 to 1599. It has, however, only been available in the printed version which carries the narration up to October, 1592.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>London, Brit. Mus., Arabic Mss. Suppl. no. Or. 1671, f. 295b-309a. Cf., Inalcik, "Yeni Vesikalara göre Kirim Hanlığı....", loc.cit., 187, N. 5. Complete Mss. of this history are to be found in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, Nos. 657-8 and 785-6. For further details about Mehemmed bin Mehemmed and Munejjimbāşī, see below, pp. 21 and 24.

<sup>2</sup>Tārīh-i Selānikī (Istanbul, 1281); an MS. of this work in 446 folios is preserved in the Bibl. Natl. Suppl. turc no. 1060 acc. to E. Blochet, Catalogue des Manuscrits Turcs (Paris, 1933), vol. II, p. 149 f.; Cf. also, Babinger, op.cit., p. 136 f. and Hammer, Geschichte III, 750; IV, pp. 180, 185, 243, 435; IX, p. 202.

Meḥammed bin Meḥammed (d. 1050/1640) prepared a general history from the birth of <sup>the Prophet</sup> Muḥammad to the year 1028/1617 entitled Muḥbe ul-Tevāriḥ ve'l Ahbār in two different renditions: the first, dedicated to Sultan 'Osman I in 1620 and the second, greatly enlarged version, to Sultan Murad IV.<sup>1</sup> Hajjī Ḥalfa seems to have dismissed this work as a mere copy of Jenabī.<sup>2</sup> This judgment seems to apply to the first part of Meḥammed bin Meḥammed's work.<sup>3</sup>

While the historians already mentioned have much to say about the Caucasian Campaigns, the War with Persia and the events leading up to the War in Hungary, it is the historical work by Ḥasanbegzāde (d. 1046/1636)<sup>4</sup> which lays the foundation for the history writing of the era commencing with the year 1000/1591-2 and extending well into the seventeenth century. Appropriately, Ḥasanbegzāde Ahmed Pasha started his career as a Dīvān Kātibī (Secretary to the Dīvān) about 1590 and consecutively took up different official positions in the retinues of the leading dignitaries of his time, such as the Grand Vezir Ibrāhīm Pasha, Satūrjī Meḥammed Paşa,

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<sup>1</sup> Geschichtsschreiber  
Babinger, op.cit., 182 f.

<sup>2</sup> Rieu, op.cit., 30-31 describes Ms. Or. 31 of the British Museum which is a copy of the first rendition.

<sup>3</sup> Meḥammed bin Meḥammed and Peçewi apparently have borrowed from the same sources on occasion; Cf. for example, the description of the Battle of Çildir by 'Ali, Nusratnāme, f. 70a with that of Meḥammed bin Meḥammed, op.cit., f. 241b and Peçewi, Tārīḥ (Istanbul, 1283) II, p.40.

<sup>4</sup> M. Cavid Daysun, "Ḥasanbeyzade Ahmed Paşa," Türkiyat Meḥmuasī, X (1953), pp. 321-340; Babinger, op.cit., p.174.

Grand Vezir Yemīşçī Ḥasan Pasha and Grand Vezir Yavuz 'Alī Pasha. It is known also that towards the end of his life, Ḥasanbegzade held high positions in the hierarchy of the finance department, was Beglerbeg of Kaffa for a time and possibly became Re'īs ul-Kuttāb.<sup>1</sup> His historical work, Tārīḥ-i Al-i 'Osman,<sup>2</sup> which narrates the principal events in Ottoman history to 1032-/1622-23, is particularly valuable for detail accounts of the Hungarian War in which the Crimean Tatars took an active part. The reliability of the work recommended itself so well to Peçewī (1061/1650), Ḥajjī Halfa (d. 1067/1657) and Na'imā (1128/1716) that they made appreciable extracts from it and, by giving credit to the original, spread the fame of the work and its compiler. These last three writers, in particular, might well be described as members of the historical school of Ḥasanbegzade.

Ibrāhīm Efendī, called Peçewī (d. ca. 1061/1650),<sup>3</sup> was related, on his mother's side, to the powerful Sokollū family whose patronage he enjoyed most of his life. His historical work, to some extent at least, reflects his lifelong attachment to this Bosnian noble family.<sup>4</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup> <sup>loc. cit</sup> Baysun, Ibid. The Re'īs was literally "chief of scribes" and in charge of the Chancery.

<sup>2</sup> Istanbul, Nūr-u 'Osmaniyye Ms No. 3105/06.

<sup>3</sup> After the Turkish name of his place of origin; Cf., F. von Kraelitz, "Der osmanische Historiker Ibrahim Pecewi," Der Islam VIII (1918), p. 252.

<sup>4</sup> Tārīḥ-i Peçewī (Istanbul, 1281-83) II, pp. 36, 41-42, 57, 62, etc. Professor P. Wittek, in his seminar on Ottoman texts, first pointed out to me this quality of the Peçewi chronicle.

Tārīh, written in a more popular style than the work of Ḥasanbegzāde, is at its best when Peçewī describes the personal incidents which he experienced during his ~~lifelong~~ career in the military and administrative hierarchy of the Ottoman State. Most noteworthy, for the purposes of this study, are the details he provides about the life of the Crimean Khan, Gāzī Girāy, with whom he was on intimate terms during the Hungarian War. Peçewī's Chronicle, which commences with the accession of <sup>Sultan</sup> Sulaymān (1520) and concludes with the death of Murad IV (1639), makes use of a wide range of sources. Von Kraelitz has designated the principal works from which Peçewī drew his information for the period of Sulaymān's reign.<sup>1</sup> In the period of the Caucasian War commencing in 1578, Peçewī frequently quotes from Ḥasanbegzāde, 'Alī Efendī, and the Risāle-i Bābiyye of 'Azīz Mālik.<sup>2</sup>

Another author of importance, Muṣṭafā bin 'Abdullah, called Hājji Halfa, or often "Kātib Çelebī" (d. 1067/1657), was born in 1609.<sup>3</sup> During the period of his active government service he worked in the financial administration but remained enrolled in the Silāhdār corps, to which his father had belonged. These posts in the financial administration kept him almost constantly in the field with the Ottoman armies until 1635. Thereafter he was able, because of an inheritance, to devote himself al-

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<sup>1</sup> Of particular interest is Peçewī's use of the Hungarian sources of Kaspar Heltai and Isthvanfi, cf. Von Kraelitz, loc.cit., 258.

<sup>2</sup> Tārīh II, 51, 93, 155; The work by 'Azīz Mālik (Tarikh II, 78) is unknown to me.

<sup>3</sup> Babinger, Geschichtsschreiber, 195.

most exclusively to historical pursuits until the end of his life.<sup>1</sup>

In 1051/1641 Kātib Çelebî completed a world history in Arabic from the Days of Creation to his own time, entitled Fazlaka Aqwāl al-Ahbār fī 'ilm al-Tārīh wa'l Ahbār, which was translated into Ottoman Turkish.

A continuation of this same encyclopaedic work, written in Ottoman Turkish, encompassing the years 1000/1592 to 1065/1654, because of its detail, adds considerably to our knowledge of the period.<sup>2</sup> Kātib Çelebî, without question, has access to information on Ġazî Girāy which no other historian has mentioned.<sup>3</sup>

Ahmed bin Luṭfullah, called Munejjimbāşî (d.1113/1702), as his Mahlas (a pen name) implies, was court astronomer under Sultan Mehmed IV during the years 1078-1099/1667-1683. At this time he prepared a general history in Arabic, Jami' al-Duwāl, consisting of two volumes on the period from Adam to 1083/1672, based upon seventy Turkish, Persian and Arabic sources. Ahmed Nedim translated the work into Ottoman Turkish between 1720 and 1730, and it was later published under a different title,

<sup>1</sup>J. H. Mordtmann, art. "Hajjî Khalifa," E.I.<sup>1</sup>, II, 204 ff.

<sup>2</sup>The Arabic original is apparently lost (Ibid), but Ottoman Turkish Ms. copies are available in many Istanbul libraries. The oldest recension (1085/1674) appears to be preserved in the Hekimoğlu Ali Pasa Library, ms. no. 785, 295 folios. This history has been published in a two volume edition, Fezleke-i Kātib Çelebî (Istanbul, 1286-87). Cf. Maarif Vekillîgi, Istanbul Kütüphaneleri Tarih-Coğrafya Yazmaları Kataloqları, I (Istanbul, 1944), fasc. 2, p. 161.

<sup>3</sup>Thus, for example, he quotes a few verses of historical importance from the Dīvān (collection of poems) of Ġazî Girāy taken from a history by Zihnî Efendî, the Dīvān Kātibî of the Khan. Fezleke, I, p. 96.

<sup>1</sup>  
Şahā'if al Ahbār.

Finally, the work by Muṣṭafā Na'īmā (d. 1128/1716) deserves mention. His Ṣauzāt al Ḥusayn fī Ḥulaṣāt Ahbār al-Hafikayn or simply, Tarih-i Na'īmā<sup>2</sup> is not a history from which much original material may be gained as it was compiled largely from the preceding sources.<sup>3</sup> It does represent, however, the high point of the seventeenth century development in history writing from the point of view of style and composition. Also many obscure events receive lucid expansion. In short, this source provides a relatively balanced account of the events from 1000/1591 to 1070/1659 based on Oriental sources.

4. Persian Sources: As Ġazī Girāy during the early years of the Persian War fell captive to the Safavids and languished some three or four years in the fortress of Alamūt, it was hoped, by having recourse to the contemporary Persian sources, that some details of the earlier life of the Khan might come to light. This quest was rewarded by the discovery

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<sup>1</sup>Istanbul, 1285, 3 vols. Cf. Babinger, Geschichtsschreiber, pp. 234-235. Munejjimbaşı is known to have used all of the standard works for the period in question as well as other lesser known items. Therefore he is considered important for this study. For additional information, see Hammer, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, VII, 545-550; H. Inalcik, "Yeni vesikalara göre Kırım Hanlığı..." loc.cit., 187; and V. Minorsky, Studies in Caucasian History (London, 1953), pp. 3-4.

<sup>2</sup>Istanbul, 1280, 6 vols.

<sup>3</sup>According to Babinger, loc.cit., Na'īmā based his work primarily on Kara Çelebizade, Husayn Wecihi, Ahmed Şarih ul-Menarzade and Hacı Halifa. Cf., also, M. Münir Aktepe, "Naima Tarihi'nin Yazma Nushaları Hakkında," Tarih Dergisi, vol. I, pp. 35-52, for a technical discussion of the Na'īmā Mss.

of a few pertinent details in the Tārīḥ-e 'Ālam-Ārāye 'Abbāsī, which was written by Iskandar Beg Munṣī (d. ca. 1039/1629-30). The writer,<sup>1</sup> who occupied various posts in the Safavid administration from the time of Shah Ismā'īl (d. 985/1577) until after the death of Shah 'Abbās I, composed a history, with background details, of the period from the accession of 'Abbās, the Great, in 995/1587 to his death in 1038/1629.<sup>2</sup>

5. Inscriptions and Coins: In a discussion of the <sup>oriental</sup> ~~Russian~~ sources for the life of Gāzī Girāy Khan, it is also worthy of mention<sup>ing</sup> that two general studies dealing with Crimean Tatar paleography and numismatics have been prepared by A. Barzenko and F. Dombrovskiy<sup>3</sup> and O. Retovskiy,<sup>4</sup> respectively.

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<sup>1</sup>For further details about the life of this writer, see Franz von Erdmann, "Iskender Munschi und Sein Werk", Z.D.M.G., XV (1861), pp. 457-501.

<sup>2</sup>For further details, see the article, "'Abbās I," E.I.<sup>2</sup>, I, pp. 7-8 (Savory).

<sup>3</sup>F. Dombrovskiy and A. Barzensko, "Bakhchesarayskiya arabiskiya i turet-skaya nadpisi", Zapiski odesskago Obshchestva istorii i drevnostey, Vol. II, pp. 489-498 (not useful).

<sup>4</sup>O. Retovskiy, "Die Münzen der Girei", Trudi Moskovskago Numismaticheskago Obshchestva, vols. II (1899-1901), pp. 241-308; III (1903-1905), pp. 10-107, 11 pls. and pp. 187-330, 19 pls. Reprinted: Moscow, 1901-1905, vii + 305 p., 30 pls. (not seen). O. Retovskiy also wrote a special article on the coinage of Gāzī Girāy, "Moneti Gazi-Geraya Khana II ben Devlet", Izvestiya Tavricheskoy Uchenoy Arkhivnoy Komissii (Simferopol', 1889), no. 8. (not useful).

## II SLAVONIC SOURCES<sup>1</sup>

### 1. Russian Sources:

a. Documents: The Tsarskiy Arkhiv (Archive of the Tsar) of Muscovy was sacked during the Time of Troubles at the beginning of the seventeenth century. A portion of this embryo archive found its way to Poland only to be retrieved during the eighteenth century partition of that country. The first quarter of the seventeenth century, after the establishment of the Romanov Dynasty, saw the foundation of the Archive of the Posol'skiy Prikaz (Ambassadorial Department) where a great number of the government documents relating to foreign affairs were then placed. Shortly thereafter, in the year 1626, a portion of this collection was burnt. Thus, this double disaster to the records of the Moscow State limited, to some extent, the amount of historical materials available for preceding periods.<sup>2</sup>

Peter the Great, in his reorganization of the Central administration of the Russian State during the early eighteenth century, formed the

<sup>1</sup>The transcription of the Cyrillic alphabet conforms to the British system as reproduced by W. K. Matthews, "The Latinisation of Cyrillic Characters", Slavonic Review, Vol. XXX(1951-52), pp. 542-543. This survey of the Russian and Polish materials relating to the life of Gazi Giray is largely dependent on printed materials available in England. In the case of the Russian Sources, much use has also been made of sixteenth and seventeenth century Tatar materials which appear in standard Russian histories. The Polish Sources, apart from documents appearing in French or Latin, have been translated for the writer.

<sup>2</sup>I. L. Sherman, Russkie Istoricheskie Istochniki X-XVIII v.v. (Khar'kov, 1959), p. 92 ff.; Cf., also, art. "Posol'skiy Prikaz", Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar' (St. Petersburg, 1898), Vol. XXIV, p. 689.



Kollegiya Inostrannykh Del (Collegium of Foreign Affairs) out of the old Posol'skiy Prikaz.<sup>1</sup> This department in turn became the Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in the early nineteenth century.<sup>2</sup> At the present time the documentary materials from the old Posol'skiy Prikaz, which were housed before the Revolution in the Moskovskiy Glavnyy Arkhiv Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del (The Chief Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), are to be found now in the Tsentral'nyy Gosudarstvennyy Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov (Central Governmental Archive for Old Documents).<sup>3</sup>

The materials within the Posol'skiy Prikaz follow roughly a three-fold classification for each foreign power:

- i) Posol'skie Dela (Ambassadorial Affairs)
- ii) Posol'skie Knigi (Ambassadorial Tomes)
- iii) Stateynie Spiski (Diplomatic Reports)

The "Affairs" consist mainly of instructions to Russian envoys for the conduct of negotiations or directives for the provision and reception of foreign envoys. The "Tomes" contain collections of documents (Gramoty) and treaties (Traktaty). Finally, the "Reports" are extremely-detailed narrative accounts of all activities of missions prepared by the respective

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<sup>1</sup> Cf., art. "Kollegiya Inostrannykh Del", Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar, XV, 695.

<sup>2</sup> Art. "Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del", Ibid., XIX, 361.

<sup>3</sup> Sherman, op.cit., 93.

envoys. Also the "Reports" sometimes contain transcribed accounts of negotiations conducted with foreign envoys in Moscow.<sup>1</sup> These categories are by no means absolute as is illustrated by the correspondence of Ġāzī Girāy with the Tsars of Muscovy assembled by Lashkov and Feyiz Khan from the "Affairs" section.<sup>2</sup> With the exception of certain materials reconstructed from information found in chronicles, all of the following publications are derived from one or more sections of the Archive of the Posol'skiy Prikaz.

The document collections of Belokurov<sup>3</sup> on the relations of Muscovy with the Caucasus, 1578-1613, of Veselovskiy<sup>4</sup> on the relations of Muscovy with Persia, 1588-1616, and of Kumykov<sup>5</sup> concerning Kabardinian Affairs from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, provide much information about the extent of Russian political and economic contacts to the Southeast during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In the Kumykov collection in particular, much material has been reconstructed

<sup>1</sup> Pamyatniki Diplomaticheskikh Snosheniy Drevnoy Rossii s Derzhavami Inostrannymi 1483-1699 (St. Petersburg, 1851), Vol. I, p. i ff.

<sup>2</sup> The documents assembled by Velyaminov-Zernov, Feyiz Khan, <sup>and</sup> Th. Lashkov are described in the section on Oriental documents.

<sup>3</sup> S. A. Belokurov, ed., Snosheniya Rossii s Kavkazom, 1578-1613 (Moscow, 1889).

<sup>4</sup> N. I. Veselovskiy, ed., "Pamyatniki Diplomaticheskikh i Torgovykh Snosheniy Moskovskoy Rusi s Persiey", Trudy Vostochnago Otdeleniya Imperatorskago Russkago Arkheologicheskago Obshchestva, Vols. XX-XXI (1890-92).

<sup>5</sup> T. Kh. Kumykov and E. N. Kusheva, eds., Kabardino-Russkie Otnosheniya v xvi-xviii vv. (Moscow, 1957), 2 vols.

from contemporary chronicles. The selection of Stateynye Sviski by Likhachev<sup>1</sup> provides some information about the early years of Ġāzī Girāy.

Another significant report from this genre of documents is the "Rechi" (~ Relation) of Semen Mal'tsev. It contains information about the Ottoman campaign to Astrakhan in 1569, the first major campaign in which the young Hānzāde Ġāzī Girāy participated.<sup>2</sup>

The Imperial Russian Historical Society published a great quantity of documentary materials pertaining to the diplomatic relations of Muscovy with Poland-Lithuania and England for the period of the Khanship of Ġāzī Girāy,<sup>3</sup> some of which cast light on the Crimean Tatars. A similar collection dealing primarily with relations between Muscovy and the Holy Roman Empire was published by the Chancery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>4</sup>

Finally, as an example of the use which can be made of the documentary materials in the "Crimean Affairs" and the "Crimean Tomes"

<sup>1</sup>D. S. Likhachev, ed., Puteshestviya Russkikh Poslov xvi-xvii vv. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1954).

<sup>2</sup>Cf., P. A. Sadikov, "Pokhod Tatar i Turok na Astrakhan' v 1569 g.", Istoricheskie Zapiski, 22, pp. 132-166.

<sup>3</sup>K. N. Bestyazhev-Ryumin, ed., "Pamyatniki Diplomaticheskikh Snosheniy Moskovskago Gosudarstva s Angliyei 1581-1604" and S. Th. Platonov, ed., "Pamyatniki...s Pol'sko-Litovskim 1598-1615", S.I.R.I.O., Vols. 38 (1883) and 137 (1912) and 142 (1913), respectively.

<sup>4</sup>See p. 29 f/n. 1.

sections of the Posol'skiy Prikaz, attention may be called to the extremely important secondary source of A. A. Novosel'skiy<sup>1</sup> which is based almost exclusively on the documents of this valuable archive. Thus, apart from the actual materials in the Soviet archives, the most important Russian sources for the history of the Crimean Khanate are the document collections mentioned here.

b. Chronicles: According to Professor M. N. Tikhomirov, a leading contemporary scholar of Russian historiography, the significance of chronicles or annals as sources for Russian history declined during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.<sup>2</sup> In the reign of Ivan IV (1533-34), these historical writings assumed the character of official history written in support of the autocratic state. The compilers of these chronicles, because of their dependance on the state, based their works on archival documents selected to illustrate a point of view.<sup>3</sup> This development, of course, also reflected the changing literary tastes of the chroniclers. No longer did the narration of events year by year satisfy them. Thus, such works as the Istoriya o Kazanskom Tsarstve (History of the Kazan Khanate) and the Stepennaya Kniga (The Book of the Successive Reigns),

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<sup>1</sup>Bor'ba Moskovskogo Gosudarstva s Tatarami v pervoy polovine xvii veka (The Struggle of the Moscow State with the Tatars in the first half of the seventeenth century), Moscow-Leningrad, 1948.

<sup>2</sup>M. N. Tikhomirov, Istochnikovedenie Istorii SSSR s Drevneyshikh Vremen do Kontsa xviii v. (Moscow, 1940), p. 129.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 131; Sherman, op.cit., p. 113.

both written under Ivan IV, took one central idea and developed it to a preconceived conclusion. The "History of the Kazan Khanate" traced the origin and development of the Khanate until it fell into Russian hands. The "degrees" (stepen' = degree, state) of the Stepennaya Kniga are the reigns of the illustrious rulers of the Rus from Olga and Vladimir to Ivan IV.<sup>1</sup>

During the sixteenth century, in addition to the Letopis' or chronicle which mainly dealt with the history of Muscovy, there appeared the so-called Khronografy (Chronographs) which were in actuality a form of universal history. They were initially translated from their Byzantine counterparts but in the 16th and 17th centuries received valuable additions and extensions by various writers and became widely circulated. The Novyy Letopisets (New Chronicler) of unknown authorship, a "Chronograph" of early seventeenth century recension, contains a history of Muscovy from the death of Ivan IV (1584) to the reign of Michael Romanov (1613).<sup>2</sup> This history, for example, contains some information on the Crimean Khanate.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately, however, the chronicles, viewed as a whole, contain very little important information about the Crimean Khanate.

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<sup>1</sup>Tikhomirov, p.132 f.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.135 f.

<sup>3</sup>An edition of this text by M. A. Obolenskiy appeared in Moscow, 1853. Another edition is to be found in the monumental series Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh Letopisey (Vol. XIV) (St. Petersburg, 1910).

c. Other Literary Sources: In addition to the documentary and chronological materials, the narrative accounts, known as Povest (Narration), Skazanie (Relation) and Vremennik (Annals), constitute a valuable third classification of sources for the history of Russia during the period of this study. The works of Ivan Timofeev, Averkiy Palitsyn and Knyaz Ivan Mikhaylovich Katyrev-Rostovskiy, and an extract by an unknown writer based on two contemporary manuscripts, all contain a little information about the activities of Ġāzī Girāy.

Timofeev (d. c. 1629),<sup>1</sup> a d'yak or official scribe in the service of the Muscovy State, is known to have served the central government in Moscow between 1598 and 1607 and thereafter in Novgorod, Astrakhan, Varoslavl and Nizhni Novgorod. His work discusses the important events in the history of ~~the Muscovy State~~ from the reign of Tsar Ivan IV (1533-1584) to 1619, but it has disappointingly little to add to our picture of the Crimean Tatars. The author was not only a contemporary observer of the events he describes, he also was well-acquainted with the historical writing of his day, particularly the Russkiy Khronograf and the Stepennaya Kniga, the latter of which he drew upon for his own narration. He also profited from the Zhitie (Life of a Saint) of Nikita Pereyaslavskiy.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Cf., the notes on Timofeev supplied by O. A. Derzhavin for his edition of the text and translation of the Vremennik Ivana Timofeeva (Moscow-Leningrad, 1951), pp. 351-357. This edition also includes information about earlier editions of this work.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., pp. 352-353. The only known recension of the Vremennik, which was formerly retained in the Florishcheva Library, Ms. no. 108/682, is now to be found in Moscow, Lenin Library ms. no. 10692, f. 312.

O. A. Derzhavin and E. V. Kolosova have recently prepared a definitive edition of the Istoriya v Pamyat' Predydushchim Rodom (History in Memory of Preceding Generations) or, simply, Skazanie, of Avraamiy Palitsyn under the editorship of L. V. Cherepnin.<sup>1</sup> This work, which describes the principal events of the history of Muscovy from 1584 to 1619, has long been considered by Russian historians as one of the important compilations dealing with the troubled events of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.<sup>2</sup> The compiler, Averkiy Palitsyn, called Avraamiy (d. 1627), was born near Rostov Yaroslavskiy. Little is known about his early life but, in the 1500's, he was the voévode (provincial governor) of Kola. He fell from grace in 1588, suffered the confiscation of his possessions, and soon became consecrated as a monk. He was not heard of again until his implication in a plot, organized by the Shuiskys, to weaken the influence of Boris Godunov over Tsar Fedor. As a result of

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<sup>1</sup>Skazanie Avraamiya Palitsyna (Moscow-Leningrad, 1955). This edition is based on the eight earliest-known recensions of the work (Ibid., 64).

<sup>2</sup>Of the eight mss. mentioned in <sup>§. n. 1, above</sup> ~~note no. 81~~, the ms. of the Moscow Ecclesiastical Academy, no. 175, f. 368, now preserved in the Lenin Library and the ms. collection of Zabelin, no. 446/641, preserved in the State Historical Museum in Moscow, occupy a special position. They represent two variants of the same, and probably the earliest, recension of the Skazanie. By means of an excellent piece of detective work, Professor Derzhavin has shown that the first six chapters of the two mss. just mentioned, which cover the events of the years 1584 to 1606, must have been copied from another author, possibly from one of the most learned men of the Muscovy of that time, Dionisiy Zobninovskiy (d. 1633) archmandrite of the Troitsa-Sergiev Monastery from 1610 to 1616. Ibid., 34-37.

his complicity Avraamiy again lost his worldly goods and this time was also banished, only to be pardoned after the accession of Boris (1598). Palitsyn chose not to take part in the government of Godunov. He spent some time at the Troitsa-Sergiev Monastery until he received his former possessions in 1600. In 1608, after Vasilii Shuiskiy had been on the throne two years, Palitsyn, an old supporter of Shuisky interests, was assigned to the position of cellarer in the Troitsa-Sergiev Monastery. Henceforth, he was a close associate of Tsar Vasilii and, by reason of his position as provisioner of the wealthiest monastery of Muscovy, he was able to give him much support and assistance.<sup>1</sup> In 1610 he was among the dignitaries in an embassy sent to Smolensk to propitiate Sigismund III. He very suddenly lost his post in 1619 upon the return from Poland of Metropolitan Filaret, father of the Tsar. This change of circumstance gives considerable credence to Derzhavin's premise that the political activities of Palitsyn during the interregnum and the Polish intervention were not above suspicion and certainly not acceptable to the Romanovs. It was probably between 1620 and Avraamiy's death that the Skazanie was completed.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Skazanie, pp. 16-63, passim.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., passim.



The text of the Povest'<sup>1</sup> by Prince Ivan Mikhaylovich Katyrev-Rostovskiy (d. 1640)<sup>2</sup> was preserved for posterity by its incorporation into the Khronograf of Sergey Kubasov. About the author little is known except that he was a nobleman of Muscovy originating in Rostov.

Finally, of interest for its information concerning the period of this study is the selection entitled Stat'i o Smute (Articles about the Disturbance)<sup>3</sup>, which is based on the conflation of two manuscripts and the continuation of the Stepennaya Kniga by an unknown author and the Khronograf of Kubasov written in 1617.<sup>4</sup>

In the light of this brief survey of Russian historical materials for the period encompassing the lifetime of Ġāzī Girāy, the Russian documentary materials found in various collections and in important secondary works, as distinct from the chronicles and other literary materials, constitute the best Russian sources available for the study of the Crimean Tatars.

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<sup>1</sup>The Imperatorskaya Arkheograficheskaya Kommissiya (I.A.K.) in its series, Russkaya Istoricheskaya Biblioteka, Vol. XIII, published the Pamyatniki Drevney Russkoy Pis'mennosti, Otnosyashchiesya k Smutnomu Vremeni (St. Petersburg, 1891) in which two different versions of the Povest' are printed:

- a) pp. 559-624, from the Khronograf of Sergey Kubasov which was preserved, until the Revolution, in the Imperial Public Library, Q, IV, ms. no. 154;
- b) pp. 625-712, a collated text version from five copies of the second.

Cf. the above-mentioned source, pp. xix-xxii, for further details about these manuscripts.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., xx and V. O. Klyuchevskiy, Boyarskaya Duma Drevney Rusi, 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1883), p. 360 N.

<sup>3</sup>This selection also appears in the I.A.K. series, XIII, pp. 1273-1322 (see note 1 above.)

<sup>4</sup>The continuation of the Stepennaya Kniga is to be found in the Library of the Academy of Sciences, ms. no. 32, f. 2315; the Khronograf, in the Moscow Synodical Library, ms. no. 135, f. 445 (not seen).

2. Polish Sources: The Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki collection of documents relative to the history of Roumania contains three volumes of Polish archival material in Latin or Polish (with French translations) which provide a wealth of information about the activities of Ġāzī Girāy in <sup>the Danubian Principalities</sup> ~~Roumeny~~ and Transylvania during the Hungarian War, 1593-1606.<sup>1</sup> The Scriptores Rerum Polonicarum, published by the Historical Commission of the Academy of Sciences, University of Cracow, contains documents, letters and memoirs pertinent to the life of Ġāzī Girāy.<sup>2</sup> A valuable description of the Crimean Tatars comes to us from the work of Marcin Broniowski, an envoy of Stephan Bathory, who was sent to the court of Mehemmed Girāy in 1579.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Documente privitoare la istoria romanilor (Bucharest, 1876-1922), 19 vols.; Supplement II (3 vols) collected by G. G. Tocilescu and A. J. Odobescu, contains the principal collection of Polish documents. Other Polish documents, mainly in their German and Italian versions, appear in other volumes.

<sup>2</sup> Scriptores Rerum Polonicarum (Cracow, 1872-1917), 22 vols; Vol. VIII "Listy Jana Zamoyskiego" (Letters of Jan Zamoyski), Vol. XX "Dziaryusz Sejmu R. 1597" (Diary of the Diet for the Year 1597) and Vol. XXII "Swietoslawa Orzelskiego Bezkrölewia Ksiąg Osmioro 1572-1576" (Eight Books on the Interregnum by Swietoslaw Orzelski, 1572-1576) were useful for this study. Many of the letters in Vol. VIII appear in the Hurmuzaki collection; Vol. XX contains some documents in German translation.

<sup>3</sup> His work, Tartariae Descriptio... (Coloniae Agrippinae, 1595) in Latin has been available to me in the selections of Samuel Purchas, Purchas his Pilgrimes, Part 3 (London, 1625). Another edition of this selection appeared in Glasgow, 1906, Vol. XIII, pp. 461-491. For similar ambassadorial reports during the reign of Ġāzī Girāy, see Kazimir Pulaski, "Trzy Poselstwa Lawryna Piaseczynskiego do Kazi Gireja, hana Tatarow perekopskich (1601-1603)", Przewodnik naukowy i literacki (Leopol, 1911). (not seen) There are, however, five letters dealing with the Embassy of Lawryn Piaseczynski included in the Mikolaj Malinowski and Alexander Przezdziecki collection which is entitled Zrzedla do Dziejów Polskich, Vol. II (Vilna, 1844), pp. 161-165. Also, for a survey of Polish relations with both Ottomans and Tatars, see J. Bartoszewicz, Poglad na stosunki Polski z Turcyą i Tatarami... (Warsaw, 1860).

There is, in addition to the materials just mentioned, a very important group of documents, a biography and a chronicle, all of which are closely connected with the life of Jan Zamoyski, Grand Chancellor of Poland (1542-1605), one of the important figures of the era in which Ġazī Girāy Khan lived. The documents, in addition to the ones in volume VIII of the Scriptores Rerum Polonicarum are to be found in an, as yet, incomplete series edited by Waclaw Sobieski and others.<sup>1</sup> The biography<sup>2</sup> and the chronicle<sup>3</sup> were both written by Reinhold Heidenstein, who served as Secretary to Zamoyski, as a diplomat for the Kings Stephen Bathory and Sigismund (Vasa)<sup>4</sup>, as well as secretary to the latter king. One other item deserves mention as a part of the materials relating to Zamoyski. This is a letter sent by the Chancellor to Cardinal Aldobrandini, which discusses in great detail the route to Hungary taken by the Tatars in 1594.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Archivum Jana Zamoyskiego (Warsaw, 1904...1949) 4 vols.

<sup>2</sup> The Vitae Joannis Zamoyscii (Posnan, 1861) apparently was never published until this late date.

<sup>3</sup> Reinholdi Heidensteinii Secretarii Regii Rerum Polonicarum ab excessu Sigismundi Augusti Libri XII (Frankfurt a/M, 1672), a chronicle of events from 1572 to 1603, also was published after the death of Heidenstein.

<sup>4</sup> Wielka Ilustrowana Encyklopedia Powszechna, Vol. VI, p. 119.

<sup>5</sup> De Transitu Tartarorum per Pecu'tiam, Anni M.D.XCIIII. Epistola Ad Illustrissimum et Reverendissimum Dominum Cynthium, S.R.E. TIT. S. Georgii Cardinalem Aldobrandinum: Ab Illustrissimo Dimino Ioan. de Zamoscio, R.P. Supremo Cancellario, et Exercituum Generali missa. (Danzig, 1595)

All of the materials taken from these Polish sources make significant contributions to the history of the Crimean Tatars in this study.

### III WESTERN SOURCES

1. Documents: The documentary materials for the life of Ġāzī Girāy which are available in Western European sources<sup>1</sup> consist of the following types:

- a. Collections of Official Exchanges between governments or heads of state;
- b. Periodical Reports and Correspondence of ambassadors or other officials residing in the Ottoman Empire;
- c. News-letters sent to governments or commercial firms by their agents stationed in Eastern Europe and Western Asia.

The most important single collection of documents for this study is the Documente Privitoare la Istoria Românilor, compiled under the direction of Eudoxin de Hurmuzaki. It was Hurmuzaki's intention to collect from the archives of Europe all of the materials relating to the history of Roumania. By conceiving this project in the broadest terms possible, the compiler included many important documents dealing with the history of the Crimean Khanate, the eastern neighbor of Wallachia and Moldavia. In particular, the Hurmuzaki collection provides important documentation for the Wallachian revolt of 1595 and for subsequent events

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<sup>1</sup>I have had to limit my research in this section to materials in English, French, German and Italian. In those instances where I have considered a Latin source to be of importance for this study, I have obtained translations of the relevant passages.

involving the Ottomans, Poles and Tatars.<sup>1</sup>

A. Veress edited the Fontes Rerum Transylvanicarum,<sup>2</sup> a collection of documents in five volumes, mostly in Latin, dealing with the affairs of Transylvania. While this collection provides interesting information about the period in question, it sheds very little light on the life of the Crimean Khan.

The Documente Privitoare la Istoria Ardealului, Moldavei și Țării-Românești,<sup>3</sup> by the same editor, contains useful materials. Dr. Veress has also collected the letters and acts (*Epistolae et Acta*)<sup>4</sup> of Georgio Basta (d. 1612), the Albanian nobleman, who served as a field commander for the Emperor in Northern Hungary and Transylvania during the Hungarian War.<sup>5</sup> Finally, an article by Dr. Veress on the campaign of Kōja Sinān Pasha in 1595 contains additional letters.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Documente Privitoare... (Bucharest, 1876-1922), 19 vols. The documents are arranged by date in each volume, and they extend from the Middle Ages to the Nineteenth Century. Of particular importance in this collection are Vols. III, IV, VIII and XI, which consist, in the main, of documents drawn from the archives of the Italian City-States and the Holy Roman Empire. The two valuable supplements are as follows:

Suppl. I - the French Archives (collected by N. Iorga)  
(Bucharest 1886) 1 vol.

Suppl. II - the Polish Archives (collected by G. G. Tocilescu  
and A. J. Odobescu) (Bucharest 1893, 1895) 2 vols.

<sup>2</sup>Fontes Rerum Transylvanicarum (Budapest, 1911-1916), 5 vols.

Acte și Scrieri

<sup>3</sup>Particularly, Vols. IV-VIII (1593-1613) (Bucharest, 1932-1935).

<sup>4</sup>E. Veress, Epistolae et Acta Generalis Georgii Basta (1597-1607), Vol. I (1597-1602), Monumenta Hungariae Historica, Diplomataria, Vol. XXXIV (Budapest, 1909).

<sup>5</sup>For a good summary of the life of Basta, see the article "Basta", Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, Vol. II (Leipzig, 1875), p. 131.

<sup>6</sup>"Campania Creștinilor în Contra Lui Sinan Pașa Din 1595", Academia Română, Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice, Ser. III/IV, (Budapest, 1925), pp. 1 - 84.

The Calendar of State Papers Foreign Series of the Reign of Elizabeth, July, 1577 - July, 1589, contain a certain amount of data relevant to this study.<sup>1</sup> As the "Foreign Series" of the Calendar thus far extends to the year 1589 it has also been necessary to consult the original materials preserved in the Public Record Office of Edward Barton, Sir Henry Lello<sup>2</sup> and Sir Thomas Glover, the English representatives residing in Constantinople during the khanship of Ġāzī Girāy.<sup>3</sup>

E. Charriere has also assembled an important number of documents from the French Archives. They consist mainly of the despatches of the French ambassadors from Constantinople up to the year 1589.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Calendar of State Papers Vols. IX-XXIII (London, 1901-1950), edited by A. J. Butler, S. C. Lomas, A. B. Hinds and R. B. Wernham.

<sup>2</sup> <sup>Report</sup> The ~~despatches~~ of Lello <sup>has</sup> have been edited by O. Burian, "The Report of Lello" Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları No. 83 (Ankara, 1952), 80 pp.

<sup>3</sup> Public Record Office, State Papers 97/Bundles 2-6.

<sup>4</sup> Négociations de la France dans le Levant (Paris, 1848-1860), 4 vols. Many of these documents were reprinted in the Hurmuzaki collection, Supplement I. A portion of the papers of François Savary de Breves, French ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, 1589-1605 and a great number of the despatches of Jean de Gontaut-Biron, Baron de Salignac, ambassador to the Sultan between 1605 and 1610, have been printed, and they comprise a valuable supplement to the Charriere collection. F. B. Savary de Breves, Relation des Voyages (Paris, 1623) and Discours abrégé.... (Paris, 1666). J. de Gontaut Biron, Baron de Salignac, "Ambassade en Turquie, 1605 a 1610", Comité d'Histoire et d'Archeologie de la Province Ecclesiastique d'Auch (Paris, 1888-1889), Fasc. 16, 19, 2 vols.

The Alberi and Barozzi-Berchet collections of Relazioni<sup>1</sup> or  
(sing., Bailo)  
Reports of the Venetian Baili and related materials, such as the various  
editions of the Thesoro Politico,<sup>2</sup> provide interesting reports of the  
Ottoman scene, during the life-time of Gāzī Girāy.

The News-Letters or Zeitungen, which became so prevalent in Western  
Europe during the latter part of the sixteenth century, have received con-  
siderable attention as sources for the period. Although some of the  
Zeitungen were based on hearsay, dubious reports and rumours, they  
derived more often from eye-witnesses of contemporary events or well-  
placed informants in government or business circles. Ambassadors, Priests,  
spies and commercial agents gathered information and passed it on to their  
respective centres or superiors where it was used as a basis for policy  
decisions. In the sixteenth century the dissemination of news, which  
had previously taken place by messenger, rumour and gossip, was possible  
on a larger scale than previously as a result of the application of the  
printing press to the printing of news items.<sup>3</sup> The Easter and Autumn

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<sup>1</sup> E. Alberi, ed., Le Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato durante il secolo decimosesto (Florence, 1839-1863), Series III, Vols. I-III; N. Barozzi and G. Berchet, Le Relazioni degli Stati Europei lette al Senato dagli Ambasciatori Veneti nel secolo decimo settimo (Venice, 1856-1878), Series V, Parts 1 and 2.

<sup>2</sup> C. Ventura, ed., Thesoro Politico (Cologne, 1589); F. Romanci (?), ed., La Terza Parte del Tesoro Politico (Turnoni, 1605); Del Tesoro politico la Parte terza e quarta (Frankfurt a/M, 1612); Tresor politique (Paris, 1611).

<sup>3</sup> At first, with the development of postal services, handwritten Zeitungen became current. In fact, the word postmaster, for a time, became synonymous with that of Zeitung (writer) as postmasters often exchanged information. In those cities where many post roads converged, such as at Nürnberg and Leipzig, it was not long before handwritten Zeitungen appeared. The rather ordinary news of the postmasters was not, however,  
(cont.)



Fairs at Frankfurt-on-the-Main became excellent centres for the distribution of Zeitungen, fliegende Blätter and related news reports.<sup>1</sup>

The great commercial family of Fugger had its own information service and distributed extracts from the reports of its agents to a select group of burghers and princely families.<sup>2</sup> To gain some idea of the extent and variety of these pamphlet-type news reports circulating in the sixteenth century, it is necessary to consult some comprehensive listing of these materials such as has been compiled by K. M. Kertbeny. Kertbeny has a special section of reports dealing with the Hungarian War.<sup>3</sup>

The next stage in the process of disseminating current news took place in the last decades of the sixteenth century. The fliegende Blätter, Zeitungen, and hand-written reports became incorporated into tracts covering periods of six months or longer. Freiherr Michael von Aitzing was one of the first writers to compile Zeitungen covering a

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(cont.)

held in such esteem as that from other sources. Cf., F. Stieve, "Über die ältesten halbjährigen Zeitungen oder Messrelationen und in besondere über deren Begründer Freiherrn Michael von Aitzing", Abhandlungen der Historischen Classe der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften Vol. XVI (Munich, 1883), pp. 177-182.

<sup>1</sup>See the description of this bi-annual event in the contemporary account of Henri Estienne, first printed in 1574: The Frankfort Book Fair, original Latin with English translation and notes by James Westfall Thompson (Chicago, 1911), particularly pp. 169 ff.

<sup>2</sup>Cf., H. A. H. Fitzler, "Die Entstehung der Sogenannten Fuggerzeitungen in der Wiener Nationalbibliothek", Veröffentlichungen des Wiener Hofkammerarchivs, Vol. II (Vienna, 1937), pp. 1-81.

<sup>3</sup>K. M. Kertbeny, "Ungarn betreffende deutsche Erstlings-Drucke, 1454-1600", Bibliografie der ungarischen nationalen und internationalen Literatur, Vol. I (Budapest, 1880), pp. 17-758.

six month period. Von Aitzing had lost his position as Hofdiener upon the accession of Rudolph II in 1576. Until then, he had desultorily pursued law studies in the Netherlands and had published short works in which he calculated the coming of the Day of Judgment. He was widely traveled and knew the important Western European languages of his day. After he had lost the patronage of the Hapsburgs, he had to replace the income he had enjoyed as Hofdiener with a more profitable venture than his previous ones. In 1581 he settled in Cologne; at the end of the year he produced the Leo Belgicus, a narration in Latin of the principal events in the history of the Netherlands from 1559 to 1581.<sup>1</sup> In the subsequent editions Von Aitzing carried the narration forward and made some revisions. In 1583 he brought out the Relatio Historica in German based on the subject matter of the Leo. This work was then translated into Latin by Michael van Isselt, an associate of Von Aitzing from the Netherlands.<sup>2</sup> Von Aitzing then began adding supplements to his basic work at regular six month intervals to correspond with the Easter and Autumn Fairs in Frankfurt. In this matter, he originated the Mess-relationen or bi-annual fair gazettes. In 1590 Von Aitzing started publishing a revised version of his Relatio. This work became valuable as a source for contemporary events because of its greater accuracy and fuller quotations of documents. Von Aitzing died in 1598.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Stieve, loc.cit., pp. 198-201; The Leo was published in Latin.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 213-214; this same Van Isselt under the pseudonym of D. M. Janssonius started publishing his own edition of the Relatio Historica in Latin under the title of Mercurius Gallobelgicus in 1596.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 215 ff.

Even by 1590 Von Aitzing, as a result of the success of his enterprise, had had many imitators. Some of them retained the strictly chronological approach of Von Aitzing; others modified their accounts, treating their subject matter chronologically by country. Von Aitzing, a liberal Catholic, had treated his source materials with considerable impartiality. The collectors and compilers of Zeitungen who followed him may be divided into those of Catholic and those of Protestant bias. Many of these successors, Catholic or Protestant, had no qualms about borrowing Von Aitzing's title, the emblem on his title page (Mercury poised on top of the Globe) or even his name. Typical of Catholic imitators of Von Aitzing are William Riephan, Caspar von Lorch and the aforementioned Van Isselt. William Riephan, a collaborator of Von Aitzing in the early part of the 1590's, started printing a separate Relatio in 1595.<sup>1</sup>

Commencing in 1596 Michael van Isselt, under the pseudonym D. M. Jansonius, started published the Mercurius Gallobelgicus in Latin.<sup>2</sup> The first volume contained a survey of events in the 1580's and gave information in detail after 1590. In 1598, the year of Von Aitzing's death, the editorship of the Mercurius passed to Caspar von Lorch (Gaspere Lorchano). Thereafter, the Mercurius was printed in Frankfurt rather than in Cologne.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. for example, Riephan's Kurze Warhaftte, und Eigentliche Historische Beschreibung (Cologne, 1596).

<sup>2</sup>See above, p. 45 note 2.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 222 f.; Cf., also, Mercurius Gallobelgicus Vol. IV (Frankfurt, 1598).

~~Already~~ In the early part of the 1590's, particularly among Protestant readers in North Germany, the writings of Jacobus Francus (Conrad Lautenbach) (d. 1595) were becoming very popular. Perhaps the most important Relatio of this Protestant clergyman of Frankfurt, who compiled his materials in secret, was his five-year chronicle, January, 1591 - August, 1594.<sup>1</sup> His historical accounts were strictly of the bi-annual fair variety. After his passing, the Relatio continued to appear until the death of his printer, Paul Brachfeld in 1599.<sup>2</sup> Sigismund Latomus, collaborating with Theodor Meurer, continued using the name of Jacobus Francus for a time after 1599. Later, however, Meurerius gained greater fame in his own right than had either Von Aitzing or Francus.<sup>3</sup>

This brief sketch of the Zeitungen and Nessrelationen might well serve as an introduction to one form of western European historiography in the early seventeenth century. The bourgeoisie in the late sixteenth century, made self-conscious by the upheavals of the Reformation, followed the inter-Christian religious wars and the war against the Ottoman Turks with avid attention. Many of the Relationes made contributions to the knowledge of Ottoman and Tatar activities in Hungary and Transylvania. Basically, Von Aitzing made his reputation narrating the events of the Wars &

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<sup>1</sup>Relatio Historica Quinquennalis ... von Anno 1590 bis 1595 (Frankfurt a/M, 1596).

<sup>2</sup>Stieve, loc.cit., 224-227.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 229.

in the Netherlands. Riephan, Francus and Meurerius drew upon current reports of the long Hungarian War to fill the pages of their Messrelationen. From these accounts, it was just one more step to the chronicles of the period which, in their turn, <sup>were</sup> often copies from the foregoing materials and, occasionally, <sup>received</sup> ~~added~~ fresh accounts of the war and additional documents. Generally speaking, they also enjoyed a somewhat better perspective than the year to year compilations. As a source for the history of the Hungarian War of 1593-1606, the Zeitungen and Messrelationen are representative of a kind of on-the-spot reporting of events which can be compared with the reports of war correspondents in our own day. ~~There-~~  
~~fore~~ They often provide a wealth of detail about otherwise obscure events, but they are also filled with rumours and conflicting accounts and, therefore, must be used with caution.<sup>1</sup>

2. Chronicles and Histories: Such chronicles as those of H. Ortelius, N. Isthvanfi, J. Decsi and Cesare Campana in varying degree draw upon the previously mentioned Zeitungen and their derivatives. Hieronymus Ortelius (d. 1614), who <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ born in Augsburg in 1524, rose to become a Procurator and Notary to the Imperial Court. In later life, as a Protestant and a defender of the Confession of Augsburg, he was banished from the Hapsburg territories (1580) during the reign of Rudolph II. He then took up residence in <sup>N</sup>urnberg and, upon the suggestion of his brother-in-law, wrote

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<sup>1</sup> The frequent <sup>accounts</sup> ~~reports~~ in the Zeitung literature <sup>which report</sup> ~~about~~ the death of the Khan provide an example of one form of wishful thinking which one finds in these despatches.

his chronicle which was based on eyewitness accounts, descriptions and tracts of contemporaries. His access to such sources, and particularly to the Zeitungen, was made easier by the connections of his brother-in-law, Johannes Sibmacher, ~~who was~~ a famous copper-plate engraver and the publisher of the book of heraldry named after him.<sup>1</sup>

The Hungarian writers Janos Decsi (d. 1611)<sup>2</sup> and Nicolaus Isthvanfi (d. 1615)<sup>3</sup> experienced the Hungarian War and wrote their histories shortly after its conclusion. Decsi, a philologist and scholar of international reputation, wrote a history of Hungary from 1592 to 1598.<sup>4</sup> Isthvanfi, a Hungarian nobleman who had studied languages in Pavia and <sup>Bologna</sup> ~~^~~, won favour at the court of Maximilian II and, during the reign of Rudolph II, was charged with negotiating a peace with the Ottoman Turks during the long Hungarian War. Later in life, as a reward for his services, he was appointed vice palatine of Hungary. It was then that he compiled his history.<sup>5</sup> As a man of affairs, who doubtless possessed many private papers of historical merit, Isthvanfi was able to write an important account of

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<sup>1</sup>Chronologia oder Historische Beschreibung aller Kriegsenporungen und Belägerungen .... so in Ober und Under Ungarn auch Sibenbürgen mit dem Turcken von Ao. 1395 biss auff gegenwertige Zeitt. ... (Nürnberg, 1602) A second edition appeared in Nürnberg, 1620-1622 and a Dutch edition came out in Amsterdam, 1619. Cf. also art. "Ortelius", Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, Vol. 24, (Leipzig, 1887), pp. 445-446.

<sup>2</sup>Information on Decsi in other languages than Hungarian is scanty indeed, see the article, "Decsi (Juan)", Enciclopedia Universal Illustrada Europeo-Americana, Vol. 17. (Barcelona, N.D.), p. 1250.

<sup>3</sup>Article, "Isthvanfius", Biographie Universelle, Vol. XX (Paris, 1858), p. 416.

<sup>4</sup>Nagyar Historiaja 1592-1598, Monumenta Hungariae Historica, Scriptores, Vol. XVII (Pest, 1866).

the relations between the Ottomans and the Christians during the Hungarian War, an account which is rich also in references to the Crimean Tatars. Cesare Campana (d. 1606) also wrote during the period of the Hungarian War and, drawing upon the Relazioni current at that time, included much information about the war in his Istoria del mondo descritte dal Signor Cesare Campana, a history of the period 1570 to 1596. He received wide acclaim for his history writing; it was considered the model of its time.<sup>1</sup>

In the year 1588, the chronicle of Leunclavius<sup>2</sup> and the history of Minadoi<sup>3</sup> first appeared; the one, in Latin, the other, in Italian. Johannes Leunclavius (Hans Lewenklaw) (d. 1594), a great Humanistic scholar of wide renown, prepared the Annales... from Turkish sources<sup>4</sup> as a direct result of accompanying Heinrich von Liechtenstein, his patron and friend, on an embassy to Istanbul during the years 1584 and 1585.

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(cont.)

<sup>5</sup>Nicolai Isthvanfi Pannoni Historiarum De Rebus Ungaricis Libri XXXIV (Cologne, 1622).

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<sup>1</sup>Art. "Campana", Enciclopedia Italiana Vol. 8 (Milan-Rome, 1930), p. 566. His work was first published in Venice, 1599 and a second edition appeared in 1607.

<sup>2</sup>Annales Sultanorum Othmonidarum, a Turcis sua lingua scripti (Frankfurt, 1588).

<sup>3</sup>Historia della Guerra fra Turchi, et Persiani di G. T. Minadoi (Venice, 1588). A second edition of this work appeared in Venice in 1594 and in 1595 an English translation by A. Hartwell was printed in London.

<sup>4</sup>Cf., Babinger, Geschichtsschreiber, pp. 43, 73, 110; Cf., also, in this regard, P. Wittek, "Zum Quellenproblem der ältesten osmanischen Chroniken (mit Auszüge aus Neşrî)", Mitteilungen zur osmanische Geschichte, Vol. I. (1921-22), pp. 77-150 and particularly, pp. 140 ff.

Most of this same work was translated into German with a supplement dealing with more recent events and particularly, events of the Ottoman-Safavid War.<sup>1</sup> A sizeable portion of this supplementary material appears to have been borrowed from Minadoi's history in spite of Leunclavius' later attack on the work.<sup>2</sup> It is evident also that both writers drew upon identical sources such as the valuable Relationi on the Ottoman-Safavid War by Giovanni Micheli and others.<sup>3</sup>

Giovanni Thomaso Minadoi da Rovigo (d. 1615), after completing his medical studies in Padua, pursued his profession for seven years in the service of the Venetian consuls at Constantinople and Aleppo. During his sojourn in the Ottoman Empire, Minadoi collected eye-witness accounts for his Historia from Ottoman military leaders, some of whose maladies he actually treated.<sup>4</sup> He also put to use any material with which the baili (sing. bailo) could provide him.<sup>5</sup> When he returned to

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<sup>1</sup> Hansen Löwenklau's Neue Chronika türkischer Nation (Frankfurt<sup>2</sup>/m, 1591)

<sup>2</sup> Leunclavius cites Minadoi as one of his sources in the introduction to his Neue Chronika. For further information about the disputation, see below, p. 52 note 2.

<sup>3</sup> See note 5 below.

<sup>4</sup> In his Historia, Minadoi mentions his close association with Husayn Bey, son of Jambulāt (p. 101), Hala (sic) Bey, Sipahi of Aleppo (p. 101) and Emir Sultan, merchant of Aleppo (p. 92).

<sup>5</sup> In his introduction, Minadoi especially praises the assistance of the Venetian consuls in Aleppo, Theodore Balbi and Giovanni Micheli; Cf., Historia, printer's mark +5 recto.



Italy, he became the private physician to the Duke of Mantua until he received an appointment as professor of medicine in the University of Padua in 1596. In this capacity, he composed a number of medical tracts. Minadoi died in Florence in 1615 where he was attending the Grand Duke Cosimo II of Tuscany.<sup>1</sup>

The works of both Leunclavius and Minadoi introduce much basic material into Western historical literature which was drawn upon by later writers even though the authors themselves disagreed about the details.<sup>2</sup> If their accounts of the events of the 1570's and 1580's are compared with the relevant Ottoman and Persian sources, they are found to be generally accurate but garbled as regards specific events.

It is fortunate for later historians that the Relaciones<sup>3</sup> of Ulugh Beg, better known as Don Juan of Persia (d. 1605), serve to clear up some errors in the works of Minadoi and Leunclavius. The writer, or more properly, the narrator of this history occupied the position of chief secretary to the Persian ambassador, Husayn 'Alī Beg, who departed from the court of Shah 'Abbās in 1599 on a mission to the capitals of Europe in the company of Anthony Sherley. Don Juan became a convert to the Catholic

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<sup>1</sup>Cf., art. "Minadous", Biographie Universelle (Michaud) Ancienne et Moderne, new edition, Vol. 27 (Paris-Leipzig), p. 339 and art. "Minadous" Nouvelle Biographie Generale, ed. Hoefer, Vol. 35 (Paris, 1865), p. 590.

<sup>2</sup>Jo. Thomae Minadoi Pro sua de bello persico historia, adversus ea qua illi a Joanne Leunclavio objiciuntur disputatio... (Venice, 1595) (not seen).

<sup>3</sup>Valladolid, 1604. This work has been translated from its original Castilian Spanish and edited with an introduction by G. Le Strnage for the Broadway Travellers Series: Don Juan of Persia a Shi'ah Catholic (London, 1926). Ulugh Beg drew upon Minadoi and other works of the period for the framework of his narration.

faith upon reaching Spain. His history, therefore, in so far as it deals with Ottoman-Safavid affairs, is most valuable for the period after his birth (ca. 1560) to 1599.<sup>1</sup>

Richard Knolles (d. 1610), author of the Generall Historie of the Turkes from the first beginning of that Nation (to 1603), graduated from Oxford in 1564-65, and, after receiving his M.A., he remained as a fellow until at least 1571. Thereafter he was appointed master of the grammar school in Sandwich, Kent, where he served until the end of his life.<sup>2</sup> For his history, Knolles depended on the Zeitungen and many of the other materials already mentioned, most of which are cited in the introduction to his work.<sup>3</sup>

G. Urechi (d. ca. 1650), who stemmed from an old boyar family of Moldavia and who achieved considerable local prominence as grand spătar (<sup>head of the army</sup> chief boyar?) and vornic (chamberlain) of lower Moldavia during his lifetime, composed the Chronique de Moldavie depuis le milieu du xiv<sup>e</sup> siècle jusqu'à 1594 in Roumanian.<sup>4</sup> This chronicle, however, has only minor in-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Le Strange, ed., Don Juan of Persia, pp. 1-32.

<sup>2</sup> Art. "Knolles, Richard", Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. 31 (London, 1887), pp. 237-238. Knolles' work appeared in London in 1603 and subsequently was revised supplemented and published many times: 1610, 1621, 1638. In 1679 Paul Rycaut revised and enlarged the work and a further revised edition in three volumes appeared between 1687 and 1700.

<sup>3</sup> V. J. Parry, who is preparing a critical study of the sources of Knolles, has indicated how Knolles condensed the information of a Relatio (August, 1602 - April, 1603) of T. Meurerius in order to complete the final pages of his work: Cf. Knolles, 1145 ff. with T. Meurerius, Relationem Historicam omnium praecipuarum et memoratu maxime dignarum rerum... (Frankfurt, 1603).

<sup>4</sup> Publication de l'Ecole des Langues Orientales vivantes, Ser. 1, Vol. 9 (Paris, 1878), edited with a French translation and an introduction by E. Picot.

portance for the study of the Crimean Tatars during the last decades of the sixteenth century.

Another history consulted for this study was compiled, largely from Venetian sources, by Giovanni Sagredo (d. ca. 1691).<sup>1</sup> Sagredo came from one of the most illustrious families of Venice and, as was typical of the role played by the patrician class, he was sent as ambassadeur extraordinaire to Oliver Cromwell in 1650 and, in the same capacity, to Louis XIV in 1656. Sagredo's brother, Nicolas, became doge in 1674 and, upon his untimely death, Giovanni Sagredo was elected to succeed him. When his enemies achieved the annulment of his election, Sagredo went into voluntary exile during which he prepared his history. When Francesco Morosini became doge in 1688, he urged Sagredo to return to the Republic where he was appointed proveditor general of the Levantine Seas. He died shortly afterwards.<sup>2</sup> His history, based upon a wealth of historical materials, serves to place the events of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century Ottoman Empire in a Western European perspective.

3. Other Sources: Some literary sources in Western European languages have served to fill the lacunae of the foregoing collections and works. These accounts fall into two general categories: General Accounts and Accounts of Specific Events.

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<sup>1</sup>Memorie istoriche de' monarchi Ottomani (Venice, 1677), a history from 1300 to 1646. There is a French translation of this by M. Laurent, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman (Paris, 1724), 7 vols.

<sup>2</sup>Cf., art. "Sagredo, Jean", Biographie Universelle, Vol. 37, p. 235.

(Bronowski)

Martin Bronowski<sup>1</sup> described the Crimean Tatar society in considerable detail at the beginning of the long Ottoman-Safavid War.<sup>1</sup> During the reign of Ġāzī Girāy, a Scotsman, William Bruce (Brussius) (fl. 1586-1613)<sup>2</sup>, a lawyer, publicist, professor at the Zamoyski Academy, and an English agent in Poland, wrote an interesting tract on the Crimean Tatars.<sup>3</sup> In the period following the khanship of Ġāzī Girāy a valuable account of the Crimean state organization and economy was composed by Giovanni da Lucca (fl. ca. 1620-1640), a Dominican friar, who visited the Crimean peninsula and the Caucasus about the year 1633.<sup>4</sup>

P. Lamberti (fl. ca. 1630-1654), a missionary of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, who had resided in Mingrelia for twenty years prior to the publication of his account<sup>5</sup> of that country, has made a valuable contribution to the otherwise obscure political, social and economic history of the Eastern shores of the Black Sea. Jean-Baptiste Tavernier

<sup>1</sup>The account of Bronowski, a Polish envoy to the Crimea, is discussed with the Slavonic sources, see above, p.37.

<sup>2</sup>See the short biographical note by S. Kot in the article "William Bruce", Polski Słownik Biograficzny, Vol. III (Cracow, 1937), pp. 3-4, to which is appended a few other bibliographical references. Cf. also, Thomas A. Fischer, The Scots in Eastern and Western Prussia (Edinburgh, 1903), pp. 68-69 and 216-218.

<sup>3</sup>De Tartaris diarium (Frankfurt a/M, 1598).

<sup>4</sup>Apparently very little is known about da Lucca. His short account, entitled Relation des Tatars, Percepites et Nogaiés, des Circassiens, Maugreliens, et Geogriens, (possibly a French translation of a tract originally written in Italian) appeared in the collection of travellers, Relations de Divers Voyages Curieux.... (Paris, 1663), Part I, pp. 14-30.

<sup>5</sup>As in the case of Da Lucca, further details of the life of Lamberti appear to be unobtainable except as they are provided in the work itself, Relatione della Cholchide Hoggi Detta Mengrellia... (Naples, 1654).

(d. 1639) also visited the Caucasus in the middle of the seventeenth century and published a travel account which supplements the material of Lamberti.<sup>1</sup>

Lazaro Soranzo (d. 1602) wrote a succinct account of the Ottoman Empire during the last years of Sultan Murad III (1574-1595) and the early years of the sultanhip of Mehmed III (1595-1603).<sup>2</sup>

Contemporary accounts of Muscovy by Giles Fletcher and Jacques Margeret provide interesting information on the military organization and economy of that state at the end of the sixteenth century. Fletcher (d. 1611), who undertook an embassy to the court of Tsar Fedor in 1588-89 on behalf of Queen Elizabeth, wrote an extremely valuable account of his mission in which he also described the Crimean Tatars.<sup>3</sup> Jacques Margerét (d. ca. 1612), after serving in the army of Henry IV to 1595, took service with the Prince of Transylvania and the Emperor. He eventually became a captain in a Polish infantry regiment. In 1600 he went

<sup>1</sup> Les six voyages de J. B. Tavernier.... en Turquie en Perse et aux Indes (Paris, 1676) 2 vols.

<sup>2</sup> L'ottomano (Venice, 1598) and the translation by A. Hartwell, The Ottoman of Lazaro Soranzo (London, 1603). Little is known about the author except that he stemmed from a distinguished patrician family of Venice which had provided doges and ambassadors in the past. The work on the Ottomans by Esprinchard entitled Histoire des Ottomans, ou Empereurs des Turcs, jusques a Mahomet III (Paris, 1609) depended on Soranzo in several instances. For further references and information, Cf., art. "Soranzo", Enciclopedia Italiana, Vol. 32 (Milan-Rome, 1936); Giovanni Sforza, "Un libro sfortunato contro i Turchi (Documenti inediti)", Scritti Storici in memoria di Giovanni Monticolo (Venice, 1922), pp. 205-219; and L.A. Gigogna, Saggio di Bibliografia Veneziana (Venice, 1847).

<sup>3</sup> Of the Russe Common Wealth (London, 1591). For other editions and information, Cf., art. "Fletcher, Giles", Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. XIX (London, 1889), pp. 299-302.

to Russia and was appointed to the command of a company of cavalry. Margèrét survived the fall of the Godunov regime and became captain of the first company of bodyguards under False Dmitri. While in confinement for a brief illness, he escaped the massacre of his unit by the followers of Prince Shuiskiy in 1606. Upon returning to France after these events, he composed an account of Muscovy between the years 1590 and 1606.<sup>1</sup> In 1609 Margèrét was again in Muscovy, but soon he went over to the Poles and distinguished himself in the Polish invasion of Moscow in 1611. At the time of his death, he was in Hamburg seeking further service in the Russian state.<sup>2</sup>

The accounts of specific missions or events, as related by Christopher Burrough, Erich Lassota, John Smith, George Tectander and Anthonio de Gouvea, provide additional background material for the history of the period. Between the years 1579 and 1581, Christopher Burrough (fl. 1579-1587)<sup>3</sup> acted as Russian interpreter for a trading venture of the Muscovy Company. This expedition took him from St. Nicholas on the White Sea to the Western shores of the Caspian, which had been recently taken from the Safavids by the Ottomans. Burrough has left an account of this journey which is helpful for the information it provides about the contemporary situation

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<sup>1</sup> Estat de l'Empire de Russie.... (Paris, 1607).

<sup>2</sup> Cf., art. "Margeret, Jacques", Nouvelle Biographie Generale, Vol. 33 (Paris, 1860), col. 545-548.

<sup>3</sup> Cf., art. "Burrough, Christopher", Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. V (London, 1887), pp. 399-400.

in the Eastern Caucasus under 'Osmān Pasha, the Ottoman governor.<sup>1</sup>

Erich Lassota von Steblau (d. 1616), scion of a noble family in upper Silesia, served in a German regiment of the Spanish army during campaigns in Portugal and the Azores (1579-1584) and between 1585 and 1589, he served the Hapsburg Imperial House and, in particular, Archduke Maximilian, in his bid for the throne of Poland. He took an important part in the short war of 1588 and was interned with the Archduke. In 1590, after his release, he was sent to Russia on a diplomat<sup>ie</sup> mission but was intercepted by the Swedes near Narva and imprisoned until 1593. He undertook a mission to the Zaporozhian Cossacks in 1594 to enlist their support on the side of the Emperor Rudolph against the Ottomans and Tatars. Shortly after this venture, he received the important post of Mustermeister for Upper Hungary during the long Hungarian War. The Lassota diary for the years 1573-1594 has many gaps but, for the Cossack mission, it is rather more detailed and casts interesting sidelights on the Crimean Tatars.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Cf., "Advertisements and reports of the 6th voyage into the parts of Persia and Media, for the companie of English merchants for the discoverie of new trades, in the yeares 1577. 1580. and 1581...." in Richard Hakluyt, ed., The Principal Navigations Voyages Traffiques et Discoveries of the English Nation (Glasgow, 1903), pp. 214-248. For additional information about the author, Cf., art. "Borough, Christopher", Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. V (London, 1886), pp. 399-400.

<sup>2</sup> Tagebuch des Erich von Steblaus, ed. by Grünhagen (Halle, 1866). For further information, Cf., art. "Lassota, Erich, von Steblau", Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, Vol. 17 (Leipzig, 1885), pp. 793-794. (Grünhagen).

Captain John Smith (d. 1631), known chiefly for his exploits in the New World and more particularly for his governorship of the colony of Virginia, spent two years in Hungary and Transylvania (1601-1602) serving the common Christian cause against the Ottomans. In his Travels,<sup>1</sup> he vividly described his Hungarian campaigning and his capture and enslavement in Crimean Tartary. His account, in fact, was so lively that it has become the subject of a long controversy.<sup>2</sup>

The description<sup>3</sup> by George Tectander (d. 1614) of a German embassy to Persia, undertaken in 1602 at the behest of Emperor Rudolph, has only general importance for this study. Tectander became secretary to the head of the Persian mission, the Appellationsrat, Stephen Kakash von Zalonkemeny. The mission took place shortly after the embassies of Shah 'Abbās had come to Prague to encourage the joint efforts of the Empire and Persia against the Ottomans. After the embassy had passed through Cracow, Warsaw, Moscow, Kazan and Astrakhan to the Caspian Sea, the ambassador Kakasch died and the remaining members of the embassy became too sick to travel. Only Tectander was able to journey on to Tabriz where he met Shah 'Abbās in December of 1603. After fulfilling his mission,

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<sup>1</sup>Travels in Europe, Asia, Africa and America (London, 1630).

<sup>2</sup>For a discussion of the authenticity of Smith's Hungarian adventures, see L. Polanyi Striker, "Captain John Smith's Hungary and Transylvania" in an appendix to Bradford Smith, Captain John Smith (New York, 1953), pp. 311-342.

<sup>3</sup>Iter Persicum (Altenburg/Meissen, 1609).



Tectander followed the Armenian campaign of the Shah in 1604; he returned to Prague in the Autumn of the year 1605.<sup>1</sup>

The Holy Roman Empire was not the only great power in this period which took the occasion of the Shah's initiative to increase its diplomatic contacts with the Safavid state. Antonio de Gouvea (Govvea) (fl. 1600-1610), at the time a priest in charge of a Portuguese college in Goa, took part in a mission to the Shah in 1608 on behalf of the King of Spain and Portugal, which he described in his Relacam.<sup>2</sup> This source gives an account of the shift in the balance of power in the Caucasus and Central Asia in favour of the Sáfavids and of the measures the Crimean Khan took to maintain good relations with his powerful neighbour to the East.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf., the Introduction to Reise nach Persien (Reichenberg, 1889), another edition of the Iter Persicum, in which the editor, R. Wolkan, provides further details about the life and mission of George Tectander von der Gabel.

<sup>2</sup> The only sound information about de Gouvea appears in the introduction to his work, Relacam em que se tratam as Guerras e grandes victorias que alcançou grãde Rey da Persia Xa Abbas do grao Turco Mahometto, & seu filho Amethe..... (Lisbon, 1611). There is also a French translation of this work, by \_\_\_\_\_, Relation des guerres et victoires obtenues par le roy de Perse Cha Abbas... (Rouen, 1646). (Here the French translation is used.)

## INTRODUCTION

### A. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND EASTERN EUROPE

#### 1. The System of Alignments and the Balance of Power Eastern

The balance of power in <sup>A</sup>Europe in the second half of the sixteenth century depended to a large extent on the pattern of alignments of other European states behind the two principal contenders, the Hapsburg and the Ottoman Empires. As a counterweight to the encircling Spanish and German Hapsburgs, France had long maintained close ties with the Sultans. The Ottomans benefitted from this arrangement, particularly through their trade with France, but France, as a friendly power, also aided the Ottomans by remaining aloof from the attempts of the Papacy to form a holy alliance. Similarly, the peace policy of the Jagellons with the Ottoman Sultans, which was necessary in order to secure the Polish flank during the incessant wars with Muscovy, also precariously placed Poland-Lithuania in the Ottoman camp. The two powers generally shared their hostility for the Hapsburgs, but the status of Moldavia and the incursions of the Crimean Tatars and Cossacks continued to remain bones of contention between them.<sup>1</sup>

The election to the Polish throne of Henri de Valois during the first Polish interregnum and the Treaty of alliance between France and

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<sup>1</sup> Cf., D. M. Vaughan Europe and the Turk, A Pattern of Alliances 1350-1700 (Liverpool, 1954), pp. 104-186.

Poland at the time provide ample evidence also of Valois ambitions.<sup>1</sup>

The Holy See, in the first instance, looked to the Habsburg realms as the defenders of Christianity and could be counted upon to back Habsburg ventures with important contributions of men and money. Even the Tsars of Muscovy, particularly when they showed themselves amenable to a union of the Russian Orthodox faith with Rome, had ready access to the ear of the Pope.<sup>2</sup> The Russians also found in the German Habsburgs a ready ally, who wished to reduce Polish influence in Hungary, Transylvania, Brandenburg-Prussia, and Livonia.

On the fringes of these core alignments, Sweden was not averse to joining with Poland to divide Muscovite territories, and England helped the Ottomans by supplying them with war material during the last decades of the century.<sup>3</sup> Venice, whom the Habsburgs had failed to assist after the fall of Cyprus (1570), made a separate peace with the Sultan in 1573. This

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<sup>1</sup> Vaughan, loc.cit.; P. Skwarczynski, "The Decretum Electionis of Henry of Valois", Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. XXXVII (Dec. 1958), pp. 113-130. K. I. Martunen, "Die Königswahl in Polen, 1575" - Suomalaisen Tiedekatemian toimittuksia, Ser. B, Vol. XII, No. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. F. Novak, "The Interregna and Stephen Batory, 1572-86", Cambridge History of Poland to 1696 (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 384-385.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. art. "Bārūd", E.I.,<sup>2</sup> Vol. I, pp. 1061-1066 (Parry).

move spoiled the plans of Pope Gregory XIII to reconstitute the Holy League of his predecessor, Pius V, which had resulted in the Ottoman naval disaster of Lepanto in 1571.<sup>1</sup> In fact, Venice had suffered such severe losses to the Ottomans, partly as a result of her fickle allies, that she maintained a precarious neutrality during the remaining years of the century. Finally, in any fair consideration of the states of Northern Europe in the sixteenth century, it is important to remember that each was torn by the bitter religious wars which followed the Protestant Reformation.<sup>2</sup>

## 2. The Black Sea and its Approaches

The Ottoman Empire, a power of considerable consequence in Europe and Asia in the sixteenth century, maintained strict surveillance over its own interests throughout the area. Disturbances infringing on what might be termed the Pax Ottomanica were, generally speaking, limited to the borderlands. At mid-century the Northern periphery of the Ottoman Sultanate in Eastern Europe - apart from Central Hungary which had been annexed outright - consisted of four vassal states: the principality of Erdel (Transylvania) whose vassalage followed closely upon the Ottoman

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<sup>1</sup> L. von Pastor, History of the Popes from the Close of the Middle Ages Vol. XIX (London, 1930), pp. 332 and 333.

<sup>2</sup> The advantages which accrued to the Ottomans as a result of this strife has been the subject of a recent study: Stephen A. Fischer-Galati, Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism, 1521-1555 (Cambridge, Mass., 1959).

victory at Mohács (1526), the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, both of which had paid tribute since the days of Mehmed II (1451-1481), and the Crimean Khanate, over whose Khans the same Sultan established the right of appointment and dismissal after 1475.<sup>1</sup> These states provided an effective buffer to the North of the Danube against the Hapsburg Empire, Poland - Lithuania and Muscovy. From the Danube River to the Armenian Plateau, the European and Asian Heartlands of the Ottoman Empire were suspended between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.<sup>2</sup> Even when some of the vital provinces of the realm were to break out into open revolt at the end of the century, Constantinople, the nerve centre of the Empire, could still maintain rapid communications with all parts of the realm and generally ensure the flow of commerce, thanks to a powerful navy.

The Mediterranean and its projection, the Aegean Sea, constituted the highway of foreign commerce for the Empire. The Black Sea, on the contrary, became largely a private concern of the Ottomans after the Genoese lost their *colonies* and its commerce was generally accessible only to traders within the Ottoman realm. Minerals and produce coming from its periphery could be purchased at Constantinople to where it was

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<sup>1</sup>H. Inalcik, "Yeni vesikalara göre Kirim Hanlığı'nın Osmanlı tabilğine girmesi ve ahitname meselesi," Belleten No. 30 (1944), pp. 185-229.

<sup>2</sup>Op. art. "Bahr-i Rûm", E.I., I, p. 936. Ottoman awareness of this position was reflected in the Sultan's title, "Sultan of the two continents and the two seas".

transported, in many cases, in vessels of the Ragusan merchant fleet.<sup>1</sup> Much of the silk deriving from Persia came to Aleppo; spices, cloth and luxury items from the further Orient, which succeeded in passing through the Portuguese blockade, found their way to Syrian and Egyptian Ports by means of caravans from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The grain export from Egypt to Western Europe annually provided the Sultan with a handsome income. Also from Egypt, wheat, rice and beans came to the Constantinople emporium.

The commercial products of the Black Sea area were absorbed, to a large extent, by the Ottoman heartland, and particularly by Constantinople.<sup>2</sup> To gain some idea of the rich resources of the Black Sea region is to go a long way towards explaining the power and tenacity of an Empire which, until the end of the eighteenth century, was able to keep the European Powers out of her heartlands.

What was the special role of the Black Sea in the Ottoman economy? Broadly speaking, the lands bordering the Black Sea consisted of five economic zones: (a) the lands between the Balkan Mountains and the Bosphorus or Eastern Rumelia; (b) the territories of Northern Bulgaria, Wallachia and Moldavia; (c) the steppe, stretching from the Dniestr

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<sup>1</sup>F. Braudel, La Méditerranée et le Monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II (Paris, 1949), pp. 79-81.

<sup>2</sup>Andrea Badoaro, the envoy sent to the Porte in 1573 to confirm the treaty of peace, wrote, "... tutto (di vettovaglie) e somministrato dal Mar Maggiore d'onde continuamente trae pane, carne e pesce." Alberi, Relazioni degli Ambasciatori, Ser. III/I, p. 353.

River to the Kuban, roughly in the shape of a crescent; (d) the Caucasus, including Circassia, Abkhazia, Mingrelia and Imereti; and (e) the Southern littoral of the Black Sea. In Rumelia, the Re'āyā and Zimmī contributed sheep, wool and grain to the Ottoman economy.<sup>1</sup> Bulgaria, Wallachia and Moldavia were noted for their contributions of grain and draught animals.<sup>2</sup> On the Southern shores of the Black Sea the Ottomans possessed a reservoir of fine ship timbers in the forests which covered the hillsides close to the seashore. There also, seaports such as Trebizond and Sinope possessed naval yards where shipwrights and other craftsmen actually built and repaired vessels for the Sultan's fleet.<sup>3</sup>

Of more particular interest for this study is the economic organization of the Crimea, the Kipchak Steppe and of the Caucasus, in relation to the Black Sea. The Kipchak Steppe, the vast grassland and semi-desert preserve of the Crimean Tatars and Nogays, served a vital purpose for the Ottoman Empire in the late sixteenth and throughout the seventeenth century. In the first instance, it was a great natural barrier to those

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<sup>1</sup> Braudel, loc.cit.; for the mineral wealth of the European portion of the Ottoman Empire Cf. R. anhegger, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Bergbaus im Osmanischen Reich (Istanbul, 1943-45), 2 vols. and Suppl., passim.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, W. Hahn, "Die Verplegung Konstantinopels durch staatliche Zwangswirtschaft" Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial - und Wirtschafts - geschichte, Beiheft VIII (Stuttgart, 1926), pp. 10-11, 19 and passim. Cf. L. Güger, "Le commerce interieur des cereales dans l'empire Ottoman pendant la seconde moitié du dix-septième siècle", Iktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası XI/1 - 4, Suppl. (Istanbul, 1953) pp. 163-188.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. F. Savary de Brèves, "Discours abrégé des asseurez moyens d'ancantir et ruiner la monarchie des princes Ottomans" Recueil Historiques (Paris, 1666) pp. 101 - 148 and C. Garzoni, "Relazione... (1573)", Alberi, Ser. III/II, pp. 419-424.

armies which depended, to any extent, upon a complex system of logistics and heavy guns. Secondly, the slaves captured on the steppe and in the Caucasus by the Tatars constituted a reserve of manpower for the Empire at a time when the Devşirme<sup>1</sup> was breaking down and the importance of the paid regulars increasing. Apart from geographic considerations and the significance of the slave trade, the Crimean Tatar forces and their auxiliaries became an important irregular force of the Ottomans for the protection of the steppe approaches and the maintenance of Ottoman control over the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. On the other hand, only to a limited extent did the Crimean Tatars prove helpful during the Ottoman campaigns in Hungary and Persia. On such campaigns, long sieges and defensive warfare robbed the Tatars of opportunities to use their manoeuvrability and sudden-thrust tactics against the enemy.

The raids of the Tatars on the borderlands of neighbouring powers had a complex purpose. In the first place, Tatar raids could be used by the Ottomans to exert political pressure on Poland or Muscovy. If Moldavia, Poland or Muscovy failed to make their payment of an annual tribute, such as the Tiyis,<sup>2</sup> which the Crimean Tatars required of them of an obligation remaining from the heyday of the Golden Horde, they again might be raided. The raids brought immediate economic gain to the participants, partly from the goods and produce thereby acquired,

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. art. "Devşirme", E.I.<sup>1</sup> pp. 952-953 (Mordtmann).

<sup>2</sup>Cf. art. "Kirim", I.A., Vol. VI, pp. 754-755 (Inalcik).



but particularly from the most readily saleable item, slaves. As might be expected in a comparatively lean environment, whenever drought or famine faced the steppe dwellers, they increased their raiding activities. Thus, the raid could be merely a steppe form of enterprise determined, in part, by economic and social pressures.

There was another type of raid, also quite suitable for taking slaves, which sought to eliminate Christian peasant-settlers from the steppe entirely. ~~Again, the scorched-earth policy, practised~~ in this instance, represented the attempt of the Tatar to maintain the steppe primarily as a grazing land.<sup>1</sup>

One should not conclude, however, that the Tatars made raids in the absence of any agricultural activity in their own territories.<sup>2</sup> There is good evidence that the Crimean Tatar beys and mirzas produced large quantities of wheat and millet on their agricultural tracts with a form of serf labour.<sup>3</sup> In exchange for dairy products, the Crimean Tatars and Nogays also acquired grain from the Circassians and the Moldavians.<sup>4</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup>This kind of raid is clearly described in S. Gerlach, dess Aeltern tace-Buch (Frankfurt a/M, 1674) under the entry for 30 January, 1576, p. 157: "...die Tatern (sic) 40. Meil in die Lang und Breite alles in Polen verwustet die fruchtbahre Baum ungehauen und die leute hinweg geführet haben."

<sup>2</sup>A. A. Novosel'skiy, in his important study, Bor'ba Moskovskogo Gosudarstva s Tatarami vo pervoy polovine xvii veka (Moscow-Leningrad, 1948), rather over-simplifies the operation of the Tatar economy and too readily concludes that the Tatars were "unproductive"; Cf. his conclusions, p. 416 ff.

<sup>3</sup>Giovanni da Lucca, "Relation des Tartares", Relation de Divers Voyages Curieux, I (Paris, 1663), p. 15; Cf. also, John Smith, Travels in Europe, Asia, Africa and America (London, 1630), pp. 23-28, where he describes his own serfdom on a Tatar estate.

<sup>4</sup>da Lucca, p. 20.

Nogays, in addition to slaves, sold large quantities of butter and furs to the Armenian and Turkish merchants in exchange for which the Nogays preferred to receive cotton twill or drapery trousers instead of money.<sup>1</sup> Fletcher reported that thirty to forty thousand Tatar horses were brought to Moscow each year.<sup>2</sup>

The steppe dwellers, besides their horses, kept large herds of cattle and flocks of black sheep.<sup>3</sup> The large natural deposits of salt in the Crimea, and the abundance of fish also made the Crimea an important centre for the export of dried fish. Moreover, caviar and botango (mullet roe) were plentiful in the streams flowing off the steppe.<sup>4</sup> The southern littoral of the Crimea produced an abundance of fruit and vegetable and some wine. Crimean<sup>h</sup> honey was famous in many parts of the Near East.<sup>5</sup> In short, the Western portion of the Kipchak steppe made an

<sup>1</sup>da Lucca, pp. 18-19.

<sup>2</sup>G. Fletcher, Of the Russe Common Wealth, Hakluyt Society Ed. (London, 1856), pp. 91-92. As for the place of origin and the prices received at the end of the sixteenth century for various breeds of horses available in Moscow, Cf. I. Margeret, Estat de l'Empire de Russie (Paris, 1607), pp. 26 r and v.

<sup>3</sup>Fletcher, loc.cit..

<sup>4</sup>Braudel, pp. 79-81.

<sup>5</sup>A. Samoylovich, "Beiträge zur Bienenzucht in der Krim im 14.-17. Jahrhundert," Festschrift Georg Jacob (Leipzig, 1932), pp. 270-275.

important contribution to the effective operation of the Ottoman state.

The Circassians who dwelt on the Caucasus were preferred above all other captives for their beautiful physiques and, in the case of the males, for their fearlessness in battle. This preference generally applied also to the Abkhazian and Mingrelian neighbours of the Circassians. The social customs of these people permitted the sale of offspring and captives, particularly to the Ottoman merchants in whose empire to become a Kul (slave) would mean the beginning of unlimited opportunities for gaining wealth, position, and prestige.<sup>1</sup> The Circassians, from ancient times, had grown grain and raised livestock. Their sheep and horses were famous. They also followed occupations in mining, fishing and beekeeping.

The mountain ranges, which cut across portions of Circassia, Abkhazia, Mingrelia, Imereti and Samtzhke on the Eastern littoral of the Black Sea, yielded iron, silver, gold, antimony and lead. The Ottomans, who exercised a rather loose overlordship over these principalities in the late sixteenth century, doubtless profited as much as they could from the

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<sup>1</sup> The French traveller, Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, relates that a certain envoy from Mingrelia maintained himself in Constantinople by selling his retainers. When they were all sold, he terminated his mission and returned home. Cf. Les Six Voyages de Jean Baptiste Tavernier ... en Turquie, en Perse et aux Indes, Vol. I, (Paris, 1676), p. 326.

mines in these regions.<sup>1</sup>

The most distinctive exports of the Abkhazians, who were a people closely related to the Circassians, were falcons and wax.<sup>2</sup> All of the Adighe (Circassian) peoples were noted for their fine metalwork.<sup>3</sup> Butter and uncured ox and cow hides also flooded the markets of Constantinople from Mingrelia.<sup>4</sup> In spite of the mineral wealth of these regions, the inhabitants appear to have played down its importance as much as possible, in order to avoid complete occupation by the Ottomans.

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<sup>1</sup>Savary de Brèves, "Discours abrégé", p. 104. Information is scanty about mining activities in the Caucasus during the late sixteenth century. In the seventeenth century P. Lambert in his account Relazione della Cholchide Hoggi Detta Menarellia (Naples, 1654), pp. 229-232, provided information about gold in Samtzhche, silver and iron in Imereti, and also information about antimony, lead and ochre: "...si crede che fra l'altissimo monte Caucaso ve ne siano pure assai: così di oro, come anco d'argento: ma che alto silenzio per timore del Turco: ... E sino al di d' hoggi si vede nella prouincia (sic) di Samsche, che fu d' Signori Artabegki; ma hora è occupata del Turco, che vicino alla città d'Aradan si cavano molte miniere d'oro ... In questo monte ve se ritrova anco dell' Antimonio, ma da loro non conosciuto del quale ... Il Principe d'Imereti ancora nel suo dominio segretamente da quei monti cava dell' argento. Ma Dadian come quello che sta su la rive del mare, nel quale vi è continuo traffico di vascelli di Constantinopoli, tiene il tutto in gran silenzio occultato ... Del ferro su i monti d'Imereti se ne cava in quantita tale, che vi sono la terre intiere, che altro mestiere non fanno, che nettare purificare, e lavorare il ferro ... Nel monte Vesco-vato di Cavis vi è una miiera d'Ochrea ... Cio mi fa argumentare che in detto monte vi siano nelle sue viscere miniere di Piombo ..." Cf. also Alberi, "Relazione ... di Marino Cavalli (1560)," op.cit. (Ser. III/I, pp. 278-279) where the bailo describes the assistance the Ottomans render the Mingrelians in their clashes with the mountain tribes. For an interesting account of mining in Mingrelia and Imereti in the middle of the seventeenth century, Cf. Tavernier, Les six voyages, pp. 324-328. At that time it was possible for Tavernier to say, "J'ay remarque ailleurs que la plus grande partie du fer qui se consomme en Turquie vient de Mingrelie (p. 325)."

<sup>2</sup>da Lucca, p. 15.

<sup>3</sup>For further details about the Circassian economy, cf. art. "Gerkes," I.A., III, p. 379.

<sup>4</sup>Braudel, La Méditerranée, p. 79-81.

Other regions of the Caucasus, and particularly Dagestan, Kakheti and Shirvan, produced raw silk, sidon (sydon) and saffian (saphion).<sup>1</sup> Even the petroleum of Baku was exploited for incendiaries, heating and medicinal uses.<sup>2</sup> No doubt the wealth of the Caucasus as such, played an important role in the decision of the Ottomans to attack the Safavid state in 1578 and subsequently to occupy a large portion of the Caucasus.

The economy of the Ottoman state was based on a rich and highly diversified system in which the produce of the Black Sea littoral and its hinterland played an important part. Moreover, with the exception of the occasional Cossack raid, the Black Sea was quite free from interference on the part of any power. The Ottomans quite early realized the value of this storehouse of foodstuffs, manpower, minerals and ships' timber.<sup>3</sup> In the second half of the sixteenth century and quite often in the succeeding centuries, the Ottoman Empire fought engagements or wars with Muscovy and Persia to maintain or extend its hold on this vital region.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Fletcher, Russe Commonwealth, p. 96 ff.; Peçewî, II, p. 88.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Marco Polo, Marco Polo da Venice sia de la reraneaglioise cose del Mundo (Venice, 1496), pp. (a viii) verso - (b i) recto.

<sup>3</sup>Prof. İnalcık in his article, "Yeni vesikalara göre Kîrîm Hanlığı ...." Belleten, No. 30 (1944), p. 352 ff. gives conclusive evidence that as early as the time of Mehmed II (1451-81), the Ottomans took steps to establish their hegemony over the Black Sea.

<sup>4</sup>The position of Safavid Persia in relation to Ottoman strategy and logistics on the Black Sea and in the Caucasus will receive attention in the following ~~chapter~~ Section (B).

### 3. The Structure of the Crimean Khanate

At the base of Crimean society were a number of semi-nomadic Turkic tribes many of which traced their origins to the Golden Horde.<sup>1</sup> The leaders of these tribes, called "mirzas", were chosen from certain hereditary noble families of their respective tribes. Tradition had determined that the mirzas of four specific tribes, the Şīrīn, Argīn, Barīn and Kıpçāk, stood above the other mirzas and were known as the "dört Karaçi begi" (the four Karaçi begs).<sup>2</sup> These four tribal leaders effectively controlled all of the tribes by reason of their senior position to the other mirzas. The mirza of the Şīrīn tribe was, moreover, recognised as the bāş beg or chief beg of all the mirza aristocracy and, in this role, he wielded great authority. Of his own volition he could call a kurultay (general assembly) of all the tribal dignitaries in times of crisis. Generally also, he kept close contact with the ruling circles of Constantinople through channels independent of the Khan, and thus could exert pressure in favour of or to the detriment of the Khan. The Khan, of course, had to have the support of the mirzas in order to raise an army among their respective tribes.

The Crimean Khans, who were descendants of Chingis Khan,<sup>3</sup> bore

<sup>1</sup>A. Z. V. Togan, Umumî Türk Tarihine Giriş, I (Istanbul, 1946), pp 341-346.

<sup>2</sup>Art. "Kīrīm," I.A., VI, p. 753 (Inalcik).

<sup>3</sup>It is generally agreed that they descended from the Tokay Tīmūr (Tuka Tīmūr) line of Juchi. Cf. art. "Giray," I.A., IV, 783-789 (Inalcik) and Togan, Umumî Türk Tarihi, I, p. ibid.

the family name Girāy.<sup>1</sup> Until the Khanate came under the protection of the Ottomans in 1475, the leading contenders of the Girāy line for the post of Khan made alliances with the principal Crimean Tatar tribes, and often also sought support from the Nogay tribes on the Kipchak steppe, or from the Circassians. It was also not unusual for pretenders to be sponsored by Poland-Lithuania, Muscovy or the Genoese.<sup>2</sup>

By establishing their right to appoint and dismiss the Khans the Ottomans gradually increased the respect for the office of Khan and also introduced a considerable amount of stability for the Khanate itself. Nevertheless, throughout the sixteenth century, the tribal aristocracy split roughly into two factions: the one, pro-Ottoman and the other, traditionalist, advocating a closer adherence to the Yāsāk.<sup>3</sup> and the

<sup>1</sup> Prof. Inalcik ("Giray", I.A., IV, 783-789) following Nemeth Gyula (Hong-foglalo Magyar-sag Kialakula-sa (Budapest, 1930), pp. 265-268), associates the name "Giray" with the name of the Mongol tribal confederation of Keraites

<sup>2</sup> The ancestors of the Girāys had taken refuge in Poland-Lithuania during the first decades of the fifteenth century when they had been driven out of their ulus or hereditary appanage by Chingisids of other lines. During the formative years of the Giray dynasty in the Crimea, it is not unfair to consider the Crimean Khans as near vassals of the Polish crown. When Mengli Giray became Khan in 1466, he weakened the ancient tie with Poland-Lithuania by forming alliances with the Ottoman Turks and with Muscovy. It was owing to the intrigue of the Genoese, then in possession of the southern shores of the Crimea, that the Ottomans were persuaded by the Şirīn Beg to intervene. This intervention led to the establishment by the Ottomans of the right of the Sultan to appoint and dismiss the Crimean Khans. For a fuller consideration of this portion of the early history of Crimean Tartary, see the monographic article by H. Inalcik, "Ilk vesikalara göre Kırım Hanlığı ..." Belleten, 30 (1944), pp. 349-402 and the art. "Haci Giray" I.A., V, pp. 25-27 (Inalcik).

<sup>3</sup> The Yāsāk was the term applied to the collection of regulations and restrictions promulgated by Jenghiz Khan which was based on the traditions of the Mongols and other steppe peoples. G. Vernadsky, The History of Russia, Vol. III, The Mongols and Russia (New Haven, 1953), pp. 99-109.

election of the Khan in the traditional manner. The Ottomans took measures to strengthen the position of their choice for Khan by providing him with funds, over and above his yearly income, to establish his own household troops. This payment, the so-called sakbān akçesi was instituted upon the forcible installation of Şāhib Girāy, the pro-Ottoman candidate, in 1534.

The Khan, within the dictates of custom, controlled appointments for his administration. He first appointed his veli'ahd or heir apparent, who was known by the title Kalgay. The Khans jealously guarded this privilege as one of the few means by which they could influence the choice of their successor.<sup>1</sup> Apart from the Crimean peninsula over which the Khan had jurisdiction except for the eyalet of Kaffa (Feodosiy) and the garrison towns of Gözleve (Evpatoriya) and Kerch, the Khan also controlled most of the Kipchak steppe from the Dnester to the Don and portions of the Kuban river basin and the surrounding steppe. These regions were predominantly occupied by Nogay Tatars and Circassians. To act as agents of the Khan and as commanders of the military contingents in these regions outside the Crimean peninsula, the Khan appointed three other officials,

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<sup>1</sup> The Khan usually appointed a younger brother or his son to this post. Mehmed Girāy II, when his brother and Kalgay, 'Adil Girāy, was murdered in Persia, wished to appoint his son Mubarek as Kalgay but, upon the objections of his brother, Alp Girāy, was forced to appoint him to this rank. Khan Mehmed, however, according to tradition, created the office of Nūr al Dīn or second in succession to the Khanship, to which office he appointed his son. He was able to gain the Sultan's approval for this innovation because Tatar troops were badly needed in Persia. For further details cf. art. "Kalgay," I.A., VI, pp. 131-132 (Inalcik).



the so-called ser-'asker sultāns,<sup>1</sup> who controlled the districts known as the Bujak, Yedisān and Kuban.<sup>2</sup> The Khan, moreover, appointed the Or begi or commander of the fortress at Orkapī (Perekop).<sup>3</sup> This office was ordinarily the prerogative of the Şirīn beg. Among other important posts, the Khan appointed also the nuftī, the ulūā-aga (the Vezir), the Kazī'asker, the hazīnedār başı and the defterdār.<sup>4</sup>

The Khan wielded his power with the aid of these dignitaries. The checks upon his authority could originate with the Ottoman Sultan, the Grand Vezir, the Crimean Tatar tribal aristocracy, the nuftī or the Defterdār. To a certain extent, the Khan was restricted by the Yasāk and other customary law as well as those acts coming within the jurisdiction of the Şerī'at. Throughout the sixteenth century there is an

<sup>1</sup> These positions were, in fact, generally filled by sons of the Khan, who were referred to either as Hanzades or sultāns. Cf. art. "Kirim," I.A. VI, p. 755.

<sup>2</sup> Bujak, a Turkish word meaning "corner", presumably referred to the corner of the steppe or much of the region known as Bessarabia today. Cf. art. "Budjak", E.I.<sup>2</sup>, Vol. I, pp. 1285-1286 (Inalcık). The ser-'asker sultān in charge of that district presumably had charge of the Tatars living in the Bujak, between the Danube and the Dniester. The region known as Yedisān appears to have included the portion of the steppe between the Dniester and the Dnepr (cf. W. R. Shepherd, Historical Atlas (London, 1922) p.139). The Kuban district encompassed the steppeland between Azak (Azov) and the Kuban river. According to Lykachev, Puteshestviya Russkikh Poslov (Moscow-Leningrad, 1947), p. 385, note 67, the Besleni (Beslani) Circassians lived between the Kuban and Lava rivers. These presumably came under the jurisdiction of the ser-'asker of the Kuban. As for the remaining Crimean Tatar territory between the Dnepr and the Don, this seems to have been the preserve of the Or Begi (beg of Perekop): Cf. the Tiylis registers in Velyaminov-Zernov, Materialy dlya Istorii Kryma, Kavkaza. The account of Giovanni da Lucca, loc.cit. also confirms these details.

<sup>3</sup> See previous note.

<sup>4</sup> Art. "Kirim" loc.cit. Cf. H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West I/i, pp. 166-168 & passim for a general explanation of these terms.

imperceptible assimilation by the Crimean Tatars of many aspects of Ottoman life. The Khans, however, retained their right to have separate coinage (Sikke) throughout the existence of the Khanate; Islam Girāy (1534-1588), the immediate predecessor of Ġāzī Girāy, acquiesced in the loss of the second great privilege of independent Muslim rulers, the right of being first mentioned in the Friday prayers (Huṭbe).<sup>1</sup>

#### 4. The Politics of the Steppe and their Significance for the Great Powers

At mid-century, apart from the doomed khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan, four distinct loci of power survived on the steppe, each possessing a certain amount of freedom of action: the Crimean Tatars, the Circassians, the Cossacks and the Nogay Tatars. The power of the Crimean Tatars centred in the Crimean peninsula but radiated to the Beslenī Circassians in the Northern Caucasus and to those Tatars, Nogay and others, who wandered between Azak (Azov) and the Bujak. Traditionally an ill-defined suzerainty even extended over the Beştepe (in Russian, Pyatigorsk)<sup>2</sup> and Kabardinian Circassians. The firmness of the Crimean Tatar hold over the Circassians depended largely on the personal effectiveness of any given khan in exerting his authority in that region. These

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<sup>1</sup> Almost since the time of the submission of the khans to the Ottomans the khans had regularly been confirmed in office by the reception of standards (tuḡ, literally, horsetails; robes of honour (hil'at) and written patents (ḥatt) from the Sultan. Art. "Kīrīn," loc.cit.

<sup>2</sup> H. Howorth, History of the Mongols (London, 1880) II, p. 489, calls them "Beshtav"; Pegevi, II, p. 77, refers to the region as "Beş Depe".

considerations did not, however, keep the Circassians from arranging separate alliances with the Don Cossacks, the Tsar of Muscovy, the Sanhai of Tarku, the Ottoman Sultan or from effectively repulsing an over-zealous Crimean Khan.

The Cossacks of the Dnepr and Don rivers were, in the main, Christians of Slavonic origin. Although they cooperated with their Muslim neighbours on occasion, they were, culturally speaking, an extension into the Steppe of the Polish-Lithuanian and Muscovite powers and in defense of the agricultural side of their economy, as well as their homes and village, they frequently assisted the Christian powers at the expense of the Muslims. For the period of this study, the two Cossack settlements will be considered as independent of each other. The Don Cossacks had their centre on the Don river near Voronezh and by the end of the century their settlements had moved downstream towards Azov and through various portages to the Donets. The Dnepr Cossacks or the Zaporozhians, as these names imply, had their stronghold "beyond the rapids" on an island in the Dnepr river. These two vanguards of Slavonic civilization on the steppe had, by mid-century, firmly established themselves. As the century advanced, the Don Cossacks, who frequently married their Circassian captives,<sup>1</sup> served the interests of Muscovy in its expansion down the Volga and into the Northern Caucasus. The Zaporozhians,

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<sup>1</sup>S. A. Belokurov, Snosheniya Rossii s Kavkazom (Moscow, 1899), pp. xxxii-xxxiii.

moreover, were frequently encouraged by the Tsar of Muscovy to raid the Crimean Tatars either across the steppe or by sea. These Dnepr Cossacks frequently also assisted or embarrassed the Polish kings by their bold attacks on Ottoman territory. The Nogay Tatars, the Turkic group on the Western steppe which was most strongly committed to a nomadic way of life, traditionally had its centre near the well-watered deltas of the Volga (It̄il) and Ural (Yā'ik) rivers and had long been closely associated, politically speaking, with the Khanate of Astrakhan.

The early decades of the sixteenth century were critical for determining the direction of the future development of the steppe. At that time, a long struggle commenced for the control of the sparsely-populated and ill-defined territories between the Ottoman and Muscovite States. The Ottoman Empire during the period had to face formidable enemies to the West, South and East and was therefore content, in general, to leave the problems of the steppe to the Crimean Khans. But, much to the consternation of the Sublime Porte, Mehmed Girāy Khan I (1514-1523) and Şāhib Girāy Khan I (1534-1551) at the height of their respective khanships, succeeded in re-establishing part of the prerogatives of the Golden Horde, thus offering a threat to Ottoman domination of the Northern shores of the Black Sea.<sup>1</sup> Mehmed Girāy had extended his sway over Kazan, Astrakhan and much of the Northern Caucasus, and, at the same time,

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<sup>1</sup>H. Inalcik, "Don-Volga Kanal Teşebbüsü ..." *Bulleten* No. 46 (1948), pp. 355-364; and id., "Astrakhan", *E.İ.*, <sup>2</sup>I, pp. 271-272 (Spuler).

had managed to extract large tributes from Moscow. Şāhib Girāy had, at one point, been almost equally successful. Both died violent deaths: the former, at the hands of the Nogays, the chief opponents of Crimean Tatar pretensions to overlordship of the steppe; the latter, in the struggle to retain control of the khanate after the Sultan had appointed Devlet Girāy to succeed him. Mehemmed Girāy had been a traditionalist and hence, a strong supporter of the Yasāq prescriptions;<sup>1</sup> Şāhib Girāy made every effort to introduce Ottoman institutions into the Crimea. Both khans, however, had dared to oppose the Ottoman hierarchy at critical stages. It is little wonder, then, that the Ottomans initially played limited attention to Muscovy except as a potential ally who could be called upon to clip the wings of their Crimean vassal.<sup>2</sup>

The fall of Kazan and Astrakhan alarmed the Porte, particularly as the Beş Tepe (Pyatigorsk) Circassians accepted Muscovite protection against the Crimean Tatars in 1552. The Kalmucks and Kabardinians followed suit in 1557.<sup>3</sup> The Muslim dam had broken and now a flood of Christian Slavs poured into the Volga-Kama Basin.

What had become apparent in a few years on the political level had been developing for decades on a social and economic plane. Generally

<sup>1</sup>See above, p. 74 note 3.

<sup>2</sup>Inalcik, loc.cit.

<sup>3</sup>Howorth, loc.cit.; Belokurov, Snosheniya, p. xxxv.

speaking, Muscovite merchants, dealing in metal wares, firearms, cloth and grain, had more to offer to the steppe dwellers than did the Crimean Tatars. The long-standing trade relations of Muscovy with the Hanseatic League and other Western European states were to be enhanced by direct trade with England after the opening of the Northern Route to St. Nicholas in 1553 by Richard Chancellor<sup>1</sup> and by direct contact with Safavid Persia across the Caspian Sea after 1556. An agricultural society possessing skilled, town-dwelling craftsmen and a society based on a pastoral economy could work out, in the short run, a symbiotic relationship profitable to both. But the Crimean Tatars, on their own, could not compete economically with Moscow, either as grain growers or craftsmen. Only Ottoman traders could have filled the economic gap, but the Crimean Tatars, by continuing the fiction of the Golden Horde prerogatives and by putting obstacles in the way of smooth relations with the Ottomans, appear to have alienated the steppe market and Ottoman traders as well. Thus, trade in human beings instead of trade along craft or agricultural lines continued to dominate the economic scene of Crimean Tatar. With the growing advantage of the settled populations over the nomadic, however, as a result of technological advances, the settled peoples began to dominate the nomads more than had been previously possible. Muscovite control of

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<sup>1</sup>~~Gf.~~ Cf. the description of this event by Clement Adams, translated into English from the Latin original for R. Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations Voyages Traffiques et Discoveries of the English Nation, (Glasgow, 1903), II, pp. 239 ff.

the Volga also checked the flow of Tatar manpower into the Western steppe at a time when pressure from the Eastern steppe, notably from the Kazaks, was tending to force the Nogays westward out of their traditional pastorage.

The Cossacks, in particular, by means of their tābūrs<sup>1</sup> or armed wagon trains, their saykas or light seacraft armed with small cannon and their increasingly effective use of firearms, developed techniques for moving about the steppe and rivers in relative safety. Such innovations as these, combined with factional rifts among the tribal leaders over what measures they might take to preserve their way of life, helped bring about a great split in the Nogay ulūs during the khanship of Ṣāhib Girāy.<sup>2</sup> As the tribes had to acquire such necessities as grain and firearms, they were forced to choose between the Ottomans and the Muscovites, the two principal powers in this region/ which could provide such items. In so far as some technical skill was required to handle new weapons, the provision of technicians also played a part.<sup>3</sup> The Nogays also found a more

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. J. Nemeth, "Neuere Untersuchungen über das Wort Tabor 'Lager'" Acta Linguistica, III (Budapest, 1953), pp. 431-446.

<sup>2</sup>Inalcık, "Don-Volga Kanalı Teşebbüsü"..., Belleten, 46 (1948), pp. 359-360.

<sup>3</sup>The Ottomans, for example, had provided the Uzbegs (Uzbeks) of Central Asia with gunners and hand guns during the reign of Sulaymān the Magnificent. Cf. ~~the~~ the translation by A. Vambery, The Travels and Adventures of the Turkish Admiral Sidi Ali Reis in India, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Persia during the years 1553-1556 (London, 1899), of the work by Sidi 'Ali Re'is (Katib-i Rumi), Mir'at al Kemālik, pp. 68-78 and passim. Margèrèt (p. 27) also describes how the Tsar of Muscovy provided arms to the Cossacks.

accessible market for their horses in Moscow than in Constantinople.<sup>1</sup> Finally, it seems that the Ottomans, in leaving Nogay affairs largely in the hands of the Crimean Tatars, had taken for granted that the Nogays would continue to support their co-religionists against the Dār al Harb, (i.e., the non-Muslim enemy countries). Moscow, on the contrary, sent to the Nogays skilled diplomats, the Maltsevs, who could speak the Nogay-Tatar dialect with ease.<sup>2</sup> By mid-century the so-called Ulūg or Great Nogays, under the leadership of Ismā'il Mīrzā, a descendant of Edigu, had come under Muscovite influence. The remainder, known as the Kiçī or Little Nogays, led by Yūsuf Mīrzā, another descendant of Edigü, left the Volga section of the steppe and entered the Crimean-Ottoman sphere of influence by settling between the Dnepr and the Kuban Rivers.<sup>3</sup> These movements and alignments during the later years of Şāhib Girāy's reign did not constitute a blessing for the Crimean Tatars or their steppe policy. On the one hand, the Ulūg Nogays, by supporting Muscovy, played a vital role in the subsequent loss of Kazan and Astrakhan to Muscovy. The Kiçī Nogays, far from helping the Crimean Tatars stem the tide, actually threatened the existence of the Khanate. Only after they were brought to obedience in 1546 could Şāhib Girāy again take measures against

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<sup>1</sup>Margèrèt, p. 18 ff.

<sup>2</sup>P. A. Sadikov, "Pokhod Tatar i Turok na Astrakhan' v 1569 g.", Istorich-eskie Zapiski, 22 (1947) pp. 132-166.

<sup>3</sup>The vacating of the Don Volga region opened it to Don Cossack settlement. Cf. Inalcik, "Don-Volga Teşebbüsü...", loc.cit., citing A.Z.V.Togan, Bugünkü Türkistan ve Yakın Mazisi (Cairo 1929-30), pp. 110-115.



the Moscow State.<sup>1</sup>

These fundamental economic and political moves enabled Moscow, in the absence of active opposition on the part of the Ottomans, to divide the steppe into two parts and to establish a foothold on the Caspian Sea. The Tsar could now control the movements of the tribes and the East-West flow of trade.

## B. OTTOMAN-SAFAVID RIVALRY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR TRANSCAUCASIA

### 1. Shah Tahmāsp and the Ottoman Wars to the Peace of Amasya (1555)

Tahmāsp I (1524-1576), successor of Shah Ismā'īl I (d. 1524), apart from the threat of a two-front war, had to contend with the internal rivalries of the Turcoman amirs (i.e., the leaders of the Kizilbaş<sup>2</sup>)

<sup>1</sup>Inalcik, "Don-Volga Teşebbüsü...", Belleken, 46, pp. 110-115.

<sup>2</sup>The devoted Turkish-speaking followers of the Shahs of Persia (who were, in Safavid times, not only heads of state but also the heads of a Shi'ite religious sect) distinguished themselves from other Turkic and Iranian subjects of the Shah by wearing a headdress of red cloth consisting of twelve folds. Both the colour and the number of the folds (representing the 12 Imams) symbolized the Shi'ite faith which the Kizilbaş (lit. red heads) professed. Only some details are known about the origin of the various Turcoman groups represented in the Safavid order. The Rūmlū, believed to be the oldest followers, were supposed to have derived from the descendants of the prisoners of war Timurlang brought with him after defeating Yildirim Bayazid in 1402. The Şamlū rose to prominence during the Sheikhdōm of Haydar, as did the Ustajlū. The name Şam (= Syria) points to the possible geographic origin of the Şamlū and there is some evidence that the Ustajlū is a branch of the Şamlū. At the same time (under Haydar) the Kajars appear, but their origin is unknown. Somewhat later but before 1500 i.e., when Ismail commenced his rise to power, the Karamanlū and the Zū 'l-Kadr are mentioned. The remaining Kizilbaş

and the attempts of his brothers to usurp his throne.<sup>1</sup> Under these circumstances, Shah Tahmāsp was forced to pursue a defensive policy vis-à-vis the Ottomans throughout most of his reign.<sup>2</sup>

Sultan Sulaymān (1520-1566) conducted three campaigns against Safavid Persia. During the first, 1534-1536, in which the Ottomans came into possession of Arab Iraq, the Grand Vezir, Ibrāhīm Pasha, occupied Tabriz for a time but refused to give it over to the troops to be sacked. In this campaign, the Shirvanshah and the Prince of Gilan sent envoys to offer their submission to the Sultan.<sup>3</sup> The brother of the Shah, Alḳas Mirza, who had been entrusted with the governorship of Shirvan, defected

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(cont.)

tribes, of which the Tekkeṭū from a region of that name in Southern Anatolia and the Afṣar from the region around Lake Urmia are the most important, appear during the reign of Ismā'īl I (1502-1524). Cf., Walter Hinz, Irans Aufstieg zum Nationalstaat im Fünfzehnten Jahrhundert (Berlin and Leipzig, 1936), pp. 78-80.

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<sup>1</sup>Alḳas Mīrzā, brother of Shah Tahmāsp, who was appointed governor of Shirvan, crossed the Kipchak Steppe and took refuge at the court of Sultan Sulaymān. During the Ottoman campaign against Persia, 1548-1549, the Sultan supplied this prince with funds to undertake a sortie deep into Persian territory. Although successful in this undertaking, Alḳas Mirza was subsequently captured by another brother, who turned him over to Shah Tahmāsp. Cf. Hammer, VI, pp. 11-14.

<sup>2</sup>Notable exceptions to this policy were the successful thrusts into Ottoman territory led by Ismā'īl, son of Shah Tahmāsp, prior to the Ottoman invasion of Persia in the year 1554. This same Ismā'īl was destined to become, for a time, Shah Ismā'īl II (1576-1577). Ibid., p. 52. For details of the life of Shah Ismā'īl, see the study by W. Hinz, "Schah Esmā'īl II. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Safaviden", Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen, Vol. 36, Part II (Berlin, 1933) pp. 19-100.

<sup>3</sup>Hammer, V, p. 210 ff. Partly as a result of this hasty action, Shirvan became a province instead of a tributary of the Safavid State.

to the Ottomans in 1547. It did not take much urging on his part to convince the Porte that the time was propitious for a new Eastern campaign. In the same year, a five-year truce was signed with the Holy Roman Empire.<sup>1</sup>

During the second campaign, 1548-1549, Tabriz was again taken without a struggle and incursions were made into Georgia and into Persia as far as Isfahan. The Ottomans acquired additional territory in the important border areas of Armenia and Kurdistan.<sup>2</sup> A renewal of war preparations in Central Europe prevented the Ottomans from following up this short campaign with another thrust into Persia the following year. As soon as the Ottomans became fully engaged in Europe, however, a Kizilbaş detachment, under the leadership of Ismā'īl, son of Shah Tahmāsp, made a successful thrust into Asia Minor in 1552 and even defeated the Pasha of Erzurum.<sup>3</sup> This event was the curtain raiser for another determined effort by Sultan Sulaymān to punish the Safavids in the campaign of 1554-1555. In 1554, the only year in which significant action took place, the provinces of Nakhichevan, Erevan and Karabagh (Karabakh)

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<sup>1</sup> Hammer, V, loc.cit.

<sup>2</sup> Hammer, VI, pp. 10-15.

<sup>3</sup> See above, p. 85 note 2. For details of this battle, cf., Hinz, "Schah Esmā'īl II", Mitteilungen 36/II, pp. 29-32.

suffered the worst exactions of a marauding soldiery.<sup>1</sup> The reluctance of the Ottomans to occupy territory in Azerbaijan and the unwillingness of the Safavid force to engage the Ottoman army led to the important Peace of Amasya concluded 29 May, 1555.<sup>2</sup> This first formal peace between the Ottomans and Safavids resulted in the recognition of the status quo. Although the Ottomans had shown themselves reluctant to undertake permanent conquests of Azerbaijan proper,<sup>3</sup> they were clearly in a position, when they assembled an army for a campaign, to dominate the border areas of Armenia, Kurdistan and Georgia.

## 2. The Safavids and Transcaucasia

The Safavids, however, in spite of the military prowess of the Ottomans during the reign of Sulaymān the Magnificent, made every effort

<sup>1</sup>As a result of this pillage, the Shah, in a letter to the Sultan, implied that the Ottomans took refuge behind their firearms. To this the Grand Vezir replied that the Ottomans would gladly lay aside their firearms for a chance to have combat with the Persians. Hammer, VI, pp. 64-65.

<sup>2</sup>Among the stipulations of the agreement, which took the form of an exchange of letters with the Shah, the Ottomans expressed tolerance, with certain reservations, of Shi'ism. The frontier commanders were urged to avoid issues which might lead to conflict and to protect pilgrims who were proceeding to Mecca and Medina. Hammer, VI, p. 70. A letter relating to this treaty appears in Peçewī, I, pp. 337-340.

<sup>3</sup>Apart from the rigours of moving men and equipment over the Armenian mountains, it became particularly difficult, once a large army was in Azerbaijan, to maintain communications with, and bring in supplies from, the Ottoman hinterland. The Safavids, knowing this, destroyed all food-stuffs as they retreated and incited their supporters among the Kurds, Armenians and Georgians, to harass the supply lines.

to dominate Transcaucasia.<sup>1</sup> The forces of Shah Tahmāsp undertook four campaigns into the Georgian principalities during which they carried off thousands of women and children into captivity. Nor did the Safavids hesitate to dethrone rulers. If, however, the Safavids, after the conclusion of peace with the Ottomans, became more involved in the politics of the Caucasus, the converse was also true: the Georgians, Circassians and Dagestanians<sup>n/</sup> began also to play an important role in the intrigues at the Safavid court. In the days of Ismā'īl I and during the first thirty years of the reign of Shah Tahmāsp, the court was divided into two principal factions: the Kizilbāş (Turkish) and Tājik (Persian). With the increasing embroilment of the Safavids in the Caucasus, however, a third faction consisting mostly of Georgians and Dagestanians began making their influence felt. Relatives and friends of the ruling families of the Caucasus, who were in Safavid harems, high governmental posts or military units, could, in alliance with one or more of the Kizilbāş tribes, wield great influence.<sup>2</sup>

The Georgians had been united and powerful at various stages in their history; the last occasion was in the time of Alexander Bagrati

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<sup>1</sup>This tendency was no doubt necessitated - at least in part - by the close proximity of the Ottomans to the Caucasus and their own increased pressure on this region. The Ottomans quite clearly supported the Dadian of Mingrelia in his wars with the Abkhazians and largely dominated the entire Black Sea Coast. Cf. the "Relazione...di Marino Cavalli" (1560), Alberi, III/I, pp. 278-280. He reported that the Georgians prefer the Persians as do the Armenians, but that the Mingrelians call upon the Ottomans for assistance against the Circassians.

<sup>2</sup>Cf., Hinz, "Schah Esmā'īl II...", Mitteilungen, 36/II, pp.46-49.

(1413-1443), son of Giorgi, following the break up of the empire of Tīmūrlang.<sup>1</sup> By the end of the reign of Shah Tahmāsp, Georgia had split up into three independent kingdoms and a number of smaller principalities.<sup>2</sup> The Bagrati line, descendants of Alexander, ruled the kingdoms of Kartli (Tiflis) and Kakheti (Zekim), while a collateral branch reigned in Imereti (Kutaisi), descending from an illegitimate line of Giorgi IX (1212-1223). The king of Kartli, Luarssab I, died in 1558, leaving as heirs, his sons Simon and Davūd. Simon, the elder, a very capable man of the sword, became king. As he had refused to become a convert to Islam and to conform to other policies of the Shah, after Safavid influence became dominant in his realm, he was imprisoned by the Safavids in 1569, and his brother, Davūd, a weakling and a convert to the Shi'ite faith, was put in his place. In 1578 when it was learned in Kazvin that King Davūd had left Tiflis to the Ottomans without a struggle Simon, who had accepted Islam and subsequently had been released from a Safavid prison in 1576, was given the trappings of a king, sufficient funds and equipment, and all of the Georgian prisoners, upon condition that he would take arms

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<sup>1</sup>Allen, History, p. 126.

<sup>2</sup>W. E. D. Allen has prepared a succinct summary of the Georgian dynasties in this period in his "Notes on Don Juan of Persia's Account of Georgia", B.S.O.S. (now B.S.O.A.S.), VI (1930-32), pp. 179-186, (hereafter cited as Allen, "Don Juan of Persia", B.S.O.S., VI).

against the Ottomans. From 1579 until his eventual capture in 1600, he harassed the Ottomans<sup>who were</sup> occupying his country, unmercifully and almost succeeded in reuniting all Georgia.<sup>1</sup>

While Kartli throughout the sixteenth century involved itself in incessant quarrels with its neighbours and the two Great Powers, Kakheti, ruled by Levan II (1520-1574), enjoyed prosperity and relative peace. Alexander II, son of Levan (hence the Iskender Levendoglu of Ottoman sources), succeeded to the throne in 1574 and by placating both Persian and Ottoman, much in the tradition of his father, he was able to reign until his death in 1605.<sup>2</sup>

The Imeretian king of the period, Giorgi IV (1548-1585), controlled most of Western Georgia as the neighbouring princes of Guria and Mingrelia were his vassals. In Ottoman sources he was designated as Baş açık ("bare-head"), apparently because the Imeretians and Mingrelians shaved their heads. The vassal state of Guria was ruled by the Wardenidze residing at Ozurgeti, who were known by the designation "Gurieli".<sup>3</sup> Lastly, the

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<sup>1</sup>Allen, History, pp. 155-160.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>According to Ulug Beg, Yusuf, son of Gori, joined the Ottomans and became a Muslim, Cf. G. Le Strange, ed. and tr., Don Juan of Persia, 139 ff; Allen ("Don Juan of Persia", B.S.O.S., VI, pp. 182-186) states that at the time of the Ottoman invasion, Giorgi II ruled in Guriel and died in 1600. He spent an exile of four years (1583-87) in Constantinople and was succeeded by his son, Mamia II, who may have had the Muslim name "Yusuf".

Dadiani family, dwelling at Zugdidi, ruled Mingrelia.<sup>1</sup>

Samtskhe or Meskhia, the country occupying the upper Kura river basin, was wedged between Ottoman territory and the other Georgian kingdoms. Its rulers, the atābegs<sup>2</sup> of the Jaqeli family, were rivals of the Bagratids. Their capital was at Akhaltzikhe, the "Atūn Kal'e" of the Ottoman sources. Here Kai Khusrau II had died in 1575, leaving his strong-willed Queen, Dedis-Imēdi, and three sons, Quarquare V (called Alexander in some sources), Manuchar II (who received the Muslim name Muṣṭafā), and Beka III. This principality, which, in the West, bordered on the Ottoman Empire, was the first to capitulate and do homage to the Sultan after the commencement of hostilities between the Ottomans and Persians in 1578.

Northern Azerbaijan, Shirvan<sup>3</sup> and Derbent<sup>4</sup> were under direct

<sup>1</sup> Mingrelia had long been under Ottoman influence. See above, p. 7/ note 1.

<sup>2</sup> Atābeg, in the proper sense of the term, indicated a person of great experience and high prestige within a state who was given the supervision of a young prince. In cases where the latter succeeded to the throne, the atābeg quite often assumed the role of a regent. An atābeg of Meskhia had earlier usurped the throne and henceforth the line of succession remained in his family; hence the term "Sa-Atobago" [= (Georgian) Land of the Atabegs] is found in some chronicles. Allen, "Don Juan of Persia", B.S.O.S., VI, pp. 182-186. Cf., also, art. "Atabak (Atabeg)", E.I. I, pp. 731-732 (Cahen).

<sup>3</sup> Shirvan was made a province of Persia in 1536. Thereafter, various attempts were made by the descendants of the Shirvanshahs to re-establish themselves in the kingdom. In 1547 when Alkas Mirza, brother of Shah Tahmāsp and at that time governor of Shirvan, defected to the Ottomans, Ismā'il Mirza, the fourteen-year-old son of Tahmāsp was appointed to the post, accompanied by his lālā or atabeg (see above, p. 85 note 3), Gökça Solṭān of the Kajar tribe. Borhan 'Alī Mirza, son of the late Shirvanshah Halil, made an unsuccessful attempt to regain his father's heritage but was repulsed by the forces of Ismā'il. The following year



Safavid control. The rulers of Dagestan,<sup>1</sup> however, who were designated by the title Şamhal<sup>2</sup> maintained a precarious independence, while, at the same time, through marriage alliances with the Safavid rulers, enjoyed considerable influence at the court in Qazvin.<sup>3</sup>

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when Shirvan, as a result of the Ottoman campaign, became devoid of Safavid troops, Borham 'Ali Kirza successfully established himself in Shirvan until he was driven out after the Ottoman withdrawal. Cf. Hinz, "Schah Esma'il II...", Mitteilungen 36/II, pp. 26-28.

<sup>4</sup>Shah Isma'il I conquered Derbent in 1509; thereafter, the ruler of Derbent was appointed by the Shah of Persia. Cf. art. "Derbend", I.A., III, p. 537 (Barthold).

<sup>1</sup>Şamhal Çubān, a Kumuck (Kūmūḱ) who controlled most of the region from the Terek river to Kaytaq (Kaya dağ or Kayakent (?)) /Cf. The Times Atlas of the World, Vol. II (London, 1959), Plate 447, and from the Avar country (Cf. ibid., the branch of the river Sulak called "Avarskoye Koysu") to the Caspian Sea, died in 1578 at Buynak. According to the art. "Dagistan", I.A., III, p. 454 (Barthold), Çubān died in 986/1578-79. He left four sons, Andiy, Gerey, El'dar and Magomet, by his Kaytak (Kaytak) wife. They divided up the realm of their father among themselves and hereafter elected the Şamhal in turn from the four houses. A fifth son of Çubān, But (sic), because he was born to a daughter of a Circassian ~~concubine~~, was excluded from the original division of the Dagestan lands and only later, by force, won himself an appanage between the Sulak and Terek rivers. Following Çubān, as Şamhal, were Andiy, Gerey and El'dar, respectively. Such a system led to a number of internal clashes. Cf., M. A. Polievktov, "Iz Perepiski Severne-Kavkazskikh Feodalov XVII veka," XLV Akademiku N. Ya. Marru, ed., I. I. Meshchaninov (Moscow-Leningrad, 1935), pp. 745-755.

<sup>2</sup>Şamhal - Şah Ba'1, etc., Cf. art. "Dagistan", loc.cit.

<sup>3</sup>The Şamhal, presumably Şamhal Çubān (see note 1 above.) held the position of Muhurdar (≈ sealbearer) under Shah Tahmāsp and Shah Isma'il (Roemer, Der Niedergang Irans, pp. 14-16). His sister, a wife of Shah Tahmāsp, had given birth to the Sultana (A princess) Parī Hām Hanum and Sultan (≈ prince) Sulaymān (Ibid. and Hinz, "Schah Esma'il..." Mitteilungen 36/II, p. 47). Moreover, the Şamhal's daughter, who was the mistress of Levan of Kakheti, had given him a daughter who became the wife of Simon of Kartli (Allen, History, p. 140).

#### 4. The Death of Shah Tahmāsp and the <sup>n/</sup> ensuing Struggle for Power

As long as Shah Tahmāsp held the reins of government firmly, the bickering among the Kizilbaş Amirs and the rivalry of the various parties at the court were held in check. When, however, the Shah fell ill in November, 1575, two principal factions, each determined to place <sup>its</sup> ~~his~~ own candidate on the throne, began to form. The offspring of three of the Shah's wives had prominent roles in the subsequent deliberations and plots. The Shah's Dagestanian wife, a sister of the Şamhal, had given birth to the clever and capable Parī Hān Hānum <sup>and the latter</sup> ~~who~~, through her influence over the Shah, had insinuated herself into an important position in state affairs. Prince Haydar, offspring of the Shah's Georgian wife,<sup>1</sup> had become a favourite of Shah Tahmāsp in his later years and had been given administrative tasks by his father.<sup>2</sup> Hence Haydar Mirza and his half sister were rivals for their father's favour. It was the Turkman wife<sup>3</sup> of Shah Tahmāsp, however, who had brought into the world the two eldest sons of the Shah, Moḥammad Hodābanda and Ismā'īl. Moḥammad Hodābanda although

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<sup>1</sup>The Georgian wife of Shah Tahmāsp was the daughter of Othar Shalikashvili, a powerful noble of Samtzhkē. Her brother, Waraza, was the lover of Dedis-Imēdi, queen of Samtzhkē. In 1574, Shah Tahmāsp, suspecting Levan of Kakheti of negotiating with the Turks, moved an army to Genje. King Levan averted disaster by casting suspicion on Waraza in a communication to Dedis-Imēdi. The queen had her lover executed. Now the Persian army, to avenge the death of Waraza, sacked Samtzhkē. Allen, History, pp. 153.

<sup>2</sup>Hinz, "Schah Esmā'īl II..." Mitteilungen 36/II, pp. 40-41.

<sup>3</sup>The mother of Moḥammad Hodābanda and Ismā'īl was the daughter of the Amīr, Mūsā Sultān Mosellū of the Turkman tribe. Roemer, Der Niedergang Irans, p. 5.

he had been named crown prince much earlier, became afflicted by an ailment which rendered him almost blind. He, therefore, received little consideration as a possible successor to the Shah during the deliberations of 1575.

Although Shah Tahmāsp recovered from his first illness, the basic alignments made at that time persisted until the death of the Shah in the following year (14 May, 1576). Only two candidates received enough support for serious consideration, Ismā'īl and Ḥaydar. Generally speaking, the half-Georgian Ḥaydar Mirza drew upon his fellow Georgians for support. The strength of this faction was greatly augmented by the support of the Ūstājīlū, the most influential of the Kizilbaş tribes at that time. Moreover, Ḥaydar had the support of the Şeyhāvand and Taleş tribes and the majority of the Persian ~~Shāhī~~ hierarchy.<sup>1</sup> Ismā'īl, who had been rotting in Kaḥkahe prison since May of 1557,<sup>2</sup> was championed primarily by the Kizilbaş tribes, but he also had the support of the Kurds and the Dagestanian faction.<sup>3</sup> Thus, with the Ūstājīlū excepted, the struggle assumed a

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<sup>1</sup>The Ūstājīlū occupied most of the important posts of the Safavid state under Shah Tahmāsp. If Ḥaydar became the new Shah, they might expect to retain this position; under Ismā'īl they could only expect his bitter enmity. Hinz, "Schah Esmā'īl II.." Mitteilungen 36/II, pp. 46-50.

<sup>2</sup>Ismā'īl Mirza, who had rendered so much service to his father during the wars with the Ottomans, seems to have looked upon the Peace of Amasya with disfavour and completely broke with his father shortly afterward. He was appointed governor of the province of Khurasan in 1556, but the Shah became suspicious of his son's independent activities and had him imprisoned the following year. In prison Ismā'īl lived a life of debauchery which seriously affected his health and his mind. Ibid., pp. 33-39.

<sup>3</sup>Hinz, "Schah Esmā'īl II...", Mitteilungen, 36/II, p. 47.

kind of ethnic character: the Georgians and Persians against the Kizilbaş and Dagestanians.

All would have gone well for Haydar Mīrza had he not been cut off from his Georgian supporters. A Dagestanian-led force, which had been let into the palace by Parī Hān Hānum through a secret <sup>gate</sup> got beheaded Haydar Mīrza. Now the Kizilbaş, who had earlier intercepted orders for Ismā'īl's execution, quickly consolidated their position and aided the accession of their candidate to the throne of Persia.<sup>1</sup> Shah Ismā'īl was crowned on August 22, 1576. Just over a year later (24 November 1577), after a night of carousing, he was found by his Vezir, Selmān Khan, dying of poison. His demise was welcomed by the majority of his subjects. In his short reign he had succeeded in alienating much of the support which had been responsible for bringing him to power. He had rewarded the decisive support of his Dagestanian half-sister by seizing much of her wealth and divesting her of influence over the administration. He had played off the Kizilbaş and Tājik dignitaries one against the other. Moreover, ~~he~~ <sup>he</sup> step by step, eliminated all of his brothers and their offspring except his own half-blind brother, Moḥammad Hodābanda.<sup>2</sup> He lost the support of his subjects partly because he took no interest in the state administration but particularly, because he preferred the tenets of Sunni Islam to those of Shi'ism.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Hinz, "Schah Esmā'īl II...", Mitteilungen, 36/II, pp. 50-60.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., pp. 69-92 and passim. At the time of his death, Shah Ismā'īl had seen to the execution of Ḥasan, son of Moḥammad Hodābanda. Also orders had been sent for the murder of 'Abbas.

The Kizilbaş amirs gathered at the Meydān-i Asp in Qazvin on 26 November, 1577, to decide on a successor. Mīrza Selmān, last vezir of Shah Ismā'īl II, presided over the assembly. Upon the suggestion of some of the other amirs, Amīr Khan Mōsellū of the Turkman and Pirah Moḥammad Khan of the Ustājlu, on behalf of their followers, agreed to avoid strife. As these two tribes were the principal contenders, the others followed suite. Moḥammad Hodābanda, the only surviving<sup>son</sup> of Shah Tahmāsp and the offspring of a Turkish mother, then became the choice of the majority of the Kizilbaş.<sup>1</sup>

After the death of Shah Ismā'īl II and during the interregnum, Parī Hān Hānum, with the aid of her influential uncle, the Šamhal, who was Muhurdār (sealbearer), took over control of Qazvin as she had done in the days of Shah Tahmāsp. Selmān Khan, whom the princess had long held responsible for her fall from grace under Shah Ismā'īl, received word of a plot against him and hastily departed for Shiraz where Moḥammad Hodābanda confirmed him in his office as vezir, an act which

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(cont.)

<sup>3</sup>It is difficult to understand why Ismā'īl tampered with something so sensitive as the religious system of his state. Perhaps in this field, as in others, his suspicious nature, bred of years suffering an unjust punishment, alienated him from the Shi'ite hierarchy. Quite clearly the leading Shi'ites had opposed his accession to the throne. Hinz, "Schah Esmā'īl II..." Mitteilungen 36/II, pp. 69-92, passim.

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<sup>1</sup>Roemer, Der Niedergang Irans, pp. 3-5. The Governor of Shiraz, Valī Sultān of the Zu'l Qadr, had been appointed lālā of Ismā'īl's son, Šah Sojā'. He proposed that the infant prince be raised to the throne and that Parī Hān Hānum be appointed the regent. This proposal was flatly turned down by the amirs. Valī Sultān, as the warder<sup>in 1577</sup> of Moḥammad Hodābanda, during the last months of Ismā'īl's reign, knew that he could expect no mercy if his charge became Shah. Hinz, "Schah Esmā'īl II..." Mitteilungen 36/II, p. 95.

marked the end of Dagestanian influence in Qazvin. One of the first orders of the new Shah called for the execution of his half sister.<sup>1</sup>

The Shah, before he entered Qazvin on February 13th, 1578, had broken the power of his sister to resist him by appointing the Şamhal governor of Şekki on condition that he depart with his retinue forthwith. Seeing the number of his former supporters who had rallied to the support of the Shah, the Şamhal complied.<sup>2</sup>

Once more the Kizilbaş Amirs appeared to be in complete ascendancy. The Georgian and Persian factions had suffered a serious setback when they failed to seat Prince Haydar on the throne. Now that the malevolent Parī Hān Hānam was dead and the Şamhal relegated to a distant province - albeit near his homeland - the Dagestanian-Circassian influence at court which had survived the turbulent reign of Ismā'īl II was reduced to nil.

#### 4. The Accession of Shah Hodābanda and the Beginning of the Ottoman-Safavid War (1578)

Although the Kizilbaş Amirs had buried their differences long enough to place a successor of Turkish descent on the throne, they had become quite unwilling to cooperate with each other in other respects. It soon became evident that the inner cohesion of the Safavid state was

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<sup>1</sup>Roemer, Der Niedergang Irans, pp.13-17 and pp. 25-26.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 19-20.

insufficient to withstand the shock of a foreign invasion. The half-blind Shah, moreover, could not be expected to re-assert the central authority with sufficient effectiveness to discipline the Kizilbaş tribes and to resist the onslaught of the Ottomans.

The Shah, as the price of his accession (February, 1578), dispersed the treasury and parcelled out the provincial governorships to the Amirs as a means of gaining their support. Already the Kurds, upon the death of Ismā'il, had made an unsuccessful attempt to seize Khoy. Now, with the encouragement of Husrev Pasha, the Ottoman commander at Van, they had brought fire and sword to a large section of the region between Lake Urmia and the mountains of Kurdistan.<sup>1</sup>

This revolt only served to encourage other provinces on the Western borders to rise against the Shah. The province of Shirvan, after it was sacked by an army of Tahmāsp in 1574, had received a tax exemption for some years. Nevertheless, in the Spring of 1578, when the Shah's treasury was exhausted, the Kürçü<sup>2</sup> (Kürçü) were asked to collect their pay from Shirvan. Abū Bekr Mīrza, son of Borhan Mīrza, who was, at the time, in Dagestan,

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<sup>1</sup>Roemer, Der Niedergang Irans, pp. 28-29. The most dangerous rising took place while the newly appointed governor of Azerbaijan, Amīr Khan Mosellū (Turkman), was still in Qazvin. The Turkman and Tekkelū tribes were ordered to pacify the Kurds in support of Husayn Sultān Šolāk (Tekkelū), the governor of Dinavar. Amīr Khan was also to send a detachment. The Kurds withdrew after their raids. The government army followed suit because it lacked provisions. Many peasants evacuated the area as the army had left more destruction in its wake than had the Kurds.

<sup>2</sup>The Kürçü were the bodyguards of the Shah, a special, paid regiment of household troops. Cf. R.M. Savory "The principal offices of the Safawid state during the Reign of Shah 'Tahmāsp' (990-84/1524-76)", O.S.O.A.S., xxiv/1 (1961), pp. 65-85.

took advantage of the unrest in his homeland caused by the rude incursion of the Kürçü to gain the support of the Dagestanians and to lead a force of Lezghian and Karaburk tribesmen against the tax-gatherers.<sup>1</sup> As the peasants had either taken part in the revolt or had fled to the mountains, the Kizilbaş governor of the province, Aras Khan (Rūmlū) and his second-in-command, Ertoğdī Halīfe (Tekkelū)<sup>2</sup> could do nothing to assist the Kürçü. Meanwhile a delegation of notables from the province made its way to Istanbul to seek Ottoman assistance.

The Ottomans decided on war sometime in late 1577 after the death of Shah Ismā'īl II. Husrev Pasha, Beglerbeg of Van, who was in contact with the Kurdish leader Ġāzī Beg, a son of Şāh Kūlī Balīl(-ān),<sup>3</sup> had closely followed the events after the death of Ismā'īl II and had reported them to the Porte, emphasizing the rightness of the time for gaining revenge and taking booty from the enemy.<sup>4</sup>

This report and the succeeding revolts on the Persian borders were

<sup>1</sup>The Lezghians and the Karaburks were smaller, less civilized tribal entities, living in the Caucasus mountain chain north of Shirvan.

<sup>2</sup>It is not clear what position Ertoğdī Halīfe actually held in Shirvan. He might possibly have been the governor of Aresh. Cf. Peçewī, II, p. 54. Roemer simply speaks of the "governors of Shirvan", Der Neidergang Irans, pp. 29-30. Ertoğdī does appear, however, to be the senior commander after Aras Khan is captured.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>"Vilāyet-i 'Acem şah olān Ismā'īl şānī ibn Tahmāsb Şāh fevt olūb yerīne karīndaşī Muhammād Hudābende nām a'mī ve nabīnā Şāh oldıgīn ... bu fırsat mahz-i ganīmet ve a'dādan intikām alacak vakītdir..." Peçewī, II, p. 36.



only incidental to the major reasons behind the decision of the Ottomans to fight a war against the Safavids. During the last decades, the power of Persia had been waning; the Ottomans had every reason for keeping the Safavids weak and what better way was there to do this than to rob her of her rich provinces, Shirvan and Azerbaijan? But the problem went deeper. The Safavids, about the time of the Peace of Amasya (1555), had begun the expansion of their trade relations with Muscovy and England through the Caucasus and across the Caspian Sea. The Ottomans quickly showed their interest in stopping this, to them, dangerous association when they made the Astrakhan campaign of 1569.<sup>1</sup> After the Ottomans gained control of most of the Caucasus between 1573 and 1590, they wasted no time in placing a naval force on the Caspian Sea.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, it was important for the Ottomans to maintain communications with Central Asia and the further Orient. The Uzbeks, as Sunni Muslims bordering the Safavids in Khurasan, shared the interest of the Ottomans in keeping the Persian state weak. Moreover, both of these powers would benefit from keeping the trade and pilgrimage routes open, particularly

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<sup>1</sup> Further details of this campaign appear in the succeeding chapter. There is no doubt whatever that the Astrakhan campaign was partly a measure undertaken to prevent the Persians from receiving succour, and particularly military supplies, from Muscovite and Western European sources. The Ottoman merchants in Persia in 1562, the year Anthony Jenkinson arrived in Qazvin, made representations to the Shah by way of the Ottoman ambassador to the effect that "... (the Frank's) coming thither would in great part destroy their trade, and that it should be good for (the ambassador) to persuade the Sophy not to favour (the Frank), as his Highnesse meant to observe the league and friendship with the great Turke his master...." Cf. A. Jenkinson, "A compendious and brief declaration of the journey of M. Anth. Jenkinson", Hakluyt ed., The Principal Navigations Voyages Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation, III (Glasgow, 1903), p. 29.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Vesselovskiy, Trudy Vostochn. Otdel. Imper. Russk. Archeolog. Obshch. XX, no. 106-108.

in the case of the Ottomans, since the Spanish and Portuguese had, by the late sixteenth century, blockaded much of the Ottoman Near Eastern sea trade with the Orient which had formerly passed through the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The Ottomans, of course, had their own religious and economic interests in the Caucasus.

There was ample cause indeed for the Ottomans to resort to war in 1578 and they methodically prepared for it. They had renewed their existing treaties with Venice in 1575 and with Poland and the Holy Roman Empire in 1577. In the deliberations preceding the campaign, only one important figure raised a word of caution: Şoköllî Mehemmed Pasha, the Grand Vezir. His long experience with Ottoman campaigns, east and west, gave him the foresight to envisage the difficult problems ahead even if the campaign were a success. He said to the Sultan, as quoted by Peçewî:

...Those paid troops will get out of hand and the tri-monthly (mevacib) salary obligations and other expenses will increase. The peasants will be oppressed by taxes (tekalif) and the incursions of the army, and even if Persia is conquered, its peasantry will not accept becoming subjected to us. As to the expenses of the campaign, the collection of revenue from the provinces will not be sufficient. What difficulties even your illustrious grandfather, the late exalted Sultan Sulaymān, experienced! And when peace between the two parties was concluded, what indignation and what anxiety he suffered. Those who put forth this (project) are those who do not know the Persian campaign, (and) who, leaving aside horses and pack animals, do not (even) ride oxen.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Peçewî, II, pp. 36-37.

### C. THE EARLY YEARS OF ĠĀZĪ GIRĀY, 1554-1578

#### 1. The Education of a Hānzāde

Ġāzī Girāy, son of Devlet Girāy Khan (1551-1577), began his life in 1554.<sup>1</sup> In the same year, Astrakhan fell to Muscovy. In 1555, the Ottomans made peace with Safavid Persia at Amasya at the same time as the Protestant and Catholic parties in the Holy Roman Empire signed the Peace of Augsburg, ending the first phase of the Wars of Religion. Two years later in 1557 the Livonian War began. These momentous events were among those which set the stage for the next half century of history, a stage on which the newly-born hānzāde (lit., son of a Khan) was to play a considerable role.

The sources are silent on the details of the birth of Ġāzī Girāy; nevertheless, as his father was at the time the reigning Khan, he most probably was born in Baġġesarāy (Bakhehisaray) the palace begun by his grandfather, Menglī Girāy Khan (d. 1515), in 1503.<sup>2</sup> Apart from the fanfare which must have accompanied the birth of a hānzāde and the public rejoicing which took place after his circumcision - usually at the age of five or six - the most important event in the life of a young Crimean Tatar sultān (A prince) was the appointment of his lālā or atābeg.<sup>3</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup> Mehemmed Rizā, Al Seb' al Seyyār (Kazan, 1832), p. 111.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. art. "Bāġġesarāy," E.I.<sup>2</sup>, I, pp. 893-894 (Spuler).

<sup>3</sup> Cf., art. "Atabak (Atabeg)," E.I.<sup>2</sup>, I, pp. 731-732 (Cahen).

atābeg (lit., father beg) assumed control of the affairs of the young prince during the Khan's pleasure. This important post ordinarily devolved upon an elder of a powerful family, in whom the Khan had full confidence. Rather than a tutor, the atābeg corresponded to the position of a counsellor and regent. He was chiefly a political advisor and, during the minority of the prince, a protector. The atābeg at various stages in the development of his charge, could and usually did, call in various learned men of the 'Ulemā' class to instruct the youth in the Islamic sciences.

To this extent the practice of atālik among the Crimean Tatars corresponded to the general Islamic pattern. Princes and sons of dignitaries also were subjected to rigorous military training. For the sons of the Crimean Tatars, however, a special institution existed which the Crimean Khans had inherited from the Golden Horde. A tribe of the Circassians, the Besleney (Rus., Besleni), apart from their normal economic activities, had the special function of training the hānzādes in horsemanship, use of weapons and military exercises.<sup>1</sup> It was customary for

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<sup>1</sup>"...Altın-Ordu devleti zamanında çerkesler bizzat ulu hamlara tabi ve Altın-Ordu hanlarının prenslerini terbiye ile mukellef mumtaz bir vilayet halinde idare edildi." (In the time of the Golden Horde state, the Circassians were subject personally to the great Khans and they were administered in the quality of a privileged province charged with training the princes of the Khan of the Golden Horde. Cf. art. "Çerkesler," I.A., Vol. III, p. 380 (Bala). On the function of the Besleney Circassians within the Crimean Tatar system see, Belokurov, Snosheniya, p. xxxvii. For more information on the Circassians, see section A above. Cf. also art. "Çerkes", E.I.,<sup>2</sup> II, pp. 21-25.

each prince to receive a different atābeg in order to avoid any strife which might occur among the princely rivals as they reached maturity.<sup>1</sup>

These young sultāns, Ġāzī Girāy and the other alert, able-bodied ones, received a good education and training modelled on Ottoman lines.<sup>2</sup> The impression which both Ġāzī Girāy and his elder brother, 'Adil Girāy, made upon their peers in the Safavid Court during their captivity, provide some indication of their upbringing in the best Islamic standards of the times.<sup>3</sup>

The return of the hānzāde from his period of training among the Besleney Circassians provided the occasion for a celebration which commenced when the sultān was met on the shore near Kerch by the Khan and

<sup>1</sup>According to Bronowski, who observed this institution at first hand during his sojourn in the Crimea in 1578, the atābegs were court officials responsible to the Khan not only for the training of the princes but also for the management of other, what might be termed, family affairs of the Khan. Cf. "Collections out of Martin Broniovius" in Samuel Purches, Purches his Pilgrims, Vol. XIII (Glasgow, 1906) pp. 461-491; also, "Opisanie Kryma (Tartariae Descriptio)" in Russian version in the Zapiski Odesskago Obshchestva Istorii i Drevnostey, VI (Odessa, 1867), pp. 333-367.

<sup>2</sup>To gain some idea of Ottoman standards of education for the dignitaries of the realm, Cf. Barnette Miller, The Palace School of Muhammad The Conqueror (Harvard Hist. Monogr. XVII) (Cambridge, 1941).

<sup>3</sup>The Turkish language, in one dialect or another, was a kind of lingua franca throughout the Ottoman, Safavid and Uzbek territories of that day. It also had currency among the early Moghuls of India and throughout the Asian steppe. For a description of the way in which 'Adil Girāy impressed the Persian court, see C. Ventura (?), Thesoro Politico (Cologne, 1589), p. BBij verso.

the chief dignitaries of the Khanate.<sup>1</sup> On that occasion, those princes who had demonstrated their fitness for leadership received appointments to positions of authority in the Khanate. The most senior of the hānzādes were appointed to posts of ser'asker of the Bujak, Yedisan and Kuban, respectively.<sup>2</sup> Henceforth, the sultāns, although, generally speaking, still under the supervision of their atābeg, could begin to attract personal followers to their standards.<sup>3</sup>

By the time of the Ottoman expedition to Astrakhan in 1569, Ġazī Girāy had reached the age of sixteen. It is not known what position he held, if any, in the governmental hierarchy of the Khanate at the time. At least one contemporary source, however, reveals that the young prince went on the campaign with his older brothers, Mehemmed Girāy, the Kālgay, and 'Ādil Girāy.<sup>4</sup> This was doubtless the first campaign in which Ġazī

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<sup>1</sup>Halīm Girāy, Gūlbun-i Hānān (London, B.M. Or. Ms. 11164) ff29b-30a.

<sup>2</sup>See Part A, Section 3 above.

<sup>3</sup>The relatives of the hānzādes, out of regard for their station, were also assigned appanages. Bronowski, Russian ed. loc.cit.

<sup>4</sup>Ivan Novosil'tsev, who was sent to the Porte in 1570, reported the following account: "Bylo dei pod Astorokhon'yu turskikh lyudey golova Kasim-beg Kafinskoy da vosm' sanchakov voevod, a s nimi tysyach poltret'yattsat' da krymskoy tsar', a s nim tri ego tsarevichi: bolshoy Magmed Kirey Kalga, drugoy Aldi-Girey tretei Kazy-Girey, a s nimi tatar bolshi pyatidesyat tysyach; ..." (The head of the Turkish army Kasim, beg of Kaffa, and eight voivodes of the sanjaks were before Astrakhan, and with them were 25000 men and the Crimean Khan, with whom were three of his sons: big Mehemmed Girāy, the Kālgay, another, 'Ādil Girāy, the third, Ġazī Girāy, and with them more than 50,000 Tatars.) D. Lykachev, Puteshestviya russkikh poslov v xvi i xvii vv (Moscow-Leningrad, 1954) p. 65f.

Girāy participated.

2. The Astrakhan Campaign and Muscovite Aspirations in the Northern Caucasus

The Ottoman and Tatar forces attempted to take Astrakhan from Muscovy in 1569 as part of a project to open up a water route between the Black Sea and the Caspian to counter the growing influence of Muscovy and Safavid Persia in the Caucasus.<sup>1</sup> The Ottomans, faced with more formidable enemies on the borders of their Western European and Asian Empire, were content to consider steppe politics as a prerogative of the Crimean Khans. The Khanate, however, was split dangerously into pro- and anti-Ottoman factions during much of the sixteenth century. This internecine warfare greatly weakened the Crimean Tatars at a time when the Tsars were gradually making encroachments in the Volga-Kama basin at the expense of the Khanates of <sup>K</sup>azan and Astrakhan.<sup>2</sup> The Nogays - heretofore a kind of buffer for the Crimea against Muscovy - also had become alienated from the Crimean Tatars by the attempts of the latter to dominate them. After the Nogays actually split into two

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<sup>1</sup>In the light of the numerous wars which have taken place between the Russian and Ottoman Empires, this incident, the first hostile encounter between these states, has attracted the interest of Soviet and Turkish scholars: Cf., P. A. Sadikov, "Pokhod Tatar i Turok na Astrakhan' v 1569 g." Istoricheskie Zapiski, Vol. 22 (1947), pp. 132-166; H. Inalcik, "Osmanli-Rus Rekabetinin Menşei ve Don-Volga Kanalı Teşebbüsü," Belleten, No. 46 (1948), pp. 349-402, and A. N. Kurat, "The Turkish Expedition to Astrakhan' in 1569 and the Don-Volga Canal", S.E.E.R., XL (December, 1961), pp. 7-23.

<sup>2</sup>Cf., art. "Kazan", I.A., VII, pp. 505-522 (Arat).

groups in the 1540's, Kazan became more isolated than previously from her Crimean Tatar and Astrakhan allies to the South. The Khanate of Astrakhan, this previously rich emporium of the north-south, east-west trade routes, had also been weakened by almost continual internal and external disturbances between the Nogays, the Crimean Tatars and the Cossacks.<sup>1</sup> After the break away and subsequent immigration of the so-called Little Nogays from the middle Volga the Don Cossacks commenced filling up the vacated portion of the steppe. While these events were taking place, Kazan fell to Moscow in 1552 and Astrakhan in 1556.<sup>2</sup>

The people to the immediate South and East of Astrakhan viewed this new proximity of a relatively strong state with mixed feelings. Some looked upon Muscovy with mistrust; others welcomed the opportunity, as had the Great Nogays, to escape from Crimean Tatar domination. Initially, at least, this feeling appears to have predominated among the Kabarda Circassians of the Northern Caucasus.<sup>3</sup> The Beş Tepe (Pyatigorsk) Circassians, probably because of their proximity to Crimean Tatar home territories, sought Muscovite protection as early as 1552. The Kabardinians followed in 1557.<sup>4</sup> The Kalmucks (Kalmīk) a nomadic entity dwelling

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<sup>1</sup>Cf., art. "Astrakhān", E.I.<sup>2</sup>, I, pp. 721-722 (Spuler).

<sup>2</sup>Cf., art. "Kazan", I.A., VII, pp. 305-322 (Arat).

<sup>3</sup>Belokurov, Snosheniya, p. xxx.

<sup>4</sup>It was through Cossack intermediaries that diplomatic relations between some Circassian princes and Moscow commenced in the 1550's. Ibid., pp. xxxii-xxxiii. The first documentation of Cossack settlements on the right bank of the Terek river dates from the early 1560's. Cf. Kumykov, Kabardino-Russk. Otnosh. I, p. 398, note 101. Belokurov, ibid., p. xxxv and Kumykov, ibid., p. 3. In part, the eagerness of these principalities to come to terms with Moscow stemmed from the importance to their own



on the steppe between the Terek and Astrakhan, submitted in the same year. The seriousness of Muscovite intentions became quite clear when Ivan IV married the daughter of a leading Kabardinian prince, Temruk, in 1561.<sup>1</sup> The Tsar was quick to help his new Circassian relatives. In 1563, at the request of his father-in-law, <sup>Temruk,</sup> he caused fortifications to be built in the Kabardinian tribal territory.<sup>2</sup>

According to the Russian accounts, the Ottomans and Tatars were now prodded into action against Moscow upon the appearance of petitions from Circassians, Tatars of Astrakhan and Kazan, Nogays, Turkman (Tyurmen) and the Krym-Şanhals (Krym-Shevkalov), petitions which came from refugees or secret delegations to the Porte and to Bakhchisaray.<sup>3</sup>

In actuality, in spite of the diplomatic successes of Moscow in the Caucasus, there were already signs that the position of Muscovy on the steppe, upon which the successes depended, was slowly deteriorating.

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economies of trading in the bazaars of Astrakhan. Karamsin, Histoire de l'Empire de Russie, VIII, p. 252.

<sup>1</sup>Karamsin, IX, p. 41.

<sup>2</sup>Belokurov, Snosheniya, lxxxv. The second marriage of Ivan IV to Maria Temrukovna (Christianised form) opened the way for Circassian nobles to marry into wealthy and important families in Moscow. In this way the Circassians strengthened their social position in the Caucasus. This orientation, towards Moscow, among the Kabardinian aristocracy, thus seems to have become quite popular. Cf. M. A. Polievktov, "Iz perepiski severno-kavkazskikh feodalov XVII veka", XLV Akademiku N.Ya. Marru (Festschrift of N. Y. Marr) (M.-L., 1935), pp. 745-756.

<sup>3</sup>Belokurov, Snosheniya, p. lxiv. It is not clear what Afanasiy Nagoy, whose dispatch Belokurov quotes, means when he refers to the Krym-Shevkalov. It is known that the line of the Şanhals split after 1578 and each branch

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Isma'il, Khan of the Great Nogays, who had been friendly to Muscovy, died in 1563 and was succeeded by Tin Ahmed, a brother-in-law of Ivan IV by his marriage to another daughter of Temruk. The Tsar's envoy to the Crimea in 1565, Afanasiy Nagoy, received information that diplomatic exchanges were taking place between the Great Nogays and the Crimean Khan.

During the sixties, moreover, Muscovy became increasingly involved in the Livonian War. The Tatars, in alliance with Sigismund August, had carried out diversionary raids on Riazan in 1564 and besieged the city of Bolkhov in October, 1565, with guns which they had carted to the site on wagons.<sup>1</sup>

The Tsar, who during the course of 1564 had unleashed a terrible vengeance on his boyars and, by means of his oprichnina<sup>2</sup> reform, had greatly reduced their power, wanted no major conflict on his southern borders. In a move to ease the mounting tension, he agreed to negotiate with the Crimean Khan on the question of the annual gifts, offer-

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tended to side with whichever of the three powers, Muscovy, the Ottoman Empire or the Safavid state provided the most advantages. There is no doubt, however, that the Crimean Tatars had influence in Dagestan which may, at this time, have had the importance of a faction. Cf. Polievktov, loc.cit., pp. 748-749, Inalcik, "Don-Volga Kanalı Teşebbüsü...", Belleten, 46, pp. 383-384 and Belokurov, Snosheniya, pp. lxiv-lxv.

<sup>1</sup>Novosel'skiy, Borba, p. 27, and Karamsin, IX, pp. 82-83 and 136-137. The Polish king had sent the Khan a subsidy of 30,000 ducats.

<sup>2</sup>Cf., V. O. Kluchevsky, A History of Russia, tr. C. J. Hogarth, II (New York, 1960) pp. 74-90.

ing to pay the subsidies as agreed to during the reign of Şahib Girāy.<sup>1</sup>

It appears that a Russian town and an Ostrog (<sup>fort</sup>palisade) was erected by Muscovy early in 1567 on the right bank of the Terek river at the mouth of the Sunzhu.<sup>2</sup> To show his displeasure with this kind of effrontery, Devlet Girāy took part in raids on Muscovite territory every year between 1567 and 1574.<sup>3</sup> One of these "raids" was the Astrakhan campaign of 1569.

The continuation of the Hungarian War after the death of Sultan Sulaymān before the walls of Szigetvar in 1556<sup>4</sup> postponed the projected Ottoman campaign on the steppe until a peace was concluded with the Emperor in 1568. At the same time, existing agreements with Poland and Safavid Persia were renewed.

<sup>1</sup>The Tsar probably felt that he had to placate the Khan in the hope that he would oppose an Ottoman campaign on the steppe. Inalcik, "Don-Volga Kanali Tesebbüsü..." Belleten, 46, pp. 367-368.

<sup>2</sup>The Temruk faction of Kabardinians had used Muscovite and Cossack elements against the Beş Tepe Circassians the previous year. Now they asked the Tsar to build them a fortified town. Another strong faction opposed this measure but was crushed in the resulting struggle. Some 20,000 were reported killed. Belokurov, Snosheniya, pp. lxvi-lxxi. Referring to this new act of hostility, the Khan wrote to the Tsar "... If the tsar wishes to be (live) in friendship and brotherhood with me, then he would not build a city on the Terek and he would give me the gifts of (which were given in the time of) Mehemmed Girāy (I)..." (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup>This new stage of Tatar warfare, which was generally coordinated with Poland-Lithuania, with whom the Khan was allied, came at a critical point in the Livonian War. These attacks made it necessary for the Tsar to revise the defence system on his southern borders. The new system, which called for the stationing of five regiments on the edge of the settled portion of the steppe, continued in force practically without alteration until the reign of Boris Godunov. For details of the regiments which were stationed generally in Serpukhov, Tarusa, Kaluga, Kolomna and Kashira, cf., Novosel'skiy, Borba, pp. 24-29.

<sup>4</sup>In this year Mehemmed Girāy, the Kalgay, had taken part in this campaign with a force estimated at 20,000 Tatars. Inalcik, "Don-Volga Kanali Tesebbüsü..." Belleten, 46, pp. 267-268.

But, by 1569, the long-discussed plans for the Astrakhan campaign were put into effect. *Şokollı* Mehemmed Pasha, the Grand Vezir, had entrusted the command to *Kasim* Pasha, the Kaffa Sanjak Beg of Circassian origin. The final plan called for the digging of a canal between the Don and the Volga rivers, as the Tsar was told later, to facilitate trade with Moscow! At Astrakhan, should it prove impossible to dislodge the Tsar in the first year of the campaign, the *Serdār* (commander-in-chief) was commanded to erect a fortress which would instruct the Tsar of the power of his adversary.

Although Astrakhan was the tactical objective, considerations had been given, from a strategic standpoint, to the security of the northern trade routes along which passed the caravans of commerce and the annual pilgrimage. Moreover, the Ottomans wanted to frustrate a possible Moscow-Safavid alliance and, at the same time, to establish another route by which to conduct war against the Safavids.<sup>1</sup> Two further problems doubtless received attention in the prior deliberations.

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<sup>1</sup>In the words of Marcantonio Barbaro (Alberi, Ser. III/I, p. 337): "Queste forze, e l'unione che ha col Persiano, siccome i Tartari l'hanno con i Turchi tentarono di far che con un taglio il fiume Volga entrasse nel fiume Tanai, per aprirsi la navigazione, come dicevano loro per comodita dei traffici di Moscovia cosa in vero che sarebbe stata di molto loro utile; ma piu veramente i Turchi si adoperavano per aprire la navigazione all'armata loro nel mar Caspio, atta a danneggiar gravemente tutta la Persia, liberandosi con questo modo de quelle incomodita suole apportar loro il lunghissimo viaggio di terra che loro convien fare quando hanno da andare contro il Sofi, l'armi del quale sous sopra modo ternute die Turchi, si come or ora diro." The French envoy to the Porte at the time, M. de Grantrie de Granchamp, also emphasized the anti-Safavid nature of this expedition. He reported to his government that there was a "...project de la Porte pour la jonction du Volga a la mer Caspienne..." and that there were "...apprehensions de guerre avec la Perse...", *Charriere Négociations de la France*, III, p. 57f.

Communications with the anti-Safavid Uzbeks in Central Asia were now greatly hampered. Moreover, the sea routes from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea to India had almost entirely been blocked by the Portuguese at the time. Sīdī 'Alī Re'īs, an Ottoman naval commander, had fought the Portuguese in the early fifties and had only managed to avoid capture after a skirmish, by leaving his vessels in Gujarat and by proceeding overland to Constantinople across Central Asia. The account of his journey and the information it provided about the current situation on the Indian Ocean and in Central Asia may have influenced the thinking of the Ottoman leaders in the sixties a great deal.<sup>1</sup>

The campaign commenced in the spring of 1569 despite the Khan's pessimistic excuses about the severity of the weather, the dangers of changing the water level of the Sea of Azov, and the threat of attack by means of the canal once it was constructed.<sup>2</sup> The digging did not progress as rapidly as had been expected.<sup>3</sup> Thus, Kāsim Pasha, aware of the approach of autumn and encouraged by a delegation of Nogays to march on Astrakhan, left the heavy guns on the Don and marched upon Astrakhan overland before the season had advanced too far. Upon facing the island stronghold which Moscow had built in the early sixties,

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<sup>1</sup>Cf., Sīdī 'Alī Re'īs, tr. A. Vambery, The Travels and Adventures of the Turkish Admiral...1553-1556 (London, 1899).

<sup>2</sup>Smirnov, Krymskoe Khanstvo, pp. 433-434. The fear of an attack by the Portuguese had been the excuse for abandoning the Ottoman Suez canal project earlier.

<sup>3</sup>Cf., Kurat, "Turkish Expedition to Astrakhan", S.E.E.R., XL, p. 17.

the army began to lose its morale. Both the captured Russian envoy and the Crimean Khan were later to take credit for this. Simeon Maltsev, in his Rechi or Memoir on the campaign, described the rumours in the camp about the shortage of food and the coldness of the steppe winter.<sup>1</sup> The Crimean Tatars were restive. They had been subjected to rumours, said to have originated with the Khan, that the sultan planned to occupy the Crimea. The Khan certainly appeared to do all he could to hinder the success of the campaign. In May, 1569, the Tsar actually had sent the officer, Khoznikov, to the court of the Shah to enlist his support.<sup>2</sup> Attempts to take the fortress by storm proved hopeless without the support of the siege guns. Kāsim Pasha now prepared to winter in the old quarter of the city. Under pressure from the rank-and-file, however, he was forced to order a withdrawal on September 20th. Karamsin goes so far as to suggest that the Khan led the troops back over a desert route exposing them to the hazards of the weather and the raids of Circassian bandits.<sup>3</sup> The withdrawal became a rout of troops strung out from Astrakhan to Azov. A large Ottoman force, in this way, demonstrated bad discipline and suffered a disaster of some magnitude. Many

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Sadikov, "Pokhod Tatar i Turok", Istorich. Zapis., 22, p. 156 ff.

<sup>2</sup>Karamsin, IX, pp. 163-165; Inalcık ("...Don-Volga Kanalı Teşebbüsü..." Belleten, 46, pp. 367-368) states that it was I. P. Novosiltsev who was sent to Persia.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

perished on the steppe from a shortage of food and water. As a final crowning blow to all who had supported the Grand Vezir in this venture, goods and equipment sufficient for a three year campaign, which had been stockpiled at Azov, caught fire either through the negligence or the deliberate activity of the disgruntled soldiery.<sup>1</sup> Not for some time was the Empire to attempt another Northern campaign. Şokollî's prestige had been damaged; Devlet Girāy was no longer trusted.

Although information about the actual part played by the Tatar princes in the Astrakhan campaign is extremely fragmentary, it is probable that they were wing commanders in the military formations of the khan which are said to have numbered 15,000.<sup>2</sup> Ġazî Girāy, however, remained with his father's retinue.<sup>3</sup> There is, however, one incident worthy of mention. It illustrates the sort of pressure which Moscow could bring to bear on the sophisticated members of the Tatar community. Karamsin reported a conversation between the Tatar princes and the captured Russian envoy, Maltsev, who had been conscripted to serve in a galley on the campaign. As Maltsev spoke the Tatar tongue, the hānzādes questioned him freely about his homeland. The envoy invited the princes

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<sup>1</sup>Inalcık, loc.cit..

<sup>2</sup>Stateyniy Spisok of Novosil'tsev in Lykachev, Puteshestvita russkikh poslov, p. 65 ff.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. the mention of Ġazî Girāy by Jędrzej Taranowski, an eye-witness, Podroze i Poselstwa Polskie do Turcyi, in the Biblioteka Polska, Part 9 (Warsaw, 1860), p. 54.

to join the service of the Tsar saying, "...Your father has a numerous family. He will send you hither and yon. Your position is not what it ought to be because you wander as nomads from steppe to steppe. In Moscow, on the contrary, you will find honour, riches, and even your father will envy your lot."<sup>1</sup> That Ġāzī Girāy was impressed by what he heard and saw, there is little doubt. The Russian envoy, Vasil'-chikov, who was sent to Persia on a mission in 1589, reported a conversation which he had with a certain Ferhād Beg, the governor of Isfahan ("spagan"). The governor, while discussing the Muscovite army with the envoy, made the remark, "...Our Shah held captive the Crimean Prince, Ġāzī Girāy, but he was in my charge; and the prince, Ġāzī Girāy related to me that he was privileged to wage war upon your sovereign and that he saw your ruler's army penetrate the great Turkish army..."<sup>2</sup>

The Tatars had proved fickle allies. Sultan Sulaymān had maintained reservations about the effectiveness of Tatar troops after the Moldavian Campaign of 1538. As Ṣāhib Girāy is supposed to have expressed it,

The Tatars, the wretched fellows, are incapable of carrying out distant or difficult campaigns, and the equipping of a detachment of select brave men, in relation to its numbers, would cost the Sultan very dearly and would amount to a useless expenditure.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Karamsin, IX, p. 164.

<sup>2</sup>Vesselovskiy, "Pamyat, Diplom. i Torgov. Snosh.", Trudy Arkheolog. Obshchestva, XX (1890), p. 75. From 1569 to 1589 there was no other direct contact between the forces of the Sultan and those of the Tsar. It is therefore most likely that the conversation to which Ferhād Beg referred was in reference to the Astrakhan Campaign of 1569. Cf., Hammer, VI, p. 339.

<sup>3</sup>Smirnov, Krymskoe Khanstvo, p. 425, citing Remmāl Hōja, f. 145.



Sultan Sulaymān had trusted Şāhib Girāy, but apparently did not feel the same way about Devlet Girāy and had little to do with the Crimea after Şāhib Girāy's death.<sup>1</sup>

Devlet Girāy had not helped wreck the "Astrakhan Campaign" without reason. He now wrote to Ivan IV demanding that he return Astrakhan and Kazan to Tatar rule. Tsar Ivan, fearing further Ottoman action against his domain, tactfully refused the khan's proposal, but stated he would negotiate on the question of Tiyiṣ payments at the rate agreed upon in the reign of Meḥemmed Girāy I.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the Tsar, not wishing to rely solely on Devlet Khan, sent his envoy Novosil'tsev to Selim II in 1570 to proffer congratulations for his accession - 4 years after the event - and to strengthen the ties of peace and friendship between their respective states at a time when the Livonian War had taken a turn against Muscovy.

The Sultan requested redress of four outstanding issues:

1. The opening of the routes through Astrakhan.
2. The destruction of the Russian fortress in the Kabarda.
3. The security of travellers passing to and from the Ottoman state.
4. The return of the Khan's envoy, Yambuldu, who was being

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<sup>1</sup>Smirnov, loc.cit.

<sup>2</sup>Inalcık, "Don-Volga Kanalı Teşebbüsü", Belleten, 46, p. 385. The tribute agreed upon at that time was known to be quite high.

detailed in Moscow.<sup>1</sup>

As no specific claims to <sup>K</sup>azan or Astrakhan were put forward at the time, it was apparent that the Sultan did not intend to contest further the conquests of the Tsar for the present.

Although the Ottomans had failed in their objectives of connecting the Don and the Volga and seizing Astrakhan, the mere presence of a sizeable Ottoman army on the steppe had, nevertheless, produced some favourable results. The lesson was obvious: if the Ottomans so desired, they could always send another army to the steppe. An important portion of the Great Nogays had shown themselves willing to cooperate with the Ottomans during the campaign. In 1571, they moved into the steppe closest to the Crimea and gave over the command of their forces to Devlet Girāy. These changing fortunes of the Tsar on the steppe were not missed by the Khan. He sent his sons to the Kabarda in 1570 where they soundly defeated the forces of Temruk Mīrza. This stroke had the effect of purging the Kabarda of Muscovite influence and, at the same time, of eliminating the threat of a flank attack during the Moscow campaign of the following year.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Inalcık, "Don-Volga Kanalı Teşebbüsü...", Belle ten 46, pp. 385-388.

<sup>2</sup>Inalcık (ibid.) states that both sons of Temruk were killed in this battle. Belokurov (Snosheniya, pp. lxxvii-lxxviii) to the contrary, states that these sons, Mamstruk and Beberyuk, were captured by 'Adil Girāy and taken to the Crimea and that Ivan IV, realizing their importance as political prisoners, offered a large ransom for them. When the Crimean Tatars learned that Ivan IV was responsible for the death of Mikhail, Temruk's third son, who was residing (as a hostage?) in Moscow, they made much of the affair to help re-establish their influence in Circassia. (Ibid.)

Muscovy, somewhat over-extended in the Caucasus and fully engrossed in the Livonian conflict, was caught off balance by Devlet Girāy in 1571. The Khan routed the Muscovite forces defending the Oka river line south of Moscow and then swept to Moscow almost unopposed. The Tatars fired the suburbs, but the inner city, owing to a strong wind, also caught fire and was almost completely destroyed.<sup>1</sup> No act was calculated to bring more immediate renown to the Crimean Khan, to whom the Tatars now gave the title Daḡtī Algān (Tahtī Alan = "Taker of the Capital").<sup>2</sup>

While this event was taking place, the Tsar's envoy, Kusminskiy, had made his way to Istanbul and had presented a letter to the Sultan which accepted all of his previous proposals.<sup>3</sup> In view of the way everything was turning against Muscovy, the Sultan was no longer satisfied with just the settlement of his previous grievances. Now the Sultan, in a return letter, demanded the surrender of Astrakhan and Kazan and even called for the submission of the Tsar. Thus, at a time when

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<sup>1</sup>Peçewī, I, p. 500; Cf. also, the references to the burning of Moscow and a general description of Muscovy during this period by A. Jenkinson in Hakluyt's Principle Navigations, III, pp. 170-195. Cf., also, the account by Richard Uscombe, ibid., p. 167.

<sup>2</sup>'Abdu 'l Gaffār, 'Umdet al Ahbār, T.T.E.M., 85, p. 122.

<sup>3</sup>The Tsar actually razed the fortress on the Terek. According to Belokurov, he did this not out of any fear of the Sultan, but as a sincere gesture of friendship. This view is not satisfactory. After the han-zades had defeated Temruk in 1570, it is highly doubtful that Muscovy enjoyed as much prestige among the Circassians as formerly. Moreover, after his defeat in Livonia and the burning of his capital, Ivan would have been foolish to continue stirring the already troubled waters in the South. Cf., Belokurov, Snosheniya, pp. lxxv-lxxvi.

Ivan IV would have liked to have made an alliance with the Sultan, hard-pressed as he was from all sides, his envoys were ill-received and even subjected to mild humiliation.<sup>1</sup>

The Tsar succeeded in checking a further attack of the Khan in 1572. Thereafter, years of famine and plague, coupled with Cossack attacks and troubles with the Nogays, kept the Tatars actively engaged closer to home.<sup>2</sup> In 1574, the Nogays and Crimean Tatars made a successful raid into the Muscovite province of Ryazan, but these allies soon fell out again, partly over old grievances, partly over new ones. The Nogays under the leadership of Tın Ahmed consequently moved across the Don and again accepted the overlordship of Moscow.<sup>3</sup>

The facts show that the Astrakhan campaign had complex origins and that some of the results of this show-of-force, combined with other developments in Eastern Europe, tended to ease tensions for the Ottomans and Crimean Tatars on the steppe. In so far as the position of Muscovy had deteriorated in the Caucasus, the Ottomans had succeeded also in lessening the likelihood of a Muscovite-Safavid rapprochement. Yet,

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<sup>1</sup>Inalcık, "Don Volga Kanalı Teşebbüsü", Belleten, 46, pp. 389-390 and Hammer, VI, p. 341.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Regardless of how often the Nogays assisted the Crimeans in their raids on Muscovy, the Nogays always received the brunt of Don Cossack and Zaporozhian attacks fostered by Moscow because of their exposed position on the steppe. Moreover, the old Crimean Tatar arrogance continued to offend the Nogays. Some Crimean Tatars also stole Nogay carts and livestock and even the Khan came under criticism for reserving the best grazing areas for the livestock of the Crimean Tatar dignitaries. Novosel'skiy Borba, p. 28.

one basic purpose of the campaign, namely, the opening of a water route to the Caspian for the purpose of improving the logistics in any future clash of the Ottomans with the Safavids, had failed, and it failed because a fundamental premise was false. In the words of Peçewî,

....Some experts said, 'The distance is small between the Don river which flows into the Black Sea and the Volga river which flows into the Caspian Sea. If the Sultan would take the trouble, it would be easy to join them together'.<sup>1</sup>

### 3. The Crimean Khanate in Troubled Times, 1574-1578

In the absence of specific information one can only speculate that Ġāzî Girāy took an active part in the various campaigns and raids of the Crimean Tatars which took place between 1569 and 1578. This would mean that Ġāzî Girāy accompanied his brothers on the campaign into the Kabarda in 1570 and that he was most likely before the walls of Moscow in 1571. Thereafter only minor skirmishes took place between the Muscovites and Tatars for some years. In 1574, following the revolt against the Sultan of Ivan Ivonia, Hospodar of Moldaviâ (1572-1574), which had been supported by some Polish grandees and the Zaporozhian Cossacks,<sup>2</sup> the Crimean Tatars received orders from the Sultan to attack

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<sup>1</sup> Peçewî, I, p. 468.

<sup>2</sup> The Porte had become annoyed by and suspicious of the connections which Bogdan IV (1568-1572), the former Hospodar, kept with Poland. He was deposed but, in the ensuing struggle, many Polish troops were put at the disposal of Bogdan. About this time (1572) Zygmunt August, King of Poland, died and the Poles were forced to return to their home territories, leaving the Turkish candidate, Ivan (the Cruel), in the office of Hospodar. The latter revolted against the Sultan in 1574 when the Sultan demanded tribute in excess of previous amounts. Cf. Hammer, VI, pp. 440-444.

the Cossacks.<sup>1</sup> According to Urechi the Tatars, under the direction of 'Ādil Girāy, actually took part in the campaign to crush the Moldavian revolt.<sup>2</sup> Ġāzī Girāy doubtless also took part in this campaign. Only in 1575, however, is Ġāzī Girāy specifically mentioned in the sources as having led a contingent of 10,000 Tatars in the company of his brothers, 'Ādil Girāy and Alp Girāy, and his nephew, Sa'ādet Girāy, son of Mehemmed Girāy, the Kalgay.<sup>3</sup> This expedition into Podolia and other eastern provinces of Poland-Lithuania during September, 1575 brought terrible destruction and many inhabitants were carried off as captives by the Tatars. According to one Polish historian this action helped to hasten the choice of a new king among the ruling councils in Poland.<sup>4</sup> The new Hospodar of Moldavia, Peter (1575-1579 and 1583-1590), son of the Hospodar Mircea of Wallachia, had given the Tatars permission to cross his territory in exchange for a share of the booty.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Novosel'skiy, Borba, p. 30.

<sup>2</sup>G. Urechi, ed. and tr. E. Picot, Chronique de Moldavie (Paris, 1878) p. 499 ff.

<sup>3</sup>Swietoslaw Orzelski, "Eight Books on the Interregnum", Scriptores Rerum Polonicarum, XXII, p. 362.  
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<sup>4</sup>Nowak, p. 376. Contemporary evidence indicates that this devastating raid had economic, rather than political, origins. Gerlach, in an entry for 31 May, 1575 (p. 96), states simply: "in der Tartarey sey grosser Hunger and Pest". Cf. in this regard, Karamsin, IX, p. 267.

<sup>5</sup>Urechi, Chronique de Moldavie, p. 511.

These clashes between the Crimean Tatars and the Zaporozhian Cossacks continued between 1575 and 1578 with the tacit support of the Cossacks by Poland and of the Tatars by the Ottoman state. Among some Polish magnates who were supported by the Habsburgs, there had long been the desire to spark a conflict between Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire. The immediate object of such a venture would be to establish Polish hegemony over Moldavia and thus to acquire a direct outlet to the Black Sea.<sup>1</sup> Poland would again take up this struggle to regain a special position in the affairs of Moldavia during the long conflict between the Holy Roman Empire and the Ottoman state (1593-1606).

The Ottomans looked upon any interference in Moldavia as a threat to be met by strong measures; therefore, every encouragement was given by them to the Tatars to counteract the Cossack raids on Ottoman soil. The culmination of this phase of the border warfare came in 1577. In this year the Cossacks made severe attacks on Ochakov, Akkerman and the Crimea. Behind these raids, in particular, the hand of Ivan IV also was detected. In supplying men and money to the Cossacks, he not only kept the Tatars from raiding his own territories, but also he must have hoped to start a major conflict between the Ottomans and

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<sup>1</sup>It is interesting to note that during the war between the Ottoman Empire and Venice (1570-1573) the spices, which formerly came from the Persian Gulf to Aleppo and then passed to Europe in Venetian vessels, began to pass from Persia to Constantinople and from there through Moldavia to Poland and Western Europe. Cf. Vincenzo Alessandri "Relatione di Persia", Alberi, Ser. III/II, p. 122.

Poland-Lithuania at a time when he had again taken the initiative in the Livonian War.<sup>1</sup> Fortunately, Stephen Bathory and his advisors realized the critical turn of events on the borders which had enabled Ivan Podkova and his Cossack followers to unseat the prince of Moldavia in 1577. Not until this adventurer was beheaded and apologies sent to the Sultan did the Ottomans renew the treaty of friendship with Poland. The signing of the peace left Poland free to settle the Danzig revolt and the Livonian War and the Ottomans and Crimean Tatars to prosecute the Persian War.

These events in the life of Ġāzī Girāy were but a prelude to the type of border warfare with which the young Khan would have to deal in the early years of his reign. Closer to home, the stresses on the ruling circles of famine, epidemics of plague and continual raiding naturally led to quarrels over matters of policy for the Khanate. The rivalry between the two eldest sons of Devlet Girāy had become particularly acute during the last years of Devlet Girāy's life (d. 1577). Finally, 'Adil Girāy, unable to reconcile himself with his brother and kalgay, Mehemmed Girāy, left the Crimea and caused a separate <sup>town</sup> ~~city~~ to be built on the Kalmius river, which flows off the steppe into the Sea of Azov. This he called Bōlī Sarāy. Fortunately, for the future survival of the Khanate, the brothers became reconciled

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<sup>1</sup> Cf., Novosel'skiy, Borba, p. 30.



just before the death of their father. Thus, the new Khan, Mehemmed Girāy (1577-1584), appointed 'Ādil to the post of Kaḡay and could<sup>1</sup> then speak of the unity of the Crimea to the Muscovite ambassador. Now the Crimean Tatars were in a better position than previously to assist the Sultan in the ensuing campaign.

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<sup>1</sup>Novosel'skiy, Borba, p. 33, citing Krym. Knig., No. 15, ff. 20-21.

## Chapter I

### GAZİ GIRAY AND THE PERSIAN WAR

#### 1. The Commencement of the Persian War

Once the Sultan had decided on war he requested his Grand Vezir, Şokollî Mehmed Pasha, to choose an appropriate commander of the Eastern Theatre (serdār). This proved to be no easy task. The vezirs, Lalā Muṣṭafā Pasha and Süfî Sinān Pasha, two field commanders who had gained distinction in their respective campaigns of Cyprus and the Yemen, had defended the war policy before the Sultan and they had now competed actively for the new post.<sup>1</sup> The Grand Vezir, seeking to maintain a balance between these aggressive subordinates, at first planned to assign to each of them a sector of the Persian frontier and an appropriate complement of troops. Sinān Pasha would receive the Baghdad sector and Muṣṭafā Pasha that of Eastern Anatolia. Immediately, however, Sinān Pasha, whom Peçewî describes as "obstinate and given to perverse contentions", complained to the Sultan that under the proposed arrangement he would receive inferior troops. In the end, Sinān Pasha became so disturbed and unmanageable that Şokollî Mehmed urged the Sultan to appoint Muṣṭafā Pasha, the serdār; that is, the sole commander of the force to

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<sup>1</sup> These generals, since the time of the revolt in Yemen (1569-1570) had been bitter rivals. Cf. Hammer, Histoire de l'Empire ottoman, VI, p. 368 ff.

be sent to Persia. This he did on 22 Seval 985/2 January, 1578.<sup>1</sup>

Muṣṭafā Pasha, an experienced campaigner in the Ottoman tradition, immediately began making preparations for the war. Nor did he neglect the opportunity to gain by peaceful means what might have cost much in terms of men and material. Understanding well the disarray of his enemy,<sup>2</sup> he directed his secretary (kātib), 'Alī Efendī, an important chronicler of these events, to dispatch letters to Şāhruh Mīrzā, descendent of the rulers of Shirvan,<sup>3</sup> the Şamḥal, ruler of the Kumucks<sup>(Kumuk)</sup> and Kaytaks of Northern Dagestan, the ruler of Tabasaran (Southern Dagestan), Ġazī Sālīḥ, and to the ruler of the Avars, Tūçe Lāv Beg (Bīg), inviting their aid and support in this righteous Ottoman undertaking.<sup>4</sup> Although these rulers represented populations which lay outside the normal Ottoman political sphere, most of them were known to have Ottoman sympathies because of their affiliations with Sunni Islam or because of their political position vis-a-vis the Safavids. Similar letters were sent to all of the petty Georgian princes, some of whom were openly friendly with the Otto-

<sup>1</sup>Peçewi, Tārīḥ, II, p. 36 ff.

<sup>2</sup>See the Introduction, Part B.

<sup>3</sup>He was living in exile in Dagestan at this time.

<sup>4</sup>'Alī, Muṣṭatname, f. 19b.

mans, while others had close ties with the Şafavid court.<sup>1</sup> Finally, Muştafā Pasha called upon the newly-appointed <sup>Crimean</sup> ~~Krim~~ Khan, Mehemmed Girāy, to lead his forces against the Safavids as serdār of Shirvan.<sup>2</sup>

The army, led by Muştafā Pasha, left Constantinople in April for the long march across Asia Minor. Many of the provisions were sent by sea to Trebizond and from there overland to Erzurum.<sup>3</sup> The Janissaries went by way of Bolı, while the serdār took the longer way over Konya. At the Sivas station Muştafā Pasha received letters of submission from the princes of Guria and Mingrelia.<sup>4</sup> The serdār assembled his troops at Erzurum in July. At about this time, letters of submission also arrived from the Şamhal, from the rulers of Tabaseran and Avaria, from Mırza Şahruh and from Prince Gregor (Giorgi II) of Imereti.<sup>5</sup> Thus, before any conflict had occurred, the conciliatory measures of Muştafā Pasha had

<sup>1</sup> 'Alī, f. 20b. After the murder of Prince Haydar, the Georgian influence at court had, of course, been eclipsed. (See the Introduction, Part B). Nevertheless, the retinues of the dignitaries and the bodyguards of the Shahs consisted almost exclusively of Circassians, Armenians and Georgians. Cf. M. Vincenzo degli Alessandri "Relazione di Persia (1574)", Alberi, Relazioni degli Ambasciatori, III/II, p. 116 ff.

<sup>2</sup> 'Alī, ff. 15a-18a.

<sup>3</sup> According to the report by the Venetian Consul, Balbi, at Aleppo, "...l'on mena en Alep seulement environ huit mille charges de froment, & par la voye de la mer Majeur on porta plusieurs desdites provisions, au port de Tresibonde (sic)..." "Relatione de Perse", Le Tresor Politique (Paris, 1611) p. 187. This report and a similar one by 'Alī (f. 40a) indicate that 1573 was a year of famine and drought.

<sup>4</sup> 'Alī, f. 37b.

<sup>5</sup> 'Alī, f. 42 a & b.

proved very effective; only Kartli, Meskhia and Kakheti had failed to respond.

## 2. The Conquest of Georgia and Shirvan (1578)

When the army camped at Ardahan, "the gateway to Georgia", in early August, some recently-captured prisoners revealed that Tokmak Khan, governor of Erevan,<sup>1</sup> planned to cut the communications of Muṣṭafā Pasha and attack him from the rear. On 5 Jumādā' II, 986/9 August, 1578, the Ottoman army left Ardahan and crossed the borders of Meskhia.<sup>2</sup> Soon contact took place between the two armies on the elevated plain of Childir. According to Minadoi, Tokmak Khan, through a miscalculation based on false intelligence, committed his main body against the Ottoman advance guard. The latter was badly mauled, but the Kızılbaş, thus caught off balance, were put to rout when they were attacked by the Ottoman main body. The losses amounted to thousands on either side.<sup>3</sup> Throughout the battle rain had fallen so heavily that neither handgun nor cannon could be fired; this somewhat weakened the technical superiority of the Ottomans.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Although the Turkish sources call him the governor of Erevan, in fact, Tokmak Khan was the governor of the border province of Cohūr-i Sa'ad, the seat of which was Erevan. H. Roemer, Der Niedergang Irans (Würzburg, 1939), p. 32.

<sup>2</sup> Peçewī, II, pp. 38-39.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. "Relatione de Perse", Le Tresor Politique, p. 188. Also, T. Minadoi, Historia della Guerra Fra Turchi, et Persiani, (Venice, 1583). p. 80 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Peçewī, II, p. 40.

In actuality both combatants had reason to bemoan the results. On the Ottoman side an inspection after the conflict revealed that many men had not even taken part in the battle.<sup>1</sup> On the Persian side, before the Battle of Childir, Imām Kūlī Khan (Vājār) and Amīr Khan (Turkmān), the governors of Genje and Barda'a (Tabriz area) respectively, were ordered by the Shah to join Toḡmaḡ Khan but, because of the discord between the Turkmān and Ustājlu tribes, only Imām Kūlī Khan had joined his troops to those of Toḡmaḡ Khan.<sup>2</sup>

Some weeks before the Battle of Childir the serdār had sent a letter to Manuchar, the youngest of the princes of Meskhia, urging him and his family to renounce whatever connections they might have with the Shah and submit themselves to Ottoman rule. Now, Manuchar appeared in person before Muṣṭafā Pasha to offer his submission. In recompense, he sought a diploma guaranteeing his sovereignty over the lands of his

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<sup>1</sup>Minadoi, p. 31. The Ottomans had already started to have more than just technical difficulties on these campaigns. More and more of the Sipahī were finding the distances from their land holdings to the frontiers quite excessive. It is not surprising that the Sipahī no longer relished these campaigns. As compensation for their bravery and the costs of equipping themselves and their men-at-arms (Jebellī), they stood little chance of increasing their personal wealth or prestige owing to the paucity of booty and the nature of the warfare in the mountains of Georgia or the swamps of Hungary. Under normal conditions a good fighting man might hope to increase his land holdings by receiving a grant of a Timar for an act of bravery, but mountain warfare brought endless ambushes and siege warfare, heavy losses. In short, in both kinds of fighting, the compensations quite often did not offset the risks. Concerning the loss of men and material, see "Relazione" of Marco Venier, Alberi; III/II, p. 297 ff.

<sup>2</sup>Roemer, pp. 32-33.

father. The Ottoman commander did not miss the point that Manuchar had waited until Ottoman arms had proved victorious at Childir. In fact, the psychological effect of Childir on the people in the Safavid sphere of influence greatly outweighed its actual military importance. However, not wishing to alienate this newly-professed vassal entirely, and yet not feeling himself obliged to comply with the wishes of this now helpless prince, Muṣṭafā Pasha assigned to him an appropriate sanjak and specific fiefs to other members of his family.<sup>1</sup>

Now the Ottomans, having accepted the submission of Meskhia, proceeded against Kartli.<sup>2</sup> Dāvud Khan, the ruling prince of this realm,<sup>3</sup> who resided in Tiflis, had not answered the requests for submission addressed to him by Muṣṭafā Pasha. When the troops reached the city on August 24, 1573, they found it and the surrounding territory devastated and evacuated. Dāvud Khan and his subjects had withdrawn to the mountains.<sup>4</sup> During a pause of five days, Muṣṭafā Pasha appointed the Sanjak Beg of Kastamonu, Mehemmed Pasha, to the governorship of Tiflis. He

<sup>1</sup>Alī, f. 65a and b.

<sup>2</sup>The main body of the Ottoman army followed the right bank of the Kura river from Ardahan to Akhaltsikhe and then to Tiflis, where the river was crossed. (Peçewī, II, p. 43.) En route, apart from the Battle of Childir, in which much of the army participated, smaller detachments seized control of strong points such as Hertiz (Khertvisi) and Dahil Kelek (Akhalkalaki). (Ibid, p. 42)

<sup>3</sup>For further details of this prince, see the Introduction, Part B.

<sup>4</sup>Peçewī, II, p. 42.

received a contingent of Janissaries and other support troops totaling about 2,000 men and also supplies and cannon for the ramparts of the citadel.<sup>1</sup>

Three days march out of Tiflis, while making camp by a stream called Kapūr Sūyū, the Ottoman Army received high dignitaries from Alexander, prince of Kakheti,<sup>2</sup> who were escorted by a contingent of Georgian troops. They showered rich gifts upon the serdār and his staff. Alexander now received the rank of beglerbeg over his own domain.<sup>3</sup>

Ten days after leaving Tiflis the Ottoman army camped on the shore of the Alazan (Kanak) river,<sup>4</sup> which formed the western border of the Persian sub-province of Shekki. From this point an Ottoman detachment of 200 horse, accompanied by a contingent of Kakhetian troops, after experiencing difficulties in crossing the Alazan, siezed Shekki. Later, this sub-province was put under the administration of one of Alexander's lieutenants.<sup>5</sup>

Meanwhile the army bivouaced on the peninsula formed by the confluence of the Alazan and the Kura rivers. Now Tokmak Khan, who had

<sup>1</sup>Peçewî, II, p. 42; Minadoi, pp. 83-85.

<sup>2</sup>For details of this prince, see the Introduction, Part B.

<sup>3</sup>Peçewî, II, p. 43; Minadoi, pp. 85-87.

<sup>4</sup>According to W. E. D. Allen, art. "Notes on Don Juan of Persia's Account of Georgia" B.S.O.S. (now B.S.O.A.S.) VI (1930-32), pp. 179-186, the river Alazan was known as the "Kanak" by Muslims. (Hereafter, Allen, "Don Juan of Persia", B.S.O.S. VI).

<sup>5</sup>Peçewî, II, pp. 36 and 46.



been routed at Childir, and a number of other provincial commanders<sup>1</sup> with their troops, followed the movement of the Ottoman army from the southern side of the Kura, hoping to take revenge on it at an opportune moment. After the Ottomans had pitched camp on the above-mentioned peninsula, Tokmak Khan devised a plan whereby he hoped to deprive the Ottomans of their mounts and supplies and then massacre them. Amīr Khan, governor of Tabriz, who had joined his forces to those of Tokmak Khan and Imām Kūlī after Childir, secured the head of a ford across the Alazan, which was called Koyun Geçidi (lit. "sheep crossing"), so that other troops could separate the Ottomans from their camels and other animals grazing behind the camp. Muṣṭafā Pasha heard of this plan, however, and sent 'Osman Pasha, Mehemmed Pasha, beglerbeg of Aleppo, and Muṣṭafā Pasha, beslerbeg of Zū'l Kadr, with contingents to repulse the already attacking Kizilbaş. Amīr Khan's force, the first across, had succeeded in gaining a foothold on the peninsula, but he could not hold such an exposed position against the Ottoman onslaught. As the force at the head of the ford gave way, those troops already on the peninsula had to face enfilade fire as they attempted to withdraw again across the ford. Many were killed and many also drowned, for they missed the ford in the din and confusion. About this time the governor of Shemakha, Aras Khan, and

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<sup>1</sup>Besides Tokmak, governor of Erevan, Murād Khan, governor of Kugan, Şeref Khan, governor of Nakhichevan, Imām Kūlī Khan, governor of Genje, and Amīr Khan, governor of Tabriz, took part in this battle, according to Peçewī, II, pp. 46-47.

the Governor of Shek<sup>k</sup>i, Ahmad Khan, with their own forces, approached the scene of battle and, when they witnessed from afar the distress of the Kizilbaş forces, they urged their troops headlong into the fray. As they crowded over the only bridge leading from the Shirvan side into the peninsula, however, the bridge, already under a strain from the swollen river, collapsed, sending many soldiers to their death.<sup>1</sup> The other Shek<sup>k</sup>i and Shirvan forces, witnessing this disaster, took it as a bad omen and withdrew.<sup>2</sup>

After the Battle of Alazan, which took place early in September, 1578, the Kizilbaş commanders, with the remnants of their troops, returned to their respective provincial capitals. In the light of the information available it seems that the force actually confronting Muṣṭafā on the Alazan was not merely a few isolated provincial troops but an assemblage of all the provincial troops on the Persian Northwest frontier. The lack of success of what was probably a superior numerical

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<sup>1</sup>Peçewī, Vol. II, pp. 46-47; Minadoi's account (pp. 86-92) preferred by Hammer (VII, pp. 86-87) states that the army, when it reached the Alazan, was so short of rations that a body of 10,000 men was detached and sent to the above-described peninsula which was known to have an abundance of grain still unharvested. The Persian force, led by the Khans Tōlmaq, Imām Kūlī and Amīr, fell upon the foragers and nearly exterminated them but were unable to beat a retreat before they were trapped on the peninsula, with their backs to the rivers, by Muṣṭafā Pasha's alerted main body. This led to the carnage and loss by drowning described above. For a variation of the Minadoi account, cf. Roemer, Der Niedergang Irans, p. 34.

<sup>2</sup>Peçewī, II, pp. 46-47. The people of Shirvan, many of whom were Sunnite Muslims, were not, in general, loyal to the Safavids. The withdrawal of these forces may be best explained on this basis.

force is apparent. The Vizilbaş attacked the Ottoman army at a location where nature rendered the latter every advantage. When the Persian force lost the element of surprise, the Ottomans merely shot down the enemy as he attempted to re-cross the ford. On the other hand, Muṣṭafā Pasha, by coming to terms with Alexander of Kakheti, had already brought into some degree of control the most powerful forces of the area, namely the cavalry squadrons of Kakheti. Finally, it is difficult to say how loyal and how eager the Armenian, Kurdish and Shirvanian feudatories of the period were to aid their Safavid overlords. Only later, when the Turkoman forces of the Central Safavid government reached Shirvan, did the action turn against the Ottomans.

After this second major conflict with the Safavid forces, Muṣṭafā experienced extreme difficulty urging his troops forward. In order to consolidate his victory he wanted to lead the army into actual Shirvan territory. This meant fording the swollen Alazan river. Had it not been for the lateness of the season and shortage of rations, perhaps this intention would have been accomplished much more easily. Finally, by making an example of himself and by offering special rewards to all who braved the stream, Muṣṭafā Pasha led his forces into Shirvan. Once across the river, the army proceeded unopposed to the city of Aresh<sup>1</sup> on

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<sup>1</sup>Allen, "Don Juan of Persia" B.S.O.S., VI, pp. 179-80, considers that the city of Aresh must have been near the modern city of Jevat, situated on the Shirvan side of the junction of the Kura and Araxes rivers. The writer concurs in this conclusion, particularly as Jevat lies on a direct North-South route to Shamakha, is opposite the regions of Karabagh

the Kura river. Owing to its strategic position, commanding the Persian approaches to Derbent and Central Georgia, Aresh was to be much fought over, before the war in Transcaucasia ended. The region around Aresh was a relatively prosperous one and, hence, the army was able to replenish its supplies and recuperate. Meanwhile, Muṣṭafā Pasha and his staff, well aware of winter's approach, hastily took measures to rebuild the bridge over the Alazan and to construct a citadel in Aresh. While these preparations for the approaching winter reached completion, news arrived from the inhabitants of Derbent that they had killed their Persian governor, Nadan Ḥalīf, and now sought the appointment of an Ottoman in his stead.<sup>1</sup>

During his final Dīvān before returning to Erzurum the Serdār, Muṣṭafā Pasha, divided his conquests into four governorships: Shirvan, Tiflis (Kartli), Gurjistan (Kakheti) and Sukum (Abkhazia). Muṣṭafā Pasha evidently had considerable trouble persuading one of his staff

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(Karabakh) and Mugan, and is a well-watered region much more capable of sustaining agriculture than its predominantly arid neighbouring regions. Cf. J. J. Hellert, Atlas de l'Empire Ottoman (Paris, 1843), Pl. XX and Yu. V. Fillipov, Geograficheskiy Atlas (Moscow, 1954), particularly pp. 104 and 105. Most conclusive evidence is provided in the Persian history, Tārīkh-e 'Ālam Ārafc 'Abbāsī by Iskandar Bēg Turkman, when he actually refers to the "Jevad Bridge". (I, p. 237).

<sup>1</sup>Peçewī (II, p. 48) reports this incident. He states that the people rebelled against the Persian governor, Harag Ḥalīf, killing him and a garrison of 300 men. Abū Bakr Mīrzā entered Shirvan from Dagestan with 3,000 followers. Roemer, Der Niedergang Irans, p. 35.

to assume the duties of governor of Shirvan. This is quite easy to understand in the light of the existing circumstances. Winter was approaching and no one could predict how the local population or the Safavids might behave towards a relatively small occupying force.

'Osman Pasha,<sup>1</sup> the hero of the two prior engagements of the army, was finally persuaded by his supporters to accept the post. Then, both Lala Mustafa and 'Osman Pasha used every means to encourage seasoned officers and troops to remain with the Shirvan force.<sup>2</sup> In terms of actual men and equipment, 3,000 Janissaries, 60 cannon and 180 boxes of ordnance supplies and equipment were allotted to 'Osman Pasha. The remainder of a force numbering about 10,000 was made up of Ottoman provincial troops and local volunteers. Kaytas Pasha, Beglerbeg of Erzurum, was appointed governor of Aresh with a force of 5,000.<sup>3</sup>

Mustafa Pasha took care in appointing the defterdar, the tahrir emini and the various Kazis. Thus, Mustafa Pasha, in Shirvan, set in

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<sup>1</sup>Özdemir Oğlu 'Osman Pasha, of Circassian origin, had distinguished himself in the reconquest of the Yemen before Sinan Pasha had removed him from his command. Mustafa Pasha, who had helped bring 'Osman Pasha back into favour with the ruling circles, asked him to come on this campaign. In the battles of Childir and Alazan this exceptional leader again distinguished himself. As governor of Shirvan he proved his skill as a military leader time after time against the superior numbers of the Safavids. On the basis of this service and his suppression of the revolt of the <sup>Crim Khan</sup> Khan, Mehmed Giray, he was appointed Grand Vezir. Cf. Hammer, VI and VII, passim.

<sup>2</sup>According to the version of Abdur Rahman Şeref, based on the Şaj'atname of Aşafî ("Osman Pasha". TOEM, IV/22 p. 1358), Lala Mustafa initially wanted to remain in Shirvan himself. Realizing that this would not be advisable, he appointed the Beglerbeg of Aleppo, Mehmed Pasha, one of

motion the long-established administrative measures which the Ottoman applied for the pacification of new territories and their incorporation into the structure of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>1</sup> In spite of all these administrative measures, Muṣṭafā Pasha must have realized that the loss of Shirvan would not be taken lightly by the Safavids, for the Shah's yearly income from the silk production, the salt works, the rice fields and the petroleum of this province alone were estimated at 25,200,000 aspers, all of which would now go to the Sultan's coffers.<sup>2</sup> The Serdār, therefore, now sought to gain by conciliation what he had not as yet taken by force of arms. In a letter to Jamšīd Khan, the ruler of Gilan, Muṣṭafā Pasha urged him to declare his submission to the Sultan; to the governor of Shemakha, Aras Khan, whose father had defected to the Safavids, he offered forgiveness in return for recognition of the Sultan's authority. Both attempts at conciliation proved fruitless. It was still quite evi-

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his relatives, to the governorship of Shirvan. The latter, however, excused himself in a few days. Therefore, the post was offered to various members of the command. Even 'Osman Pasha, at first, refused the position.

<sup>3</sup> Hammer, VII, p. 89; Minadoi, pp. 97-99.

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<sup>1</sup> Peçewī, II, p. 49. For details on the successive stages of this process see H. Inalcik, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest", Studia Islamica, II (1954), pp. 103-129.

<sup>2</sup> Hammer, original Ger. Ed., Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches IV, p. 71. For further comment on the resources of the Caucasus, see the Introduction, part A.

dent that it would be extremely difficult for 'Osman Pasha to conquer the rest of Shirvan with the small number of troops at his command;<sup>1</sup> consequently, Mustafa Pasha had continued to seek support from the Crimean Khan.<sup>2</sup>

Mustafa Pasha departed from Aresh with the bulk of the Ottoman army on 6 Sha'ban, 986/8 October, 1578. Eight days after crossing the Alazan he was met by the Samhal who, after his submission, was assigned the Sanjak of Shabiran.<sup>3</sup> In Tiflis from October 24 - 29 the army received its first taste of the Georgian winter when it was swept by high winds and a snowstorm. As the season advanced and as the sporadic attacks of small forces under Imam Kuli Khan and Simon Luarssab<sup>4</sup> increased, the return to winter quarters turned into a disorderly retreat during which the Ottomans suffered serious losses of men, animals and equipment in the mountains.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Hasanbegzade (Tarīh-i Al-i 'Osman (Istanbul, Nur-n Osmaniyye Ms. No. 3105/06) f. 470a) estimated 'Osman Pasha's forces at 8,000 men. For details, see Munejjimbaşı, Şah'if al Ahbar, III, p. 541.

<sup>2</sup>See above p. 127 note 2.

<sup>3</sup>Munejjimbaşı, III, p. 541; Peçewi, II, p. 50. The anonymous "successi della Guerra" (1581) (Alberi, III/II, p. 455) concurs with Peçewi in so far as it speaks of the Samhal meeting Mustafa Pasha on the Alazan. But Mustafa Pasha is here given credit for striking a bargain with the Samhal: the latter was to provide 4-5,000 troops to help 'Osman Pasha and also give his daughter in marriage to 'Osman Pasha in exchange for the Sanjak of Shabiran and further rewards from the Sultan.

<sup>4</sup>See the Introduction, part B, for further information on Simon. Simon, after his imprisonment by Shah Tahmāsp, had become a Shi'ite Muslim. He

Muṣṭafā Pasha stopped in Akhaltsikhe long enough to pick up the two sons of Dedis Imedi, Manuchar and Alexander, whom he sent to the Sultan.<sup>1</sup> The army reached Erzurum on the 21st of Ramazan, 986/21st November, 1578. The campaign had lasted eight months from its inception to its close. In terms of actual distances, it is not surprising to learn that the army stopped at sixty-five stations between Constantinople and Erzurum and that, from Erzurum to Aresh and back, there were sixty-nine.<sup>2</sup> From the capital to Aresh alone the Ottoman troops had travelled well over 1,000 miles, not even counting the devious routes and the rough terrain!

### 3. The Advent of the Crimean Tatars

The events described in the previous section constituted the effort of the main Ottoman army in the first year of the Ottoman-Safavid War. These events in themselves, however, only serve to introduce some

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was released from prison in the time of Isma'īl II and given men and arms to fight the Turks in 1578. Roemer, Der Niedergang Irans, p. 36. Cf. also "An anonymous report", Alberi, III/II, p. 456, and Allen, History of the Georgian People (London, 1932), p. 55f.

<sup>5</sup>Peçewī, II, p. 51.

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<sup>1</sup>According to Minadoi (pp. 103-105) Manuchar, the youngest, had accompanied Muṣṭafā Pasha on the campaign. In Constantinople he became a convert to Islam. As a reward he was made governor of his father's kingdom and became responsible also for his brother, Alexander, who refused to change his faith.

<sup>2</sup>Alī, f.



of the dramatis personae and dramatis loci of a struggle which continued until 1590, a struggle which, in part, reflected a three-cornered competition of Muscovite, Safavid and Ottoman for control of the vital trade, pilgrim and communication routes of the Caucasus. In the case of the Ottoman-Safavid clash, if the Ottomans had succeeded in making the Peace of 1590 final, they would have been able, in league with their co-religionists, the Uzbogs of Central Asia, to reduce the Persian state to a third-rate power.

Only the Italian writers of the period - although their accounts are often confused in matters of detail - were able to remove themselves from the tactical situation and to provide future generations with a view of the over-all Ottoman plan for the conquest of the Caucasus. In the words of Minadoi.

"The Turks in the present war have sought to occupy all four (regions of Georgia) simultaneously; by way of the Colchis (Mingrelia) sending an armada to the mouth of the river Phasis (Rioni), by the shores of the Albanians (Dagestanians) leading 'Adil Girāy, the Tatar, into Shirvan; and then through these (previously mentioned mountains of Georgia) two (mountain) passes the entire army moved into their regions as we shall describe...."<sup>1</sup>

Taking into consideration that Muṣṭafā Pasha most likely did send a detachment across the mountains to Tiflis by a route other than the one taken by the main body of his forces<sup>2</sup> this description adds two additional

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<sup>1</sup>Minadoi, p. 59.

<sup>2</sup>See above p. 130 note 2.

elements to the invasion plan of the year 1578: naval support and Crimean Tatar participation. The Ottoman navy was, in fact, responsible for making incursions into Mingrelia and Imereti by way of the "river of Phasis" (mod., Rioni river). The immediate objective, apart from a show of force, was apparently to seize the town of Kutaisi as the first stage towards opening communications to Tiflis by this short route. The first attempt was discouraged by the resistance of the local inhabitants, but the Ottomans succeeded in building a fortress on an island at the mouth of the river.<sup>1</sup> In the following year further incursions were made under the direction of the Kapudan Pasha.<sup>2</sup>

The participation of the Crimean Tatars in the Safavid campaign was not possible initially. Even in 1577, during the life of Devlet Girāy, the Sultan had informed the Khan that his services would be needed in case of a future conflict with Persia.<sup>3</sup> As an answer, however, to the activities of Cossacks, and urged on by subsidies from the Tsar,

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<sup>1</sup>A. Lamberti, Relazione della Cholchide (Naples, 1654) pp. 230 ff.

<sup>2</sup>According to Seyyid Lukmān (Mujmil al Tumār (London, B.M. Ms. no. Or. 1135), f. 185b) in Rabi' al evvel, 987/April-May, 1579, the Kapudan Pasha with forty galleys sailed to the Black Sea and, from the Phasis river, undertook an expedition against the province of Imereti (Bās Aqūḳ), a portion of Georgia. ("...Kapudan Paṣā kırk pare kadirge ile Kara Derize varub Faṣe şuyundan Gurjistan hiṣṣatından aqūḳ baş vilayetine 'azm-i jihād eyledi...")

<sup>3</sup>A. A. Novosel'skiy, Bo'ba Moskovskogo Gusudarstva (Moscow, 1948), p. 31, citing Krym. Knig, No. 15, f. 30.

the Crimean Tatars perpetrated heavy raids on Poland in 1577 and 1578.<sup>1</sup> Only through the active intermediation of the Grand Vezir was peace between Poland and the Crimean Tatars concluded in September, 1578.<sup>2</sup> According to two French dispatches dated July 20 and October 5, 1758<sup>3</sup> the Tatars had made an unsuccessful attempt to invade Georgia early in the summer. In view of the menacing situation on the steppe until the afore-said peace was concluded, these reports, without further corroboration, appear to be unfounded.

By 1578 the unrest in Transcaucasia and the Crimea had its counterpart in the Northern Caucasus. The two Kabardinian princes, Kan (Khan?) Bulat and Mamstruk Temruk, petitioned Ivan IV to re-establish the fortress on the Terek river which had been destroyed around 1570 either by the Muscovites themselves or by the Crimean Tatars. The Kabardinians again sought the protection of Moscow, in particular against the Crimean Tatars.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Novosel'skiy, p.31. Cf. also, the correspondence of the Grand Vezir with Stephan Bathory, Hurmuzaki, Documente Privitore, III, pp. 14, 17 and 35, and Karansin, IX, pp. 351-354.

<sup>2</sup>Novosel'skiy, p. 31; according to S. Juye, the French envoy at the Porte, "...les seigneurs du pays (Poland-Lithuania) se sont accordes avec le Tartari de luy payer sa pension ordinaire..." Charriere, Negociation de la France dans le Levant (Paris, 1848-60), III, p. 752.

<sup>3</sup>S. Juye a Henri III, Ibid., pp. 748 and 759-760.

<sup>4</sup>Belokurov states that Kan Bulat and his family became Christians. The fortress was re-built and Luk'yan Novosil'tsev received the appointment as voivode with a strong contingent of troops. A. S. Belokurov, Snosheniya Rossii s Kavkazom (Moscow, 1889) pp. lxxix and lxxxvii.

The ambassadorial reports of Luk'yan (or sometimes Luka) Novosil'tsev, on the occasion of his mission to the court of the Emperor Rudolph II in 1585, provide an eye-witness account of the Tatar expeditionary force. According to Novosil'tsev, who was voi-vode on the Terek in 1578, 'Ädil Girāy led a force of 15,000 Tatars past his fort (gorod) and crossed the Sunzhu river near Goryachaya Kolodez',<sup>1</sup> At this time, the Cossacks, under the command of the voi-vode, assisted the Tatar river crossing. When the Tatars returned after their defeat in Shirvan they crossed the Sunzhu further upstream and got 10,000 men across the Terek before they were discovered by the Cossacks.<sup>2</sup> The implication here is that the defeat and dispersal of the Tatars had made them wary of any potentially hostile force in the area. The Crimean Tatars reached the Sunzhu branch of the Terek river at the end of October, 1578.<sup>3</sup> The contingent was led by 'Ädil Girāy,

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<sup>1</sup>Lit. hot well = hot spring, probably near the locality designated as 'Goryacheistochenskaya' today.

<sup>2</sup>T. Kum'kov, ed., Kabardino - Russkie Snosheniya, Vol. I, pp. 46-48. On the basis of this account it is possible to conclude that the Crimean Tatars lost some 5,000 men in their clashes with the Persians. The account of Novosil'tsev concludes with the description of how he and his men harassed the returning Tatars by attacking them and driving off their horses.

<sup>3</sup>The timing here depends upon the following facts: The Tatars reached Shemakha on November 11. In 1583 an Ottoman relief force, travelling from Kaffa to Derbent, a distance of about 800 miles, reached their destination in about 80 days. (Peçewî, II, p. 61). On the other hand, a Tatar force made a similar journey during the year 1579 in 30 days (Şeref, <sup>Teem</sup> p. 1422 and Hammer, op.cit., Vol. VII, p. 98). This gives us the rough measure that the Ottomans, other conditions being equal, travelled about ten miles per day (probably drawing artillery and other heavy

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the Kalğay, who was accompanied by his brothers, Ġāzī and Sa'adet, and the son of the Khan, Mubārek. Whether or not the Tatars had received further dispatches from 'Osmān Pasha after the departure of the Ottoman army is not clear.<sup>1</sup>

While the Tatars were thus proceeding towards Transcaucasia 'Osmān Pasha and Kaytās Beg had pacified much of Shirvan. As the shortage of food continued to create hardship among the troops, 'Osmān Pasha led a very successful raid into the enemy territories of Genje and Karabagh (Karabakh) across the Kura. Meanwhile word reached 'Osmān Pasha that Aras Khan, who had retired across the Kura near the city of Sal'yany in the face of the superior numbers of the army led by Muṣṭafā Pasha,<sup>2</sup> had again entered Shirvan and was marching on the capital, Shemakha, with 15,000 men.<sup>3</sup> 'Osmān Pasha and Kaytās Beg took up defensive positions near their respective strongholds of Aresh and Shemakha. Of the ten thousand troops 'Osmān Pasha must have had about eight thousand.

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goods); the Tatars, thirty miles per day. As the distance between the Terek river and Shemakha is approximately 300 miles the Tatars must have taken 10-12 days to reach their destination. Cf. J. Bartholomew, The Times Atlas of the World, Vol. II (1959), Plate 44.

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<sup>1</sup>Minadoi (pp. 106-107) writes that Muṣṭafā Pasha ordered 'Osmān Pasha to send further dispatches to the Crimean Tatars.

<sup>2</sup>Roemer, Der Niedergang Irans, p. 35.

<sup>3</sup>'Alī, ff. 134a and 134b; according to Munejjimbāshī (III, p. 542) 25,000.

The battle of Shemakha commenced on the 9th of Ramaẓān 986/ 9 November, 1578. At about the same time, Imām Kūlī Khan, Governor of Genje, and Amīr Khan, ruler of Gilan, attacked Aresh with a combined force of 15,000. Kayṭās Beg sallied forth to meet the Safavid attack only to fall victim to an enemy sword. Soon his small garrison of troops were routed and the victorious Kizilbāş entered the city, bringing death or humiliation to known Sunni Muslims and completely sacking entire districts.<sup>1</sup> The greatly out-numbered troops of 'Osmān Pasha managed only to hold their positions against the Safavid attack led by Aras Khan.

The second day of the battle proved to be as bloody as the first, but a certain 'Abdī Çavuş got through the Persian lines to bring the news that the Tatars were only one station away. By now the Ottoman lines were quite weakened but this news brought strength to all the troops.<sup>2</sup> The third day, as both armies had fought to near exhaustion, the intense fighting slowed down to an exchange of arrows and lead. Then, at the time of the afternoon prayer, a numerous Tatar force appeared on the scene and, although they were doubtless weary from their long journey, they entered the mêlée and shortly broke the Persian re-

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<sup>1</sup>'Alī (f. 135a) speaks of Kayṭās as "devoid of caution and exceedingly vainglorious"; Cf. also, Peçewī, II, p. 53 and Munejjimbāşī, III, pp. 542-543.

<sup>2</sup>Seref, <sup>Toem IV</sup> pp. 1364-1365.

sistance.<sup>1</sup> During the course of the battle Aras Khan was taken alive by Ġāzī Ġirāy's Mīrānōr, Sahrab, who accomplished this feat by shooting down the successive mounts of the former governor and then wounding his sword arm. This unfortunate commander was shortly after put to death.<sup>2</sup>

*conflict had subsided*

When the ~~din and confusion~~ had passed away the Tatar leaders and their troops were warmly thanked and greatly honoured by the Ottomans for their timely arrival. Having considerable familiarity with the Tatar character, however, 'Osman mentioned to 'Adil Ġirāy and to his brothers and the other dignitaries in the Tatar camp that even in the war zone it had been Ottoman policy to protect the lives and property of the Muslim inhabitants. The Tatars replied that "for the Tatars, raiding was as necessary as worldly goods were for the repose of ordinary people" and they let it be known that they could not accept his restriction.<sup>3</sup>

Soon a fitting task for the Tatars diverted them from indiscriminate raiding. 'Osman Pasha learned that many of the fleeing Safa-

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<sup>1</sup>Peçewī, II, pp. 52-53, gives the figure of the Tatar forces as 40-50,000. In the light of succeeding events, this <sup>appears to be</sup> a gross exaggeration. Perhaps a figure of 15-20,000 would be more accurate. As Iskandar Beg (op. cit. Vol. I, p. 236) described the demise of Aras Khan - "...From one side, the Ottoman soldiers, from another side, the Tatars, and from still another side, the Lezgīs, the Karāburks and the Shirvan rebels surrounded the Kizilbaş."

<sup>2</sup>Şeref, <sup>Toem IV</sup> p. 1365. 'Alī, f. 135b.

<sup>3</sup>Şeref, <sup>Toem IV</sup> p. 1366.

vid dignitaries, including a certain Ertoğdī Khan, had entrenched themselves with their retinues and households, and also with the worldly wealth of Aras Khan, across the Kura River near Sal'yany on their former camp site. In this same area, which probably was a prearranged assembly point, there gathered a number of the Safavid troops who had fled from Shemakha. The trenchworks were defended by cannon, but the Tatars quickly overran the position and acquired more booty and slaves than they could carry off.<sup>1</sup> As a result, this generally mobile force incautiously loaded itself with an excess of pack animals.<sup>2</sup>

While the Tatars set out from Sal'yany to rejoin 'Osmān Pasha at Shemakha the main Persian army, numbering 30-40,000 men,<sup>3</sup> the advance guard of which had so successfully sacked Aresh, now moved in the direction of Shemakha under the command of Selman Khan, the Vezir of Shah Ḥodā-banda.<sup>4</sup> In the evening of the 24th of Ramaẓān, 936/24 November, 1578, the

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<sup>1</sup> Toem Şeref, p. 1366; Peçewī's description of this event (II, p. 54) is obviously taken from 'Alī, 163b and 164a.

<sup>2</sup> Peçewī (II, p. 54) reports that they acquired 12,000 camels loaded with booty; Munejjimbaşı gives the more believable figure of 2,000 (III, p. 543).

<sup>3</sup> Peçewī (II, pp. 54-55) names this figure; 'Alī (f. 164a) gives 50,000; Şeref (pp. 1366-1367) estimates 30,000.

<sup>4</sup> In Qazvin the recent change of rulers had left the Safavid state devoid of firm leadership. A portion of the Turkoman tribes had been sent to quell the uprising of the Kurds. The forces on the Northwestern frontier had been in contact with the Ottoman army. When the Ottomans had succeeded in penetrating into Shirvan, Selman Khan was sent to bolster the troops already committed against the Ottomans with an army consisting of contingents from Iraq, Fars and Kerman. Hamza Mīrẓā, the young Crown Prince, and his mother, the Begum Hayru'n-Nesā', who was the real power



Kizilbaş army began its siege of Shemakha.<sup>1</sup> After surveying the situation, 'Osman Pasha attempted to send word to the Tatars, but his Çavuş was intercepted. Upon discovering the whereabouts of the Crimean Tatars, Selman Khan, not realizing the dire extremities in which the Ottomans were, left a containing force around the walls of Shemakha and led the bulk of his army against the Tatars.<sup>2</sup> On the last day of Ramazān, 986/30 November, 1573 the Tatars and Safavids clashed on the plain near Maḥ-mūdābād.<sup>3</sup> Fierce fighting followed for three days between the Tatars and the numerically far superior Safavid forces. According to 'Alī, the Tatars had gained a considerable advantage over their adversary when a terrible rainstorm swept over the battlefield. This storm greatly hampered the Tatars, who relied heavily on their bows and arrows and the manoeuvrability of their mounts. The vanes or feathers of the bolts became

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(cont.)

in Persia after the accession of Shah Hudābanda until her death in 1579, accompanied the army as far as Kara Ağaç, which the army reached about the 9th or 10th of November, 1573. Roemer, Der Niedergang Irans, pp. 15 and 36-38. Cf. also, Munejjimbāši, Vol. III, p. 543, where he refers to the Begum as "... the wife (of the Shah) who was on the point of exercising absolute dominion over his state...." (...Devletine tesalluṭ uzere olan zevjesi....)

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<sup>1</sup> Peçewī, II, pp. 54-55; 'Alī, f. 164a.

<sup>2</sup> Şeref, <sup>Toem IV</sup> pp. 1366-1367; Roemer, Der Niedergang Irans, pp. 40-42.

<sup>3</sup> The exact location of this battle is difficult to determine. Şeref (p. 1363) places it on the shore of the "Menlā Hasan" river. 'Alī (op.cit., f. 164b) locates it near "Mahmudabağ". According to Roemer (loc.cit.) the district was called "Molla Hasan" and the stream was the Aḫsū (cf. the town of Aḫsū south of Shemakha).

soaked and the bows warped; thus, their accuracy was greatly impaired. Their horses, also, became mired in a sea of mud. The Tatars disengaged and retreated in the direction of Derbent; the Kızılbaş moved off towards the Kura River.<sup>1</sup>

Supplementing the material found in the Muṣratnāme and the Ṣeja'at-nāme, the Tārīh-e 'Ālam Arāīe 'Abbāsī<sup>2</sup> indicated that 'Ādil Girāy became a prisoner of the Safavids during this struggle. Moreover, the above-mentioned Tārīh-i 'Ālam gives further details concerning the strength of the Tatar forces at the time of the battle. When the latter reached Shirvan, they are said to have been 20,000 strong. In the clash with the forces of Selman Khan in the Menlā Hasan (Mollā Hasan) district, the Tatars then numbered 12,000 but had additional support from 4,000 to 5,000 Lezgians, Karaburks and Shirvan rebels.<sup>3</sup>

The Safavids conducted 'Ādil Girāy to Qazvin where he received particularly good treatment, thanks to the favour of the Shah's wife who had accompanied the army in the recent campaign and who exercised a great

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<sup>1</sup> 'Alī, f. 164b; Munejjimbāṣī (III, p. 543) provides additional information about this battle which helps account for the setback of the Tatars. After they had defeated the remnant of Aras Khan's army near Sal'yany and had seized the booty, "... 'Ādil Girāy and Gāzī Girāy, together with fifteen thousand Tatars, remained with 'Osman Pasha; all of the others, including the Hāyvekili (vezir), Hājji Muṣṭafā Beg and the Hanzāde, Mubārek Girāy, departed for their home province." Munejjimbāṣī gives the figure 40,000 for the original number of Tatars (*ibid.*), thus only a fraction had remained to fight at Mahmudabad (or Mollā Hasan).

<sup>2</sup> Iskander Beg, Vol. I, pp. 236-237.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

deal of control in the Safavid state, because her son was still a youth and the Shah was nearly blind. Qazvin, during this troubled period, offered the young Tatar great opportunities for intrigue. It soon became rumoured that the Tatar prince had entered into intimate relations with the Begum. He most certainly was under serious consideration as a suitable match for one of the sultanas (~ princesses) providing the Tatar hānzāde would agree to some suitable political arrangements between the Crimean Tatars and Persia.<sup>1</sup> It is not clear how much 'Ādil Girāy felt it necessary to play this game in order to save his life. At any rate, in the end, he apparently overplayed his hand, for it was not a grandiose scheme of Persian control of the Tatars, but the liberties 'Ādil Girāy was alleged to have taken, in the harem, which outraged the court and led to the deaths of the Begum and 'Ādil Girāy.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Peçewî, II, p. 59.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Minadoi, pp. 121-123; Iskander Beg, I, pp. 237-239 and II, pp. 668-669; J. Malcolm (The History of Persia (London, 1815), Vol. I, p. 518) following the Persian History, Zubdat al Tevārīh, states that ... "the leader ('Ādil Girāy) of the latter (the Tatars), who had attacked Gilan, was defeated, made prisoner, and afterwards murdered." Peçewî (II, p. 55) gives the impression that 'Ādil Girāy was not captured at all during the encounter at Hollā Hasan but, rather, in a later skirmish after Hamza Mīrzā and Selmān Khan had regrouped in a Karabağ with possible intentions on Derbent. In this regard, Cf. also M. Kazimirski, "Precis de l'histoire des khans de Crimée", Journal Asiatique, Serie 2/XII (1833), pp. 375-376. Peçewî gives a detailed account of the defilement of the Shah's harem and the ignominious murders of the Begum and 'Ādil Girāy by the Kūrçū or Imperial guard (II, pp. 59-61).

Meanwhile, 'Osmān Pasha, having heard the results of this latest clash, decided to withdraw from Shemakha to Derbent before Selmān Khan could regroup his forces to encircle him again. He had suffered severe losses against both Aras Khan and Selmān Khan and within his own ranks he had to fight the seditious activities<sup>1</sup> of the Şamhal, who had joined the Ottoman forces after the departure of Muştafā Pasha. A portion of the Tatar troop assisted in the removal of part of the army supplies and equipment; the remainder was burned.

Under the circumstances, Derbent offered 'Osmān Pasha the only refuge possible for so few regular troops.<sup>2</sup> 'Osmān Pasha, upon his departure, despatched a letter to the serdār in Erzurum describing the recent events. In his letter he called upon the serdār to inform the Sultan concerning the needs of the people of Shirvan who now had no means of survival in their war-ravaged land. He also pleaded for reinforcements in addition to the Tatars.<sup>3</sup> The retreat over the mountains in the month of December proved disastrous. According to Dal Mehemmed in the Şejā'at-nāme, equipment, animal corpses and human bodies left a gruesome trail in

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<sup>1</sup> During the three day intensive siege of Shemakha the odds in favour of the Persians must have been about 4 or 5 to 1. This greatly demoralized the Ottoman troops and the auxiliaries attached to them from Lesghia and Dagestan. All were considerably fatigued by the previous battles and the persistent shortage of rations. Encouraged by the Şamhal of Tarku, several troops began showing signs of disaffection. 'Osmān Pasha immediately rebuked or punished the known dissenters and put the Şamhal under arrest. Şeref, <sup>100m</sup> p. 1368.

<sup>2</sup> Feğewī, II, pp. 54-55.

<sup>3</sup> Alī, f. 165a.

the snow from Shemakha to Derbent. Dal Mehemmed, called Asafī, was assigned to the rear guard with Gāzī Girāy. This body of men succeeded in rescuing ~~much~~ equipment and saving many lives.<sup>1</sup>

En route the rear of the column was harrassed by Safavid detachments and the forward areas were subjected to attacks from some of the Dagestan tribes. When the army reached Derbent more than a foot of snow lay on the ground.<sup>2</sup>

As he approached Derbent, 'Osmān Pasha sent his Kethudā forward to arrange for the arrival of his troops. However, as some of the Tatars fleeing from the previous battle had passed through Derbent bringing news of total defeat, the dignitaries who controlled the city were reluctant to yield to the Ottoman army. 'Osmān Pasha thus had to gain access to the city by a show of force.<sup>3</sup>

The Ottoman holding force had barely escaped extermination in Shirvan. This would undoubtedly have been their fate had the Tatars not reinforced them. In spite of this assistance, they were cut off from further support and supplies from the direction of Tiflis and they now had to face a severe winter. This prompted the withdrawal to Derbent which was more easily defensible and which lay further from the Persian

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<sup>1</sup>Peçewī, II, pp. 54-55; I. H. Ertaylan, Gazi Geray Han (Istanbul, 1958), p. 14.

<sup>2</sup>Selānikī, p. 156.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid; Kazimirski, "Précis", J.A., ser. 2/XII, p. 375 states that the Tatars were sent ahead.

supply centres. Derbent also had the advantage of possessing an alternative overland connection with the Ottoman domain. In Derbent the Ottomans were reinforced by Nogay and Dagestan troops.<sup>1</sup> For the moment at least the Ottomans still had a foothold in the Caucasus.<sup>2</sup>

As a fitting close to this first year of the Caucasian War, it is instructive to recall the reasons Minadoi gave for the success of the Ottomans against the Persians.<sup>3</sup> He pointed to the rapid increase of Ottoman power in the sixteenth century on land and sea. As a counter-weight to this foe on their borders, the Persians had not even fortified their cities. Therefore, when once the mountains were crossed, there were no physical barriers for the Ottomans. Particularly advantageous for the Ottomans, he notes, is their "conquest of the arts". They learned Western skills from the conquest of Christian cities. The Ottoman used his newly-acquired weapons better than his adversary and improved upon them. Finally, Minadoi contrasts the concord and celerity of the Ottomans with the discord and dissension of the Safavids.

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<sup>1</sup> Peçewî, II, p. 55.

<sup>2</sup> 'Osman Pasha now sent a long despatch to the Sultan describing the entire action. This time, however, he sent his messenger to Istanbul across the Nogay Steppe north of the Caucasus range to Temruk and Kaffa instead of to his immediate superior in Erzurum. Peçewî (*ibid*) considered this move a strong indication that 'Osman Pasha had become estranged from Mustafa Pasha owing to his lack of assistance during the recent events. It is important to observe, however, that Imām Kūlī Khan, the Governor of Genje, may already have commenced the siege of Tiflis and thus have blocked the route through Georgia.

<sup>3</sup> Minadoi, pp. 74-75.

Braudel<sup>1</sup> emphasises the fundamental difficulties of the Caucasian campaign. Largely following the objections to the campaign attributed to Sokollu Mehermed Pasha, he emphasises the tenacity of the adversary, the inconstancy of the local population, the great distances from Ottoman centres and, finally, the difficulties of terrain and climate.

#### 4. Toward the Consolidation of the Northern Flank, 1579-1584

Although the first year of the Caucasian War had, in some respects, resembled previous Ottoman-Safavid encounters, new Ottoman goals had altered the situation considerably. In former wars with Persia, Ottoman armies had generally entered the Western provinces of Persia only to withdraw at the approach of winter. Thus, the campaigns of Sultan Sulaymān had ended in stalemate. Now, however, the Ottomans were making a concerted effort to hold the Caucasus permanently. Such a grand project only became plausible after the Ottomans had secured long-term peace treaties with their enemies in Western Europe.

The Russian acquisition of Astrakhan was the final result of a long deterioration of Ottoman interest in her Northeastern frontier following the conquest of the Genoese Colonies in 1475. This acquisition served further to emphasize to what extent the Ottoman East-West trade monopoly had been undermined by hostile powers. Earlier the Portuguese, by using the Cape route, had hindered the flow of goods to Persian Gulf

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<sup>1</sup>Braudel, La Méditerranée, pp. 1011-1012.

and Red Sea ports. Now, Russia had severed an important link with the Eastern trade routes which crossed Central Asia. Thus the Persian War became strategically important as a check to Russian and Safavid economic and political activities, as a move to maintain direct religious and economic ties with Central Asia and, lastly, as a confirmation of Ottoman rights on the shores of the Black Sea and in the Caucasus.<sup>1</sup> The discontent of the semi-independent Georgian, Shirvanian and Dagestanian Emirates in the Caucasus and their bitter rivalries over the succession to the throne after the death of Shah Tahmāsp had provided ample excuse and opportunity for the onset of hostilities.

The campaign of 1573 had shown that, with a sizeable force, the Ottomans had been more than a match for the Persian provincial forces. Şokollî Mehemmed Pasha had already warned his countrymen about the pitfalls of climate and terrain and the stubbornness of the local inhabitants. Upon the withdrawal of the main army, had it not been for the stamina and courage of old campaigners like 'Osmān Pasha and the timely arrival of Tatar reinforcements, the entire effort would have ended in complete failure the first year of the war. Moreover, with the appearance of Selmān Khan, the Vezir, who was nominally under the command of the young Persian heir apparent, Hamza Mīrzā, came the best fighting forces of the

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<sup>1</sup> Rights implicitly or explicitly granted in the Peace of Amasya of 1555 as well as the vague rights over the orthodox Muslim community assumed by the Ottoman Sultan in his role as Hādīm al Haremāyn (Servitor of the Sacred Cities - Mecca and Medina).



realm.<sup>1</sup>

Henceforth the war progressed on two largely unco-ordinated fronts: in the Western Caucasus the action developed around supply trains and fixed fortifications; to the East, raids, battles and the gain and loss of territories continued.

At the beginning of 1579 'Osmān Pasha and his exhausted forces found themselves in Derbent, a region poorly provided with rations to feed even a small army. To all of the surrounding regions supply missions were sent. When peaceful requests produced no results from the Gūrī tribe 'Osmān Pasha resorted to force. He did not, however, merely extract much-needed grain and livestock from this tribe, he reduced them to obedience by evacuating entire districts. In Tabāseran the Ottoman supply mission was attacked and destroyed. This time a force led by Sīdī Gāzī Beg brought fire and sword to the area and actually took charge of Mahariķe, the principal town.<sup>2</sup>

Shortly after the basic needs of the army were met by these two actions Burhān Oġlū Abū Bekr Mīrzā conceived a plan for unseating the Persian commander, Moḥammed Halīfe, who had been left in charge of Shir-

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<sup>1</sup> Among the dignitaries in Hamza Mīrzā's retinue were the following: Mīrzā Selmān, the Vezir; the Head of the Kūrçū; Şahruh Khan, the Muhurdār; Moḥammed Khan Turkman; Pira Moḥammed Khan Ustajlū; Sultan Huseyn Khan, grandson of Durmiş Khan Şamlū; Velī Halīfe Şamlu; Muşī Khan, Şeref ed-Dīn Oġlū Tekkelū; Imām Kūlī Khan Kājar and Amīr Hamzah Khan, son of 'Abdullah Khan Ustajlū. Cf. Iskandar Beg, I, p. 237.

<sup>2</sup> Şeref, op. 1418-1419. Mahariķe is a town in Southern Dagestan.

van upon the withdrawal of the main body of the Persian army. He reasoned that, because of his connection with the old ruling family, the inhabitants of Shirvan would flock to his banner.

'Osmān Pasha was taken in by this argument. Little did he realise that Abū Bekr Mīrzā intended to negotiate with the Safavids for a portion of Shirvan, for he had grown disillusioned with the Ottomans after only being offered a zi'amet<sup>1</sup> by 'Osmān Pasha. Abū Bekr Mīrzā clashed with Moḥammed Ḥalīfe at Tenk Doḡazī (pass) but, as he shortly fled from the field, his small force was defeated and routed.<sup>1</sup>

'Osmān Pasha already had too few troops. He could little afford such adventures as this. After news of the defeat had circulated through the mountains the Qaytaqs, one of the strongest tribes in the region, revolted. 'Osmān Pasha personally led a punitive raid against them. Although they were not evacuated, as the Ġūrīs had been, the Qaytaqs were effectively subdued and now many came to Derbent to serve under Osmān Pasha.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile Muṣṭafā Pasha had convinced the Porte of the necessity for building a series of permanent fortifications right across Georgia to Shirvan in order to hold the recent conquests permanently. In the spring of 1579 he set about this task by rebuilding the fortress at Kars

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<sup>1</sup> <sup>Toem IV</sup> Şeref, p. 1419. The location of this skirmish is unknown to the writer. Burhan Mīrza is said to have had his centre of operations at Hāhamir (Kuba?). Cf. Roemer, Der Niedergang Irans, p. 78.

<sup>2</sup> <sup>Toem IV</sup> Şeref, p. 1420.

which had formerly belonged to Meskhia or "Saatobago". Meanwhile, 'Osman Pasha was left to make the most of a bad situation. Mustafa Pasha doubtless counted on the Crimean Tatars to fill the gap.

From the military standpoint, it made sense to secure the Caucasian flank before undertaking any adventures on the Tabriz plain.<sup>1</sup> Thus, Mustafa Pasha moved his strong Ottoman force to the borders of Persia and Georgia in the summer of 1579. This action at least prevented the Safavids from deploying all of their provincial forces against Tiflis and other fixed positions held by the Ottomans.<sup>2</sup> While the main army marked time at Kars a strong Ottoman detachment raided the country around Erevan bringing back numerous prisoners.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, one of the principal tasks of the army was to move supplies arriving at Erzurum up to the fortresses in the Caucasus.<sup>4</sup>

Imam Kūlī and Simon Luarssab had besieged Tiflis for over four months with an army of 10,000. To relieve this hard-pressed, starving garrison, Mehemmed Hasan Pasha, the son of Grand Vezir Şokollu Mehemmed Pasha, was sent with a relief force and supplies on the 1st of Jumada

<sup>1</sup> Minadoi, pp. 129-130.

<sup>2</sup> Mustafa Pasha left Erzurum on 18 Jumada'1 Ulā, 987 and arrived in Kars on the 2nd Jumada II, 987 (13th July - 27th July, 1579), Şeref, <sup>see p. 14</sup> p. 1420; Peçewī, II, p. 56.

<sup>3</sup> Peçewī (Ibid., p. 58) enumerates the Fetvas applicable to the treatment of prisoners of war and states that 20,000 were enslaved.

<sup>4</sup> Braudel, p. 1012.

II, 987/26th July, 1579. He accomplished this perilous task in sixteen days, but was harassed continually by Georgian irregulars led by Simon.<sup>1</sup>

The Serdār had counted on the Tatars to provide as much support for 'Osman Pasha in 1579 as they had the previous year. He was not able to ensure this, however, without special concessions. First of all the Khan was officially appointed commander-in-chief of the Ottoman army in Dagestan.<sup>2</sup> The letter to the Khan from Murād III, ~~which is~~ dated 987/1579, which is found in Ferīdūn Beg's collection, clearly indicates how much discretionary power the Khans, at this time, still possessed. The Sultan hoped that the Khan would send as much assistance as in the previous year.<sup>3</sup> When once it became known that 'Adil Girāy had been put to death by the Safavids, Mehemmed Girāy faced the problem of choosing a new Kalğay acceptable to the Tatar Mīrzās and to the Sublime Porte. He preferred his own son, Sa'adet Girāy but, as his brother, Alp Girāy,

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<sup>1</sup> Toem IV  
Şeref, pp. 1420-1422; Peçewī, II, pp. 57-58; Munejjimbāşī, III, p. 547.

<sup>2</sup> Hammer, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, IV, pp. 88-89, citing a diploma of die Briefsammlung der vom Diez'schen Handschriften, Nr. XLV, Bl. 60, of the Berlin State Library.

<sup>3</sup> Ferīdūn, II, pp. 122-123. J. Rypka, Festschrift George Jakob, pp. 251-252, states that this dating of the letter comes into question because the capture of 'Adil is not mentioned. There is a strong possibility, however, that this letter was dispatched before news of 'Adil's capture had been confirmed. Assuming that the news was already current, the Tatars would hardly wish to be reminded that their leader and heir apparent had been captured.

was the senior member of the family, the Khan was forced to appoint him to the post. Nevertheless, not wishing to eliminate his own son entirely from the prerogatives of high office, he proposed to the Porte that a second heir to the Khanship be designated who would be known as Nūr al Dīn. Relations being what they were between the Porte and Persia, the Ottomans needed Tatar forces and, therefore, accepted his suggestion.<sup>1</sup>

The Khan, prior to his departure for Derbent from Bakhchisaray (Bāğcesarāy), on <sup>1</sup>/<sub>10</sub> Jumādā II, 987/26 July, 1579 had furnished Mehemmed Beg, Sanjak Beg of Azak (Azaf), with 10,000 Tatars. This advance party and supply train reached Derbent in exactly 74 days. Thereupon 'Osmān Pasha honoured Mehemmed Beg by appointing him the Kāpūdān (~ Grand Admiral) of the Caspian Sea (Bahr-i Kāzim) with an income of 800,000 Akçe. Shortly after the arrival of the advance party 'Osmān Pasha went forth from Derbent to receive the Khan himself.<sup>2</sup>

'Osmān Pasha and Mehemmed Khan made a triumphal entry into Derbent together after the Tatars had completed the journey in 30 days.<sup>3</sup> Neither

<sup>1</sup>For details see, Smirnov, Krymskoe Khanstvo, pp. 439-440; Halīm Girāy, Gūlbūn-ū Hanān, p. 55; art. "Giray", I.A., IV, p. 786 (Inalcik). The Khan also received general subsidies of money, cf. Charriere, II, pp. 789-793. Cf., also, Alberi, Ser. III/II, p. 462.

<sup>2</sup>Peçewī, II, p. 61; according to at least one source (Kazimirski, "Precis", pp. 377-78), the Khan first sent his son Murād, with a small force, but this did not satisfy the Sublime Porte. He then presumably followed the supply train after he had made himself ready. Smirnov, loc.cit., mentioning this campaign, gives us the information that the Khan was so fat he had to make the long journey in a wagon. Iskander Beg, I, p. 253, emphasises the revenge aspect of the Khan's campaign in Shirvan and Karabağ. (Karabakh).

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Hammer's time table (Fr. ed. VII, p. 98) with that of Şeref, <sup>Toen</sup> IV, p. 1422.

the Ottomans nor the Tatars remained in Derbent. They removed themselves to a pre-arranged headquarters about one league from the city. After the Tatars had feasted and rested several days the campaign commenced. From Şabiran (Southern Dagestan) a large force was detached and sent ahead. This army defeated Moḥammed Ḥalīfe (Zu'l Kadr), the Persian general, in two separate clashes, made him a prisoner, and sent the remainder of the Persian forces scurrying across the Kura river into Karabağ (Karabakh) and Muğan. After Shirvan had once again been cleared of Persian troops, a force was sent against Baku.<sup>1</sup> Thereafter, the Tatars spread out and collected booty and slaves throughout the countryside.

All of these joint efforts by 'Osmān Pasha and the Tatar Khan had been carried out in the full expectation of the early arrival of Muṣṭafā Pasha. Finally, however, a courier arrived from Kars bearing the news that Muṣṭafā Pasha would not return to Shirvan that year.<sup>2</sup> The

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1422. Apparently that of Şeref, who used Peçewī for supplementary material in his treatment of Özdemirolu 'Osmān Pasha's life, confused the 74 days journey of the supply train with the much more rapid transit of the Tatar main body. Cf. Peçewī, II, p. 61.

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<sup>1</sup>Şeref, <sup>Toem IV</sup>IV, pp. 1422-23, states that 'Osmān Pasha instigated this move while the Anonymous Chronicle of Kazimirski, "Precis", pp. 377-78, stated that the Khan sent his son to conquer Baku; Munejjimbaşı (II, p. 547) mentions that a "contingent of Tatars" was sent to Baku.

<sup>2</sup>Şeref, <sup>Toem IV</sup>loc. cit.

Tatar Khan held council with his brothers and the other Tatar dignitaries and became determined to return to the Crimea. 'Osman Pasha was able to dissuade them from this action for a time by suggesting a raid into the provinces south of <sup>the</sup> Kura. The Khan and his horsemen thus crossed the river and concentrated on the province of Genje (district around modern Kirovabad) where still no trace of a Persian army was apparent. In fact, after gathering booty an entire month, the Tatars left that province in disarray. When these successes were announced to the Serdār in Kars, a return dispatch urged 'Osman Pasha and the Khan to attempt even the conquest of Ardabil, the sacred city of the Safavids. Both 'Osman Pasha and the Khan, however, realised the folly of such an undertaking with so few forces. As winter was approaching and as the Serdār was withdrawing from Kars to Erzurum, the Tatars left Genje, rested a few days in Aresh, and then started for the Crimea.<sup>1</sup>

Although the Khan was urged by 'Osman Pasha to winter in Shirvan, he only consented to leave his brother, Gāzī Girāy, and his son, Sa'adet Girāy, in the Caucasus with a few thousand Tatars.<sup>2</sup> He told 'Osman Pasha that he considered himself an independent prince, not a Beg subject to the Porte.<sup>3</sup> It was just this uncompromising attitude that was ultimately

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<sup>1</sup>Şeref, <sup>Toem</sup>IV, p. 1424; Peçewî, II, pp. 61-62; there is an unconfirmed report that Alexander of Kakheti was also disciplined for refusing supplies to 'Osman Pasha (Alberi, Ser. III/II, pp. 464-465.)

<sup>2</sup>Şeref, <sup>Toem IV</sup>p. 1424.

<sup>3</sup>Kazimirski, "Précis", pp. 377-378; Peçewî, II, pp. 61-62.

to earn him the hatred and distrust of the Sultan.<sup>1</sup>

When it was known for certain among the Ottomans that the Tatars were leaving, friendly relations ceased between 'Osmān Pasha and the Khan. The Ottoman troops, in most of the previous engagements, had had to stand by while the Tatars took the lion's share of the booty. They now realized that they had to garrison this frontier and to fight the Persian army while the Tatars returned to their homeland.<sup>2</sup> Although 'Osmān Pasha knew that the Tatars would never be reliable as garrison troops, he only partially succeeded in maintaining discipline among his own men after their departure. A group of 2,000 Ottoman troops deserted the Shirvan force and started for Erzurum of their own volition. Only a third of them were destined to survive the attacks of the Georgian irregulars.

With only a handful of 3,000 to 4,000 Ottoman regulars, 'Osmān Pasha could not hope to hold Shirvan. To make things more difficult Mehemmed Khan soon ordered his son, Sa'ādet Girāy, to return to the Crimea with his retinue. Thus, Ġāzī Girāy was left in command of a still smaller group of Tatars.<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile, Selmān Khan was conducting a large Persian force towards Shirvan. An advance contingent sent against Shemakha suffered defeat at the hands of Dāl Mehemmed, the author of the Shejā'atnāme, who

<sup>1</sup>Peçewī (II, pp. 61-62) erroneously refers to Ġāzī Girāy as the son of Mehemmed Giray Khan.

<sup>2</sup>Seref, <sup>Toem IV</sup> p. 1424.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 1425-1426.



was in charge of the Shemakha garrison. This gave 'Osmān Pasha time to make an orderly withdrawal to Derbent through Baku. 'Osmān Pasha was able to profit from the direct control of its commerce in petroleum and silk. Selmān, following this move, occupied Shemakh<sup>1</sup> and the head waters of the Kura.

While preparations for further clashes were taking place on the Shirvan front an assassin had killed the Grand Vezir Şoköllü Mehemmed Pasha on 8 Şa'bān, 987/ 30th September, 1579. The news of this deed first reached Muştafā Pasha on October 27th.<sup>2</sup> This event led to the appointment of Ahmed Pasha, an Albanian by origin, to the grand vezirship,<sup>3</sup> and in the month of Şeval/November-December, Sūfī Sinān Pasha, the general who had contended for the command of the Eastern Front, now replaced his old rival, Muştafā Pasha. The latter returned to the Porte and assumed his place in the governmental hierarchy as second vezir.<sup>4</sup> He died during the following year while acting as Ka'imakām<sup>5</sup> in Istanbul.

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<sup>1</sup> Toe m iv  
Şeref, p. 1426 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Peçewī, II, p. 62.

<sup>3</sup> Hammer, VII, p. 99.

<sup>4</sup> It is interesting to note that, while Şoköllü and his Serdār were Bosniaks, the new Grand Vezir, Ahmed Pasha, an Albanian, selected Kōja Sinān Pasha, another Albanian, as Serdār. Peçewī, II, pp. 62-63. A small body of men who had managed to escape the defeat of Kaytaş Beg at Aresh had succeeded in reaching Erzurum and in spreading the word about the insufficient measures taken by Muştafā Pasha to strengthen the Shirvan garrison. These and other reports helped bring about the demise of Muştafā Pasha. Cf. Selānikī, Tārīh, p. 157.

<sup>5</sup> This title was given to the Pasha who was left in charge of affairs at the capital during the absence of the Grand Vezir.

had  
 Why/the Safavids failed to oppose the Ottoman-Tatar invasion of their tributaries and territories in 1579? The period between the death of Shah Tahmāsp in 1576 and the accession of Shah 'Abbās in 1587 was one of virtual anarchy in Persia. The general reasons for this state of affairs were well known to contemporary observers. In his Relazione of 1592, Lorenzo Bernardo, bailo, explained that the troubles of Persia could be attributed to intrinsic and extrinsic causes ("...une intrinseca, l'altra estrinseca..."). As intrinsic causes, he called attention to the incapacity of Shah Hudābandā, and to the discord which prevailed between the Shah and his sons, Hamza and 'Abbās, and between the Shah and the chief dignitaries (the "sultani" or Kizilbaş aristocracy). As for the extrinsic causes of the difficulties in Persia, Bernardo called the attention of the Venetian Signoria to the struggle which Persia had to conduct against two strong enemies, the Ottoman Turks in Azerbaijan and the Uzbeks (Uzbeks) in Khurasan. Moreover, these powers were secretly in alliance ("...Usbech re de' Tartari ... il quale, sia per secreta intelligenza col Turco..."). Finally, Bernardo mentions the form of government, the quality of the army, and the lack of artillery as reasons for the weakness of Persia. Nor is the Kingdom of Persia centralized like that of France or the Ottoman Empire, he said, but more like Poland or Germany, for the power and the wealth is diffused among the "sultani", the heads of the Turcoman tribes ("perche consiste tutta la forza, la milizia, e la ricchezza di esso nelli sultani, cioe principi, ognuno de' quali e padrone di qualche provincia, e la regge e governa a modo suo...")<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Alberi, Ser. III/II, pp. 391-392.

After Selmān Khan had put the Tatars to flight at Mollā Ḥasan and had garrisoned Shemakha upon the withdrawal of 'Osmān Pasha to Derbent, he had returned with the army to Kara Ağaç where the Begum Ḥayr al Nesā' and her son, Hamza Mīrzā, had remained during the campaign.<sup>1</sup> The decision to return displeased the Begum. She had ordered that the Tatar hānzāde be sent to the court and that a winter campaign be launched against Derbent. Selmān Khan was free of blame; internal dissension among the Kizilbāş amirs had made the extension of the campaign impossible.

The Begum was not to forget this act of disobedience. During the remaining months of her life, she took every occasion to humiliate the leading Kizilbāş families by exercising the prerogatives of the Shah without due regard for the actual power still in the possession of the great tribes. Two incidents in particular serve to illustrate the anti-Kizilbāş policy of the Begum, which brought about her own downfall and death.

In the early months of 1579 the Begum directed her attention to Māzandarān, her land of origin. Some years before, her father, the reigning prince of Māzandarān, had been murdered by the forbears of the then ruling prince, Mīrzā Khān. As the latter prince had failed to do homage to Shah Ḥudābandā, upon his accession, the Begum, in the spring of 1579, sent an army to besiege him. When, however, Mīrzā Khān obtained the sworn oaths of the leading Kizilbāş amirs and of Selmān Khan for his safe

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<sup>1</sup>Roemer, p. 38. Kara Ağaç was the traditional winter quarters of the Persian army.

conduct, he agreed to make the required journey of homage to Qazvin. The Begum, however, disregarding the oaths of the leading personages in the realm, had him murdered as he approached the capital. Thereafter, Selmān Khan and several of the Kizilbaş amirs plotted the removal of the Begum from her seat of power.<sup>1</sup>

Another event, paralleling the previous one, began unfolding in Khurāsān early in 1579, thus further distracting the attention of the capital from the events in Shirvan and Genje. Imperceptibly at first, the old rivalries between the chief tribal protagonists, the Shāmlū-Ustājlū and the Turkman-Tekkelū, began to revive. 'Abbās Mīrzā, the second son of Hayr al Nesā', and Shah Hudābende, when only a child, had been sent, as governor of Khurāsān, to Harāt in the charge of his lalā (≈ guardian) 'Alī Kūlī Khan Shāmlū. The Begum, considering the residence of her son outside the capital a threat to her own authority and to that of the Velī Ahd (≈ <sup>Heir Apparent</sup> ~~Crown Prince~~), Hamza Mīrzā, ordered his return to the capital. The leaders of the Shāmlū and Ustājlū rightly saw in this measure an attempt on the part of the Begum to reduce their influence; hence, they took measures to oppose her. 'Alī Kūlī opposed the request ostensibly on the grounds that, for the security of Persia, a member of the ruling family must remain in residence on the Northeast frontier. Now the Begum ordered Ibrāhīm Beg (Turkman), the governor of

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<sup>1</sup>For further details of this episode, Cf. Roemer, pp. 44-50.

Qom, to bring 'Abbās Mīrzā to the capital. Murtaẓī Kūlī (Turkman), governor of Meshhad, who heretofore had adhered to the party of 'Abbās Mīrzā merely to maintain the support of his local Begs, now joined with his kinsman to enforce the decrees of the central government. Meanwhile, the Begum attacked the powerful relatives of 'Alī Kūlī at court. Prominent among these was the father of 'Alī Kūlī, the governor of the capital. He journeyed to Herat in an attempt to dissuade his son from this treasonable activity but, when his mission failed, he was removed from high office.<sup>1</sup>

As a result of these two important developments, Selman Khan had lent his full support to the Kizilbaş intrigues against the Begum.<sup>2</sup> The formation of this coalition against the Begum coincided with the return to the capital in late July of the disgruntled Kurçū, who had been sent to Shirvan late in 1578 with a carte blanche to "collect" their pay.<sup>3</sup> It is believed that the ensuing rebellion of the Kurçū was encouraged by the dissident amirs who, in order to inflame the hatred of these forces, accused the Begum of having intimacies with the Crimean Tatar Hanzāde, 'Adil Girāy. Both, consequently, were brutally murdered.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Roemer, pp. 51-55.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 56-57. The Kizilbaş saw in the Begum, who was a Tajik (Persian), a definite threat to all Kizilbaş power. Selman Khan also met his end partly for the same reason.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 57-58.

<sup>4</sup>Roemer, pp. 58-59. Ulug Beg (Don Juan of Persia, p. 153) considered the charge a fabrication. Peçewī (II, p. 59) blames the begum and the sultana for throwing themselves at the Hanzāde. He also discloses that all three were killed. In the light of Peçewī's account, one is led to believe that something more than fabrication was involved at the time.

may have been

In spite of the discord in the capital and in Khurāsān, the Kizilbaş amirs still loyal to the Shah were able to assemble an army and march to Shirvan in the autumn of 1579. After the re-occupation of Shamakha, however, the unity of the force was threatened because of eternal bickering and Selmān Khan once again was forced to withdraw without engaging the meager forces under the command of 'Osmān Pasha in a major battle.<sup>1</sup>

The following year (1580), the Shāmlū-Ustājilū faction defeated the Turkman faction and thus gained control of Khurasan, but this rebellious act brought to an end the formidable influence of the Shāmlū-Ustājilū tribes at the court in Qazvin. Only by strenuous efforts indeed was the Shah able to bring the revolt in Khurāsān under control in 1581. Even then his vezir, Mīrzā Selmān, whose daughter was the wife of the heir apparent, Hamza Mīrzā, became the political sacrifice. He was blamed for stirring up trouble between the tribes and wrongly casting suspicion on the good intentions of 'Abbās Mīrzā. Subsequently he was executed.<sup>2</sup>

Ḳōja Sinān Pasha took to the field in the spring of 1580. The Safavids took alarm at the new preparations.<sup>3</sup> In view of the Khurāsān

<sup>1</sup>Peçewī, II, p. 78.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 84-86; "Relatione de Perse", Treſor Politique (Paris, 1611), pp. 197-198.

<sup>3</sup>Peçewī, II, p. 64.

rebellion it might have been better for the Persians to make small concessions for peace with the Ottomans than to risk the extension of the war to Southern Azerbaijan, where it was rumoured Sinān Pasha would attack.<sup>1</sup> But Sinān Pasha showed himself more capable of talking about war than actually fighting it. During the months of the campaign season, he only achieved the provisioning of Tiflis<sup>2</sup> and a show-of-strength by means of a military review for the Persian ambassadors, which accomplished very little. What was more serious, the Ottomans, in spite of the absence of a serious battle, again suffered a great number of casualties to the Georgian and Persian irregulars in the Georgian mountains.<sup>3</sup>

In spite of his do-nothing policy Kōja Sinān Pasha became Grand Vezir on this campaign and, after spending the winter in Erzurum, he returned to the Porte in the summer of 1581.<sup>4</sup>

In the capital preparations were already under way for the sumptuous feast in honour of the circumcision of the Ottoman heir apparent,

<sup>1</sup> Hammer, VII, pp. 101-103. Two different ambassadors sent by the Shah to Sinan Pasha during the year 1580 showed themselves willing to make minor concessions at the expense of Georgian territory.

<sup>2</sup> As the Serdar Mustafā Pasha is known to have gone to Tiflis by way of Tomānīj (Dmanisi), there is every reason to believe that some relief trains to Tiflis took this much shorter but more hazardous route over the Malyy Kavkaz range from Childir. The Safavids are known to have brought their troops as close as the Arpa river in that year. Cf. Peçewī, II, pp. 64-68.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid; according to the "Relatione de Perse"<sup>Treſor</sup> (p. 193) the forces of the Shah waited in Kara Ağaç for an Ottoman attack but Tokmak Khan and Imām Kūlī were detached to harass the Ottoman lines.

<sup>4</sup> Peçewī, (II, p. 70) characterized the services of Sinān Pasha as "not worth a half-akçe tip". (yārim ākçe kadar yād olunajak bir hizmet...)

the future Mehemmed III, on the 6 Jumādā I, 990/29th May, 1582.<sup>1</sup> During the year 1581, as both the Safavids and Ottomans had shown themselves inclined towards peace, no campaign took place. Only in Shirvan, by a major effort against 'Osman Pasha, did the Kızılbaş appear to take advantage of the lull on their western borders in order to improve their bargaining position at the peace table.

At the end of August, 1582, a convoy of supplies under the command of Mehemmed Pasha, a nephew of Lala Muştafā, and the eunuch, Hasan Pasha, Beglerbeg of Diyarbakir, and the assistance of Muştafā Beg (formerly the Georgian Manuchar) left Erzurum for Tiflis. Upon the suggestion of Muştafā, the Georgian, they did not take the mountain route through Dmanisi but followed the Kura river. Mehemmed Pasha, confronted with a combined Persian and Georgian force under Simon Luarssab on the plain of Gori, sought to avoid combat but, in his flight towards Tiflis, lost the all-important baggage to the enemy and many <sup>of his</sup> troops drowned at the crossing.<sup>2</sup> After making up the shortage for the garrison at Tiflis through purchases and gifts from Alexander Levend, Mehemmed Pasha on his return journey planned to kill Muştafā, the Georgian, partly because he suspected him of informing his father-in-law, Simon Luarssab, of the Ottoman troop movements, and partly to detract attention from his own negligence and derilection

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<sup>1</sup>Munejjimbāṣī, Vol. III, p. 549.

<sup>2</sup>Simon Luarssab, who had proposed to Sinān Pasha, in the previous year, that he be given the province of Tiflis as a Sanjak in return for a generous tax, apparently now sought to avenge his rebuff. Hammer, VII, pp. 104-107.



of duty.<sup>1</sup> Muṣṭafā (Manuchar), however, suspected a trap and escaped with his retinue. He now reverted to Christianity and joined the forces of Simon. Much of the blame for this debacle and for the utterly inadequate peace proposals put forward by the Persian ambassador<sup>2</sup> fell upon the Grand Vezir. Sinān Pasha was now replaced by Siyāvūṣ Pasha on the 5th December, 1582.<sup>3</sup> Thereafter, Ferhād Pasha was appointed serdār and he departed for the Persian front in the spring of 1583.<sup>4</sup> This year marked the fall of Erevan. At the same time, strong detachments relieved the garrison at Tiflis and carried fire and sword to Meskhia, homeland of Manuchar.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Hammer, VII, pp. 104-107; Cf. also, "Relatione d<sup>e</sup> Perse", <sup>Treſor</sup> App. 195-197.

<sup>2</sup> Sinān Pasha had actually boasted that he had "made peace" with Persia. Peçewī, II, p. 86.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.; Sinān Pasha was banished and many of his followers were consigned to the galleys, cf. Peçewī, ibid., p. 75. Paolo Contarini, in his report to the Senate, described the crisis in the Ottoman army brought about by the slaughter of the cavalry on the Eastern front. Alberi, Ser. IV/III, p. 230. According to a French report, the Shah in 1582 was willing to cede the province of Shirvan to the Sultan. Cf. Charriere, IV, p. 128.

<sup>4</sup> Peçewī, II, pp. 75. The same author (ibid., p. 86) states that Siyāvūṣ Pasha, fearing he would be sent to the Eastern front as serdār, quickly promoted Ferhad Pasha, Beglerbeg of Rum, to the rank of Vezir in order that he would qualify for the difficult Eastern assignment. Later, Ferhād Pasha, as the senior commander on the Eastern front, appointed Ğigālazāde Sinān Pasha as governor of Erevan. Peçewī ironically points out how this was a sign of the times. Ğigālazāde, a product of the palace school, was high in favour of Sulaymān the Magnificent. Ferhād Pasha, on the contrary, had formerly been a member of the kitchen staff of Sultan Selīm II. (ibid., p. 87). Cf., also, art. "Ğigālazade Sinān Pasha", E.I., II, pp. 33-34 (Parrh).

<sup>5</sup> "Relatione d<sup>e</sup> Perse", <sup>Treſor</sup> App. 199-201; Hammer, VII, pp. 109-110. Peçewī, II, pp. 86-87. The defection of Manuchar was not certain until he had murdered the çavuş and the kapu whom Ferhād Pasha had sent to him.

During the celebrations of the previous year 'Osmān Pasha had sent a letter to the Porte depicting the dangerous state of affairs in Shirvan and describing Safavid treachery. A Persian commander in Shirvan had pretended that peace had been agreed upon between the Ottomans and the Persians. He then slaughtered an Ottoman force in his locality when the latter had stopped its vigilance. This occurrence had hastened the downfall of Sinān Pasha and had led to the humiliation of the Safavid ambassador, Ismā'il Khan.<sup>1</sup> In the autumn of 1582 a strong contingent of troops, led by Ja'fer Pasha, Beglerbeg of Kaffa, went to the relief of the Ottoman force in Dagestan by way of the Northern route through Circassia and Kabarda.<sup>2</sup>

In the spring of 1584, Ferhād Pasha had apparently planned to attack Nakhichevan, but, under orders from the Sultan, he directed his army to Georgia where he proceeded to complete the work of his predecessors by building more, or strengthening the existing, fortresses between Kars and Tiflis. This great effort had the desired effect of pacifying the central provinces of Georgia. Now, with corresponding successes against the Persian forces in Shirvan, the northern flank had become reasonably stabilized. The revolt of the Ottoman troops against Rīzvan Pasha and Ferhād Pasha at the end of the campaign of 1584 gave

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<sup>1</sup>Peçewī, II, p. 75; Munejjimbāšī, III, p. 549. For details of this treachery see below p. 183,

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

evidence <sup>of</sup> to the harshness of the task.<sup>1</sup>

Fortunately for the Ottomans, the Safavids had their own acute internal problems which were aggravated by the systematic plundering and conquest of their Western provinces <sup>by the Ottomans</sup>. Amīr Khan (Turkmān), governor of Tabrīz, had failed to relieve Erevan the preceding year and, consequently, for this and other acts of disobedience, suffered the punishment of blinding. The Turkmān tribe therefore revolted.<sup>2</sup> The Shah and his son, Hamza Mīrzā, certainly had little cause for optimism when it was learned on the eve of the campaign of 1585 that the Grand Vezir, 'Osmān Pasha, would be the Serdār.

#### 5. Gāzī Girāy in the Service of 'Osmān Pasha

Gāzī Girāy played an important part in the extremely fluid campaign which took place in Shirvan. He had led one wing of the Tatar forces under 'Adil Girāy which had saved 'Osmān Pasha and his Shirvan army from defeat in 1578. Also, according to the account of Muñejjimbaşī,<sup>3</sup> he was

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<sup>1</sup> The troops, both Janissaries and Sipāhīs, objected to their becoming "masons and dabbers". On the return march to Erzurum the tent ropes of the Serdār were cut, his baggage carried off and his harem assaulted and dispersed. Peçewī, II, p. 88; Minadoi, pp. 250-255; Hammer, VII, pp. 110-111. According to Leunclavius (Neue Chronika turkischer Nation (Frankfurt a/M, 1591), pp. 127-128) there developed a great outcry in Istanbul against Ferhad Pasha when it became known that he had sold the provisions of the Persian force for his own profit.

<sup>2</sup> Minadoi, pp. 259-261.

<sup>3</sup> See above, p. 149 note 1.

present at the defeat of Maḥmūdābād (Mollā Ḥasan) with 'Ādil Girāy. When the latter fell captive to the Safavids in the same battle, Ġāzī Girāy became the senior Tatar commander in Shirvan. At the time, the Ḥanzāde was twenty-four, physically mature and on the threshold of gaining a wealth of political and military experience under the tutelage of the brilliant commander, 'Osmān Pasha.

The defeat of the Tatars had decided the fate of the Ottoman and Shirvanian troops who were besieged in Shemakha. In the hasty retreat which ensued the Tatar forces, perhaps two thousand, over which Ġāzī Girāy had maintained control, and probably a small number of Lezghians, had the important role of acting as rear guard to the 8,000 odd Ottoman and Shirvanian troops and equipment.<sup>1</sup>

In 1579, apart from the major raid across the Kura and the garrisoning of Shemakha and Baku after the Tatar Khan had come to Derbent in the summer, 'Osmān Pasha, with the aid of Ġāzī Girāy, had concentrated on consolidating his position in Dagestan. Even the garrison at Shemakha had to withdraw when the Safavid army, or a portion of it, re-entered Shirvan in the late autumn.

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<sup>1</sup>For details, see above pp. 149-152.

But Shemakha remained the only advance position of the Safavids in the year 1580. There is even some question whether it was any longer garrisoned by either side. Christopher Burrough, an English merchant who traded in Shirvan and Dagestan that summer, reported that "Shamaky was wholly spoyled".<sup>1</sup> In this year of the do-nothing campaign of Sinān Pasha and of peace overtures and tribal conflict in Persia, the Shirvan front remained relatively quiet.

The visit of the English merchants to the Ottoman expeditionary force between late May and early October doubtless provided a pleasant interlude for 'Osman Pasha and Gāzī Girāy. The merchants anchored their vessel at a town called Bildih in the latitude 40° 25',<sup>2</sup> about six leagues from Baku.

Burrough described the retinue of the Beg in charge of the strongly fortified town of Baku as wearing "...shirts of male, and some of them had gauntlets of silver, others of steele, and very faire".<sup>3</sup> After they had exchanged gifts with the Beg and had sent word of their purpose to 'Osman Pasha they were instructed to proceed to Derbent in their vessel in order

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. the account of Christopher Burrough, "Advertisements and Reports of the 6(th) voyage into the parts of Persia and Media, for the company of English Merchants for the discoverie of new trades, in the yeeres 1579. 1580. and 1581..." The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation, Hakluyt Society, Extra Series (Glas-cow, 1903), III, p. 224.

<sup>2</sup>They therefore landed on the Apsheron Peninsula east of the present city of Mashtagi.

<sup>3</sup>Burrough, Principal Navigations, "III, p. 225.

to deal directly with him. An adverse wind made it necessary for one of the merchants, M. Turnbull, to journey overland to Derbent, with an escort provided by the Beg, where a royal reception awaited him:

...then came forth noble men, captaines, and gentlemen, to receive them into the castle and towne. As they entred the castle, there was a shot of twentie pieces of great ordinance, & the Basha sent M. Turnbull a very faire horse with furniture to mount on, esteemed to be worth an hundred markes, and so they<sup>1</sup> were conveyed to his ('Osman Pasha's') presence:....

'Osman Pasha granted them trading privileges, but he urged them to concentrate their activities at Derbent, "... knowing the state of his countrey to be troublesome...."<sup>2</sup> From the Pasha they purchased 1,000 batmans of raw silk. On all of their transactions the Pasha levied a duty of four per cent. Shortly before the merchants departed for Astrakhan, after experiencing many difficulties, Burrough happened to witness the arrival of an Ottoman convoy bringing the pay of the soldiers:

And being on shoore he saw there the comming in of the Turkes treasure, being accompanied with 200 souldiers, and one hundred pioneers, besides captaines and Gentlemen: .... Treasure was the chiefe thing they needed, for not long before the souldiers were readie to breake into the Court against the Basha for their pay: there was a great mutinie amongst them because hee had long differred and not payed

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<sup>1</sup>Burrough, Principal Navigations, III, pp. 228-229.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

them their due. The treasure came in seven wagons,  
and with it were<sup>1</sup> brought tenne pieces of brasse  
(i.e., cannon).

The report of Christopher Burrough provides an intimate view of the small Ottoman holding force in the Caucasus during a period of relative calm. Without any prompting, the Beg of Baku made reference to the "mayden Queene" (Queene Elizabeth) and verified the home of the merchants as "Enghilterra". In summarizing the manner in which 'Osman Pasha had dealt with the merchants, Christopher Burrough notes, "His dealing with our Merchants as it was not with equitie in all points according to his bargaine, so it was not extreme ill".<sup>2</sup>

In early autumn, around the time the English merchants departed for Astrakhan (October 5, 1580), 'Osman Pasha learned from his spies that a large Safavid force, under the leadership of the Vezir, Selman Khan, had begun to concentrate on the Mugan Steppe. This locality was a most appropriate assembly area from which to launch an attack on the Ottoman-held strong points of Baku and Derbent.<sup>3</sup> Considering the formidable nature of the fortresses at Baku and Derbent and the severity of the winters in Dagestan, there is every reason to believe that the

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<sup>1</sup>Burrough, Principal Navigations, III, p. 234. To my knowledge there is no report of this supply train in Ottoman or Russian sources; therefore, it is quite difficult to determine exactly by which route it came. Given the difficulties of passing through the Georgian irregulars and the difficult terrain, it seems most likely that such a small force could only expect to reach its destination by the Northern route through Circassia.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 226 and 234.

<sup>3</sup>Şeref, <sup>Teem IV</sup>op.cit., p. 1426.

Kizilbaş army was actually going into winter quarters at the time in preparation for an offensive early in the Spring of 1581. 'Osmān Pasha, in anticipation of this plan, wintered in Baku from where he could maintain better surveillance of the enemy situation.<sup>1</sup>

In late November or December 'Osmān Pasha and Ġāzī Girāy, who enjoyed the full confidence and intimate council of the Ottoman commander,<sup>2</sup> conceived a plan which would delay and harass the Safavid preparations for the expected offensive. A mixed force of Tatar and Ottoman cavalry were to be sent against the Safavid Kışlak, or winter quarters, in a night raid. In order to take the enemy by complete surprise, this force of two or three thousand would have to attack the position from an unexpected quarter. Ġāzī Girāy effectively carried out this raid with the assistance of his <sup>cousins</sup> relatives Murād Girāy, son of Mehemmed Khan and Şafā Girāy, <sup>sons of the Khan</sup> his younger brother.<sup>3</sup> The Safavid camp was thrown into great disorder and Selmān Khan only barely managed to escape capture by galloping away on draft horse.<sup>4</sup> Little news of the hard-pressed force in Shirvan reached

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<sup>1</sup> Şeref, <sup>Toem IV</sup> op. cit., p. 1426.

<sup>2</sup> Ertaylan, <sup>Ġāzī Giray Han (Istanbul, 1958)</sup> op. cit., p. 15.

<sup>3</sup> Şeref, <sup>Toem IV</sup> pp. 1427-1429. For a copy of the Hukm-u Serif (- citation of honour) to Ġāzī Girāy, dated 28 February, 1581/24 Muḥarrem, 989, see Şeref, loc. cit. Smirnov (Krymskoe Khanstvo, p. 441) calls Şafā Girāy the son of Mehemmed Girāy.

<sup>4</sup> Şeref, pp. 1427-1429. This sudden attack caused sufficient stir in the Kizilbaş camp to warrant mention in the Safavid histories. Cf. Iskandar Beg, I, p. 262. This humiliating experience may have aided the downfall of the Persian vezir in the following year.



the Porte, but somehow 'Osman Pasha got word through to the Sultan after this singular feat of bravery. Gāzī Girāy received a personal commendation (Hukm-i Şerif) from the Sultan, dated 24 Muharrem, 989/28 February, 1581, in which the hānzāde was informed of a 50,000 akçe increase in his annual subsidy.

The Safavids lost little time over the preceding event. In the spring of 1581, Gāzī Girāy and Dāl Mehemmed, a cavalry commander and author of the Şejā'atnāme, were decisively defeated before Shemakha, and the two commanders only just managed to escape.<sup>1</sup>

'Osman Pasha, having left a garrison at Baku, now prudently withdrew to Derbent. A Persian force, led by Pīrī Moḥammad Beg, a notable Ustajlu commander, skirted the Baku strong point and harassed his withdrawal along the Caspian shore to within range of the guns on the ramparts of Derbent. This same force then occupied the seaport of Shabiran.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, Baku was now besieged but, in spite of inadequate supplies and munitions the defenders held out. Pīrī Moḥammed died shortly after this failure and with his death the Ustajlu-led force withdrew behind

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<sup>1</sup> Şeref, <sup>Toem IV</sup> p. 1430.

<sup>2</sup> This city, apparently no longer in existence, was most probably the one designated as Samaron by William of Rubruck, located at about 41° of latitude. See W. R. Shepherd, Historical Atlas (London, 1922), p. 102. Cf. the description of "Shavaran" described as 4 days' journey from Shemakha, in the account of a Muscovy Company trading expedition of the years 1568 to 1574 in the Hakluyt Society, Principal Navigations, III, pp. 151 and 154.

the Kura.<sup>1</sup>

Now Imām Kūlī Khan (Kājār), who had long been in the forefront of those amirs who bore the brunt of the Ottoman invasion, now took charge of the operations in the Caucasus and suggested to the Shah that Paykar Khan, one of his own tribe, <sup>(Kājār)</sup> be appointed governor of Shirvan. The Shah complied and furnished the latter with 15,000 troops.<sup>2</sup>

‘Osmān Pasha, learning through spies of the intention of Paykar Khan (Kājār) to advance on the Ottoman strong points, again selected Ġazī Girāy to lead a diversionary action against the advancing Safavid forces. With two or three thousand men the Tatar prince held up the Persian advance for one day at a point somewhere between Shemakha and Shabiran.<sup>3</sup> According to the Ottoman version, at the end of the first day the two forces disengaged. After posting a night watch Ġazī Girāy took his repose. During the night Abū Bekr Mīrzā, who had taken part in this action on the Ottoman side, suddenly dashed off through the night with his Lezghian followers, scattering the Ottoman force. Taking advantage of this confusion, the Safavids moved into the melee. Ġazī Girāy, whose mount is reputed to have struck a tree, fell into the hands of Paykar Khan. Later, he was brought in chains before Hamza Mīrzā and,

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<sup>Toem IV</sup>  
<sup>1</sup>Şeref, p. 1430.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>See above, p. 180, note 2 and Iskander Beg, I, p. 270.

because he betrayed the pride befitting his station when he was submitted to questioning, Ġāzī Girāy was sent to the Castle of Alamūt, former stronghold of the Ismā'īlī (Assassin) sect, where he languished in prison for much of the next four years.<sup>1</sup>

In the Persian version of this noteworthy encounter, word came to Imām Kūlī Khan that Ġāzī Girāy and Şafā Girāy had again entered Shirvan. Imām Kūlī, aiming to give the Tatars a proper reception, sent reinforcements to Baykar (sic!) Khan. 'Osmān Pasha also sent an Ottoman commander with many troops to the support of the Tatars. Ġāzī Girāy distinguished himself by his bravery and attracted attention to himself as he galloped about making repeated attacks. During such a sally he fell into the midst of a group of Kāfār Turcomans who blocked his every mode of escape. In this manner, Ġāzī Girāy received his "divinely-ordained" imprisonment in Alamūt.<sup>2</sup> The two versions of this important setback for the Ottoman cause in the Caucasus appear to be minor variations of a similar event. Each version gives additional details about the life of Ġāzī Girāy.

The position of the Ottomans in the Caucasus now reached its most critical stage. Dāl Mehemmed, in another attempt to disrupt and harass the Safavid advance on Baku and Derbent, garrisoned a fortress known as Kabāle Kal'esi, most probably at a mountain pass or other strate-

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<sup>1</sup>Şeref, <sup>Toem IV</sup> pp. 1431-1432; Iskander Beg, loc.cit. I, p. 270.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 260-271.

gic location.<sup>1</sup> Paykar Khan who, in letters to 'Osmān Pasha, boasted that he could now seize Baku and Derbent, deceived Dāl Mehemmed by informing him that peace between the two powers had been signed in Istanbul. When the Ottomans abandoned the isolated stronghold to return to Derbent the superior Persian force fell upon them and slaughtered great numbers. Dāl Mehemmed also became a prisoner of the Safavids.<sup>2</sup> When news of this treachery reached the Sublime Porte, it hastened the dismissal of Sinān Pasha and abruptly ended the peace negotiations. Moreover, the tone of imminent disaster in the letter of 'Osmān Pasha prompted the immediate equipping and embarkation of a sizeable army to Derbent by way of Kaffa and Circassia in the autumn of 1582.<sup>3</sup> Meanwhile, 'Osmān Pasha had not been idle. While most of the Persian army had been attempting to stamp out the Shāmlū-Ustājilū rebellion in Khurāsān during the summer of 1582,

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<sup>1</sup>The exact location of this fortress is not known. Most likely, however, it is situated somewhere between Shemakha and Derbent.

<sup>2</sup>Şeref, <sup>Toem IV</sup>app. 1432-1433.

<sup>3</sup>See above p. 173 and also Peçewī, II, pp. 75-79. The forces, under the leadership of Ja'fer Pasha, beglerbeg of Kaffa, consisted of 3,000 Janissaries, the Silāhdār units, the left and right wings of the Rūmilī (Rumeli) forces and the erbāb-ı tīmar and the zu'umā' of the Sanjaks of Kustindīl, Silistre and Nikboli. The combined force left Kaffa on the 27th August/7th Şa'ban and reached Derbent 80 days later, on the 24th November/27th Şewal, 990/1582. The route of march took the Ottomans across the straights of Kerch to Temruk, across the Kuban river on Circassian rafts, across the wasteland known as Hayhat to Beş Tepe (Pyatigorsk) and on to Derbent through the Kabarda. Munejjimbāşī (III, p. 550) mentions, in particular, the friendly reception of the Ottomans in the Kabarda (Kabartāy). This was doubtless a conciliatory move in view of the size of the relief force.

the Ottoman troops had again garrisoned Shemakha.<sup>1</sup>

The Ottoman troops hardly reached Derbent in time to provide themselves with adequate shelter from the severity of the winter season. Food grew very scarce indeed.<sup>2</sup> The arrival of this strong Ottoman force was not overlooked by the local rulers or the Safavids. This incursion of a new force presenting so much diversity of dress and skill alarmed the Şamhal, the Georgian princes and other local Begs to such an extent that they addressed letters to Imām Kūlī requesting help, saying:

"...Let us, allied with each other, quickly get rid of them (the Ottomans), or else, if things go on like this for one or two years longer, they will remove us."<sup>3</sup>

It is interesting to note, in this regard, that the Ottomans had already arranged to have ships built on the Caspian Sea. The expeditionary force led by Ja'fer Pasha also contained consignments of men and equipment to help man and equip a Caspian naval force.<sup>4</sup>

When Imām Kūlī launched his offensive against 'Osmān Pasha in the spring of 1583, he could boast of an army numbering 50,000.<sup>5</sup> Near Shābirān, in a preliminary skirmish, between a portion of the Ottoman troops

<sup>1</sup> Iskander Beg, I, p. 271.

<sup>2</sup> Peçewī, II, pp. 75-79.

<sup>3</sup> "...Hemān ittifaq iyle būnlarī ōrtadan gōtūrelim yohsa bir ikī yīl dahā bōyle giderse anlar bizī gōtūrurler." Peçewī, II, p. 79.

<sup>4</sup> Şafvet Bey, "Hazer Dēnizinde 'Osmānlī Şanjāgī" T.O.E.M., III. (No. 14), pp. 859-861.

<sup>5</sup> Peçewī, loc.cit. The Ottoman army probably amounted to about half this number.

and the Persian advance guard, which was undertaken against the wishes of 'Osmān Pasha, the Ottomans were easily routed. Already Abū Bakr Mīrzā, the descendent of the Shirvan shahs, had gone over to the Persians, and now many of the Georgians, who had wavered between joining the Ottomans or the Persians, went into the ensuing battle in the ranks of the latter.<sup>1</sup> The Safavid leader taunted 'Osmān Pasha for remaining in his fortress (Derbent) and accused him of sole responsibility for the blood bath of Shirvan. 'Osmān Pasha replied, "Let them not trouble themselves, I am coming".<sup>2</sup>

The Ottoman army left Derbent on 6 Rabī' II, 991/30 April, 1583. Between the Samur river and the Shābirān the two armies clashed and fought a four day engagement (14-18 Rabī' II, 991/7-11 May, 1583) which became known as the "Meş'ale Şāvāşī" (Torch Battle) because the armies were so intent on wiping out their opponents that they fought each other at night, sword in one hand, torch in the other. The Ottomans routed the Persians but, as so often was the case in this war, the casualties were heavy on both sides. After the battle, various pockets of resistance were eliminated and a new fortress was built at Shemakha. The Georgian princes, meanwhile, hastened to show their loyalty to the Ottomans. In fact, this campaign proved to be the last major attempt to oust the Ottomans from

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<sup>1</sup>Şeref, <sup>Ben IV</sup>pp. 1438-1440. According to Peçewī (II, pp. 80-81), a detachment of Rūm İlī troops, while grazing horses near Shabiran, suffered this defeat.

<sup>2</sup>"Zahmet etmesinler, ben geliyorum." Şeref, pp. 1438-1440.

Shirvan until the reign of Shah 'Abbās. As an example to the Safavids the heads of their dead, some 7,500, were piled up into a pyramid.<sup>1</sup>

After spending Ramazān in Derbent, 'Osman Pasha appointed Ja'fer Pasha as acting governor of Shirvan and departed for the Crimea, by the Northern route, on 4 Şevāl, 991/21 October, 1583. Only a few stations from Dagestan the Ottomans comprising a force of about 4,000 veterans of the Shirvan campaign, while crossing the Sunzhu river, ran foul of a Muscovite Cossack force stationed on the Terek. After a brisk encounter which entailed pursuing the Cossacks through the dense forests of that region the Ottomans besieged them in their tābūr.<sup>2</sup> The Ottomans quickly reduced the fort to ashes and, according to Munejjimbāşī, few escaped. The Ottomans then pushed on across the steppe to which the Cossacks had set fire, passed an Ottoman relief force <sup>on</sup> ~~near~~ the Kuban steppe and reached Kaffa late in December, 1583 or early in January, 1584. The weather was so cold that the ice on the straits between the Taman peninsula and Kerch was frozen to a depth which supported the crossing of the Ottoman troops.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Peçewī, II, pp. 80-83; Şeref, <sup>Ta'arīf</sup> pp. 1441-1443. The encounter took place in a locality called "Beşdepe".

<sup>2</sup>This tābūr is most probably the fort that the Kabardian princes in 1578 had requested the Tsar of Muscovy to build.

<sup>3</sup>Peçewī, II, pp. 84-86; Munejjimbāşī, III, p. 553; Şeref (pp. 1481-84) states that, after this encounter, some of the Kabardinian Begs met with 'Osman Pasha and that one of them was a close relative of the Ottoman General. Peçewī (II, pp. 84-86) in attempting to assess the motives for the Cossack attack, states that they had foreknowledge of the treasure shipment which 'Osman Pasha soon encountered on the steppe before he reached Temruk. Although the Ottomans continued to use this route as long as Dagestan and Shirvan remained in their hands, they also continued to be harassed by Cossacks who had direct contact with Moscow. See, for example, a copy in Russian of the letter sent by Murad III in 1583 to

By 1584 the Ottomans had largely stabilized their hold over Dagestan, Shirvan and Georgia and had made important preparations for an all-out attack on Southern Azerbaijan by occupying Erevan and the mountainous portions of Kurdistan. So far no commander on the Eastern front had distinguished himself as much as 'Osman Pasha had in Shirvan and Dagestan. Ġāzī Girāy, until his capture by the Safavids, had served this great Ottoman commander with honour; as a reward, this young Tatar sultān (~ prince), who had come to Shirvan at the age of twenty-four, gained a wealth of experience in the art of political survival in a lean environment against great military odds. This experience would soon serve him well in the Crimea.

6. The Revolt of Mehemmed Girāy Khan and the Escape of Ġāzī Girāy

'Osman Pasha, presumably after he had informed the Porte of his signal victory over the Safavids near Shābirān, received an order from the Sultan to proceed to Istanbul and, en route, to put an end to the rule of Mehemmed Girāy Khan.<sup>1</sup> Since his personal participation in the campaign of 1579 the Crimean Khan had only assisted the war effort in Shirvan with a detachment of two or three thousand Tatars under the leadership of Ġāzī Girāy. After the latter had been captured it is doubtful if the Tatars assisted any more at all. Booty and slaves, which ordinarily

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(cont.)

Ivan IV complaining about the seizure of Ottoman ambassadors and messengers by Cossacks on the Terek river. T. Kumykov, ed., Kabardino-Russkie Snosheniya V XVI-XVIII. VV. (Leningrad, 1957) I, p. 35.

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<sup>1</sup> Hammer, VII, p. 118 and Hasanbegzade, f. 478a.



provided an incentive for the Tatars had largely been carried off or scattered after the first two years of the war. In spite of the repeated insistence of the Sultan, Mehemmed Girāy had made excuses for not participating in the campaign.<sup>1</sup> By 1583 the Sultan, who had meanwhile permitted the Khan to name his son as second heir to the Khanship,<sup>2</sup> had increased the subsidies of the Khan and had sent to him a great quantity of military equipment and supplies; no longer trusted the Khan and sought his dismissal.

The Khan was most certainly guilty of disobeying his overlord. It is wrong, however, to judge the Khan exclusively on the basis of the Ottoman chronicles which, with the exception of Selānikī, place most of the blame on the Khan. The Crimean Khan never made any decisions without the concurrence of his principal advisers, the leaders of the Crimean Tatar tribes.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, Mehemmed Girāy, like all the Crimean Khans, had to wrestle continually with enduring <sup>problems</sup> ~~dangers~~ threatening his state: (a) internally, because of insufficient production of foodstuffs and (b) externally, because of the proximity of powerful neighbours. In 1581

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<sup>1</sup> See the letter to the Khan from Sultan Murād in the year 1580, Ferīdūn Beg, Münşe'at al Salāṭīn, II, pp. 123-126. In a letter of De Germigny to Henri IV there is a description of the rich gifts sent to Mehemmed Giray in 1580, E. de Hurmuzaki, Documente Privitoare la Historia Romanilor, Suppl. I/I, p. 51.

<sup>2</sup> See above p. 160.

<sup>3</sup> Novosel'skiy, Borba, pp. 33-34; also, see above p. 73.

the Khan sent his vezir to the Porte to declare that he would go on campaign if the revenues of Moldavia and Kaffa were given to him and his son, respectively. The Sultan refused to consider this extreme request at all.<sup>1</sup>

It is worthwhile to remember that, at this time, the Livonian War was entering its final stages. The Crimean Tatars, who were traditional allies of Poland, quite naturally wished to participate in the spoils, perhaps even to the extent of regaining control of Kazan and Astrakhan. Both the Crimean Tatars and the Nogays maintained steady pressure on the southern regions of Muscovy during 1580 and 1581, and the Crimean Khan was at least partly responsible for instigating a revolt in Kazan.<sup>2</sup> For a time, during the year 1582, it appeared as if the Crimean Khan would go to the aid of 'Osmān Pasha on condition that the Sultan would provide him with sufficient weapons, armament and money. When the Sultan met these conditions, Mehemmed Girāy actually started out as if he were going on campaign, but he soon returned to his capital.

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<sup>1</sup>De Germigny to Henri III (15 April, 1581), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. I/I, p. 56. For a similar report, see Sinzendorf to the Emperor, (15 April, 1581) in Hurmuzaki, III, p. 61. Some reports even say that the Khan also desired the possession of Derbent. *Ibid.* IX, p. 108.

<sup>2</sup>Karamsin (*Histoire de la Russie*, IX, p. 393) discloses that the Tsar had to garrison heavily the line of the Oka river in anticipation of Tatar attacks during 1580. Novosel'skiy, *Bor'ba*, pp. 31-33, states that, although the role of Poland and Sweden in the Livonian War is well known, no study has yet been made of the serious effect of the Tatar and Nogay attacks. In fact, Ivan IV could do little to quell a revolt in Kazan until peace was concluded with Poland in 1582.

He excused his action this time by blaming, (a) the advanced season,  
 (b) the anxiety he felt about his sons, who had fled to the Porte<sup>1</sup> and  
 (c) the Cossacks, who were planning<sup>n</sup> to attack the Crimea in his absence.<sup>2</sup>

These excuses, which were received with so much scepticism at the Porte, may have had some validity. It is known, for example, that, in 1582, the Russian ambassador, Vasily Mossalskiy, succeeded in concluding a five year truce with the Crimean Tatars.<sup>3</sup> Such an agreement did not, however, keep the Crimean Khan from supporting a general revolt of the Cheremiss in 1583.<sup>4</sup> But such a<sup>2</sup> treaty most certainly disturbed Poland. Perhaps news of the Russian treaty was behind the Polish decision to withhold the subsidy which the Poles had been paying the Khan during the Livonian War.<sup>5</sup> At any rate, in 1583, the peace measures between the Ottoman Empire and Poland-Lithuania, which had been worked out in 1578, now once again broke down. The Cossacks made a devastating attack on

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<sup>1</sup>In a dispatch from Cobham to Walsingham it is stated that these errant sons were returned to the Khan, Calendar of State Papers Foreign Series (January-June, 1583), pp. 185-186. (hereafter, C.S.P., Foreign)

<sup>2</sup>Leunclavius, Neue Chronika, pp. 109-110. In a letter from Stephen Bathory to the Grand Vezir, Sinan Pasha, mention is made of the flight of the brothers of the Khan to Poland; Hurmuzaki, III, p. 68 and XI, p. 671. See also Seref, pp. 1487-1491.

<sup>3</sup>Karamsin, IX, pp. 454-455.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 529.

<sup>5</sup>See the C.S.P. Foreign (January-June, 1583).

Bender and other of the Ottoman and Crimean Tatar settlements, according to one account, just at the time Mehemmed Girāy had started for Derbent.<sup>1</sup> The Sultan made strong protests to Stephān Báthory and the latter, not wishing to incense the Sultan, had the Cossack leaders, who were responsible, beheaded.<sup>2</sup> The Sultan, on his part, forestalled a clash between Polish forces and the Crimean Tatars, over the issues of the tribute and the Cossack raids, by agreeing that the Crimean Khan should no longer demand tribute or violate the Polish Frontier. The Sultan, in turn, compensated the Crimean Khan for his loss of tribute in the hope that his aid would be forthcoming.<sup>3</sup>

After these most involved events and negotiations the patience of the Sultan had come to an end.<sup>4</sup> Perhaps the Khan had secretly been bribed by agents of the Shah. In any case, 'Osmān Pasha had received

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<sup>1</sup>It is certain that a terrible raid took place against Moldavia and Bender in May or June of 1583. Apparently, however, the Khan was not "on campaign", but had sent Tatars to the assistance of the garrison at Bender. The Cossacks, by their adroit use of cannon, held the Tatars at bay until the arrival of the Jaissaries. Cf. the reports of Preyner to the Emperor, Hurmuzaki, XI, pp. 665-666.

<sup>2</sup>Hrushevsky, History of the Ukraine (New Haven, 1948), p. 180, and Harbonne to Walsingham, C.S.P. Foreign (August, 1584 - August, 1585, pp. 65-67.

<sup>3</sup>Harbonne to Walsingham, C.S.P. Foreign (January-June, 1583) pp. 185-186 and p. 397. In spite of this subsidy, the Khan nonetheless seems to have conducted a raid. See, in this regard, Eyzing to the Kaiser, Hurmuzaki, XI, pp. 682-683.

<sup>4</sup>Only the French ambassador, de Germigny, in a dispatch to Henri III, mentions that the Khan had had intelligence with the Shah. Cf. Charriere, IV, pp. 284-285. Considering the attempts the Safavids made to gain support among the Crimean Tatars by giving reasonable treatment to such prisoners as 'Adil Girāy and Ġāzī Girāy, this disclosure does not seem surprising.

the order to depose the Khan. These two cunning leaders, Mehemmed Girāy and 'Osmān Pasha, each sought to sap the strength of the other by a series of stratagems. Initially, 'Osmān Pasha counselled the Porte to mask its intentions with conciliatory letters for, he cautioned, much trouble could develop here at a time when the outcome in Persia was not yet conclusive.<sup>1</sup> The Khan, on his part, professing friendship for his former comrade-in-arms, invited the Pasha to come to Bağcesarāy (Bakhchisaray). When the Khan learned that he had been dismissed by the Sultan and that his brother, Islām Girāy, had been appointed in his stead, he besieged Kaffa in the spring of 1584 with a large body of his followers and personal retinue.<sup>2</sup> Awaiting the arrival of the Ottoman fleet which was to conduct the new Khan to the Crimea, 'Osmān Pasha had to withstand a siege of 37 days. During this time, however, he was not idle. Apart from spreading the news of the Khan's dismissal he invited the 'Ulemā' and the other dignitaries to come over to the side of the new Khan.<sup>3</sup> Behind him, as everyone knew, lay the power of the Ottoman Empire. Mehemmed

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<sup>1</sup> Peçewī, II, pp. 90-91.

<sup>2</sup> As an interim measure, 'Osmān Pasha is supposed to have announced that Alp Girāy was the new Khan. To this the Khan is supposed to have replied, "While I am an absolute sovereign, possessor of the right to have my name on the coinage and foremost in the Friday prayer, who is able to dismiss or to oppose me?" (Ben sāhib-i sikke ve huṭbe padişah iken, beni 'azî ve naşbe kim kâder olur.). Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Munejjimbāşī, III, p. 553; Selānikī, (pp. 177-178) recalls that 'Osmān Pasha nursed a grudge against the Khan since 1579. The Khan really did not want to revolt and it was only his careless speech, enlarged upon by informers, which had brought about such extreme measures.

Girāy now even sought to justify his revolt by asking the Mufti <sup>Muslim</sup> (legal authority) for a Fetvā, or legal decision, on the rightness of his cause. The judgment went against the Khan.<sup>1</sup> After the new Khan arrived, at first Tatars, one by one, and then in whole groups, went over to Islām Girāy.<sup>2</sup> Prominent among the leaders of the defection were 'Alī Beg of the powerful Shīrīn tribe and, at the same time, the son-in-law of Mehemmed Girāy, and Alp Girāy, the Kalğay. Soon only the household troops of the Khan, said to have numbered 7,000 and all of Circassian stock, remained loyal. The Khan and his dwindling retinue now planned to take refuge beyond Perekop on the steppe with the Great Nogays, but their escape was blocked by the Kalğay, who had his brother <sup>strangled</sup> ~~executed~~ forthwith "with his own bow-string".<sup>3</sup> 'Osmān Pasha had put an end to this dangerous revolt, but the opposition to the Ottomans in the Crimea, to which Mehemmed Girāy had given voice, was later effectively carried on by his sons with the assistance of Muscovy. 'Osmān Pasha, thus delayed, now made his triumphal entry into Istanbul accompanied by the veterans who had shared in and had managed to survive the long ordeal in the Caucasus.

When 'Osmān Pasha sailed into the Golden Horn at the beginning of Rejeb, 992/early July, 1584, his prestige had reached its highest point.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Munejjimbāšī, III, p. 553.

<sup>2</sup> Peçewī, II, p. 91.

<sup>3</sup> Peçewī, II, p. 91; Munejjimbāšī, III, p. 553; Kazimirski, "Precis", J.A., Ser. II/XII, p. 380; Smirnov, Krymskoe Khanstvo, p. 441.

<sup>4</sup> Peçewī, II, p. 91; Selānikī, pp. 178-179.

This was never more clear than during the personal interviews which Murād III held with 'Osmān Pasha.<sup>1</sup> There were several small-minded men among the dignitaries, however, chief of whom was the Grand Vezir, Siyāvus Pasha. The latter begrudged 'Osmān Pasha his hard-won prestige and had sought means of undermining his position long before the hero had reached Istanbul. Thanks to the evidence provided by his friend, the Bōstānjī Bāšī, 'Osmān Pasha was able to show that Siyāvus Pasha had conspired with the Crimean Khan to do him harm.<sup>2</sup> The continued attempts of Siyāvus Pasha and his accomplices to defame 'Osmān Pasha came to the attention of the Sultan in a different manner. The Grand Vezir had not approved of the pay increases and promotions with which 'Osmān Pasha had rewarded his troops on battlefields from Şemakhāto Kaffa. These troops, most of whom were members of the Silāḥdār regiment had returned with their pashas to the Porte. When they learned of the decision of the Imperial Dīvān they marched on the palace and caused a great disturbance. This led to the dismissal of Siyāvus Pasha, whose place was filled by 'Osmān Pasha on 20 Rejeb, 992/27 July, 1584.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>For details see Peçewī, II, p. 91 and Selānikī, pp. 178-179 and Munejjimbāšī, III, p. 554.

<sup>2</sup>C.S.P., Foreign (August, 1584 - August, 1585) pp. 44-46; Minadoi, pp. 272-275.

<sup>3</sup>Selānikī, p. 180; Munejjimbāšī, III, p. 554. 'Osmān Pasha was known to be a lover of wine and the question of his drinking was closely scrutinized before he received the appointment. Peçewī, II, pp. 93-94. The irony of the dismissal of Siyāvus Pasha was that he was accused of excess taxation which was indirectly necessitated by 'Osmān Pasha's liberality with his troops. Ibid., p. 95.

The new Grand Vezir was not destined to enjoy a few months of well-deserved rest. In Ramaẓān, 992/September-October, 1584, news reached the Porte that the sons of Meḥemmed Girāy Khan, Murād Girāy and Sa'adet Girāy, leading a strong force of Nogays, Cossacks and dissident Tatars had routed Islām Girāy, who <sup>had taken</sup> ~~took~~ refuge in Kaffa, and had sacked the Crimean capital.<sup>1</sup> Upon hearing this news 'Osman Pasha immediately assembled an army and left Istanbul on the 10th Şevāl, 992/15 October, 1584 for Kastamonu, where he made his winter quarters. From there an army could easily be dispatched either to the Crimea from the port of Sinop, about 120 miles further to the east, or to the eastern Front. At first, 'Osman Pasha had resolved to settle the Crimean affair in person, but upon his arrival in Kastamonu, he sent Ferhād Pasha, who had recently been dismissed from his post as Beglerbeg of Bosnia. Before the latter had reached Kaffa, however, Islām Girāy, with the aid of the Beglerbeg of Kaffa, had driven out the invaders.<sup>2</sup>

At least three factors had helped bring about this revolt against the new Khan. In the first place, Murād and Sa'adet Girāy, like their father, had given vent to anti-Ottoman feelings still harboured by the more conservative elements of the Crimean Khanate. Doubtless most of

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<sup>1</sup> Selānikī, p. 183.

<sup>2</sup> Peçewī, II, p. 96. The invaders had seized the Khan's treasure and many slaves. Now Sa'adet and Murād sought the protection of the Tsar. Sa'adet was permitted to lead a nomadic life with the Nogays and Murād Girāy lived in Astrakhan. For details, see Chapter II, p. 207 ff.



the Crimean Tatar leaders realized that, without the Ottomans, they would go the way of Kazan and Astrakhan; yet, they could not accept certain aspects of Ottoman domination, such as the appointment of Khans and their enforced participation in unremunerative campaigns. Secondly, Islām Girāy, who had been turned over as a hostage (rehīn) to the Ottomans early in the reign of his father, Devlet Girāy, had become Ottoman in taste, speech and habit and, moreover, had spent the last few years living the life of a <sup>1</sup> dervish in Konya. In short, the new Khan, in most respects, preferred things Ottoman. He proved this early in his reign when he "voluntarily" gave up the time-honoured privilege of hutbe (having his name mentioned first in the Friday prayer). A Khan, in such a position, naturally did not enjoy the full support of his people.<sup>2</sup> A third element was the unrest on the steppe, particularly among the Great Nogays, as the threat of Muscovy and the pressure of the Cossacks became more apparent. As Sa'adet Girāy had married the daughter of a mirza of the Great Nogays, it was natural that he should seek refuge with his father-in-law and also that he should be able to count on Nogay support in an attempt to establish himself in the Crimea as Khan.<sup>3</sup> The unrest of the Nogays at this time expressed itself along traditional lines:

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<sup>1</sup> Halīm Girāy, Gūlbun-ū Hānān, p. 57.

<sup>2</sup> Novosel'skiy, Borba, p. 34, and art. "Girāy", I.A., IV, p. 786 (Inalcık).

<sup>3</sup> Leunclavius, Neue Chronika, p. 113. Among the Crimean Tatars it was customary for the leading families to make marriage ties with prominent Nogay or Circassian families. This practice often had the effect of increasing the influence of any given hanzade in the affairs of the Khanate.

they sought a union with the Crimean Tatars and they also ardently sought the protection of the Ottoman Sultan. Moscow, by supporting the invasion of the Crimea and by harbouring the rival Khans, actually weakened the Crimea and the position of the Nogays.<sup>1</sup> Apparently a second attack was made on the Crimea by Sa'adet Girāy in the early part of 1585, but this attack was repulsed by the Kalgay, Alp Girāy.<sup>2</sup>

In the spring of 1585, when the outcome of the Crimean rising became known, 'Osman Pasha led the army to the eastern front.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Novosel'skiy (Borba, p. 35) points out that the Moscovite policy of carefully planned campaigns followed by the building of forts to hold ground soon convinced Urus Khan of the folly of attempting to establish an independent power on the lower Volga.

<sup>2</sup>Halim Girāy, pp. 57-58. C.S.P. Foreign (August, 1584-August, 1585) pp. 313-314; Kazimirski, "Précis", J.A. Ser. II/XII, p. 379. For further details on these events see Smirnov, Krymskoe Khanstvo, pp. 442-443, and Howorth, History of the Mongols, II, p. 520 ff.

<sup>3</sup>The Moscovite ambassador, Boris Blagov, conferred with Islām Girāy, 'Osman Pasha and the Sultan. The main subjects of these discussions were the Terek Cossacks and the question of religious freedom in Kazan and Astrakhan. The Sultan also requested the return of messengers and envoys who had been captured on the Terek. Belokurov, Snosheniya, pp. lxxxix-xvi. Blagov had been sent to the Porte to announce the accession of Tsar Fedor. In his conversation with 'Osman Pasha in Kastamonu, he was struck by Ottoman concern over Muscovite-Safavid relations and the threat this might offer to Ottoman Communications in the Northern Caucasus, Kumykov, ed. Kabardoni-Russkie Snosheniya, I, pp. 36-46.

During his sojourn in Istanbul the Grand Vezir had not felt well. Apparently his condition became progressively worse as he approached Persia. In Erzurum he found a severe food shortage.<sup>1</sup> 'Osman Pasha, in spite of his infirmity, let it be rumoured that he planned an attack on Nakhichevan. This rumour served to split the Safavid forces between Hamza Mīrzā in the North and 'Alī Kūlī, governor of Tabriz.<sup>2</sup>

Before 'Osman Pasha left Erzurum for Persia an event took place which brought great joy to him. Gāzī Girāy, who had become such a favourite of the Pasha before his capture in the spring of 1581, appeared suddenly in Erzurum after escaping from his Persian confinement. The sources are about evenly divided on the question of whether he spent four years in the prison of Kahkahe or the prison of Alamūt.<sup>3</sup> The story of the fabulous escape of the hānzāde is directly connected with the preceding events. When Hamza Mīrzā learned that the Tatars, according to information he had received from the Şamhal, had revolted against the Ottomans, he suggested to his father, the Shah, that they curry favour with

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<sup>1</sup> Peçewī, II, pp. 96-99; Morosini reported to the Senate in 1585 that, although 'Osman Pasha, whom he estimated to be 60 years of age, volunteered to take command of the Eastern front, he had hoped the Sultan would, in view of his long service in Shirvan, refuse. This was unfortunately not the case, Alberi, Ser. III/III, pp. 285 and 305.

<sup>2</sup> "Relatione dē Persiā", <sup>Treſer</sup> pp. 201-204.

<sup>3</sup> The Persian sources and the best informed Ottoman sources say Alamūt. See above Notes 158 and 159. Cf., also, Munejjimbāšī, II, p. 703 and Halīm Girāy, p. 54.

the Tatars by releasing Ġāzī Girāy. If he was found to be sufficiently obedient, he could be made a son-in-law, by arranging a marriage between him and a sultāna<sup>(~ princess)</sup>. Finally, he could be given troops and appointed Khan of Shirvan. Ġāzī Girāy, seeing an opportunity to escape, played along with this scheme and, as a result, he was released from prison and became a close and trusted associate of Hamza Mīrzā, who took his Tatar charge with him to Tabriz.<sup>1</sup> From Tabriz, Ġāzī Girāy escaped across the border dressed as a dervish. He took refuge in Van and from there was sent to Erzurum by Ġigālazāde Sinān Pasha, the beglerbeg of Van.<sup>2</sup>

After mutual rejoicing, 'Osmān Pasha gave Ġāzī Girāy the command over all of the Tatar and Circassian troops in his army and ordered the advance on Tabriz. The physical condition of the Pasha had meanwhile deteriorated to such an extent that he had to be carried in a litter. The Ottomans had a particularly bloody encounter with Hamza Mīrzā at Sufian, a town to the West of Tabriz, from which Ġigālazāde emerged the hero. Now the path to Tabriz was open. The army entered the city on

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<sup>1</sup>Şeref, pp. 1499-1500. It is interesting that Dāl Mehemmed, the former companion of the Khan of Shirvan, had also been sent to Alamūt. When Ġāzī Girāy needed a scribe to answer the letters of the Shah, he was able to obtain the release of Dāl Mehemmed for the purpose. Later, upon the intercession of Ġāzī Girāy, the latter also was released and managed to escape by a different route. He reached Erzurum about the same time as did Ġāzī Girāy. (*Ibid*) According to the above account, Ġāzī Girāy must have been released from prison during the time of the revolt of Mehemmed Girāy.

<sup>2</sup>Selānikī, pp. 241-242. Şeref, pp. 1499-1500.

28 Ramazān, 993/23 September, 1585. 'Osman Pasha ordered the construction of a fortress in the midst of the city. Upon its completion Ja'fer Pasha was put in charge of a garrison numbering 12,000. Thereafter the army withdrew.<sup>1</sup> In the city some incidental killings of Ottoman troops had sparked off a general massacre of the local population. Moreover, Çigālazāde, who was accompanied by Gāzī Girāy and Dāl Mehemmed during a battle outside the city, had let himself be tricked by a feigned withdrawal of the enemy and, against the advice of his companions, had involved his troops in a severe conflict. It is possible henceforth that Çigālazāde may have held a grudge against the hānzāde which came to light in 1596, when Çigālazāde became Grand Vezir.<sup>2</sup>

Hamza Mīrzā, who by this time had gained a great reputation for bravery among the Ottomans, harassed the Ottoman withdrawal mercilessly. 'Osman Pasha, upon whose presence and reputation the discipline of the army depended, died shortly after the army had left Tabriz. Çigālazāde, who had been appointed serdār by 'Osman Pasha in anticipation of his death, remained as commander of the rear guard in the attempt to hide

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<sup>1</sup>The withdrawal started on the 4th Zi'lka'de, 993/28 October, 1585. In Tabriz, during the feast which followed Ramazān, 'Osman Pasha, for perhaps the last time before his death, confided in Gāzī Girāy and Dāl Mehemmed. He told them that the only satisfactory means of holding the newly-gained Persian possessions was to gain the full support and assistance of the Crimean Khan. He also expressed his desire to have Gāzī Girāy appointed Khan and to have Dāl Mehemmed made the Beglerbeg of Kaffa. Şeref, pp. 1502-1505. Cf., also, Peçewī (II, pp. 97-101) for details of the occupation of Tabriz.

<sup>2</sup>Şeref, pp. 1503-1504. See below p. 297 ff.

this news from the Ottomans and Persians alike. But for this and other measures of Ğigālazāde, the withdrawal might have turned into a major disaster.<sup>1</sup> On 8 Zī'l Hījje, 993/December 1, 1585, the eunuch Mesīh Pasha became the new Grand Vezir and Ğigālazāde was confirmed as serdār of the Eastern front, only to be transferred to Baghdad a few months later.<sup>2</sup>

#### 7. The Close of the Persian War

With the conquest of Tabriz, the Persian War entered its second and final stage. The conquests of the previous seven years had shorn the Safavids of their borderland tributaries; this new thrust into the rich heartlands of Azerbaijan was destined to bring the Safavid state speedily to its knees. The move had the desired effect. The Ottomans, however, left nothing to chance. Apart from the annual convoys for reinforcing their garrisons and provisioning them, they completed the conquest of Northern Azerbaijan by seizing Genje in 1588 and Nakhichevan in 1589. Ğigālazāde, at the same time, marched on Hamadan from Baghdad. Ferhād Pasha, who had been responsible for the last major conquests in Azerbaijan, made a triumphal entry into Istanbul in the following year, bringing with him the Persian plenipotentiary

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<sup>1</sup>Peçewī, II, pp. 101-102; Munejjimbāšī, III, pp. 559-560; "Relatione de Perse", p. 204.

<sup>2</sup>Peçewī, II, p. 107. After 6 months Mesīh Pasha was deposed and Siyāvus Pasha was named Grand Vezir for the second time. In April, 1589, he was replaced by Sinān Pasha, Hammer, VII, p. 226.

and a hostage.<sup>1</sup>

Another development had hastened the signing of peace in 1590. 'Ogman Pasha, in the early years of the war, had sought diligently to establish Ottoman naval supremacy on the Caspian Sea as a means of blocking any relief measures which Moscow might attempt, and also as a means of establishing liaison with the friendly Uzbek power in Central Asia. There is at least some evidence that, by the accession of Shah 'Abbās in 1587, the Ottomans had established a measure of naval power on the Caspian.<sup>2</sup> The ~~close~~ liaison, which now developed between the Ottomans and Uzbeks, enabled the latter power to open a second front against the Safavids in Khurasan in 1588.

While these events were taking place, Hamza Mīrzā had been assassinated in 1586. His murder, although a great loss to Persia, eliminated the division of the population into two hostile camps, one supporting Hamza Mīrzā as successor to the throne, and the other, 'Abbās Mīrzā. In a decisive battle which took place early in 1587 between the Shāmlū, the tribe which had heretofore protected 'Abbās, and the Ustājilū, the Ustājilū won the day, deposed the half-blind Shah Muḥammad Hudābende, and placed 'Abbās Mīrzā on the throne.<sup>3</sup> The young Shah solemnly resolved

<sup>1</sup>Munejjimbāshī, III, pp. 560-563; Selānikī, pp. 204-250, passim.; Peḡewī, II, pp. 107-113.

<sup>2</sup>Selānikī (pp. 225-226 and p. 236.) states that an ambassador arrived at the Porte from 'Abdullah II, Khan of the Uzbeks, in 1587. By the years 1588-1589 the Ottomans were able to stop and search vessels on the Caspian Sea. One merchant of Gilan was questioned about the Russian ambassador who had gone to Persia and then was robbed. Cf. N.I. Vesselovskiy, ed. "Pamyatniki Diplomaticheskikh i Torgovikh Snosheniy Moskovskoy Rusi s Persiyei" Trudy Vostochnago Otdeleniya Imperatorskago Russ-

to reconquer what the Ottomans had taken but, in the light of the aforementioned difficulties, this resolve, for a time, remained unfulfilled. He was forced to ratify the humiliating peace of 1590 which was based on the status quo. Now much of Georgia, Shirvan, Derbent, Azerbaijan and Kurdistan passed into the hands of the Ottomans.<sup>1</sup>

As a result of the Persian War, 1578-1590, the Ottoman State came into possession of much of the Caucasus. Viewed in historical perspective the outcome proved to be a Pyrrhic victory. No empire could withstand the shock of a war lasting thirteen years without sacrifices of men and material and without altering some of the institutions and goals of its society. These considerations, although extremely important, are beyond the scope of this study.<sup>2</sup> In the short run, the

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kaġo Arkheologicheskago Obshchestva, XX, pp. 106-108.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. art. "'Abbās I", E.I.<sup>2</sup>, I, pp. 7-8 (Savary).

<sup>1</sup>Selānīkī, p. 236 ff.; "Relatione dē Perse", <sup>Treſor</sup> pp. 204-206; "M. de Maisse to Henri III", Charrier, IV, pp. 578-585; for further details see Hammer, VII, pp. 222-228 and the art. "'Abbās I", E.I.<sup>2</sup>, I, pp. 7-8 (Savary). At one stage, before Shah 'Abbās made peace with the Ottomans (ca. 1588), he promised to give the Tsar of Muscovy Derbent and Baku if he took action against the Sultan. The Muscovite Ambassador to Persia, G. Vasil'chikov, claimed that his government had already intervened on the Shah's behalf when it had constructed the fort on the Terek and had intercepted the Crimean Tatars and Ottomans. Belokurov, Snosheniya, p. xcvi; for documents on the Vasil'chikov mission, see Vesselovskiy, "Pamyatniki Dipl. i Torgov. Sosh." Trudy...Arkheolog. Obshch. XX, pp. 53-54 and passim.

<sup>2</sup>The European sources provide a considerable amount of insight into the economic and social aspects of the war. Cf., for example, the French report of "...pertes croissantes des Turcs dans la Guerre de Perse...." Charrier, IV, p. 436 ff. Leunclavius (Neue Chronika, pp. 133-134) ex-

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Ottomans had upset the balance of power in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Safavid Persia appeared to be well on the way towards becoming a second-rate power. Even before the war had officially ended all of the states and principalities which had relations, to a greater or lesser degree, with either of these powers, had begun coming to terms with the new equilibrium in Western Asia. On the one hand, some of the smaller political entities of the Caucasus tended to band together and to cast about for allies in order to offset the dominating influence of the Ottoman Empire. Alexander of Kakheti, for example, followed an extremely equivocal policy. He paid a generous tribute to the Ottomans and thus avoided the establishment of a direct Ottoman administration on his home soil. At the same time, however, between the years 1586 and 1588 he established close diplomatic ties with Muscovy.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, some

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plains the uprising in Istanbul of June, 1588<sup>9</sup>, in terms of the arrears in the pay of the soldiers and the falsification of the gold content in newly minted ducats. Giovanni Moro, Bailo, reported to the Venetian Senate (1590) how seriously the authority of the Grand Vezir had been undermined by court favourites during the last years of the war, Alberi, Ser. III/III, p. 366. Gianfrancesco Morosini, Bailo, likewise reported in 1585 (*Ibid.*, p. 301 ff.), "Questa guerra da' turchi è grandemente abborita, e stimata fastidiosissima; perché fra li confini de' turchi e il paese abitato da' persiani si ritrova una interposizione di molti terreni sterili e disabitati che non possono servire per sostenter gli eserciti di maniera che è necessario portarsi dietro tutti i viveri..." This Bailo then takes up the problems of the great losses of men and the complete disability and infirmity of those who manage to survive the long journey and the scarcity of food.

<sup>1</sup>Belokurov, *Snoshaniya*, pp.xciii-xcv. Danilov had gone to Kakheti in 1586. When he returned, he brought with him an ambassador of Alexander Levend. The negotiations which followed led to the acceptance by Kakheti

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political entities such as the Nogays, the Kumucks and Kaytaks of Dagestan, the Uzbeks of Central Asia and the people of Shirvan, who had been, geographically speaking, isolated from the main centers of Ottoman control and yet shared common cultural, political or economic aims with the Ottomans, generally welcomed the new state of affairs. This tendency was particularly true in those cases, represented by the Nogays and Shirvanians, where the nearest great power actually pursued a policy of complete domination over them.

Muscovy, in view of the new situation in the Caucasus, had become more cautious in Circassia. After 'Osmān Pasha had destroyed the fort on the Sunzhu in 1583, no further direct contact with the Kabardians was accomplished until 1587-1588. During the course of 1588, a new fort was built on the Terek, but this time it was situated at the mouth of the river (the Staryy Terek branch) far from the normal Ottoman supply lines. This fort and the town which grew up around it soon became the centre of Muscovite trade and political activities with the peoples of the Northern Caucasus, Dagestan and Kakheti.<sup>1</sup>

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of an ill-defined Muscovite overlordship. This was, at the time, only a means of putting pressure on the Ottomans. Meanwhile, the Ottomans continued to collect their harāj, Peçewī, II, p. 109.

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<sup>1</sup> The Princes Mamstruk and Kudensk, in the name of Prince Kanbulat, petitioned the Tsar to set up a city on the Terek and to protect them from the Crimean Tatars, the Ottomans and the Şamhal, Kумыков, Kabardino-Russkie Snosheniya, I, pp. 50-51 and the notes, p. 399. Cf., also, Belokurov, Snosheniya, pp. xcvi-xcvi. A German embassy returning from Persia in 1604 stopped at a Muscovite settlement on the Terek. George Tectander, Iter Persicum (Altenburg, 1609), pp. 127 ff.

During the eventful years of the Persian War, Ġāzī Girāy had matured. He had gained, by the accident of circumstance, first-hand knowledge of all of the traditional adversaries of his ancestors. As a youth he had joined in the Astrakhan campaign and had accompanied or led raids into Poland, Russia and the Caucasus. During the Persian war he had served 'Osmān Pasha, one of the greatest of all Ottoman commanders, in Shirvan and Dagestan. Later, he had observed the Safavid society at first hand during his captivity. After the death of 'Osmān Pasha, he spent some time in Istanbul and then settled into a quiet life on one of the Tatar estates which were maintained for Crimean Tatar princes near the capital. The young hānzāde had now ended his long apprenticeship; henceforth, he would carry the burdens and responsibilities for which his earlier experience had trained him.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Selānikī, loc. cit. p. 241-242.

## Chapter II

### ĞAZI GIRĀY KHAN AND HIS RELATIONS WITH THE STEPPE POWERS, 1588 - 1594

#### 1. The Legacy of Mehemmed Girāy Khan

Mehemmed Girāy Khan (1577-1587), continuing in the tradition of his father, Devlet Girāy Khan (1551-1577), firmly defended the semi-independent position of the Khanate, not only against outside encroachments, but also against the encroachments of the Ottoman state. Yet, paradoxically, it was during his reign and the reigns of his immediate successors that pressure on the steppe portion of the Khanate from the adjoining lands of Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania reached such proportions that more reliance than previously on the might of the Ottoman Empire became inevitable. Thus, in the time of Mehemmed Girāy, a clear conflict of interest developed between the Khan, representing conservative elements in the Crimea, and the Ottoman Sultan. While Mehemmed Girāy was willing to supply the Sultan with a limited number of Tatars for the Persian War - particularly from among the supporters of his brothers (hence, the participation of Ğazī Girāy and 'Ādil Girāy in the Shirvan campaign) - he wished to keep his main forces at home. This policy led eventually to his deposition and death. Mehemmed Girāy had also shown that he wished to perpetuate the Khanship in his own immediate family. His sons, Sa'ādet Girāy and Murād Girāy, were able to disrupt the Crimea for several years by drawing support from a conservative, basically anti-Ottoman faction in the Khanate.

The inexperienced and thoroughly Ottomanized Islām Girāy Khan (1584-1588) had to contend with these basic internal problems and several new external developments upon his accession. Islām Girāy Khan, who had spent most of his life in Istanbul, was alien to the ways of his countrymen. Far from enjoying the support of the conservative majority of his subjects, he had to lean heavily on the support of the Beglerbeg of Kaffa and of an Ottoman garrison (Bakhchisaray) to maintain himself in power.<sup>1</sup> Even then he was driven from his capital on two separate occasions, in 1584 and 1585, by the pretender to the Khanship, Sa'adet Girāy; the latter was helped by his brothers, Murād Girāy and Safā Girāy. These exiled sons of Mehemmed Girāy enjoyed support from a conservative faction in the Crimea as well as from the Great Nogays and the Don Cossacks. After their final expulsion from the Crimea in 1585, Sa'adet Girāy and Safā Girāy sought refuge, first among the Kumucks (of Dagestan) then later with the Great Nogays. Murād Girāy, after taking refuge in Astrakhan for a time, was summoned to Moscow where he had an audience with the Tsar, and was then returned to Astrakhan as the nominal governor of that city, a position in which he served as the puppet of Moscow until his mysterious death about 1590.<sup>2</sup> The invasions of the Crimea by Sa'adet Girāy had left the Khanate in disarray, the treasury empty,

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<sup>1</sup> S. M. Solov'ev, Istoriya Rossii, VII (Moscow, 1960), p. 259, citing Krym Del., Nos. 16-21.

<sup>2</sup> Novosel'skiy, Borba Moskovskogo Gosudarstva s Tatarami v pervoy polovine xvii veka (Moscow-Leningrad, 1948), p. 35 ff., citing Krym. Knig. no. 16, f. 16b-24. Krym. Del., (1586), f. 10-13, 27 ff.

and had greatly increased the concern of the Tatars for their north-eastern flank, exposed as it was to hostile attacks, particularly from the Don Cossacks. Moreover when <sup>1</sup>Stepan Bathory died in December of 1586, Poland had entered its third interregnum in a period of only fifteen years. The particular importance of this event for the Crimean Tatars lay in the ensuing breakdown of discipline within the Polish-Lithuanian state. Bathory, a strong ruler, had held the Zaporozhian Cossacks in check; after his death they made up for lost time by carrying out a series of raids on the Danubian Principalities, the Ottoman towns along the Dnepr, and on the Crimean Khanate.<sup>1</sup> Now the Khanate faced a threat from both flanks of its steppe. Islām Girāy Khan made every effort to hold the hostile force at bay. His Tatars invaded the border regions of Muscovy in the spring of 1586, but were repulsed by a Muscovite force. In 1587, another raid into Muscovy brought in some booty.<sup>2</sup> This raid was followed by a successful venture into Circassia.<sup>3</sup> During the same year, some Nogay subjects of the Khan dwelling in the

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<sup>1</sup>M. Kazimirski, "Précis de l'Histoire des khans de Crimea", Journal Asiatique, Ser. 2/XII (1833), p. 380; M. Hrushchevsky, History of the Ukraine (New Haven, 1950), p. 181 ff.

<sup>2</sup>According to Karamzin, among the settlements attacked were Belev and Kozelsk. In 1587, the settlement of Krapivna was actually seized. M. Karamzin, Histoire de l'Empire de Russie, X (Paris, 1826), pp. 76-77, citing Krym. Del., no. 16 and Turetsk. Del., no. 2. Cf. also Hrushchevsky, loc.cit.

<sup>3</sup>The raid must have taken place later in the same year and was doubtless partly responsible for the renewed diplomatic activity between Circassia and Moscow thereafter. Kazimirski, loc.cit.

Bujak region (Bessarabia) were responsible for an attack on Moldavia. This unauthorised raid upon the possessions of the Sultan led to serious protests from the Porte and a demand by the Sultan for the Khan to return all property and prisoners immediately. The affair serves to illustrate the poor state of order within the Crimean Khanate in the time of Islām Girāy. It resulted in the further submission of the Crimean Khan to the will of the Ottoman Sultan. As proof of his loyalty, the Khan either felt it necessary or was forced to give up an important mark of sovereignty, namely, the right of Hutbe, the mentioning of his name first in the Friday prayers. Henceforth in the Crimea the name of the Ottoman Sultan preceded that of the Khan. The degree of control the Ottoman state could exercise in the Crimean Khanate was definitely on the increase.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile, the Zaporozhian Cossacks had been capturing Tatars and also driving off a large number of cattle.<sup>2</sup> In retaliation, the Crimean Tatars had invaded the Polish-Lithuanian borderland in 1587 while Archduke Maximilian of Austria was attempting to make good his claims to the Polish throne by an attack on Poland through Silesia.<sup>3</sup> The Cossacks answered this raid with an attack by sea on the coast of

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<sup>1</sup> Kazimirski, loc.cit., art. "Islam Giray", loc.cit.; and Halīm Girāy, Gülbn-i Hanan (Istanbul, 1327), p. 58. I.A. V 1105

<sup>2</sup> Solov'ev, VII, p. 260, citing Krym. Del., nos. 16-21.

<sup>3</sup> (Barton) to (Wolsingham)? C. of S.P., XXIII, p. 134.

the Crimea early in 1588. Islām Girāy had just commenced a counter-raid in the spring of 1588 when he met his end.<sup>1</sup> The new Khan, Ġāzī Girāy, inherited the task of pacifying the Zaporozhians. Viewed in a larger context, the time had come to deliver a blow to the growing numbers of the Zaporozhians. Not only did they hamper the passage of merchants and embassies across the steppe between the Ottoman-Crimean possessions and Poland-Lithuania or Moscow, they also maintained their Sich, or island stronghold, on the lower stretches of the Dnepr, in easy striking distance of the Principalities, of the Ottoman border districts of Akkerman and Bender and of the possessions of the Crimean Khan.<sup>2</sup> These seemingly insignificant raids and counter-raids on the borderlands of the Ottoman and Polish states led up to the crisis between these two powers in 1589 and 1590.

Before the advent of Ġāzī Girāy the stage was set for a Muscovite take-over of the Crimea on the Don-Volga side of the steppe through the exploitation by Moscow of the equivocal position of Murād Girāy. Tsar Fedor and his advisers had seen in the rebellion of Mehemmed Girāy Khan and the unpopular rule of Islām Girāy a chance for Moscow to establish a puppet ruler in the Crimea similar to those which had been placed by

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Letter of Zamoyiski to the Sultan (22 April, 1588), E. Hurmuzaki Documente Privitore, Suppl. II/I, p. 295 with Selaniki, Tarih, pp. 241-242.

<sup>2</sup>Solov'ev, VII, p. 28 and L. Soranzo, L'Ottomano (Venice, 1598), pp. 52<sup>v</sup>-53<sup>r</sup>. Cf., G. Vernadsky, Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Age (New Haven, 1959), pp. 249-268.



Ivan IV in Kazan and Astrakhan prior to the Muscovite conquest of those Khanates. In the dispossessed sons of Mehemmed Girāy, Sa'ādet, Murād and Şafā, the Tsar had placed his hopes. Moreover, these hānzādes could be used as figureheads in an attempt to create factions among the Nogays who were in revolt against Moscow.<sup>1</sup> This twofold intention of the Tsar was brought to the attention of the Sultan by Uzbek and Little Nogay ambassadors in Şevāl, 995/September 1587. They urged that a campaign be launched against Astrakhan immediately. The Sultan now sent the orders necessary to the preparation of a campaign against Astrakhan in the following year.<sup>2</sup>

As soon as the Tsar received word of the Sultan's intentions, he sent an ambassador to the Crimea to assure the Khan that he would not permit the sons of Mehemmed Girāy to attack the Crimea on three conditions: (a) if the Khan would not attack the lands of Moscow, (b) if the Khan dissuaded the Sultan from attacking Astrakhan, and (c) if the Khan sent information to Moscow about the plans of the Ottomans.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Murād Girāy was made the puppet governor of Astrakhan (ca. 1586) and, in this role, he helped the Tsar reduce the Great Nogays to obedience. Nevertheless, from beginning to end, the puppet was never trusted. Whether he was negotiating, praying in the mosque, or decorating various tribesmen for special services, he was always under the close supervision of the real authorities, R.M.Pivov and M.I.Burtsov. (Novosel'skiy *ibid.* p. 35).

<sup>2</sup>Selānikī, pp. 229-230; the Muscovites had expected some kind of action against them by the Ottomans in 1586. Murād Girāy had told the Tsar he expected the Ottomans to build a city on the Terek; Cf. S. A. Belokurov, Snosheniya Rossii s Kavkazom, 1578-1613 (Moscow, 1889), p. xcvi. (Whether such a city or outpost was ever built is not known. More likely, the Ottomans continued to rely on amicable relations with the local peoples, relations which were, of course, overshadowed by the grandeur and might of the Ottomans.)

<sup>3</sup>Solov'ev, VII, pp. 259-260.

It is not clear why the plans for an attack on Astrakhan evaporated in the following year. The war in Persia had not yet ended. Islām Girāy, early in the spring of 1588, had sustained a heavy Cossack raid on his home soil. Shortly after this, the Khan, after having commenced a retaliatory raid, became ill and died.<sup>1</sup> Professor Inalcik suggests that the Crimean Tatars, fearing a flank attack from Poland or Muscovy while they were marching on Astrakhan, preferred a direct attack on Moscow. Doubtless the lessening of tension following the accession of Ġāzī Girāy contributed much towards establishing a new equilibrium on the steppe. Furthermore, by 1588 the Sultan would have heard of the capitulation of the Great Nogays to Moscow, a fact which may have discouraged the Ottomans from intervention, since intervention would perforce have had to be planned on the scale of a major campaign. Ġāzī Girāy wrote the Tsar that he had persuaded the Sultan to give up his claim to Astrakhan. The Khan also sought a treaty of alliance with Moscow.<sup>2</sup> All of these considerations doubtless played their part in the decision of the Porte not to make a campaign against Astrakhan. One thing is certain; Moscow, although she had suffered serious defeat from the armies of Poland and Sweden, had nevertheless been able to increase her pressure on the Caucasus and the steppe.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Contrary to the report given by Inalcik ("Don Volga Kanalı Teşabbusu", Belleten, 46, p. 395), which is based on Selānikī (p. 242), the Khan evidently had contemplated an attack on some portion of Poland for he died on 1 April at Tehine. Cf. Zamoyski to Radziwiłł (24 April, 1588), Archivum Jana Zamoyskiego IV (Cracow, 1748) pp. 198-199.

<sup>2</sup>Karamsin, X, p. 144, citing Krym. Del., no. 17 and Selānikī, pp. 241-242.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid. and H. Inalcik, "Don-Volga Kanalı Teşebbüsü —" Belleten, 46 (1948), p. 394. For information about financial support which Moscow was giving

## 2. The Accession of Ġazī Girāy Khan and the Nogay Question

Upon the death of Islām Girāy Khan in the spring of 1588, Ġazī Girāy was designated the new khan of the Crimea.<sup>1</sup> He had returned to Istanbul after the last campaign of 'Osman Pasha in 1585 and had henceforth passed a comparatively quiet existence in Yanbolu, a place of residence for members of the Girāy dynasty. It was here that Crimean Tatar Sultans - some, exiles; others, hostages - were detained at the Sultan's pleasure. Selānikī states that Ġazī Girāy received the news of his appointment with considerable surprise, for he had, in the interim, spent his time in the company of learned men and had actually contemplated a life dedicated to letters.<sup>2</sup>

The Tatars had meanwhile elevated the Ḳalgay, Alp Girāy, the senior surviving son of Devlet Girāy, to the position of Khan and had sought the approval of the Sultan; however, their petition was ignored.<sup>3</sup> Ġazī Girāy Khan, after the customary ceremony of investiture,<sup>4</sup> departed for Kaffa on 18 April, 1588.<sup>5</sup> To the posts of Ḳalgay and Nūr al Dīn he appointed his brother, Feth Girāy, and the son of 'Adil Girāy, Baḥt Girāy, respectively. Alp Girāy and Şakay Mubārek Girāy, after an abort-

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to Kakheti and Persia at the close of the long war, see the account of Jerome Horsey, Hakluyt ed. Principal Navigations of the English Nation, Extra Series (London, 1856), pp. 223-224.

<sup>1</sup> At the time it was believed that the Khan had been poisoned, Hammer, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, vii, p. 207.

<sup>2</sup> Selānikī, p. 242 and 'Abd'l Gaffar 'Umdet al Abbar, p. 115. Edward Barton, the English ambassador, to the contrary, implied that Ġazī Girāy sought the appointment from the Sultan. C. of S. P., Foreign, XXII, p. 174.

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ive attempt to maintain themselves in power, fled the Khanate, the former to Istanbul, and the latter to Circassia.<sup>1</sup>

From the time of his accession to the beginning of Crimean Tatar participation in the long Hungarian War (1594), Ġāzī Girāy had to face a series of external threats to the Khanate. The first of these threats, a plan for establishing a Moscow puppet regime in Bakhchisaray, was already far advanced. In the view of Moscow, the realization of this scheme depended on two factors: the maintenance of internal strife in the Crimea and the pacification of the Great Nogays, who acted as a kind of buffer between the Muscovite strip of territory along the Volga and the Crimean lands.

The new Khan, instead of merely reacting to events in the manner of his predecessor, devised a strategem which checked the machinations of Moscow and eventually brought considerable stability to his regime. He understood that the external difficulties of the Khanate had, in part, derived from internal strife during the reign and after the murder of

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<sup>3</sup>Selānikī, p. 242 and H. Howarth, History of the Mongols, II, pp. 523-524. Cf. also, M. de Lancosme a Henri III, Charriere, Negociations de la France dans le Levant, IV, pp. 662-663, and the letter of John Zamoiski to the Sultan (22 April, 1588), Hurmuzaki, II/I, p. 295.

<sup>4</sup>See the Introduction, Part A, Section 3.

<sup>5</sup>Charrier, loc.cit.

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<sup>1</sup>Meĥammed Riżā, Al Seb' al Seyyār (Kazan, 1832), pp. 107-108; on the basis of numismatic evidence, it would seem that Ġāzī Girāy first established his court and coined money at Ġōzlev (Evpatoriya), perhaps owing to local resistance in the interior. Cf., O. Retovskiĥ, "Moneti Ġāzī-Geraya Khana II ben Devlet", Izvestiya Tavricheskoy Uchonoĥ Arkhivnoĥ Kommissii, No. 8 (Savastopol', 1889), pp. 90-98.

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Meḥemmed Girāy Khan. Sa'ādet Girāy, the eldest son of Meḥemmed Girāy, was related by marriage to Urus Khan, the titular head of the Great Nogays, and therefore was assured of refuge with the Nogays for himself, his brothers, and their supporters. This same faction, with the support of the Don Cossacks, had been chiefly responsible for the sack of the Crimea in 1584 and 1585. The Tsar had set up the puppet regime of Murād Girāy in Astrakhan only after the sons of Meḥemmed Girāy had failed to establish themselves permanently in the Crimea. Ġāzī Girāy took a long step towards resolving the grievances of this faction by announcing, with the support of the Sultan, a general amnesty and by appointing Şafā Girāy, a son of Meḥemmed Girāy, as Nūr al Dīn in place of Baḥt Girāy.<sup>1</sup> This policy of reconciliation proved so successful that even Murād Girāy, who had showed himself as little more than a tool of Moscow, expressed the desire to return to the Crimea. He died of poisoning in Astrakhan around 1590; thereafter, the Tatars and Russians accused each other of murdering him.<sup>2</sup>

Ġāzī Girāy had thus, in one bold move, brought back to the Crimean fold a number of influential relatives and dignitaries with their followers. He next attempted to establish a measure of support and cooperation for his regime among the Great Nogays themselves. It was noted above<sup>3</sup> that

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Novosel'skiy, Borba, pp. 33-36, citing Krym.Knig. no. 17, f. 8-192 passim, and H. Inalcik, "Don-Volga Kanalı Teşebbüsü", Bellekten 46, p. 395. Inalcik states that the initiative first of all came from the fugitive hānzādes. Cf. plate VII, ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Novosel'skiy, Borba, p. 37, citing P.S.R.L. XIV/1, p. 39 and Krym. Knig. no. 17, f. 307-308.

<sup>3</sup>See Introduction, Part A, Section 4.

under Ismā'īl Khan the Great<sup>1</sup> Nogays had accepted the overlordship of Muscovy. Upon the death of this ruler in 1563, his eldest son and successor, Tīn Ahmed Khan (1563-1578) initially vacillated in his relations with Moscow, but later sought to re-establish the lost independence and former influence of his people on the lower Volga in league with the Crimean Tatars.<sup>1</sup> The attempt at cooperation with the Tatars failed, but the Great Nogays continued to fight against the encroachments of Muscovy and the Don Cossacks. Urus Khan (1578-1590), son of Ismā'īl Khan, succeeded Tīn Ahmed. Although he was a bitter opponent of Moscow, he was forced to accept an uneasy truce with the Russians, through the traitorous good offices of Murād Girāy, even before the accession of Ġāzī Girāy.<sup>2</sup> In actual fact, the disunity of the Nogays was proving no match for the single-minded policy of repression fostered by Moscow. The Don Cossacks and the Muscovite troops, armed with hand guns and cannon, pushed across the steppe towards the traditional strongholds of the Nogays and built a series of fixed fortifications as they progressed.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Novosel'skiy, Borba, p. 28 and p. 40, citing Krym. Knig. no. 13, f. 263-264 and no. 14, f. 259; also, Turetsk. Knig. 2, f. 47-49.

<sup>2</sup>Novosel'skiy, Borba, pp. 34-36. See also the conversation on this matter between the Russian ambssador to the Shah, Vasil'chikov, and the Khan of Gilan, Oct. 7097/1588, N. I. Vesselovskiy, ed., "Pamyatniki Diplomati i Torgov. Snosh. Moskov. Rusi s Persiey" Trudy Vostoch. Otdel. Imperat. Russk. Arkheolog. Obshch., XX, pp. 52-53.

<sup>3</sup>Forts were built at Ufa and Samara in 1586, at Tsaritsyn in 1589, and at Saratov in 1590. Novosel'skiy, ibid.

When Ġāzī Girāy declared his amnesty and appealed to the former supporters of the Crimean Tatars among the Nogay Mirzas, a number of the most anti-Moscow elements, including Urus Khan, left the vicinity of Astrakhan and moved to the shores of the Don River. The dignitaries, however, were not yet prepared to put themselves at the mercy of the Crimean Tatars from whose hands their people had suffered in the past. They sent representations to the Sultan seeking his permission to reside in the vicinity of Bōlī Sarāy on the Kalmius, the site formerly occupied by 'Adil Girāy during his quarrel with Mehemmed Girāy over the succession to the Khanship. The Sultan, however, appeared unwilling to meddle in affairs which by tradition were dealt with by the Khan. The petition was not successful. A further hindrance to the settlement of large numbers of Great Nogays in the Khanate now became apparent. The Little Nogays, who had since mid-century been a part of the Crimean Khanate, showed themselves quite unwilling to share their pasturage and water supplies with an enemy whom they must have considered largely responsible for the extension of Muscovite power to the lower Volga, Don and Ya'īk (Ural) Rivers, the traditional grazing lands of the Nogays. A bitter struggle took place on the shores of the Don between these old enemies during the winter of 1588-1589, immediately following the accession of Ġāzī Girāy. This enmity upset the plan of the Khan to bring all of the Nogays into the Ottoman-Crimean sphere of influence. Urus Khan was actually killed in 1590 during one of the clashes between the Great and the Little Nogays.<sup>1</sup> Ġāzī Girāy had clearly demonstrated how ephemeral the

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<sup>1</sup>Novosel'skiy, Borba, pp. 35-37.

hold of Moscow was on the Nogays. In the ensuing years this became more apparent; nevertheless, neither the Ottomans nor the Crimean Tatars, in view of their commitments with relation to the war in Hungary, were able to assist the Great Nogays at a time when they were being beaten into submission for want of modern equipment and tactics and sufficient internal unity. The sons of Tīn Ahmed, Ur Mehmet and Tīn Mehmet, successively occupied the Khanship of the Great Nogays in the 1590's. Throughout this period the Tīn Ahmed faction had to face the opposition of the Urus Khan faction. At the end of the century the latter group, led by Yanārāslān Mīrzā, appears to have dominated the tribe. Such a situation clearly pointed to the election of Yanārāslān Mīrzā as Khan in 1600, but the strength of the Muscovite support for İsterek Mīrzā, another son of Tīn Ahmed, made possible the manipulation of the election in his favour. Henceforth, the leaders and supporters of the sons of Urus Khan were hunted down, imprisoned, banished and even exterminated by the sons of Tīn Ahmed and their Muscovite allies. Yanārāslān himself was captured in 1604 and taken to Moscow as a hostage.<sup>1</sup>

Viewed in the light of this perspective, the internal policy of Ġāzī Girāy at the beginning of his reign was only partially successful. He had eliminated the threat to the Crimea represented by the sons of Mehemmed Girāy and supported by Moscow, but he failed to augment the

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<sup>1</sup> Novosel'skiy, *Borba*, pp. 38-40. These two protagonists, with the Great Nogay Horde, had fought over the right of succession to the Khanship during the 1590's and the early years of the 17th century: the Tīn



number of his followers appreciably from the ranks of the Great Nogays. The Ottoman Sultan and the Crimean Khan, by not coming to the aid of their co-religionists, had left the Volga Basin and, ultimately, the control of the steppe to the Muscovite State.

### 3. The Ottoman-Crimean Crisis with Poland-Lithuania

Upon the death of the Polish king, Stephen Bathory in December, 1586, the ancient treaty of peace and friendship between the Ottoman and Polish states became subject to renewal by his successor. This fact was acknowledged in an exchange of letters between Murād III and King Sigismund Vasa late in the year 1587. The letter of the Sultan referred specifically to Islām Girāy thus, "Our letters are also directed unto the most excellent Tatar Prince Isbam (sic) Gerai (whom God bless), straitly charging and commanding him not to make or suffer any incursion to be made into the borders of Polonia".<sup>1</sup> The Zaporozhians had for some time

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Ahmed faction had upheld the principle of the seniority of the Tīn Ahmed line, while the Urus faction supported the principle of the seniority of age - Yanāraslan Mīrza being older than his cousins. Legally, tradition was on the side of the Tīn Ahmed line, as Yanāraslan even admitted: "...in the Nogay Horde... the eldest son of the eldest brother first of all succeeds to the Khanship and afterwards, the son of another brother ..." These considerations apart, Urus Khan was an outspoken enemy of Moscow, an advocate of an independent Nogay confederation which would presumably maintain traditional ties with its Muslim neighbours. This accounts for the policy of repression which Moscow relentlessly pursued against the Urus Khan faction from 1590 until their power to resist was broken. The rigged election of İsterek Mīrza as Khan in 1600 marked the ascendancy of Moscow over the Great Nogays.

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<sup>1</sup> R. Knolles, Generall Historie of the Turkes from the first beginning of that Nation (London, 1638), p. 009.

been causing havoc on Crimean Tatar soil.<sup>1</sup> In 1587 they had taken and sacked Ochakov and early in 1588 they had ravaged the Crimean coast.<sup>2</sup> It is little wonder then that Islām Girāy had <sup>begun making a</sup> ~~led at least one~~ punitive raid against the Lithuanian borders in 1587.<sup>3</sup> The death of Stephan Bathory had relaxed the hold of the central government on the border areas, which were populated by the Cossacks. Moreover, pay for the registered Cossacks was grossly in arrears.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, Ottoman and Crimean Tatar defensive measures had become lax as a result of their preoccupation with the Persian War and internal squabbles respectively. These conditions gave ample scope indeed to Cossack freebooters. But an affair which had commenced as a series of raids for local economic and political advantage was quickly seized upon by the Polish state, then under the tutelage of the Grand Chancellor, Jan Zamoyski, as an opportunity to remove some of the more objectionable clauses of the traditional treaty of peace and friendship between the Ottoman and Polish states. The Ottomans, however, who were satisfied with the status quo, viewed any changes on the part of Poland as a threat to their hold on the Principalities and, ultimately, their preserve on the Black Sea.<sup>5</sup> The raids of the Zaporozhians

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<sup>1</sup>Solov'ev, VII, p. 260.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>See above, p. 211.

<sup>4</sup>The registered Cossacks were those enrolled by the Polish state to protect the frontiers. See below, p. 223.

<sup>5</sup>Knolles, Generall Historie, p. 1013.

increased in ferocity after the accession of Ġazī Girāy. The English ambassador to the Porte, William Harborne, in a despatch to England dated 26 June, 1588, quoted excerpts from a letter the Sultan had recently sent to the Polish King. In this document the Sultan warned that the Cossacks must be held in check for, according to information which the Sultan had received from the Crimean Khan, the Cossacks were continuing their attacks and when the Tatars gave chase, "... the Cossacks ... by flight do succour themselves in the Polish castles Bar, Vintis, Braslow, Nestbosa and Camanets ...".<sup>1</sup> In short, the Sultan had begun to hold the Polish King responsible for the Cossack depredations.

Two raids in particular brought the Ottoman State to the brink of war with Poland. It was customary for the Ottomans, in exchange for similar forbearance on the part of neighbouring powers, to overlook raids of a small scale. The Cossacks, however, according to a dispatch received by the Holy Roman Emperor, had, in the spring of 1588, raided the Ottoman sanjāk of Bender (Tehine) and had destroyed thirteen villages. This attack led to the mobilization of the forces in the Ottoman territories south of Poland.<sup>2</sup> The new threat had caused the Sultan to order the construction of a fortress at the usual crossing place of the Cossacks on the Dnepr and, furthermore, to demand that the Polish king send an am-

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<sup>1</sup>C. of S. P., XXI (June, 1586 - June, 1588), p. 650.

<sup>2</sup>Pezzen to the Emperor, 12 August, 1588, - Hurmuzaki, Suppl. I., p. 714.

bassador to renew the ancient agreement between the two powers.<sup>1</sup>

Apparently the Cossacks reappeared in the locality of Bender late in the same year and drove back Ġazī Girāy and his followers in a bloody skirmish.<sup>2</sup>

The continuing turbulence of the steppe bordering the sanjāk of Bender prompted the Sultan to convert the district into a beglerbeglik, thus providing additional administrative and military resources for the preservation of order on the borderlands of the Empire.<sup>3</sup>

It is not clear to what extent the devastation wrought by the Cossacks in 1588 and the subsequent raid on the Crimea in 1589 can be traced to attempts on the part of Poland to improve her bargaining position with the Ottomans prior to negotiations. It is known, for example, that the Polish-Lithuanian State had been failing to pay the registered Cossacks.<sup>4</sup> Their dearth of funds may have encouraged them to raid the Ottoman and Tatar settlements. For some years, particularly since the Livonian wars, Poland had defaulted in her annual "gift" payments to the Sultan and the Khan.<sup>5</sup> There is no doubt that the Polish state de-

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<sup>1</sup> Barton to Walsingham (?), 25 October, 1588, C. of S. P., Foreign Series, XXII (July - December, 1588), pp. 281-282.

<sup>2</sup> Pezzen to the Emperor, 30 November, 1588, - Hurmuzaki, Suppl. I, p. 719.

<sup>3</sup> This measure seems to have been taken against both Tatar and Cossack depredations. Pezzen to Archduke Ernst (21 June, 1589), Hurmuzaki, Appx. I, pp. 725-726.

<sup>4</sup> M. S. Hrushevskiy, Istoriya Ukraini-Rusi (New York, 1956) VII, p. 172.

<sup>5</sup> Knolles, Generall Historie, p. 1013, and the despatch of Edward Barton of 15 August, 1588, C. of S. P., Foreign Series, XXII (July - December, 1588), p. 139.

sired to eliminate the "gift" payments from the traditional peace arrangements between the two states.<sup>1</sup> The Sultan, however, was under constant pressure from Ġāzī Girāy to force Poland to pay the tribute alleged to be seven years in arrears.<sup>2</sup>

The Khan had his own economic problems, for he had inherited an empty treasury from his predecessor. It is true that both the Polish and the Ottoman States had ample reasons for a shortage of silver in this period; owing to the cost of the Livonian and Persian Wars, respectively. It is highly probable, moreover, that their currency problems were related to the monetary crisis in Western Europe at the time, which had been induced by the influx of New World silver into Western Europe.<sup>3</sup>

In the spring of 1589 a raid of considerable proportions was directed against the Crimea by the Zaporozhian Cossacks. This force, which was led by the ataman, Kulaga, attacked the city of Gözlev (Evpatoriya) after having slipped a flotilla of shaykas<sup>4</sup> past the Ottoman fortress of

<sup>1</sup>For a summary of the agreement made in 1578, see Hammer, VII, p. 45.

<sup>2</sup>Barton despatch of 15 August, 1588, loc.cit.; Poland, at this time, was supposed to pay the Turks annually a tribute in furs valued at 25,000 crowns; Soranzo, L'Ottomano, p. 36<sup>v</sup> - 37<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Frank C. Spooner, L'Économie Mondiale et les Frappes Monétaires en France, 1493 - 1680 (Paris, 1956), pp. 19-35, 319-331 and passim and B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, 1961), pp. 27-30. Cf. also, N. Beldiceanu, "La crise monétaire ottomane au XVI<sup>e</sup>s. et son influence sur les principautés roumaines", Sudost-Forschungen XVI (1957), pp. 70-86.

<sup>4</sup>For a discussion of Cossack terminology, see O. Pritsak, "Das erste türkische-ukrainische Bündnis (1648)", Oriens VI (1953), pp. 266-298.

Ochakov at the mouth of the Dnepr. En route to the Crimea, the Cossacks had even overpowered a Turkish vessel. The Russian envoy reported to Moscow that Lithuanian soldiers also took part in this affair.<sup>1</sup> When word reached the Khan of the approach of the Cossacks, he assembled at once his forces and rode to intercept them. Before the Khan arrived, however, the Cossacks had already penetrated the city and had robbed the shops of their finery. They had killed some Turks and Jews and had made prisoners of many others when suddenly they were attacked by the Kalğay Feth Girāy and a general struggle ensued. After thirty Zaporozhians had fallen prisoner and their leader Kulaga had met his death, they withdrew. En route to their Sich, or island stronghold, they were also reported to have set fire to some villages in the locality of Akkerman. While these events were taking place at Gozlev, other presumably Don Cossacks had raided the environs of Azov. These actions prompted the Sultan to send five galleys (kadirga) to the mouth of the Dnepr and three to the Crimea, each equipped with cannon and filled with Janissaries. Now, the Sultan ordered the Khan to attack Lithuania.<sup>2</sup> Ġāzī Girāy, following the bidding of the Sultan, conducted a sizeable counter-raid into Podolia, with some

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<sup>1</sup>Solov'ev, VII, pp. 261-262. At the time of the raid, a fair was in progress in Gozlev, an appropriate occasion for a rich haul of booty. Cf., Vraye Relation de la Route... des Tartares (Lyon, 1590).

<sup>2</sup>Solov'ev, VII, pp. 261-262 and Vraye Relation, loc.cit.

measure of success.<sup>1</sup>

At this point, amicable relations between the Ottoman and Polish States almost broke down. The Ottomans assembled a sizeable force on the Polish frontier, and the Crimean Khan received orders to encamp with his Tatars on the shores of the Dnepr close to the Lithuanian border. Ġazī Girāy, while complying with the orders of the Sultan, sought to turn this hostile act against Poland to his own advantage. Straight away he sent word to the Tsar of the forthcoming action and suggested that the Tsar support the move with appropriate gifts of money. At the same time, the Khan, testing the friendly overtures of the Tsar, requested that Murād Girāy be released to him. The Tsar, however, neither sent money nor released his puppet governor.<sup>2</sup>

A revolt of the Janissaries in 1589 had brought about a significant new development at the Porte. The Sultan dismissed the Grand Vezir, Siyāvuş Pasha, and appointed in his place the old war horse, Kōja Sinān Pasha.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, the war in Persia was drawing to a close. Soon a large number of troops would again be at the disposal of the Porte.

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<sup>1</sup>The sources concerning this raid are contradictory. Kazimirski ("Précis", J.A., Ser. 2/XII, p. 428) reported that the raid brought a rich reward in furs. Sagredo (*Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, IV, p. 352) mentioned that the Sultan rewarded Ġazī Girāy with a diamond encrusted sword for his services on this occasion. In a despatch to Archduke Ernst dated 18 August, 1589, the Hapsburg ambassador Pezzen reported that 7,000 Tatars lay dead in Podolia, Hurmuzaki, Supp. I, p. 728. Selānikī (p. 257) confirms the report of Sagredo.

<sup>2</sup>Solov'ev, VII, p. 262.

<sup>3</sup>17 Jumāda' I, 997/3 April, 1589, Hammer, VII, p. 237.

The Grand Vezir decidedly wanted to open hostilities with someone, and the insolence of Poland, as well as her apparent internal troubles, made her a likely target. One dignitary, possibly Sinan Pasha, is reported to have argued that Poland had defaulted on her tribute and had interfered in the affairs of the Principalities and that a victory over Poland would provide an easy access to the Habsburg State, to the unruly Cossacks and to Muscovy. He also argued that there was also internal dissension (i.e. the invasion of Archduke Maximilian of Austria) and that the Poles were known to have little skill in military matters. Had not even King Stephan Báthory relied heavily on Hungarian mercenaries for his successes against Moscow? So the argument went.<sup>1</sup>

The Poles augmented the war fever by administering a sharp setback to a Tatar force early in August.<sup>2</sup> While the Ottoman and Tatar forces continued to make sorties into Polish territory,<sup>3</sup> Poland made an inauspicious attempt to re-establish amicable relations. The Polish ambassador had arrived at the Porte on 12 April, 1589. He very quickly undermined the rather precarious position of Poland by declaring that his master neither could nor would continue paying tribute. The unfor-

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<sup>1</sup>

Knolles, Generall Historie, p. 1013.

<sup>2</sup>Sagredo, Histoire IV, p. 352; Pezzen to Archduke Ernst (18 August, 1589), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. I, p. 728. It appears that the Porte was also chagrined that the Poles had released the Habsburg, Archduke Maximilian. Hammer, VII, p. 253.

<sup>3</sup>Polish Ambassador to Zamoyski (28 December, 1589). Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, p. 305.



tunate ambassador, whether through mistreatment or other mishap, died shortly thereafter.<sup>1</sup> The bellicose Zamoyski reacted to these events with a fiery speech to the Senate proposing an attack on the Tatars and the occupation and fortification of Moldavia on the lines of the Danube.<sup>2</sup>

By the end of the year, reason seems to have gained the upper hand. The new Polish ambassador reported to Zamoyski that the chief cause of the recent troubles, from the point of view of the Ottomans, was the unprovoked raids of the Cossacks on Bender (Tehine), Ochakov and Gozlev (Evpatoriya). The Grand Vezir had laid down the terms upon which he was prepared to make peace. In particular, Poland would have to renew the annual gifts. Moreover, no permanent ambassador from Poland would be acceptable, a standard practice of the Ottomans at this time.<sup>3</sup> The ambassador also informed the Grand Chancellor that gifts of fur and of English dogs to the beglerbeg of Rumelia, who commanded the Ottoman and Tatar forces on the border, would encourage him to restrain his forces from raiding into Podolia and Pocoutia (Pokutia) during the negotiations.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Hammer, VII, pp. 253-254.

<sup>2</sup>Zamoyski to the Senate (16 October, 1589), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, p. 302.

<sup>3</sup>The Ottomans only allowed permanent representation to countries with whom they had agreements known as capitulations. Cf. Francois Emmanuel de Guignard, Count de Saint Priest, Memoires sur l'Ambassade de France en Turquie et sur le Commerce des Francais dans le Levant (Publications de l'Ecole des Langues Orientales Vivantes, Ser. I/6) (Paris 1877).

<sup>4</sup>Polish ambassador to John Zamoyski (28 December, 1589), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, p. 305; and Von Hallegk to Archduke Caröl (12 January, 1590), Hurmuzaki, XI, p. 211; see also the letter of the beglerbeg to Zamoyski, Vraye Relation..., pp. 14-15.

Apparently the wrath of Poland had turned to consternation when the outcome of the Persian War became generally known during the course of 1589. The Sultan even boasted of his acquisitions in a letter to King Sigismund and threatened him with total war.<sup>1</sup> The Sultan, in turn, upon the mediation of the English ambassador, Edward Barton, and the Hospodar of Moldavia, Bogdan, consented to accept a peaceful solution of the affair.<sup>2</sup> A preliminary agreement, signed on 15 May, 1590, was confirmed in the following year. Now the Ottomans could turn their full attention to the border disturbances in Hungary, while Poland could take measures to control the turbulent Cossacks, who had been in large measure responsible for the recent crisis. The settlement of the tension between Poland and the Ottoman Empire also gave to Ġāzī Girāy an opportunity to settle grievances with Moscow.<sup>3</sup>

4. The Attack on Moscow and the Crimean-Muscovite Settlement of 1594

Ġāzī Girāy had taken effective measures towards establishing his position in the Crimean Khanate by patching up a family feud and

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<sup>1</sup>Hammer, VII, p. 254.

<sup>2</sup>Hrushevsky (History of the Ukraine, p. 181) gives the false impression that the Ottomans were forced to make peace because of the Cossack raids.

<sup>3</sup>Cf., V. Velyaminov-Zernov, Materiali dlya Istorii Krymskago Khanstva (St. Petersburg, 1864), pp. 9-12 for a copy of the offensive and defensive understanding made between the Khan and the King of Poland in the spring of 1592.

had also strengthened his position on the frontiers of the Khanate by regaining the allegiance of many Nogays and by helping the Sultan to re-establish peace with Poland. The Great Nogays, through their struggle against Muscovite interference and domination, tended to keep Don Cossack pressure off the Khanate. But the Nogay question and the attempt to establish a puppet regime in the Crimea were just two phases of a concerted attempt by Moscow to consolidate her position on the lower Volga and to aggrandize herself at the expense of her southern neighbours who were much weaker and more divided, politically, than were her enemies, Poland and Sweden, to the West.

While Moscow was successfully containing the Nogays within a ring of fortifications, she made her next move in the direction of the Caucasus. The Persian War did not officially end until 1590. Between 1588 and 1590 considerable diplomatic activity was taking place between Moscow and Persia. On the one hand, the Shah sought to bring the Tsar into the conflict on his own side by promising to compensate him with territories in the Caucasus over which Persia no longer had control. On the other hand, the Tsar could not view with equanimity Ottoman political control of the Caucasus and naval control of the Caspian. Osmān Pasha had already destroyed a Muscovite fort on the Terek in 1583. Now the Tsar, in answer to petitions from the pro-Moscow faction of the Circassians, had built another fort on the Terek. Moscow also established diplomatic and trade relations with Kakheti at this time.<sup>1</sup> After the accession of Shah

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<sup>1</sup> According to Allen (History of Georgian People, p. 164), the first contacts between Moscow and Kakheti took place in the Cossack fort of Terki, at the mouth of the Terek, in 1586.

'Abbās I in 1587, Persia sought an overt military commitment from the Tsar, but the Muscovite ambassador equivocated by calling attention to the inconvenience the Tsar had already caused the Sultan through intervention in the affairs of Circassia and Kakheti.<sup>1</sup> When Ferhād Beg, the governor of Isfahan, asked the Russian ambassador if the Circassians, the Šamhal and Alexander of Kakheti would make common cause with Moscow and Persia against the Turks and Tatars, the ambassador replied that pressure had been brought to bear on them to this end through the offices of Murād Girāy in Astrakhan, but that the Circassians and the Šamhal would keep faith with the Sultan.<sup>2</sup> The diplomatic exchanges between Persia and Moscow at the time did bear fruit, however, in the form of a trade agreement by which Moscow undertook to provide the Shah with arquebuses and up-to-date war materials, in exchange for silk and other commodities.<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile Shah 'Abbās, confronted by a war on two fronts,<sup>4</sup> and by internal dissension among the Kizilbaş amirs, continued to seek satisfactory terms from the Ottomans. When negotiations broke down between his representative and Ferhād Pasha in 1588, the Shah wrote to the Crimean

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<sup>1</sup>Vesselovskiy, "Pamyat. Diplom. i Torgov. Snosh.", Trudy...Arkheolog. Obshch. XX, pp. 53-54., pp.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 91.

<sup>3</sup>Sagredo, Histoire, IV, pp. 371-372.

<sup>4</sup>Herat had fallen to the forces of Abdullah Khan, ruler of the Uzbeks, in 1588. Cf. L. L. Bellan, Chah 'Abbas I (Paris, 1932), p. 24 ff.

Tatar Khan, Ġāzī Girāy, asking him to act as mediator for a peace settlement between the Persian and the Ottoman States. Ġāzī Girāy brought this matter to the attention of the Porte, but the Sultan declined the offer.<sup>1</sup> The incident serves to illustrate that diplomatic channels remained open between the Crimea and Persia, a consideration of importance at a later date.

Moscow had shown itself reluctant to provoke the Ottomans excessively during the Persian War, but she did not abandon her interest in the Northern Caucasus. In fact, before the ink of the Ottoman-Persian treaty had dried, the Muscovites had made provision for the rebuilding of their fort at the mouth of the Sunzhu (1590) and had already initiated plans for a march against the Şamhal, whose territories blocked their own access to Kakheti.<sup>2</sup> Alexander of Kakheti, traditionally an enemy of the Şamhal, had lent strong encouragement and support to this enterprise.<sup>3</sup> At this time, the intentions of Boris Godunov, the influential brother-in-law of the Tsar, to establish a kind of hegemony for Moscow over a considerable portion of the Northern Caucasus and its approaches were becoming apparent. The Ottomans were quick to recognize

<sup>1</sup>Sagredo, Histoire, IV, p. 347.

<sup>2</sup>See the important letter of the Tsar to Mamstryuk Temryuk, T. Kh. Kумыков, Kabardo-Russkie Otnosheniya, I, p. 65 and F.N. 141 and Novosel'skiy, p.41. Moreover, the Shah's envoy had urged the Tsar to put pressure on the Ter-ek supply route of the Ottomans. Vesselovskiy, "Pamyat. Diplomat. i. Torgov. Snosh." Trudy...Arkheolog. Obshch., XX, pp. 5-6.

<sup>3</sup>Allen, History of Georgian People, pp. 152 and 164.

the threat that this policy offered to their line of communications with Dagestan across the Kuban and Terek river valleys. Thus, Ġazī Girāy had no sooner checked the strategy of Moscow on the steppe than he was forced to deal with this threat to the Ottomans and Tatars in the Caucasus.

In the years 1590 and 1591, the Muscovite voivode<sup>1</sup> on the Terek, Gregory Zasekin, attacked the Şamhal and succeeded in occupying territory up to the mouth of the Koyşa (Sulak) river. As a result of this new aggression and the construction of Ostrogs (forts) along the Terek, both the Khan and the Sultan became convinced that nothing short of a campaign would serve to check the Tsar.<sup>2</sup> Even though the attack on the Şamhal had been on a small scale, as an attack on their vassel, it represented a clear affront to the Ottoman Sultan and the Crimean Khan. The affront, moreover, assumes greater proportions when it is placed in the context of Crimean-Muscovite diplomacy of the period. Ġazī Girāy had commenced his reign with an expression of good will to the Tsar.<sup>3</sup> The Tsar had returned this cordiality, stating that only because Ġazī

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<sup>1</sup>"Voivode" here is used in the Russian sense of a district governor, as distinct from the use of the term as applied to the Hospodar of Wallachia or Moldavia or the Prince of Transylvania.

<sup>2</sup>The attack on the Şamhal was renewed in the years 1593 and 1594, but after initial successes, including the sack of Tarku, the Muscovite forces under A. Khvorostinin sustained serious losses and were forced to withdraw. Cf. Kумыков, Kabard. Russk. Snosh., loc.cit. and Solov'ev, VII, pp. 278-279 and p. 291.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 260.

Girāy had replaced the perfidious Islām Girāy had the Crimea been spared further attacks by the Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks. Beneath this verbage, however, as the historian Solov'ev indicated, the Tsar revealed the growing contempt of Moscow for the power of the Khanate in the following ways:

- (a) The Tsar now addressed the Khan with poklon (bow, salute, greeting) and not chelobit'e (petition, respect, homage) and the Khan addressed Boris Godunov as "our brother";
- (b) the value of the gifts which were customarily sent to the Khan and the leading dignitaries of the Khanate diminished;
- (c) the customary maintenance provided by Muscovy for bona fide diplomatic personnel of the Khan and their retinues now became limited to thirty individuals.<sup>1</sup>

Ġāzī Girāy had other grievances which he brought to the attention of the Tsar. The Sultan had complained to him about the periodic attacks of the Don Cossacks on the environs of Azov. The Terek Cossacks also were harassing Ottoman troops as they passed to and from Azov and Derbent across the Nogay steppe. Moreover, the Don Cossacks during their encroachments on Tatar territory had driven off scores of Tatar cattle and horses. In the course of enumerating these grievances, the Khan

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<sup>1</sup>Ġāzī Girāy was informed of this latter restriction early in his reign. Solov'ev, VII, pp. 260-261.

warned the Tsar that the Sultan would not tolerate such activity and that the Ottomans would seize the fort on the Terek and would wage war against Moscow.<sup>1</sup>

But all attempts to gain material or diplomatic satisfaction from the Tsar ended in failure. Moscow, to the end of the century, continued to deny that there was any connection between the Don Cossack encroachments and the Muscovite state.<sup>2</sup>

The mysterious death of Murād Girāy in 1589 or 1590 brought about a further deterioration of relations between Moscow and the Crimea.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the Muscovite attack on the Şamhal of Tarku in 1590, in combination with the worsening of diplomatic relations between the Khan and the Tsar, produced a grave situation.<sup>4</sup> Other factors of a local nature may have come into consideration. Among the Crimean Tatars, there was a well-established custom which obliged a Khan of military prowess to prove his

<sup>1</sup>Solov'ev, VII, p. 262.

<sup>2</sup>Typical of the official responses from Moscow is the denial made to the Porte in 1593 by the ambassador G. Volkonskiy, "Na Donu zhivut vory beglyse lyudi, bez gosudarya nashego vedoma". (On the Don live thieves, fugitive people, without the consent of our sovereign). I. I. Smirnov, Vosstanie Bolotnikova, 1606-1607 (M - L, 1951), p. 124 citing Turetskie Dela, No. 3, f. 220.

<sup>3</sup>From the account of the death of Murād Girāy found in the M. A. Obolensky edition of the Novyy Letopisets' (Moscow, 1853) (pp. 30-31) one is tempted to conclude that the cause of his death was from blood-letting not from poison administered by the Little Nogays (Kāzıoglı). Cf. Novosel'skiy, Bor'ba, pp. 33-36.

<sup>4</sup>Among other grievances of the Khan, Karamzin notes that the Tsar had informed the King of Poland of a plan put forth by the Khan for a combined Muscovite-Tatar attack on Poland. Karamsin, X, pp. 195-197.



skill by leading his Tatars in a campaign to the heart of the Muscovite State.<sup>1</sup> Such a campaign, of course, had its own raison d'être in the lucrative booty and the rich haul in slaves which resulted from deep thrusts into enemy territory. In any case, the Khan must now either reassert the power of the Khanate or else risk the slow sapping of its strength through the encroachments of Muscovy.

Nevertheless, Ġāzī Girāy most likely would not have launched a campaign into the heart of the Muscovite State in 1591 without some prospect of success. There may also have been some connection between the Muscovite penetration of Dagestan and the attack on Moscow.<sup>2</sup> The renewed outbreak of war between Moscow and Sweden in 1589 provided the Khan with reasonable assurance that he would not have to face the entire Muscovite army.

Upon the resumption of hostilities between Sweden and Moscow,<sup>3</sup> the Swedish king despatched an ambassador to the Crimea with promises

<sup>1</sup> Thus, for example, Devlet Girāy Khan, the father of Ġāzī Girāy, after burning Moscow in 1571, had received the title "Taht Algān" (taker of the city). Cf. Karamsin, X, pp. 196 and 404, citing Krymskie Dela, no. 19, f. 106.

<sup>2</sup> Kumykov, Kabard. Russk. Snosh., I, p. 401.

<sup>3</sup> The treaty between Moscow and Sweden was due to expire on January 1, 1590. Karamsin, X, pp. 145-146. The Polish interregnum and the subsequent clash with the Habsburgs had, at this time, conveniently distracted the attention of Poland-Lithuania from her Eastern borders. Nevertheless, Moscow went out of its way to assure the Poles that the Convention of Warsaw would be strictly adhered to. Karamsin, X, pp. 144-156. For details of the Polish election, see H. Biaudet, "Les Origines de la candidature de Sigismund Vasa au trone de Pologne en 1587", Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, Series B II/10 (Helsinki, 1910) and Von Pastor, History of the Popes, xxii, pp. 162-163.

of rich gifts and subsidies and with assurances that the presence of Swedish forces in the North would draw off the main Muscovite army from the vicinity of the capital.<sup>1</sup> Preparations for the Tatar campaign against Moscow began therefore in the winter of 1590-1591.

The present conflict between Moscow and Sweden had its immediate background in the Livonian War. The collapse of the political power of the Livonian Knights in the 1550's had provided the occasion for the Baltic powers - particularly Denmark, Sweden, Poland-Lithuania, and Muscovy - to lay claim to portions of the Baltic littoral. Poland had seized Livonia and had forced Moscow to accept this new state of affairs in the peace of 1582. Sweden, moreover, by 1581 had made good her claims to all of Estonia; thus she hoped to control the Western European trade of Moscow which had formerly passed through the port of Narva. A peace treaty recognizing this gain was concluded with Moscow in 1583. One very important objective of Sweden in the war beginning in 1589 was apparently to secure unchallenged access to the Arctic Sea across the Finnish wastes, enabling Sweden to interfere with the trade Moscow was enjoying with England through St. Nicholas.<sup>2</sup> By reopening hostilities in 1589, Moscow had intended to contest Swedish control of Estonia and the port of Narva. The Crimean Khan was doubtless aware of the impli-

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<sup>1</sup>Karamsin, X, pp. 145-152 and 195-197, and Solov'ev, vii, pp. 262-263.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. M. Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus, A History of Sweden, 1611-1632, (London, 1953), I, pp. 11-13.

cations of the Muscovite Swedish War. The Khan most certainly was as much interested as Poland and Sweden in blocking the flow of English military supplies into Moscow by way of the Arctic Sea.<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, upon hearing of the negotiations between Sweden and the Crimea,<sup>2</sup> attempted at the end of 1590 to forestall the Khan by despatching the courier, Bibikov, to Bakhchisaray. Unfortunately for Moscow, such a last-minute bid for the favour of the Khan could not gloss over the aggressive acts of Moscow on the steppe and in the Caucasus. The Khan, after receiving the gifts and the compliments of Tsar Fedor and Boris Godunov, failed to answer this courtesy with suitable respect. On January 11, 1591, Ahmed Agā, the Vezir of the Khan, came to Kyrkor, the Jewish village where the Muscovite courier was permitted to reside, and, in the name of the Khan, confiscated all of his property, ostensibly because he had not sent an additional gift of furs to the Khan and because he had contacted the mullah, or chief religious dignitary of the Crimea, against the wishes of the Khan. On 5 May, the Khan informed

<sup>1</sup>In actuality, Sweden, for a time, realized her goal of access to the Arctic Sea in the Peace of Taysina of 1595, the agreement which officially ended the present conflict with Moscow. M. Roberts, loc.cit.

<sup>2</sup>Information regarding negotiations between the Swedes and the Crimean Tatars is to be found in Novosel'skiy, Borba, p. 41 citing Krym. Knig. no. 19, ff. 109 and 186-187. Cf. also, G. Jorring ("Gustaf II Adolf och tatarna på Krim", Ny militär tidskrift, V, p. 306) for information about a Swedish mission to the Crimea in 1592. Unfortunately, before the year 1637, no Swedish archival material relating to the Crimean Tatars appears to have survived. Cf. K. V. Zettersteen, Türkische, Tatarische und Persische Urkunden im Schwedischen Reichsarchiv (Uppsala, 1945), p. xiii.

Bibikov that the Tatars were preparing a campaign against Lithuania, not against the borderlands of Muscovy. Only late in June did official circles in Moscow know that the attack would fall on their own domain.<sup>1</sup>

On 5 July the Russian voivodes and their troops, who were stationed on the banks of the Oka river south of Moscow and in the border forts further to the south, were ordered to assemble at Serpukhov under the boyar Prince Fedor Ivanovitch Mstislavskiy, but when it was learned that the Khan appeared to be advancing on the capital and would avert the concentration of troops at Serpukov, the boys and voivodes were ordered to withdraw to the capital to take up new positions. They arrived at Moscow in the evening of 10 July and at once prepared to meet a Tatar attack from the direction of Kolomenskoe, a district just south of Moscow. On 11 July, the Muscovite forces were drawn up on a line facing the Danilov monastery, which was also south of the city, and they were inspected by the Tsar on the same day. Koltovskiy, the commander of a forward detachment on the Oka, reported on 12 July that the Khan has crossed the Oka below Teshilov, had camped overnight on the Lopasnya, a river between the Oka and Moscow, and now marched directly towards Moscow. A small force of 250 men was placed on the Pakhra river to harass the crossing of the Tatars. Most of this detachment were either killed or captured. The Muscovite forces organised themselves into a strong centre regiment

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<sup>1</sup>Gf. Obolenskiy, ed., *Novyy Letopisets*, pp. 36-37 and Solov'ev, VII, p.263. Karamsin gives an excellent account of the improvisations which the Muscovites undertook prior to the Tatar onslaught. Gf. Karamsin, x, pp.198-203.

led by Prince Mstislavskiy, a right wing under Prince Nikita Trubetskoy, a vanguard under Prince Timofey Trubetskoy, and a left wing under Prince Vasiliy Cherkesskiy. Together with other high dignitaries, the Godunov brothers stationed themselves with each of the first three regiments mentioned. Boris Godunov attached himself to the centre. On the morning of 13 July, a Sunday, Ġāzī Girāy Khan took up his position opposite Kolomenskoe and ordered an attack on the Muscovite lines. The Muscovite cavalry, consisting of Lithuanian and German troops as well as the native forces, met the onslaught and fought bitterly the entire day without any decisive result. That night the Khan, doubtless realizing the folly of attacking such a well-defended city without siege weapons, ordered a withdrawal.<sup>1</sup> Following the withdrawal of the Khan, nothing more was heard of the Tatars with the exception of a small rearguard action below Tula.<sup>2</sup>

Towards the end of July, the Kalğay Feth Girāy reached the Crimea with a troop of Tatars. Not until the night of 9 August did the Khan

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<sup>1</sup>Karamzin (X, p. 204) calls particular attention to the effective use the defenders made of arquebuses. The Russian version attributes this sudden withdrawal to the news, which Ġāzī Girāy acquired from prisoners, that the main Muscovite army fighting the Swedes in the North was coming to the aid of Moscow. Solov'ev, vii, p. 263-264. The Solov'ev account of this engagement follows closely the general account given by Ivan Timofeev, pp. 34-36. Only Karamzin (X, p. 197, citing Polskie Dela No. 21, f. 178 and 183) mentions that Ottoman forces from Azov and Akkerman, accompanied by artillery, joined in this campaign.

<sup>2</sup>The richness of the gifts bestowed on the leading commanders, and the founding of the Donskoy convent by the Tsar in thankfulness to God for the deliverance of Moscow, in some measure attests to the critical position of Muscovy at the time of this attack. Solov'ev, ibid. Cf. also the account Karamzin gives of the baggage and munitions left behind on the shores of Oka. (X, p. 208.)

appear in Bag<sup>h</sup>esaray; he was carried in a wagon. Perhaps the wounding of the Khan was one reason for the sudden withdrawal. Later on the Khan was seen with his left hand bandaged. At an audience with the Khan at the end of August, Bibikov, the Muscovite courier, was kindly received and invited to dine with the Khan. Ġazī Girāy told him that his attack on Moscow had been long overdue. It was dishonourable if a Khan failed to make such incursions. Then one of the Tatar dignitaries asked Bibikov why the Tsar was establishing several towns on the Terek, and on the Volga about the Crimea. Bibikov replied that the peoples of Muscovy had multiplied and were cramped, and, as the Tsar was powerful, he built new towns. The Khan now referred to what must have been known among the Tatars as a classic example of Muscovite perfidity, "Your ruler thus wishes to do as he did with Kazan: at first he established a town close by, then afterwards seized Kazan; but the Crimea is not Kazan, in the Crimea there are many hands and eyes; it will be necessary for your ruler to go beyond the towns to the very heart (of the Crimea)."<sup>1</sup>

Towards the month of October in the same year, the Khan sent a diplomatic mission to Moscow. Upon being questioned about the motives of

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<sup>1</sup>Solov'ev, vii, pp. 264-265. According to Karamzin (*Histoire*, X, p. 230), Ġazī Girāy received a sharp reproach from Sultan Murad for having taken flight from before Moscow. The implication was that he had dishonoured the accompanying Ottoman troops. The Khan had another reason to rue his sudden withdrawal from Moscow. When his envoy, a certain Cherkes Anton, was sent to Sweden in the following year to collect the gold which had been promised, King John only put him off with the words, "Gold is ready for the victor". Karamzin, X, pp. 224-226, citing *Krym. Del.* No. 19. The "relazione ... di Lorenzo Bernardo (1592)" (Alberi, III/II, p. 386) confirms the report of Karamzin. The Porte considered that the Tatars had behaved cowardly. Bernardo, in passing, also mentions what good arquebuses and artillery the Muscovites possessed.

the Khan in his recent attack, the envoys replied that their Khan asked not for the return of Astrakhan or Kazan but only for the traditional tribute ("gifts"), as provided for in previous agreements.<sup>1</sup> The boyars then stated that it was the <sup>Khan</sup> ~~Kan~~, a ruler little to be trusted, who should be sending <sup>the</sup> "gifts" and that Moscow was accustomed to send gifts in return for friendship which the Khan had not shown towards Moscow. It was clear that the Tsar felt himself to be in such a strong position that he no longer considered it necessary to give attention to the grievances of the Tatar Khan. He was greatly deceived.<sup>2</sup>

In May, 1592, Feth Giray, the Kalgay, suddenly fell upon the Ryazan, Kashir and Tula regions of the frontier area. This raid came at a time when the Muscovite troops had been concentrated in the region below Viburg, northwest of Moscow, in preparation for a conflict with the Swedes.<sup>3</sup> The Tatars killed many people, burned villages and towns and carried off a number of local dignitaries and their families, who, not suspecting an attack, had not even left their estates to take refuge in fortified towns. Afterwards the Khan told the Muscovite envoy, Bezobrazov, who had been sent in all haste to the Khan, that the Tatars were

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<sup>1</sup> Here it appears that the Khan simply tried to renew previous remunerative agreements with the Muscovite state and, at the same time, to set forth his other grievances.

<sup>2</sup> Solov'ev, vii, pp. 265-271, citing Krym. Del. Nos. 16-21.

<sup>3</sup> Obolenskiy, ed. Novyy Letopisets, p. 39.

amazed at the absence of resistance to their intrusion and that they were able to drive off the captives with lashes. The envoy made the only excuse possible, that the Tsar had not prepared for the attack because he had believed in the friendly overtures of the Khan in the previous year. In truth, however, the Tsar had been giving all of his attention to the prosecution of the war against Sweden.

The Tsar had provided the envoy with sufficient funds in gold coin to make gifts to the Khan and to the chief dignitaries of the Khanate and also to purchase the freedom of the important personages who had recently been captured. Finally, the envoy received detailed instructions from the Tsar designed to prepare the way for serious negotiations between the Crimea and Moscow. Even a tentative meeting place was suggested, the town of Livny on the Sosna River, which marked the border between the territories claimed both by the Tsar and by the Khan.

In May, 1593, before sending an embassy to represent him in negotiations, Ġāzī Girāy first sent another courier, Yamgurçī Atalīk to the Tsar with two requests: that he be given 30,000 rubles to be used for the construction of a fortress on the Dnepr above the rapids at a ford known as Koshkina or Dobryy, and that the wife of the deceased Murād Girāy be released to the Crimea. The reaction of court circles to the first request was understandably cautious. One d'yak remarked that the Turks wrote many things and he wondered how one could trust their intentions. Upon probing the courier further, the officials of the Tsar became even more baffled. Had the Khan quarrelled with the Sultan? If the contemporary translations into Russian of the Tatar letters are reasonably



accurate, the words of the courier lead one to conclude that Ġazī Girāy, at this time, must have quarrelled with the Sultan and now feared his dismissal.<sup>1</sup> Two clues provided by the Tatar courier suggest this. In the first place, he informed the Tsar that, as regards the removal of forts on the Terek, the Tsar need not disturb his Cossacks there, but he should inform the Khan officially that he had evacuated the forts so that the Sultan would no longer require the Crimean Tatars to make a campaign in that direction. In the second place, when questioned about the purpose the Khan had in building a fortress on the Dnepr, the courier intimated that the Khan planned to abandon his seat of power in the Crimea and establish himself on the Dnepr as a support to the Muscovite state, presumably against Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Solov'ev, loc.cit. and, for a copy of the actual document, Cf. Th. Lashkov, Pamyatniki diplomat. snosh. Krymskago Khanstva s Moskov. Gosudarst. v XVI i XVII v.v. (Simferopol', 1891), no. 27, p. (May, 1593) p. 29-31.

<sup>2</sup>In the view of Karamzin (X, p. 231 f.), this was just another attempt on the part of Ġazī Girāy to deceive the Tsar. In actuality, however, there were always factions at the Ottoman court putting pressure on the Sultan to remove any given Khan. Typical of this sort of intrigue is the attempt by Mubārek Giray, the former Nūr al Dīn of Islām Girāy Khan, to have his brother, Alp Giray, named Khan and himself, Kalgay. (Mubārek Giray, it is to be recalled, fled to the Caucasus when his brother, Ġazī Giray, became Khan.) When his designs on the position of Ġazī Giray failed to find favour at the Porte, he then requested troops, money and equipment to embark on a campaign to seize control of the Muscovite positions in the Northern Caucasus. This project found favour with the Sultan and plans were well advanced when Mubārek suddenly died (ca. Autumn, 1592). Now the pro-Ottoman faction of the Circassians petitioned the Sultan to equip them with arms and provisions and they would drive out the Muscovites. For details see the despatch of G. A. Nashchokin to the Tsar, Kумыков, Kabard. Russk. Snosh., I, pp. 68-69.

The Tsar's advisers, on the basis of these preliminary conversations and of information which they had received from other quarters, decided to send Prince Shcherbatov to the Crimea with gifts, as in former times, valued at 40,000 rubles, consisting partly of money and partly of furs. They also decided to release the wife of Murād Girāy to the Khan. In October, 1593, the ambassador, Prince Shcherbatov, was accompanied as far as Livny by the Boyar, Prince Fedor Khvorostinin and the Sword-bearer, Bogdan Bel'skiy, who were to participate in the negotiations.<sup>1</sup> After a preliminary disagreement over whose tent and which shore of the Sosna would serve as the point for negotiations, Khvorostinin agreed with Ahmed Pasha (sic) (Ahmed Agā, the Khan's vezir), the plenipotentiary of the Khan, to hold their discussions on a bridge connecting the two shores.<sup>2</sup> Now Ahmed Pasha gave his oath on behalf of the Khan and his heirs to be in sincere friendship and brotherhood with the Tsar. Khvorostinin promised that if the Khan, the Kalgay and all of the Hanzādes stood by their word and did not attack the borderlands of Muscovy in the summer of 1594, then the Tsar would send his ambassadors in the autumn with the other half of the hard bargain (zapros). Shcherbatov

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<sup>1</sup>Prince Shcherbatov actually delivered a letter to the Khan from the Tsar accepting in principle the secret proposals placed before the Tsar regarding the establishment of the Khan on the Dnepr in a position independent from the support of the Sultan. Lashkov, Pamyatniki, No. 28 (Oct. 1593) pp. 31-34. The conclusion of this agreement is also mentioned in the chronicle of Timofeev, (Derzhavin, ed.) Vremennik, pp. 224-225.

<sup>2</sup>For the interesting argument regarding this question, see Solov'ev, p. 268.

was to deliver the first portion of this "gift".<sup>1</sup> Henceforth the gifts would be sent each year. Furthermore, Ahmed Pasha stated that the Tsar would order the removal of the Cossacks from the Don and the evacuation of the routes leading to Derbent and Shemakha. Khvorostinin, as regards the Don Cossacks, gave the traditional answer that these people were fugitives from Moscow and that they acted contrary to the wishes of the Tsar, but since the Khan was not joining in peaceful relations with the Tsar, the Muscovite Prince would send his troops to remove the Cossacks from the Don. As for the Terek, the Tsar would send strict orders to his voivode that Ottoman troops should not be inconvenienced in any way.

In spite of the large measure of agreement between Khvorostinin and Ahmed Pasha, all was not sweetness and light when Prince Shcherbatov arrived in the Crimea with the gifts. Of the gifts whose total value had been estimated at 40,000 rubles, the Khan received 10,000 rubles. Immediately after the distribution of this largess, those who had not been favoured by a special gift, or those who felt their portion to be inadequate, commenced to bicker among themselves or to complain to the ambassador. In private, the Kalgay, Feth Giray, became particularly incensed over his portion and had a quarrel with the Khan, his brother, during which he threatened, "You received much money, you alone received all, and now you go to Hungary, but I shall remain in the Crimea and I

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<sup>1</sup>The text of this agreement, concluded on 9 November, 1593, near Livny, is found in Lashkov, Pamyatniki, No. 30, pp. 35-36.

shall attack the border areas of Moscow".<sup>1</sup>

The Khan now <sup>hesitated</sup> ~~hesitated~~ to give his oath, and at an audience with the ambassador he asked that the Tsar should send every year to himself and to his brother 10,000 rubles. Shcherbatov quickly parried this suggestion, however, by saying that if the Khan went to Hungary without giving his oath, then the Tsar would make an alliance with the King of Poland and no one would receive anything in the future. Finally, after considering the problem carefully, and doubtless recalling also that the Sultan had ordered him to go to Hungary, Ġāzī Girāy Khan gave his oath, agreed to write the full title of the Tsar on the sworn document and to affix his own seal to it, an official act which was customarily reserved for correspondence with the Ottoman Sultan only.<sup>2</sup> When the ambassador then suggested that a mutual exchange of prisoners might take place, Ġāzī Girāy declared that it was not for the Khan to have to worry about such matters. If any exchanges were to be arranged, they would have to be worked out with the Hānzādes and Mīrzās directly concerned.<sup>3</sup>

During these negotiations with the Crimean Khan, Moscow also sent its representative to Constantinople. Thus, the envoy Nashchokin left

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<sup>1</sup> Solov'ev, vii, p. 269. Shcherbatov heard about this quarrel from an old Russian captive who lived among the millers of a certain mīrzā. (Ibid., p. 270)

<sup>2</sup> This document also appears in Lashkov, Pamyatniki, No. 31, pp. 36-40. According to Novosel'skiy (pp. 41-42), this agreement was signed on 14 April, 1594. The Khan, however, assumed no responsibility for the actions of the Little Nogays (Kazıoğlu) or the Azov garrison of the Ottomans.

<sup>3</sup> That is, with those who possessed the slaves.

Moscow in April, 1592. Blagov, the previous representative, who had been sent to the Porte in 1584, had suffered much inconvenience at the hands of the Don Cossacks; therefore, Nashchokin in his passage down the Don to Azov had the additional mission of appeasing the Don Cossack <sup>H</sup>orde with appropriate gifts such as saltpetre and other supplies. At the same time, the Tsar addressed to their leaders the request that they refrain from seizing or molesting the Ottoman and the Circassian fishermen (of Azov), as they were wont to do, until after Nashchokin had returned from his mission. The Cossacks refused on the grounds that the Ottomans and Circassians had seized many of their Cossack comrades recently and had made them galley slaves. They absolutely refused to release any men of Azov without compensation, and when the envoy suggested that they accept the leadership of a Don Cossack <sup>1</sup>ataman (elder, leader), who was appointed by the Tsar, the Cossacks mistreated both the envoy and the ataman.

After many difficulties Nashchokin proceeded to Istanbul and carried out his mission. He expressed to the Sultan the desire of the Tsar for amicable ties with the Ottoman State. During the stay of the Muscovite envoy in the Ottoman capital, however, news arrived that the Don Cossacks had taken captive 130 men of Azov and, moreover, that the Tsar had built four new forts on the Don and on the Terek. Now once

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. M. Vasmer, Russisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch, I (Heidelberg, 1953), p. 31.  
<sup>1</sup> Cf.

again the dignitaries at the Porte found it necessary to threaten Moscow with the combined might of the Crimean Tatars, the Nogays and the Ottoman army. When news of the recent attacks reached the ear of the Tsar, he threatened to fortify the Don with his own troops and drive away the Cossacks if they continued to create for Moscow bad relations with the Ottoman State. The Ottoman envoy Rizvān, who returned with Nashchokin to Moscow, set forth the same complaints that the Muscovite representative had heard in Istanbul, namely, the problems of the Cossacks on the Don and the Terek. As regards the Don Cossacks the answer was the same, that they were fugitive peoples and robbers. When the new Russian ambassador, Isleniev, came to the Porte in July of 1594, he gave a new turn to the problems of the Terek region. In justifying the construction of forts and the attacks on the Şamhal, the Tsar now claimed that the Circassians and the peoples of Dagestan were peoples of his realm who had long ago fled to the Northern Caucasus.<sup>1</sup>

In conclusion, it seems fair to say that, as regards the relations between Muscovy and the Crimea on the steppe, the peace agreement of 1594 provided a welcome breathing spell for these traditional enemies. Henceforth, the Khan would be occupied with his role in the Hungarian War. As for the rivalry between Muscovy, Persia and the Ottoman State in the Caucasus, the bilateral exchanges of envoys between Constantinople and Moscow

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<sup>1</sup>Isleniev brought a letter from the Tsar in which the latter agreed to repress the Cossacks, to permit free passage of Ottomans to and from Derbent if the Sultan restrained Ġazī Girāy, and to quiet the inhabitants of the Circassian mountains who were our ancient inhabitants of Ryazan. Karamsin, X, pp. 235-236.

had produced little of substance. At best there existed between the three states in the Caucasus an armed truce which soon worked out to the advantage of Persia, for Muscovy was entering her "Time of Troubles" and the Ottomans and Crimean Tatars were fully occupied with internal strife and the Hungarian War.

### Chapter III

#### GAZĪ GIRĀY KHAN AND THE HUNGARIAN WAR

##### 1. The Background of the War

In Central Europe, during the reign of Sulaymān the Magnificent (1520-1566), the Habsburg Empire had failed to wrest Hungary from the Ottomans. The difficulties of the terrain - in the case of Hungary, frequent rains, swampy soil and swollen rivers - the distance from Ottoman supply centres, and the various problems connected with the provisioning of a large army, however, impeded the Ottoman advance beyond Buda as much as any Habsburg army.

The Sultan Sulaymān had been anxious to consolidate his position in Hungary and, generally speaking, he succeeded. John Zapolyai, the voivode of Transylvania, had been raised to the Hungarian throne in 1526 after the death of King Lewis on the plains of Mohacs. The Archduke Ferdinand, brother of the Emperor Charles V, however, on the basis of his marriage with Anna, the sister of King Lewis, laid claim to the crown of Hungary and succeeded in driving Zapolyai to the Polish border and in having himself declared king at Stuhlweissenburg in 1527. Now Zapolyai turned to the Sultan for support. This move led to the first Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1529. Thereafter, Zapolyai, ruling ~~from~~ Buda, served as the vassal of the Sultan until his death in 1540.<sup>1</sup> In 1538, John

<sup>1</sup>Cf. J. W. Zinkeisen, Geschi

(Gotha, 1855), pp. 611-748.

Or. J. W. Zinkeisen, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa, II (Gotha, 1855), pp. 611-748.



Zapolyai and the Archduke Ferdinand had come to an agreement, without the consent of Sultan Sulaymān: each was to bear the title of King over the portion which he then held of Hungary. On the death of Zapolyai his lands would fall to the Archduke. Should Zapolyai enter into marriage - as indeed he did in 1539 with Isabella of Poland - adequate provision was to be made for his widow and his heirs. He died in 1540 just after the birth of a son. The anti-Hapsburg faction, which was led by Martinuzzi, the bishop of Grosswardein, called upon the Sultan to aid Hungary against the anticipated attempt by the Archduke Ferdinand to put into effect the agreement of 1538. This situation gave to the Sultan an opportunity to make of central Hungary an Ottoman province. The Queen and her son, John Sigismund, were moved to Lippa in 1541, from where they ruled Transylvania as Ottoman vassals. The limits of the new beglerbeglik extended north from the Drava and the Sava, skirted the Plattensee and encompassed Stuhlweissenburg and Gran (Esztergom) on the upper Danube. From there the limits of the new province curved to the east until above Zolnok they met with the river Theiss (Tisza), which formed the eastern border and which in turn joined itself with the Danube to the south. Buda became the seat of the pasha who controlled this new province. Thus began the threefold division of Hungary, the Austrian-controlled portion in the extreme north and west, Transylvanian, east of the Theiss, and between them, the territory now occupied by the Ottomans.<sup>1</sup> Opposing the

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<sup>1</sup>Zinkeisen, II, pp. 807-865, 866-913.

Ottoman strongholds of Belgrade, Temesvar, Stuhlweissenburg, Buda and Gran, the Habsburgs developed such strong-points as Wihitsch, Kanizsa, Raab (Yānik), Komorn (Kōmurān) and Erlau (Egrī). The Archduke Ferdinand, who was Holy Roman Emperor from 1556 to 1564, and his successor, Maximilian II, attempted to unseat John Sigismund (Zapolyai) but the truce of 1547, whereby Ferdinand was forced to pay a tribute of 30,000 Hungarian ducats annually for his control of the western and northern fragments of Hungary, became the basis of <sup>a truce</sup> peace between the two powers. It was essentially this peace that was renewed in 1562 and 1568. Sulaymān the Magnificent died in 1566 and was succeeded by his son, Selim II (1566-1574) and by Murād III (1574-1595). The Emperor Maximilian II (1564-1576) was unable to alter appreciably the situation in Hungary. After the death of Selim II, Maximilian managed to have the truce renewed with Sultan Murād III in 1575. His death in the following year made it necessary for Rudolph II (1576-1608), his son and successor, to enter into fresh negotiations with the Porte. The Ottomans at this time were already far advanced in their preparations for the war of 1578 against Persia. Rudolph II, more devoted to astrology and alchemy than to the administration of an empire, held his court at Prague, leaving the government of Upper and Lower Austria to the Archduke Ernst (d. 1595) and the administration of the military border <sup>1</sup>to the Archduke Karl (d. 1590).

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<sup>1</sup>G. E. Rothenberg, The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522-1747 (Illinois University Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. 48) (Urbana, 1960) (hereafter cited as Rothenberg), p. 44.

After the archdukes Karl and Ernst died, the Archduke Matthias and his brother, Maximilian, took an ever-increasing part in administering Upper and Lower Austria, in attending to the affairs of the military border, and in prosecuting the war. The Emperor Rudolph continued making decisions until he was forced by his brothers to give up much of his authority in 1605.<sup>1</sup> In 1608 a further limitation was placed on the power of the Emperor Rudolph II. Henceforth he retained control in Bohemia only, leaving Matthias in charge of the Austrian, Moravian and Hungarian portions of the realm.<sup>2</sup>

While the Ottomans were fighting Persia between 1578 and 1590, significant developments took place along the borders between the Ottoman and Habsburg possessions, which provided the casus belli for the Ottoman-Habsburg conflict which began in 1593. In each of the treaties which had been concluded between the Emperor and the Sultan special clauses dealt with the raids and counter-raids of the borderers.<sup>3</sup> Each power maintained a series of lesser fortifications in the actual border

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<sup>1</sup>H. Hantsch, Die Geschichte Ostereiches (Graz, 1951) (hereafter cited as Hantsch) I, p. 336.

<sup>2</sup>For further details on the gradual diminution of the central authority in the Habsburg realm, see Hantsch, I, p. 344 ff.

<sup>3</sup>Thus, for example, the peace concluded in 1568 contains such a clause as the following (mentioned by Hammer, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, VI, p. 316): "...les deux souverains convenaient de faire de mutuels efforts pour enlever aux voievodes tous motifs de troubler la paix; ils s'engageaient a exercer une active surveillance sur les heiduques, les azabs, les martoloses, les levends et les haramiyes ou brigands..."

areas to maintain a modicum of control over the mutual raids of such border marauders as the Christian Uscocs<sup>1</sup> and the Muslim Ġāzīs.<sup>2</sup>

The border raids continued in spite of the peace treaties signed on successive occasions. Neither the Emperor Maximilian nor his successor Rudolph wished to aggravate the Ottomans unnecessarily, but they also felt that they must improve their border defenses. A factor of great importance in such a venture was their constant lack of funds to organize, staff and equip the border defenses properly.<sup>3</sup> It was also not clear who should be responsible for the organization of the border defences. Should it be the responsibility of Inner Austria, with its greater efficiency and financial resources, or was it to be left to the Ban of Croatia or to the often rebellious Hungarian and Slavonian magnates? The latter of course feared that the Habsburgs might take away their local autonomy, once Austria assumed control of the borders.

In September, 1577, the Archduke Karl was placed in command of the military border which stretched from the Adriatic to the Sava.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The Uscocs are believed to have been in origin Serbian refugees who settled in the border areas of Croatia and Slavonia. Cf. Rothenberg, p. 28.

<sup>2</sup>These Muslim borderers, in spite of pressure put on them by the Ottoman state from time to time, still continued to raid the lands of the infidel, bringing back captives and booty.

<sup>3</sup>For details, see Rothenberg, p. 40 ff. It seems that the Luthern magnates blocked appropriations out of the fear that such funds might be used to equip an army to enforce the policies of the Counter Reformation.

<sup>4</sup>Rothenberg, pp. 46-47.

Shortly thereafter a reform of the administration of the Croatian and Slavonian borders was instituted, which actually put the borders under the direction of Inner Austria. Now important measures were taken to strengthen the garrisons and to improve the conditions of the frontier fortifications.<sup>1</sup> During the 1580's, however, interest in the border waned. One result was that the Uscocks and the other borderers only received their pay and allowances intermittently, if at all. They tended, therefore, to have recourse to brigandage as a means of subsistence. Particularly irksome to the Ottomans and to the Venetians at this time were the Uscocks of Zengg (Segna) who had turned to piracy on the Adriatic. They and other border elements had disturbed the Ottoman borders and sea lanes to such an extent during the course of the Ottoman-Persian conflict that, upon the conclusion of that war in 1590, a number of influential officials at the Porte viewed with approval the retaliatory raids of the Beg of Bosnia, Hasan Pasha, into Croatia and Slavonia. In 1591 and 1592 the border forts of the Habsburgs on the Kulpa, Unna and Sava rivers were systematically attacked. After the fall of Wihitsh, the key city in the defence system of the Archduke Karl, the Habsburgs mustered a strong force and engaged Hasan Pasha in June of 1593, while he was laying siege to Sissek (Siske).<sup>3</sup> The Ottomans were pushed back

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<sup>1</sup>Rothenberg, p. 49 ff.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 54; Cf. by the same author, "Venice and the Uskoks of Zeng: 1537-1618", *Journal of Modern History*, XXXIII/2 (June, 1961), pp. 148-156.

<sup>3</sup>Rothenberg, p. 56; Peçewî, *Tarih*, II, p. 129.

towards the Kulpa, a large number of them being either slain or drowned in the river. This disaster, in which eight or ten thousand Ottoman troops lost their lives, could not be overlooked.<sup>1</sup> War quickly followed. Von Kreckwitz, the ambassador of the Emperor, and his entourage who had brought the annual "gift" to the Porte, was thrown into prison together with his retinue. Sinān Pasha marched to Belgrade and carried out a campaign in the same year (1593).

Both powers now began manoeuvring to gain, through diplomacy, tactical and strategic advantages over their adversary. Pope Clement VIII supplied the Emperor with funds and troops; moreover, he sent diplomatic missions to the Balkans, to Russia and to Persia.<sup>2</sup> The mission of Alexander Komulovic, rector of the Yugoslav church of San Girolamo in Rome, laid much of the groundwork. In 1593 he visited Sigismund Bathory, Prince of Transylvania, the Voivodes of Wallachia and Moldavia, and then visited the King of Poland, the leaders of the Cossacks and Tsar Fedor<sup>3</sup> of Muscovy. The Emperor also sent emissaries to the Polish

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<sup>1</sup>Although Hasan Pasha had been sent reinforcements from Rumeli by the Grand Vezir, Siyāvuş Pasha, he never received them, for the movement of these troops had been stopped by Kōjā Sinān Pasha upon his appointment to the Grand Vezirate, because he held a grudge against the Pasha of Bosnia. Peçewī, II, p. 128.

<sup>2</sup>The Pope had hopes of forming an anti-Ottoman league. Cf. Von Pastor, History of the Popes, XXIII, p. 273. A study of the diplomacy of this period has been made by J. Matoušek, Turecka Válka v Evropske Politice v letech 1592-1594, published by the Academia of Sciences of Czechoslovakia, Ser. I/82 (Prague, 1935). (not seen)

<sup>3</sup>Pastor, loc.cit.

king, to the Cossacks and to the Tsar. In the year 1594, the Emperor's envoy, Mikolay Varkach, was told by the Tsar that Muscovite representations to the Khan on behalf of Rudolph had kept the Khan at home.<sup>1</sup> This mission did not result in an overt alliance but the Tsar assisted the Emperor with a gift of furs in 1595 which were valued at 400,000 rubles.<sup>2</sup>

The aim of these diplomatic efforts was, first of all, to form an anti-Ottoman league. This project met with only a limited success. Venice, Spain, Poland and Moscow remained aloof, but the endeavour to incite Transylvania, the Danubian Principalities and the Cossacks to revolt against the Ottomans and Tatars proved to be more rewarding.

On the second visit of Komulovic to Transylvania in January, 1594, the young prince, Sigismund Báthory, agreed to make a secret agreement with the Emperor<sup>3</sup>. He signed an offensive and defensive alliance at Prague on 28 January, 1595. Báthory gave up his claims to Hungary but was recognized by the Emperor as prince of Transylvania.<sup>4</sup> The Báthory line, which had replaced the house of Zapolyai in 1571, was friendly to

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<sup>1</sup>Pamyatniki Diplomaticheskikh Snosheniy Drevnoy Rossii s Derzhavami Inostrannyimi 1488-1699 (St. Petersburg, 1851) I, col. 1394.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. R. H. Fisher, The Russian Fur Trade 1550-1700, Univ. of California Publications in History, Vol. 31 (Berkeley, 1943), pp. 137-138.

<sup>3</sup>P. Pierling, Papes et Tsars 1547-1597 (Paris, 1890), pp. 451-452.

<sup>4</sup>R. Gooss (ed.), "Österreichische Staatsverträge Fürstentum Siebenbürgen (Veroff. d. Kem. für neu. Gesch. Öster. IX)" (Vienna) pp. 226-231; Cf. also, Hammer, VII, pp. 273-275.

the Catholic powers. Stephan Bathory, who had become King of Poland in 1576, was under Jesuit influence. He had left his Transylvanian crown to Christopher, his brother, who was succeeded by a youthful nephew, Sigismund Bathory (1581-1602).<sup>1</sup> In spite of the treaty which Sigismund Bathory made with the Habsburgs, however, he still had to contend with an influential Protestant faction in Transylvania.<sup>2</sup> Measures of the counter reformation which were undertaken by the Habsburgs in Hungary, later in the war, helped ultimately to bring to grief the promising beginning of Habsburg influence in Transylvania.<sup>3</sup>

The Danubian Principalities dealt the first blow in what might be termed the "little war" of the tributary principalities. The revolt of Michael, Voivode of Wallachia, toward the end of 1594, at first aided the Habsburg cause greatly; the Ottoman State had to face a serious threat on its right flank, which endangered the chief supply routes from the Porte and the lower Danube to Hungary, whether they came by boat up the Danube or overland by way of Adrianople, Sofia, Nish and Belgrade.

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<sup>1</sup>A. De Bertha, Magyars et Roumains devant l'Histoire (Paris, 1899) (hereafter cited as De Bertha), p. 197; also, R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Roumanians (Cambridge, 1934) (hereafter cited as Seton-Watson), p. 110.

<sup>2</sup>Details of the history of the Protestants in Hungary will be found in Seton-Watson, pp. 107-110.

<sup>3</sup>Even before Sigismund Bathory signed a treaty with the Emperor, certain members of the Transylvanian Diet who opposed Sigismund, including some of his own kinsmen, were put to death. Cf. Pierling, pp. 451-452. Of the three estates which were represented in the Diet, namely the Magyars, the Szekely and the Saxons, the Szekely were particularly hostile to the rule of the Bathory line. Cf. De Bertha, p. 198.



During the early years of the war the alliance between Wallachia and Transylvania, an alliance strongly supported by the agents and the funds of the Pope and of the Emperor, was indeed dangerous for the Ottomans.

Michael, called the Brave, was the third son of Petrascu, Voivode of Wallachia from 1552 to 1557.<sup>1</sup> He belonged to the noble boyar class, a fact which accounts for many of his subsequent activities.<sup>2</sup> He married the niece of the Ban of Craiova. The maternal uncle of his wife, the rich and influential Jan Cantacuzinos, became Ban after the death of Michael's father-in-law. On this occasion, Michael was given control of the district of Mehedinetz. Later, the Voivode Mihnea II (1577-1583 and 1585-1591) had named him stolnik (councillor) and then grand aga or head of the armed forces of Wallachia. When Jan Cantacuzinos went to the Porte in 1590 in order to enlist the support of his highly-placed Phanariot relatives on behalf of the Voivode, Michael replaced him as Ban of Craiova.

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<sup>1</sup>De Bertha, p. 196.

<sup>2</sup>Thus, for example, Michael did not side with the peasantry against the boyars, as one of his predecessors, John the Terrible (1572-1574) had done. The armies of Michael consisted of boyars and mercenaries, who together fleeced the peasantry and robbed the monasteries to support their campaigns. Michael, after his conquest of Transylvania in 1599, sided with the Magyar nobles against the Vlach peasantry, who had risen in revolt believing that Michael had come to liberate them. Cf. Seton-Watson, p. 62.

As grand agā and then Ban of Craiova,<sup>"</sup> Michael acquired popularity and influence to such an extent, that he aroused the jealousy of the Voivode Alessandro Bogdan (1592-1593) and only escaped execution at the instigation of the latter by fleeing to Transylvania. It was thus that Michael, in 1592, first made contact with Sigismund Báthory. Sigismund wrote to Edward Barton, the influential English ambassador and to Sinān Pasha, the Grand Vezir, on behalf of Michael. These letters, combined with the influence of his Cantacuzinos relatives, obtained the voivode-<sup>1</sup>ship for Michael in 1593.

Such favours from high dignitaries at the Porte were not, however, provided for nothing. Soon creditors and office seekers descended on Michael from every side. Thus, in addition to the normal commitments of the office, i.e. the payment of tribute and the supplying of provisions in time of war to the Sultan, Michael had to pay off his creditors. It is difficult to determine exactly what led Michael to revolt against the Ottomans and equally difficult to determine how long he had worked towards this end. Some sources state that he was already planning a revolt while he was in exile in Transylvania.<sup>2</sup> One Ottoman historian calls attention to excessive Ottoman war demands and the lack of a conciliatory policy towards the Danubian Principalities as underlying causes for the unrest.<sup>3</sup> Ottoman fiscal oppression was particularly onerous to the boyars.

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<sup>1</sup>De Bertha, pp. 192-200; Seton-Watson, pp. 62-63.

<sup>2</sup>De Bertha, pp. 199-200.

<sup>3</sup>Peçewī, II, p. 158.

In addition to tribute, from 10,000 to 30,000 ducats per year in Moldavia and twice that amount in Wallachia, there were presents, gratuities and the finding of food at fixed prices, first for troops on campaign, then for the inhabitants of Istanbul.<sup>1</sup>

In March 1594, some six months after he had become Voivode, Michael received a visit from Komulovic, <sup>who was styled the</sup> apostolic visitor of the Latin churches in the European part of the Ottoman state. There is no doubt that these contacts with influences outside the Ottoman milieu, first with Sigismund Bathory and then with Komulovic, encouraged Michael in his plans to revolt.<sup>2</sup>

By the end of the same month, the then Voivode of Moldavia, Aaron, called the Tyrant (1591-1592 and 1592-1595), also received the apostolic visitor and gave him assurances that he would take part in an anti-Ottoman league. Moreover, Aaron sent with Komulovic personal letters to the Cossacks, to the Chancellor of Poland, Zamoyski, and to the Tsar of Muscovy.<sup>3</sup> Aaron had one major reservation about the league. He demanded special protection against the Tatars, if he should break with the Porte. A report of June, 1594, shows that the Moldavian Voivode took no chances. He had prepared already for the expected passing of the Tatars through his territories en route for Hungary by provisioning the halting stations along

<sup>1</sup>Cf. N. Iorga, A History of Roumania, tr. J. McCabe (New York, 1926) (hereafter cited as Iorga - McCabe), pp. 106-108 and p. 147 ff; also Beldiceanu, N., "La crise monétaire ottomane au XVII<sup>e</sup> et son influence sur les principautés roumaines," Sudost-Forschungen XVI (1957) pp. 70-86.

<sup>2</sup>Pierling, pp. 447-454.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 454.

routes previously travelled by the Tatars.<sup>1</sup> Michael, at the end of 1593, did not fail to maintain amicable relations with the Khan.<sup>2</sup>

Poland remained aloof from the anti-Ottoman league, considering such a course to be the best means of preserving her own position between the Habsburg realm and Muscovy. Sigismund Vasa, son of John III of Sweden, succeeded to the Polish throne in 1588. After overcoming an attempt of the Archduke Maximilian to unseat him, he then had to turn to the crisis with the Ottomans, which developed out of the indiscriminate raiding of the Cossacks on Ottoman and Tatar possessions at this time.<sup>3</sup> The movement of settlers and soldiers of fortune from western into the eastern Ukraine during the late sixteenth century became more rapid and widespread with the extension of serfdom.<sup>4</sup> Following this influx of peoples into the Ukraine in the sixteenth century, the Polish State, in order to protect the settled areas, attempted to register some of the more turbulent elements, such as the Zaporozhian Cossacks who lived on the edge of the open steppe in more or less self-sustaining communities.<sup>5</sup> These attempts had failed, because the registered

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<sup>1</sup>Hurmuzaki, IV/2, p. 179.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 174-175.

<sup>3</sup>For details of these incidents see Chapter II above. A summary of the Polish-Ottoman agreement of 1592 can be found in Z. Abrahamowicz, Katalog Dokumentow Tureckich...1455-1672 I (Warsaw, 1959), pp. 225-226.

<sup>4</sup>Hrushevsky (History of the Ukraine (New Haven, 1950) (pp. 173-174) attributes this gradual development to the increase in the demand for grain during the century and to the consequent need of the landlords for an increased and more secure measure of peasant labour on their estates.

<sup>5</sup>For an important study of the formation and development of the Cossack (cont.)

Cossacks continued to associate freely with the unregistered ones, thus rendering discipline impossible.<sup>1</sup> The problem of indiscriminate raiding against Ottoman territories combined with the encroachment of certain Cossack groups on the lands of powerful Polish nobles, led to the defeat of the Cossacks by a force composed of Hungarian mercenaries and of Polish nobles with their retainers. This battle fought at Piatka in 1590 and the subsequent repressive measures of a local nature which continued until 1593 have been termed by Hrushevsky the "First Cossack War".<sup>2</sup>

Not until 1594 did the Zaporozhian Cossacks feel themselves secure enough to become embroiled once more in international events. Having been duly prepared for a role in the Habsburg-Ottoman struggle by visits from Komulovic and from representatives of the Emperor, Rudolf II, the Cossacks welcomed Erich Lassota, a special envoy of the Emperor, during the summer of 1594.<sup>3</sup> As a result of these negotiations, the Cossacks, accepting banners and supplies of money from the Emperor, harassed the Crimean Tatars and laid waste Moldavia in 1594 and 1595.

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communities, see G.Stökl, Die Entstehung des Kosakentums (Munich, 1953).

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<sup>1</sup>Hrushevsky, pp. 178-181.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 182-183.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. R. Schottin, ed., Tagebuch des Erich Lassota von Steblau (Halle, 1866), passim.

These activities helped to bring about the intervention of Poland in Moldavian affairs in 1595 and led directly to the complete repression of the Zaporozhian Cossacks by the Polish state in 1596. This "Second Cossack War" scattered the Cossacks far and wide - hence the relative weakness of the Zaporozhian Cossacks during the period of the Hungarian War.<sup>1</sup> The Cossacks, on this occasion, had negotiated with the Emperor and the Tsar as an independent power, a development which the Polish state had not tolerated.

## 2. The First Years of the Hungarian War and the Role of the Crimean Tatars

The Crimean Tatars, during the Persian War, had been called upon to participate in a struggle between the Safavids and the Ottomans. In the new struggle, the Tatars were destined to take part in a war the stakes of which were the control of the Danube basin, including the heartlands of Hungary and the tributary principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania. This time the principal contenders were the Habsburgs and the Ottomans with Poland playing an important minor role commensurable with her own interests.

The campaign season was already far advanced when Sinān Pasha left Istanbul in 1593 to undertake the first major operation of the war. He

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<sup>1</sup>

For the religious and social implications of this repression, cf. Hrushevsky, pp. 188-192 and 211-214.

reached Belgrade in September, reviewed his troops at Stuhlweissenburg, and then proceeded to reduce Veszprem and Palota before taking up winter quarters. The Grand Vezir had gained a tactical advantage for the following year by setting up his headquarters in Belgrade. The Austrian forces, however, were not averse to taking advantage of the Ottoman distaste for winter campaigns. Christopher Teuffenbach, commander-in-chief of the Styrian forces, joined his troops with those of Count Palffy and took several lesser strongpoints, amongst them Szabandna and Divin. Weather permitting, the Imperial forces could often also take advantage of the Ottomans' slowness in assembling their troops in the Spring. Thus, for example, Archduke Matthias began a siege of Gran in early May, 1594, but he was forced to withdraw upon the approach of Sinān Pasha at the beginning of June. The main Imperial army crossed the Danube and camped near Raab. Another army, under the command of Archduke Maximilian, operated on the Croatian border, took several lesser forts, but lost most of them again to the Ottomans upon the eventual withdrawal of the Archduke.

Sinān Pasha had received reinforcements from Istanbul which were led by the Janissary Agā. The Grand Vezir, after driving the Imperial forces from before Gran, besieged Raab. It was at this juncture that the Crimean Tatars, led by their Khaḡ, Ġāzī Girāy, joined the Ottoman forces and rendered assistance in the conquest of Raab and Papa. The Ottomans now turned to the reduction of Komorn but, the season being far<sup>1</sup> advanced, the army abandoned the siege and moved to winter quarters.

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<sup>1</sup>Hammer, VII, pp. 267-272.

In summary, during the year 1594, the superior organization and resources of the Sultan gave to the Ottomans a strategic advantage which was emphasized by the fall of Raab, one of the most important of the Christian border strongholds and situated only a little more than 100 milometres from Vienna.

After the Ottoman troops had taken up their quarters or had dispersed for the winter, the Tatar Khan, Ġāzī Girāy, left the plains of Hungary for the Crimea. The Khan, upon receiving the instructions of the Sultan to join Sinān Pasha in Hungary, had brought his negotiations with the Tsar to a fruitful conclusion.<sup>1</sup> In preparation for the Ottoman campaign the Khan mustered a force estimated at 30,000 to 40,000 horsemen.<sup>2</sup> According to the Khan's own description, as quoted by Peçewī, the mustering of the Tatar contingents followed a traditional pattern. Every ten or twelve men brought their own cooking pot (kazgān) and such a unit

<sup>1</sup>On 14 April, 1594 the agreement was signed. For details, see Chapter II above.

<sup>2</sup>In one passage Peçewī (II, p. 156) attempts to estimate the number of troops on campaign in Hungary in 1594. He gives the number 30,000 for the total of the Kapī Kūlarī alone, and estimates another 30,000 coming from Rumeli. To this he added an unknown number from the garrisons in the border fortresses. Also, as no campaign had been made in Hungary since the days of Sulaymān, as many as another 30,000 camp followers of various description joined the campaign out of their thirst for booty. (The usual slave merchants, prostitutes, provisioners, armourers etc.) Finally, Peçewī included in his count at least 20,000 Tatars and as many more irregulars, bringing the total to something between 120 and 150,000 (a modest total of six or eight divisions according to present day standards).



was termed a kōs. Moreover, it was known how many kōs came from each village unit.<sup>1</sup>

The most difficult problem which now faced the Khan, after he had made peace with Moscow, was the movement of his forces to the plains of Hungary. During the entire spring and early summer of 1594, the diplomatic correspondence of those states which were friendly to the Emperor shows a marked preoccupation about whether the Khan was coming and, if so, by what route and in what strength. Furthermore, on behalf of the Imperial cause, three separate attempts to block the coming of the Tatars can be discerned - by the Principalities, by the Zaporozhian Cossacks and by Transylvania. The role played by Poland was equivocal. She did not wish to be dominated by the Porte, but the possibility of having the Habsburgs as a neighbour on her Transylvanian border was equally distasteful. An examination of the map will show that the Tatars had available to them two main routes into Hungary, the one acrosss Moldavia and Wallachia and then along the southern shores of the Danube, the other through southern Poland and Transylvania. Both routes had been used by Tatar forces en route to Hungary in the past. Under normal circumstances the easiest route would have been the one along the Danube. Moldavia, a relatively weak and poor state, could not, on its own, offer

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<sup>1</sup>It is interesting to note in passing that the historian Peçewī, a personal friend of the Khan, felt that Ġāzī Girāy grossly exaggerated the size of his forces. The Khan doubtless wished to exaggerate his contribution in order to receive a large grant from the Sultan or to enhance his political importance in other ways. Cf. Peçewī, II, pp. 156-157.

much resistance to a large Tatar contingent. Wallachia, with its greater resources and a strong voivode like Michael, could be otherwise.

The diplomatic exchanges between Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania and the representatives of the Pope and the Kaiser did not pass unnoticed by the Porte. Already Sinan Pasha, after the first year of campaigning, had found it necessary to rebuke the Voivode Michael for the inadequate provisions he had sent to the front.<sup>1</sup> In 1594 the Sultan and the Grand Vezir sent strong letters to the princes of the three principalities<sup>2</sup> in the hope of keeping them in the Ottoman fold. It is no wonder that the Khan, in view of the unsettled situation on the Danube, very early decided upon the northern route through Poland and Transylvania. It is also probable that such a move was made for strategic reasons. If it could be shown to the Prince of Transylvania how easy it was to concentrate Tatar forces on his soil, then he might think twice about changing his allegiance. It is evident that Transylvania would have a key position in the event of a rebellion on the Danube since supplies and men sent from the Habsburg lands to Wallachia and Moldavia would have to pass through Transylvania.

Already in December of 1593 Marco Zane, the Venetian Bailo at the Porte, informed the Doge that rumours suggested that the Tatars might

<sup>1</sup>Peçewî, II, p. 152; Cf. also "Erdel", I.A., IV, p. 300.

<sup>2</sup>Hammer, VII, pp. 273-274.

pass through Poland en route to Hungary. He also listed the provisions, such as arquebuses, money, spades, tents, pikes, maces and bows, which the Ottomans were sending to the Crimea.<sup>1</sup> By the spring of 1594 it became apparent that two separate contingents would be going to Hungary. The Bailo Marco Venier reported on 20 May that at least one contingent had been held up by a serious Cossack raid on Tatar territory at the end of March and that, although the voivode of Moldavia had prepared ample food and halting stations for the Tatars, they had not yet passed into Moldavia.<sup>2</sup>

Indeed both the Khan and the Sultan had made plans well in advance. On 5 March, 1594, the Hospodar Aaron of Moldavia wrote to Grand Chancellor Zamoyski that the Khan had sent an envoy to him in order to discuss the provisioning of the routes for the passage of the Tatars through Moldavia. At this time also, the Khan asked the Voivode to provide him with some guides for his forces on their passage through Southern Poland into Transylvania.<sup>3</sup> By 12 April, the nuncio Speziano, who was residing at the court in Prague, was able to report that a çāvuş (envoy, ambassador) from the Sultan had arrived in Warsaw to request permission

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<sup>1</sup> Hurmuzaki, IV/2, pp. 174-5.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 179.

<sup>3</sup> Hospodar Aaron to Zamoyski (5 March, 1594), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, p. 329. At this time the hospodar wrote that he had no intention of providing guides for the Tatars.

for the Tatars to pass through Poland.<sup>1</sup> In a letter of Zamoyski to Christof Radziwill, the voivode of Vilna, dated 30th March, 1594, the chancellor discussed the arrival of this same çavuş. Evidently the çavuş actually denied that the Tatars planned to go to Hungary by way of Poland, a view that the chancellor held himself at the time. It was difficult for him to conceive that the Sultan would want to risk war with Poland at a time when he was at war with the Emperor.<sup>2</sup> On 27 May, the nuncio Speziano reported from Regensburg that 7,000 or 8,000 Tatars had joined Sinan Pasha. They came through Wallachia because they were blocked from entering Poland by the Duke of Ostrog.<sup>3</sup>

For some time the diplomatic missions working for the Emperor had sought to block the mountain passes, particularly in Transylvania, in order to bar the passage of the main Tatar<sup>4</sup> force. It seems however that

<sup>1</sup>Hurmuzaki, XI, p. 432.

<sup>2</sup>Accompanying the çavuş was a certain Pole who had become a convert to Islam. The latter declared that the çavuş was not to be trusted because the Tatars did plan to go through Poland. Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, pp. 337-338. The Ottomans may have been sincere. The Khan may have decided to go through Poland at the last minute, to avoid an ambush. Cf. Hurmuzaki, XI, p. 394.

<sup>3</sup>This may have been a small detachment sent as a diversionary force. As the editor, Hurmuzaki, has noted, the main Tatar contingent came through Moldavia and then through Maramureş in June and July. Cf. Hurmuzaki, XI, p. 446. Some confirmation of this report may be found in Francus. According to his account, the Tatars attempted to force their entrance into Poland by stampeding a large amount of livestock into the waiting Polish forces. The plan failed, however, when the noise of the Polish guns reversed the stampede and forced the Tatars to flee towards the south. Francus, Quinouenalis, pp. 504-505.

<sup>4</sup>Cf. for example, Von Kühbach to Archduke Ferdinand (19 Jan., 1594), Hurmuzaki, XI, p. 403.

before final plans for blocking the Tatars either on the steppe or in the mountain passes had been completed, the Tatars were able to join the Ottomans in Hungary by way of Poland and Transylvania.

Why did the Poles, who were playing the game of interested neutrals in this way, permit the Tatars to pass unmolested? The obvious answer is that they did not permit it but were unable to take appropriate action in time.<sup>1</sup> The diary of Erich Lassota, special envoy of the Emperor to the Cossacks, and related materials help to resolve this problem. Before Lassota had arrived on the Dnieper in the summer of 1594 a certain Stanislaus Chlopicki had visited the court at Prague and, giving himself out as the head of the Cossacks, made specious promises about what he and his men might accomplish if they were supported by the Emperor. Chlopicki returned to the Zaporozhians with money, silver drums, an eagle crest and banners during the winter of 1593-94. Thus, when an envoy of the <sup>Emperor</sup> ~~Kaiser~~ sought an alliance with Poland against the Ottomans in February, 1594, the Polish Diet complained about the secret negotiations of the Habsburgs with the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who were subjects of Poland. The envoy of the Emperor excused the government at Prague

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<sup>1</sup> Zamoyski, in a rather apologetic letter to Cardinal Aldobrandini, explained how the Tatars slipped through his fingers. He had taken steps to block the pass near Sambor, the most commodious of the three possible routes and also the route which the Tatars had followed for the Szigetvar campaign of 1566. But the Tatars took the route leading to Hust. By the time Zamoyski had marched his troops to the other pass, the Tatars were already in Transylvania. Cf. De Transitu Tartarorum per Pocutiam, Anni MDXCIII Epistola (Danzig, 1595).

by stating that Chlopicki had represented the Cossacks as being an independent state.<sup>1</sup> Chlopicki, not being fully content with the support he had obtained from Prague, also went to Moscow in August, where concessions were made to him on the condition that he accept Muscovite troops in his force and that he recognize the suzerainty of Moscow.<sup>2</sup>

While these events were taking place, the main Tatar force led by Ġazī Girāy had begun its long journey to the Hungarian front. Lassota's report of a clash between Cossacks and Tatars about 18 June, 1594 near Ochakov refers no doubt to an event which occurred during the first stages of this long trek. Lassota learned from a friendly Tatar called Bellek that the Khan himself and his two sons, with eighty thousand (!) men, had departed from the Crimea, but that only about twenty thousand were troops. Bellek also reported that a force of only 15,000 remained to guard the Crimea.<sup>3</sup> After the Tatar forces were ferried across the mouth of the Dnepr to Ochakov, they quickly passed through Moldavia probably reaching the Polish frontier in late June. The Khan waited three days near Snyatyn, north of Czernowitz, for a reply from Zamoyski with whom the Khan had presumably been in correspondence about free passage.

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<sup>1</sup>Lassota, Tagebuch, pp. 7-8.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Lassota, p. 211. Ochakov was a likely spot for an attack. It was to this point that Ottoman vessels ferried the Tatars across the estuary of the Dnieper from the Crimean side of the river. It is doubtful if this "attack" was anything more than a minor harassment. Cf. Ibid., p. 217.

Some guides for the march appear to have been Poles sent by Zamoyski, "traitors" from Transylvania, and a number of boyar and Greek supporters of Peter the Moldavian (Peter VI (1592)). When the awaited answer from Zamoyski arrived, there was no indication whatsoever that Zamoyski might have provided guides for the Tatars to cross Polish territory.<sup>1</sup> The chancellor, on the contrary, challenged the presence of the Khan and his forces and threatened him with Polish troops to the number of 50,000 which were held in readiness some four leagues from the Khan.<sup>2</sup> In actuality, it appears that the chancellor wanted to stop the Tatars but many Cossacks upon whom he planned to rely proved untrustworthy, doubtless for lack of pay, and hastened to join the project of Chlopicki which developed into a diversionary action against the Ottomans and took the form of an invasion of Moldavia. This adventure of Chlopicki helped bring about the revolt of the Voivode Aaron in 1594.<sup>3</sup> Apparently, during

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. the long report of Morinni Paully to the Kaiser (ca. beginning of July), Hurmuzaki, III, pp. 200-206 and also the memoir of Abraham Tocken, Hurmuzaki, XI, p. 391.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid. At this time the Khan must have quickly moved his forces into Transylvania. Cf. Zamoyski to Aldobrandini, De Transitu Tartarorum, loc.cit.

<sup>3</sup>It must have become clear to Lassota that the Tatar advance could not be stopped; therefore, he negotiated with the Cossacks about either a diversionary attack on the Ottomans through Moldavia and Wallachia to the Danube or an attack on Perekop (Orkapu) in the Crimea or both. The main objections which the Cossacks raised were that a) they lacked a sufficient number of horses, b) they considered their members too few and the Vlachs too perfidious to attempt an invasion of that country and c) they could not undertake such a major enterprise for so small a reward (i.e. pay). Thus Lassota gained as much as he could. The Cossacks undertook the invasion and plunder of Moldavia. Cf. Lassota, p. 8 and pp. 215-219. One of the chief disappointments of Lassota during the mission was his discovery that Chlopicki was not the head of the Zaporozhian

the summer of 1594 the Cossacks were doubly bought off, for the Papal envoy, Komulovic concluded a treaty with the Cossacks on 30 August, 1594, in which the latter party undertook to attack the Tatars.<sup>1</sup>

Although the report mentioned above refers to the problem of guides for the Tatar forces, it is clear that the Tatars had at least a certain number of their own guides, who knew the route to Hungary through the Carpathian passes very well.<sup>2</sup> Several passes could be used by the Tatars to cross the Carpathians but the most likely pass was probably the one still known as the "Tatars Pass" or Per Yablonitse at a height of 841 metres. This pass connects the source of the Prut and the Tissa (Tchorna Tisa), a branch of the Tisza (Thiess) river.<sup>3</sup> By following the Tisza, the Tatars could very quickly reach the plains of Hungary.<sup>4</sup>

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Cossacks of the Sich but of those in Kiev. Nevertheless, Chlopicki, with the gold of the Emperor, was able to win over these Cossacks to the Habsburg cause. Ibid.

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<sup>1</sup>Pierling, Papes et Tsars, p. 460.

<sup>2</sup>Peçewî, (II, p. 149) described Jānis Ağā, a talented guide and the one who led the Tatars to Hungary. Peçewî implies that Janis Ağā had more divine inspiration than actual knowledge of the routes.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Grosvenor, The Times Atlas of the World, IV, Pl. 82 (J - 2.5) and J. Chardonnet, Atlas International Larousse (Paris, 1950), Pl. 8 (L - d/e). Cf. letter of Kornis to Zamoyski in which Kornis mentions the pass "circa augustias Snatinensis" (21 March, 1594), Veress, Documente Privitoare, IV, p. 71.

<sup>4</sup>In the account of Peçewî it is clearly stated that the Tatars, by way of the shores of the Turla (Turlî) river, passed out of Poland and into Hungary. It is quite possible that the Turul river, another tributary

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Further news about the Tatars deals with their activities around Huszth, a city on the Tisza in upper Transylvania. Their arrival in northern Transylvania shortly after Sigismund Bathory had decided to caste his lot in with the Emperor appears significant. A Jesuit correspondent from Transylvania accused certain Transylvanian senators of conniving with the Tatars to undo the plans of Sigismund.<sup>1</sup> A report in Ortelius confirms the suspicion that the Tatars were sent to Transylvania for strategic considerations. It is certain that highly placed individuals had earlier informed the Sultan of Sigismund's betrayal; moreover, when it was learned that the Tatars would pass through Transylvania, these same informers were said to have sent forged letters to the Prince which were signed by Zamoyski asking the Prince to come to the Polish border for consultations with him. Thus, they hoped to bring about the undoing or the capture of Prince Sigismund near Huszth with the help of the Tatars.<sup>2</sup> In actuality, however, it would appear that these are

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of the upper reaches of the Tisza in the province of Maramuresh is meant. Cf. Chardonnet, loc.cit. and Peçewî, II, p. 148. It is difficult to imagine how the Tatars passed out of Poland with the Turul, however, because this stream does not lead to any pass of importance. Another possibility is that the Tatars either confused the names, lost their way and came to the Turul, or else the term "Turla" refers in Turkish to some other better known stream such as the Prut. For an idea of international boundaries at the time, see Cambridge Modern History Atlas (Cambridge, 1924), Maps Nos. 3, 20, and especially 21. The account of Katib Çelebi (Fezleke, I, pp. 34-35) while mentioning the Turlî stream, also mentions the name of the pass leading to Huszth which was called "Balkan". Both Ketib Çelabi and Zamoyski (De Transitu Tartarorum, loc.cit.) mention that the pass was blocked but that the Tatars dismounted, crept around the barriers of rocks and felled trees and slaughtered a force guarding the pass.

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<sup>1</sup>A. Veress, ed., Annuae Litterae Societatis Jesu in Fontes rerum Tran-

examples of a garbled account. Kaspar Kornis, governor of Huszth, was ordered to block the passes. He was later asked by the Prince why he had let the Tatars through. Kornis then showed the Prince letters signed by the Prince countermanding the original order.<sup>1</sup>

The Tatars had a number of minor clashes with enemy forces of unknown strength in Poland, but they did not stop to raid or plunder, until they reached Transylvania. In Transylvania Kaspar Kornis, governor of Huszth, attacked the vanguard of the Tatars near his city, but he was so badly defeated that he almost did not reach the protection of his fortress. He then sent gifts to the Khan and the latter, not wishing to molest the territory of a Prince who paid tribute to the Sultan, continued on his way.<sup>2</sup> The Tatars, even after reaching the confines of the Ottoman provinces in Hungary, were not sure they had reached their goal for they saw hardly anyone wearing turbans.<sup>3</sup> In

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sylvanicarum, V (1921), pp. 41-42.

<sup>2</sup>Ortelius, pp. 227-228; Zeitung no. 1095 cited by K. M. Kertbeny, ed. "Ungarn betreffende deutsche Erstlings - Drucke, 1464-1600" in Bibliographie der ungarischen nationalen und internationalen Literatur, I (Budapest, 1880), p. 259 (Hereafter cited as Kertbeny) and Marco Venier to the Doge (25 November, 1594), Hurmuzaki, III, p. 463.

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Anonymous Letter to Ferdinand, Hofkammer President (2 May, 1595), A. Veress, Documente Privitoare, IV, pp. 209 and 213.

<sup>2</sup>Those Tatars who could not forego opportunities to raid or burn in Poland were put under arrest a few days and then again released. In short, in Poland the Tatars avoided trouble whenever possible. Peçewî, II, p. 149; Munejjimbaşı, II, p. 703. Cf. also, A. Decsi, pp. 109-110.

<sup>3</sup>Peçewî, II, pp. 149-150. Kātib Çelebî reports that the Khan had a serious skirmish with Stephan Bathory near Debreçen but that, fearing the enemy cannon, he withdrew (Fazleke, pp. 34-35.).

summary, the Tatars had commenced their journey shortly before 18 June. Next they were reported at Huszth on 28 June and by 5 August they had joined the army of Sinān Pasha before Raab. Thus their total travel time by the northern route was slightly more than one and a half months.<sup>1</sup>

On 19 Zī'l Ka'de, 1002/6 August, <sup>1594</sup>~~1495~~ Sinān Pasha ordered a full-dress parade in honour of the arrival of the Khan. After meeting one another on horseback and exchanging formalities, they moved off to the ornate pavilion of the Grand Vezir, where they sat down and feasted together on the food which had been prepared. Some Ottoman dignitaries saw in this gesture of the Grand Vezir a kind of mortification for the Khan. They found it unfitting that the Grand Vezir should seat the Khan on his right, or sit with him at all, particularly as the Khan himself was the higher in rank. They felt it to be highly inappropriate, regardless of the high position of the Vezir, to treat as an equal a ruler whose ancestors had possessed rights of Sikke and Hutbe for four hundred years (sic). But the Khan paid little attention to these matters. After the banquet he washed his hands in a golden basin with water brought in a golden ewer. Then he received a number of valuable gifts, including a traditional grant of 5,000 gold pieces and a charger. He seated himself on his new mount and was escorted back to his own pavilion.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Peçewī, II, pp. 149-150.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 150-151. Munijjimbasī, III, p. 570.

The presence of the Khan was a matter of no small importance for the success or failure of the Ottoman campaign. The Tatars in numbers alone much increased the striking force of the Ottomans. They served as forward scouts, as skirmishers and even as assault units, particularly across rivers for they needed no bridges; they merely swam with their horses across the water. Of no mean significance was the psychological impact of their presence on the discipline of the Ottoman troops. As the Sultan rarely took part in the campaigns, the presence of the Khan without a doubt added to the dignity and chances of success of any given campaign. The Tatars were still considered invincible by the ordinary people.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the Khan, ever conscious of his own exposed position on the borders of the Ottoman state, was true to his name, Ġāzī (warrior fighting the infidel), able to see in this war the traditional struggle (Ġazā) of Islam against all unbelievers. In the Khan's own words, "Only this Ġazā of the Ġāzī (either the Khan or Ġāzīs in general) is a great Ġazā, which is an introduction to all Ġazās!"<sup>2</sup> There were of course other fundamental reasons in the nature of political and economic expediency which brought the Tatars to Hungary. Politically speaking, the Sultan could remove or refuse in other ways to assist a disobedient Khan if he failed to join a campaign.<sup>3</sup> Of primary importance

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. La Terza Parte del Tesero Politico, p. 463.

<sup>2</sup> "Ġāzīnin yālniz bu Ġazāsı bir Ġazā-yi āzīmdir ke jumle Ġazālarına dībāje dir..." Peçewī, II, p. 150.

<sup>3</sup> This was seen clearly in the case of Mehemmed Girāy Khan.

to the Tatars were the chances for acquiring booty and captives. The Khan himself received extra grants of money while on campaign, grants which he could use to better maintain his position in the continual intrigues of the Porte and among his own mirzas.

The Khan received his initial war grant upon his arrival, but difficulties now arose because Sinān Pasha refused to authorise a scorched earth policy even under pressure from the Khan and other dignitaries. The Ottoman army had made camp on the plain before Raab on 13 Zi'l Ka'de, 1002/31 July, 1594.<sup>1</sup> The Tatars first saw action in the storming of an enemy Tābūr situated across the Danube and next to the main fortress of Raab. The Ottomans placed pontoon bridges of various sorts across the Danube upon which volunteers, members of the Serden Geçdi (≈ enfants perdus) regiment, could pass to the other side. The Tatars, led by the Khan, merely swam their horses across. The fortress itself lay on the bank of the Raab river and was protected by a moat on the land side. In the reduction of the fortress the Tatars performed the service of dragging up sandbags with their horses because the soil was too wet for entrenching. Later an attempt to dam up the waters of the Raab river which swirled through the moat proved unsuccessful and the citadel was eventually reduced on 17 Muharrem, 1003/2 October, 1594 by the action of sappers (lagimjilar) who systematically mined a portion of the walls.<sup>2</sup> In the light of these facts, it is difficult to

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<sup>1</sup>Peçewī, II, p. 145.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 146-147, p. 153 and Munijjimbāṣī, III, p. 571.

substantiate the claim of the Tatar chronicler 'Abd al Ġaffār that the Tatars played a decisive role in the conquest of Raab.<sup>1</sup> When it became clear that Raab would soon capitulate under steady bombardment and mining operations, Ġāzī Girāy was sent to the neighbouring fortress of Tata, but finding it unoccupied, he was able to report its conquest on the same day as Raab itself fell.<sup>2</sup> After a brief siege of Komoron, the Tatars went their way towards the Crimea and the Ottoman forces took up winter quarters on the frontier. Only a token force of Tatars camping in their yapūnja or reed and mud huts spent the winter on the plains near Stuhlweissenburg.<sup>3</sup>

Fortune had definitely smiled on the Ottomans in Hungary. Sinān Pasha had kept a stern discipline over all of the units in his command even though the Khan and several other dignitaries felt that those troops not actually involved in the sieges should have been permitted to raid enemy territory indiscriminately. But the Grand Vezir felt that the Re'āyā had already suffered enough at the hands of bandits and marauders: for the Ottomans to perpetrate similar excesses would only play into the hands of the enemy; no profit would accrue to the Ottomans, if they con-

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<sup>1</sup>'Abd al Ġaffār, p. 115. According to the account of Munijjimbaşī (III, p. 571), however, it was the Khan who, together with other commanders, turned the tide by conceiving the plan of crossing the Danube, seizing the Tābūr, then attacking the fortress by bridging the moat.

<sup>2</sup>Munejjimbaşī, loc.cit.

<sup>3</sup>Peçewī, II, p. 156.

quered territory from which their own troops had driven the peasantry.<sup>1</sup> This was sound Ottoman policy but it did not give the Crimean Tatars an opportunity to capture slaves or collect booty. There is evidence from an Italian report that, over and above the question of whether or not the Tatars should be free to raid, the Khan came into conflict with the Grand Vezir in connection with another matter: Ġāzī Girāy wanted to have two of his brothers appointed to be the voivodes of Wallachia and Moldavia as recompense for the Tatar contributions to the Hungarian war - a desire that Sinān Pasha did not welcome.<sup>2</sup> This is the first indication of a scheme for Tatar territorial aggrandizement which the Khan henceforth pursued almost to the end of his life.

3. The Revolt of the Principalities and the Dismissal of Ġāzī Girāy Khan

The tributary principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania had, by the end of 1594, been prepared for a revolt against the Ottomans and had even concluded formal agreements with the Emperor.<sup>3</sup> Voivode Michael made the first open break with his overlord the Sultan by exterminating his Ottoman creditors in Bucharest in October of 1594. His troops then drove all the Ottomans, except those stationed in fortresses,

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<sup>1</sup>Peçewī, II, pp. 157-158.

<sup>2</sup>Marco Venier Bailo to the Doge (Para, 12 November, 1594), Hurmuzaki, III, p. 463.

<sup>3</sup>Peçewī, II, pp. 158-159; Zinkeisen, G.O.R., IV, pp. 598-599 and Jorga, G.O.R., III, p. 303.

out of Wallachia and sent them reeling south across the Danube. Aaron, Voivode of Moldavia, had encouraged the Cossacks in his pay to attack Bender and sieze the new Ottoman fortress of Ismail.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile, on 16 January, 1595, Sultan Murād III had died and was succeeded by Sultan Mehemmed III (1595-1603). At the time of the accession Ferhād Pasha had also replaced Kōja Sinān Pasha as Grand Vezir.<sup>2</sup>

This extremely serious threat to the Ottoman flank and to the vital road and river routes which served as the supply line for Hungary had to be met immediately. Not until July, however, did Ferhād Pasha bring up his forces to Ruschuk where he commenced the construction of a bridge. Shortly thereafter Ferhād Pasha was dismissed and Kōja Sinān Pasha assumed the rank of Grand Vezir again. Sinān Pasha marched into Wallachia intending to settle the revolt, but Michael withdrew his troops to the border of Transylvania and only sallied forth at the beginning of October in the wake of the withdrawing Ottoman forces. The withdrawal, harassed by attacks from Michael's troops, whose numbers had swelled appreciably through additions from Transylvania,<sup>3</sup> now became a rout.

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<sup>1</sup>Munejjimbāšī, III, p. 579; Peçewī, II, pp. 158-160; Jorga-McCabe, p. 149. Jorga (G.O.R., III, p. 303) gives the date of Michael's treachery as 15 October.

<sup>2</sup>Peçewī, II, pp. 123-125 and Munejjimbāšī, III, pp. 581-582.

<sup>3</sup>On 25 May, 1595, Michael had signed an agreement recognizing Sigismund Bathory as his King in exchange for supplies of men and other concessions. For details, see Seton-Watson, p. 63.



All now converged on the bridge at Ruschuk - cattle, men, supplies and equipment - resulting in one of the great disasters of the war.<sup>1</sup>

In spite of the seriousness of this threat, the Sultan had been reluctant to accept a proposal made earlier by Ġāzī Girāy Khan that his brothers be appointed to the voivodeship of Wallachia and Moldavia in return for their pacification. Nevertheless, as the rebellion in Wallachia and Moldavia spread rapidly during the winter of 1594-1595, the Ottomans were increasingly forced to make use of the Tatars in all manner of assignments there.<sup>2</sup>

The Tatars led by the Khan departed from the Hungarian front in the late autumn of 1594. When the Khan, however, learned that all of the routes in Transylvania were blocked, he was forced to remain on the Hungarian plain until the ice was frozen solid on the Danube, a more suitable time to move such a large force along the southern route. Hence, the Tatars were scattered from Zolnok to Temesvar, some scouting out the routes, others raiding and still others camping in their wretched huts (yāpūnja). The Khan himself stayed with the Pasha of Temesvar. Only in late February of 1595 do the Tatars again start their march for the Crimea.<sup>3</sup> When they reached the lower Danube, by which route they

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<sup>1</sup>Munejjimbaşı, III, p. 583 and Zinkeisen, G.O.R., IV, p. 599.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. The remarks of Novosel'skiy, Borba, pp. 41 and 42.

<sup>3</sup>J. Decsi, Magyar Historiaja (De Rebus Ungaricus), 1592-1598 (Pest, 1866), pp. 147-148.

were returning, three or four factors determined that they conduct themselves in a more military manner. In the first place, they were by now laden with booty and hence less manoeuvrable. Furthermore, the Ottomans had strong garrisons in the area, notably at Silistria, and the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were under arms and in revolt. Marco Venier, the Venetian Bailo, reported to the Doge on 20 February, 1595 that about 24,000 Tatars had entered Wallachia, earlier in the month, and had been permitted to journey unmolested for two days before they suffered a terrible massacre at the hands of the Vlach and Hungarian troops of the Voivode Michael. This surprise attack caused the Tatars to flee back across the Danube whence they had come.<sup>1</sup> Another report gave fuller details of this clash and revealed that the Tatars had entered Wallachia in two separate forces from Nicopolis. When the Tatars recrossed the Danube at Ruschuk they encountered Mustafa Pasha who was on his way to Moldavia to install the Voivode Bogdan.<sup>2</sup> The latter was to replace Aaron, who had revolted. In consideration of a generous gift from the new voivode, Ġāzī Girāy detached some 4,000 Tatars, under the leadership of one of his sons, to aid the cause of the

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<sup>1</sup> Venier to the Doge (20 Feb. 1595), Hurmuzaki, IV/2, pp. 188-189; and also Voivode Aaron to Zamoyski (15 Feb. 1595), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, p. 341.

<sup>2</sup> It was now that Ġāzī Girāy, who had received a wound from an arquebus, was treated by a barber in Silistria. Marco Venier, Bailo, to the Doge, (6 March, 1595), Hurmuzaki III, p. 469 and IV, p. 189.

voivode.<sup>1</sup> Behind the scenes both voivodes, new and old, were intriguing to remain in favour with the Sultan. This is perhaps why Aaron permitted the Khan free passage through to the Dnieper. Sigismund Bathory, however, continued to exert pressure on Michael of Wallachia and on Aaron of Moldavia to maintain the struggle against the Sultan.<sup>2</sup> Aaron was able to defeat the forces of Bogdan and Muṣṭafa Pasha and he remained in power until May when he was driven out by Stefan VIII, Razvan who was voivode only from May, 1595 to August, 1595.<sup>3</sup>

The Khan seems to have spent the months of March through September, 1595, in the Crimea.<sup>4</sup> By then it had become evident to the Ottomans that, if something was not done to stop the spread of Transylvanian influence in Moldavia, they would find it difficult even to receive help overland from the Tatars. The Grand Vezir Sinān Pasha was busy in Wallachia. In Hungary the Imperial forces, during the summer of 1595,

<sup>1</sup> Dispatch of Simḥon Genga from Alba Julia to his brother, Joan, ambassador of Sigismund Bathory in Rome, in A. Veress, "Campania Creștinilor in contra Lui Sinan Pașa din 1595", Academia Română, Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice, III/IV (Bucharest, 1925), pp. 33-35 (Hereafter cited as Veress, Academia Română)., Cf. also the Ottoman report of the meeting of Gāzī Giray and Muṣṭafa Pasha, Peçewī, II, pp. 158 and 159. In a letter of Marini Pauly to Prague (28 April, 1595) it was reported that this son of the Khan was killed, Cf. Varess, Documente, IV, p. 207.

<sup>2</sup> Veress, ibid. Voivode Aaron had been the protege of Kōja Sinān Pasha. Bogdan was the new appointee of Ferhād Pasha who had replaced Sinān Pasha as Grand Vezir. Cf. Peçewī, II, pp. 158-159.

<sup>3</sup> Peçewī, ibid. Munejjimbāšī, III, p. 573; Iorga-McCabe, p. 268; Seton-Watson, p. 63. Stefan Razvan, captain of Aaron's Hungarian guard, had been instrumental in bringing about the arrest and banishment of Aaron to Hungary. When Stefan Razvan then declared himself voivode, he had the full support of Michael and Sigismund Bathory. Jorga, G.O.R., III, p. 307.

<sup>4</sup> Isthuanfi (pp. 671-672) mentions that the Khan had defended the Crimea against a Tatar attack in August of 1595.

attacked the fortress of Gran and eventually forced its capitulation.<sup>1</sup> The forces of Sigismund Bathory also besieged the fortress of Temesvar, but to no avail. In short, most of the Ottoman forces were pinned down and only the Khan could come to the assistance of the Porte. Ġāzī Girāy, however, now played for larger stakes. He had already sought control over the Wallachian and Moldavian principalities.<sup>2</sup> The Sultan or the Grand Vezir may have made some vague promises in this direction, for the Khan at last moved into action. While the Grand Vezir was withdrawing from Wallachia, he received word from the Khan that he had quieted the Re'āyā in Moldavia. Now the Khan sought a specific declaration of his rights in Moldavia, but this ambition was thwarted by a directive from the Sultan.<sup>3</sup>

By August, 1595, the Poles, having heard that the Ottomans and Tatars were on the march again, had mobilized their forces. They did not view with pleasure the extension of Habsburg influence into Transylvania and from there into Wallachia and Moldavia, nor did the Poles want to see the Danubian principalities turned into Ottoman Provinces.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Peçewī, II, p. 178 ff.

<sup>2</sup>The Khan was reported to have begun to cross the delta of the Dnepr with his troops around the first of July. Jeremia Movila to Sigismund III of Poland (1 July, 1595), Hurmuzaki Suppl. II/I, p. 343. But the Khan, however, only took up action in October (Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, pp. 352-353). Thus if these reports are to be believed, the Khan lingered along the border area for at least two months.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Peçewī, II, p. 147; Kātib Çelebī, I, pp. 61-62; and Hofdiener to Sigismund Bathory (October, 1595), Hurmuzaki, III, pp. 252-253.

<sup>4</sup>Jacobus Francus, p. 90, Jōrga, G.O.R., III, p. 313.

Only gradually does any Ottoman plan come to light. It would seem that Sinān Pasha was supposed to make short work of the Wallachians while the Khan was to deal likewise with Moldavia. Thereafter one or both of these forces would have marched into Transylvania.<sup>1</sup> Michael and Sigismund had of course foiled the Ottomans by withdrawing to the mountains until their adversaries went into winter quarters. In Moldavia, meanwhile, the Polish forces led by the Chancellor, Jan Zamoyski, checked the Tatar bid to take over Moldavia. Later, after his debacle at Giurgiu bridge, Sinān Pasha put the blame on the Khan, saying that he had received no support from him.<sup>2</sup> There was probably some truth in his claim. The Khan had not seen fit to enter the *mêlée* until October, 1595. It may be, however, that he had agreed with Zamoyski to stay out of Moldavia. By October, the Khan probably felt that events were going well enough in Wallachia to permit him to take some risks in relation to the Poles.<sup>3</sup> The Khan and his brother, Feth Girāy, the Kalgay, arrived at Tehine and were regally received by their relative

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<sup>1</sup>Hofdiener to Sigismund Bathory, loc.cit.

<sup>2</sup>Sagredo, V, pp. 45-46; Jorga, III, p. 316.

<sup>3</sup>The fortress of Giurgiu did not fall into Michael's hands until 31 October, 1595. Munejjimbāšī, III, pp. 585-586. Cf. Venier to the Doge (15 September, 1595), Hurmuzaki, IV/2, p. 205, concerning the reluctance of the Tatars to participate that year.

Ahmed Beg, the Sanjak Beg of Tehine (Bender) and Kilia.<sup>1</sup> The Khan now joined his forces with those of the Beg and marched into Moldavia. He apparently intended to put the Beg on the throne of Moldavia and then proceed into Transylvania.<sup>2</sup> In a despatch of Zamoyski to King Sigismund III, the succeeding events are clearly spelled out. The Khan advanced to the lines of the Polish forces which were placed near the juncture of the Cecora (Tutora) and the Prut rivers. Neither army wanted a full-scale conflict. Thus, after a brief sham battle with only a few casualties, negotiators from both sides met and concluded an agreement. Zamoyski had stipulated that Jeremia Movila, a member of an old Moldavian family, would have to be appointed Hospodar of Moldavia, that no damage be suffered by Moldavia or Poland and that the Tatars evacuate Moldavia within three days. Ahmed Agā, the chief negotiator for the Khan, much to the surprise of Zamoyski, accepted these stipulations upon the undertaking of the chancellor to eliminate the Zaporozhian Cossack raids on Tatar territory. The agreement of

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<sup>1</sup>R. Heidenstein (Vitae J. Zamoyscii, pp. 117-121) reports that Ahmed Beg was the son of the Khan's sister.

<sup>2</sup>Statement of a Serbian prisoner, Dimitrasko (17 October, 1595), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, pp. 352-353. This is confirmed in a letter of "Siaban Bascha", chief vezir of the Khan to Jeremia (16 September 1595), Veress, Documente Privitoare, IV, pp. 273-274. The letter reveals that Jeremia had twice sought the standards of investiture from the Khan and Sinan Pasha but without success. The vezir "Siaban", however, encourages Jeremia to continue seeking the post and he will act as mediator.

Cecora was concluded on 22 October, 1595.<sup>1</sup>

Now that the Poles and Tatars had driven Stefan Razvan, the Transylvanian protege, from the office of voivode, Zamoyski attempted to smooth over the wrath of Prince Sigismund, who was related to the Polish king. He excused the action which he had taken in regard to Moldavia on the grounds that he was merely restraining the Tatar forces. In actuality, he and the Khan had agreed to a kind of joint tributary protectorate over Moldavia, an agreement which had received the blessing of the Sultan.<sup>2</sup> After the successes of Michael in Wallachia became common knowledge, the chancellor withdrew to Polish territory in November, possibly out of fear of being attacked, but more probably because of the lateness of the season. The Tatars took up winter quarters around Tehine, Akkerman and Kilia, a fact which indicates how little the Khan trusted the situation.<sup>3</sup> At this juncture it became known that King Sigismund was displeased with the action that his chancellor had taken at Cecora. After all, had not his relative Sigismund Bathory driven the Ottomans

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<sup>1</sup>Zamoyski to Sigismund III (24 October, 1595), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/1, pp. 357-358. According to another document, the Khan had also given up his right to demand tribute or damages from Poland. Hurmuzaki, VIII, p. 196. Decsi (pp. 203-204) denies this. Cf. also, in this regard, the letter of the Khan to King Sigismund III, N. Reusner, *Epistolae Turcicae* XIV, p. 161. For information about a Cossack raid on Kaffa in September, which may have delayed the coming of the Tatars, see Letter of E. Barton (20 September, 1595), Cotton M.S., Nero B XI, Brit. Mus., f. 215a. Cf. also, Jorga, *G.O.R.* III, pp. 317-318 and Isthvanfi, *loc.cit.*

<sup>2</sup>Filip Pigafetta to Belizar Vinta, grand chancellor to the Duke of Tuscany (18 October, 1595), Veress, *Academia Româna*, III/IV, pp. 34-52. Pigafetta was secretary to Capt. Piccolomini, commander of a group of Tuscan crusaders serving under Michael.

<sup>3</sup>Pigafetta to Vinta (14 November, 1595); Veress, *Academia Româna*, II/IV, pp. 61-64.

beyond the Danube! Would not an alliance between Hungary, Transylvania, Wallachia, Moldavia and Poland now be appropriate? These were some of the thoughts of the Polish king as he discussed the problems with his Báthory relatives. Meanwhile, King Sigismund received a strongly-worded letter from his cousin, the Prince of Transylvania, reproaching him for interfering with Christian successes over the Ottomans.<sup>1</sup>

After the honeymoon year, a new tendency was beginning to appear along the Danube. Moldavia was now once more in Ottoman hands. The standards from the Sultan recognizing Jeremia Movila as voivode of Moldavia arrived from the Porte in December. Sigismund Báthory had not, as yet, given up the idea of sponsoring Stefan Razvan again in a new campaign into Moldavia with the help of Michael. But Poland was now, if not friendly, at least more cooperative with the Ottomans; the ambitions of the voivode of Transylvania and Wallachia were becoming apparent. These ambitions could become the prelude to Habsburg encroachments in the Principalities, they might upset the position of the buffer states to such an extent that the Ottomans might turn the Danubian Principalities into Beglerbegliks.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Pigafetta to Vinta (14 November, 1595), Veress, loc.cit; also, document of 2 December, 1595, Hurmuzaki, IV/2, p. 209.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Venier to the Doge (2 December, 1595), Hurmuzaki, II, pp. 496-497; the same (14 December) ibid, IV/2, p. 210; and Pigafetta to Vinta (26 November, 1595), Veress, Academia Română, III/IV, pp. 66-67.



The Crimean Tatars, in their turn, although they had commenced their activities late in the season, had generally served to stabilise a very fluid situation in Moldavia by the Peace of Cecora with Poland. But the Khan was not pleased. Already towards the end of 1595, there is a suggestion that the Khan is ready to play the role of a neutral power in subsequent conflicts in consideration of appropriate gifts and grants of money from the Christians. According to one observer, the Khan felt that he could no longer support the tyranny of the Sultan and his chief dignitaries.<sup>1</sup> The Khan, at a time when his popularity and importance were beginning to be significant, had aroused the jealousies of certain personalities close to the Sultan. Sinan Pasha had harmed the position of the Khan considerably at the Porte by placing blame upon him for the mismanaged Wallachian campaign.<sup>2</sup> These were some of the developments at the end of the year which would lead to the dismissal of the Khan in 1596.

The year 1595 proved disastrous for Ottoman strategy and morale. The great border fortress of Gran had fallen and the Christian principalities of Transylvania and Wallachia had successfully kept the Otto-

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<sup>1</sup> Mariani to Bonocolto (ca. October-November, 1595), Hurmuzaki, III, p.215.

<sup>2</sup> By January of 1596 it became a very serious question of face saving with the old Pasha. He manipulated the factions and he particularly aroused the suspicions of the Porte by insinuating that there was danger of collusion between the Khan, the Poles and the Voivode of Moldavia against the Ottoman State. Venier to the Doge (12 January, 1596), Hurmuzaki, IV/2, pp. 211-212.

mans at bay, thus leaving a great wedge of territory on the Ottoman flank in enemy hands. The two most pressing problems, army morale and the strength of the principalities of Transylvania and Wallachia had to be reckoned with. For the sake of morale it was decided that the Sultan must unfurl the sacred banner of the Prophet and head the campaign in person. As for the problem of the principalities, the frontal attack of 1595 had failed; the difficulties of terrain, the mountains and the forests, had played into the hands of the skilful leadership of Voivode Michael. To check such successes the Ottomans decided to strike at a most vulnerable spot indeed, the area of the main supply route between the Habsburg lands and Transylvania. The main objective for this campaign became the fortress of Erlau (Egri), which was situated close to the narrow corridor of land through which ran the communications between Austria and Transylvania.

Meanwhile certain changes had taken place in the Ottoman government. Kōja Sinān Pasha had been dismissed on 16 Rabi' I, 1004/19 November, 1595, after his defeat at Giurgiu. When his successor to the Grand Vezirate, Lālā Mehemmed Pasha, died only one month later, Sinān Pasha returned to the office for the fifth and last time; he died on 5 Sha'ban, 1004/4 April, 1596. Ibrahīm Pasha now became Grand Vezir. By 15 Zī'l Hijje, 1004/16 August, 1596, the main army camped before Belgrade. At this point some dignitaries expressed their preference for a campaign against the Emperor's forces <sup>who were camped</sup> north of Pest, but the majority held out for the move into upper Transylvania. Erlau fell to the Ottomans on 19 Şefer, 1005/12 October, 1596 before the Imperial

forces could come to its relief. Now, however, as the Ottomans turned towards the swampy Plain of Mező-Keresztes (Hāç Ovasī) they ran into the Imperial Army which had fortified itself behind Tāburs (rings of wagons). The mobility of the Ottoman forces was greatly reduced because the Habsburg forces had control of the passes through the swamps. The Ottomans, pushed to the last extremity, made one final desperate assault in which the third Vezir, Çigāla-zāde Sinān Pasha, played a prominent role. The Imperialists were now routed and driven into the swamps. Çigāla-zāde, as a reward for his timely services, was now appointed Grand Vezir, a post he held for only a little more than a month, Rabī' I - Rabī' II, 1005/October-December, 1596.<sup>1</sup>

Sigismund Bathory had, during the winter of 1595-96, betaken himself to Prague where he received some money, troops and supplies from the Emperor and representatives of the Pope. The Transylvanian prince had also encouraged another invasion of Moldavia under the leadership of his protégé, <sup>Stephen</sup> ~~Sefer~~ Razvan, in December, 1595, after Zamoyski had returned to Poland. The Poles, however, who had been watching the development of close ties between Transylvania and the Habsburgs, had left <sup>troops</sup> with Jeremia ~~troops~~ which had defeated and executed Razvan.<sup>2</sup> The Poles occupied Moldavia again during the campaign

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Peçewī, II, pp. 188-206; Munejjimbaşı, III, pp. 586-592. During this engagement the very tent of the Sultan was under attack for a time. Had it not been for the steady influence of Hōja Sa'd al Dīn, the preceptor of the Sultan, the latter might have fled, or have been captured. See also, Hammer, VII, pp. 325-326 and 329.

<sup>2</sup>Campana, <sup>Historia del Mondo.</sup> 41b-42a; Seton-Watson, p. 64; Jorga-McCabe, p. 151 and Jorga, III, p. 313.

season of 1596.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile, Michael himself had been hard pressed by a sudden invasion of Ottomans and Tatars in February or March. The intent of the Ottomans was to put Radu, the son of the former Voivode Mihnea II (1585-1591) into the voivodeship of Wallachia. Michael, catching the drift of events, and perhaps fearing that the extensive preparations for the Erlau campaign were intended for him, petitioned the Porte to accept him back into the Ottoman fold. At the Porte some of the great dignitaries, among them the late Grand Vezir, Sinān Pasha, had supported the project of replacing Michael with a reliable vassal. After the death of Sinān Pasha, Ibrāhīm Pasha, now raised to the Grand Vezirate, and the preceptor of the Sultan, Hōja Sa'd al Dīn, were able to have Michael's submission accepted by the Sultan on the condition that he send to the Porte one of his sons as a hostage. This was an important expedient while the Sultan was on the plains of Northern Hungary.<sup>2</sup> The first definite word concerning the whereabouts of Ġazī Girāy came from Jeremia Movila. On 12 August, 1596, Jeremia reported to King Sigismund

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<sup>1</sup> The Poles may have been prompted to <sup>take</sup> action by information that the Cossacks planned another invasion of Moldavia. Cf. Potocki to Zamoyski (19 April, 1596), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, p. 385. The main reason for their reoccupation of a portion of Moldavia, however, was to prevent the same action by the Tatars.

<sup>2</sup> Venier to the Doge (10 February, 1596), Hurmuzaki, III, p. 504; also Despatch of an unknown (2 March, 1596), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, pp. 378-379; Oertelius, p. 304; Hammer, VII, pp. 319-320; Iorga-McCabe, p. 268.

III that the Khan was known to have celebrated the Kurbān Bayramī or festival of sacrifice on 10 Zī'l Hijje, 1004/5 August, 1596 at Perekop in the Crimea. In this despatch the Voivode speculated that the Khan would soon thereafter begin his march to Tehine (Bender).<sup>1</sup> Actually shortly after this date a large movement of Crimean Tatars took place. Voivode Jeremia on the 28 August, 1596, reported to the Grand Chancellor Zamoyski that he expected the Tatars of Tehine (Bender) at the end of the week. The Voivode Michael relayed a similar message from Jeremia to Prince Sigismund Bathory and asked for troops.<sup>2</sup> The Khan himself had written Jeremia Movila that he was coming with a very large army.<sup>3</sup> This force was in fact a large body of men led by the Khan and the Kalğay Feth Girāy, the latter of whom was destined to play an important role in the battle of Mezo-<sup>"</sup>Keresztes. It would appear, however, from the evidence of a few meagre reports that, while the troops under Feth Girāy were hastening to assist the Sultan in Hungary, the Khan himself

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<sup>1</sup>Jeremia to Sigismund III (12 August, 1596), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, p. 394.

<sup>2</sup>Jeremia to Zamoyski (28 August, 1596), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, pp. 395-396 and Michael to Prince of Transylvania (5 September, 1596), Hurmuzaki, III, pp. 275-276.

<sup>3</sup>Zamoyski to Radziwill (6 September, 1596), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, p. 398.

remained in Wallachia ravaging the countryside.<sup>1</sup> On 20 December, 1596, Ġazī Girāy wrote Jeremia Movila regarding the exchange of prisoners.<sup>2</sup>

The most significant event of the year 1596 for the Crimean Tatars was the deposition of Ġazī Girāy. How far this political move was a development arising out of the insubordination and the grandiose schemes of the Khan and how far out of intrigues at the Porte is difficult to determine. Both factors had no doubt some bearing on the actual decision to depose the Khan, but the performances of Feth Girāy and Ġigāla-zāde Sinān Pasha at Mezo-Keresztes did much to turn the balance against Ġazī Girāy. At Mezo-Keresztes the Sultan, upon initial contact with the enemy, had ordered Feth Girāy to seek out the Imperial forces and report on their strength. When the Sultan received this report, he realised that the Infidels had assembled a very large army indeed.<sup>3</sup> In truth, the battle of Mezo-Keresztes (Hāç Ūvasī) was destined to be the only significant field battle of the war and was to be ranked by the Ottomans alongside such famous victories as Mohacs and Chaldiran.<sup>4</sup> At a critical

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<sup>1</sup>Fugger Report (30 October, 1596), Hurmuzaki, III, p. 271 and Jeremia to King Sigismund III (25 November, 1596), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, p.405. According to Jorga (III, p. 321), this Tatar incursion into Wallachia was only the first of several attempts to put the brother of Jeremia, Simeon Movila, into the voivodeship of Wallachia. Of course Poland would have acquiesced in this for the Movila brothers owed their prominence to Polish support.

<sup>2</sup>Ġazī Girāy to Jeremia (20 December, 1596), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, p.408.

<sup>3</sup>Peçewī, II, p. 197.

<sup>4</sup>Hammer, VII, p. 329.

stage in the conflict, the Tatars were able to attack the Imperial forces at the rear of their Tabūr and with this diversionary action to draw off a sufficient number of enemy troops to enable the advancing Ottomans to push back the ranks of the enemy.<sup>1</sup> Feth̄ Girāy had served the Ottoman cause well and in recognition of this he was appointed the new Khan of the Crimean Tatars by Ğigālāzāde Sinān Pasha when he became Grand Vezir in late October.<sup>2</sup>

Feth̄ Girāy, a good soldier and rather less ambitious than Ğāzī Girāy, made a good impression on many of his contemporaries. The Kalgay at first refused the post of Khan saying that it rightfully belonged to his elder brother. With the insistence of the Grand Vezir and other dignitaries, however, he reluctantly accepted.<sup>3</sup> It was a fateful step. The general lines of the ensuing conflict between the two brothers is fairly clear. Ğāzī Girāy, after his incursion into Wallachia, returned to the Crimea where he learned of his deposition in early November. The former Khan had every advantage for he occupied the home territory. Feth̄ Girāy did not even have too large a force at his command in Hungary, 20,000 Tatars at most. Another factor favoured Ğāzī Girāy:

<sup>1</sup> Munejjimbāṣī, III, p. 591. For a plan of this battle, see Wilhelm Dilich, Ungarische Chronica (Cassel, 1609), pp. 297-299.

<sup>2</sup> Peçewī, II, p. 205; Munejjimbāṣī, III, pp. 591-593.

<sup>3</sup> Maḥammed Riza, pp. 108-109. At least one Turkish historian has suggested that an old enmity existed between Ğigālāzāde Sinān Pasha and Ğāzī Girāy from the days when both of them assisted 'Osman Pasha in the taking of Tebriz in 1585. See Chapter II above, p. 200.

The Sultan, hard-pressed as he was in the war, could not afford to detach a strong troop to aid Feth Girāy in unseating the former Khan. But Feth Girāy Khan had his friends in the Crimea. He had appointed the former Nūr al Dīn, Baht Girāy, the son of 'Ādil Girāy, to the rank of Kalgay and Selāmet Girāy, his brother and future Khan, to be Nūr al Dīn.<sup>1</sup> As each of these relatives came into new positions of prominence, their traditional supporters and kin fell into line and helped to produce a strong pro-Feth Girāy faction. Meanwhile Çigālazāde was dismissed from office in December of 1596. Shortly thereafter, Grand Vezir Ibrāhīm Pasha<sup>wished to</sup> reinstated Ġāzī Girāy as Khan<sup>if he met</sup> under certain conditions. Ġāzī Giray, meanwhile, had decided to go to the capital to plead his case. He boarded a vessel for Istanbul but before embarking he met Çerkes Hāndan Ağā, Muteferriķa Başī (~ head of a special guard to the Sultan) who had been sent to settle the squabble over the Khanship. He was directed to give the mukarrernāme (letter of confirmation) of the Sultan to the brother who appeared to have the largest following. Hāndan Ağā, an old friend of Ġāzī Girāy, gave the mukarrernāme to him. But Feth Girāy had influential friends at the Porte who were able to have an Imperial patent (Haṭṭ-i Şerif) issued declaring that he was the rightful Khan.

In the end, because the passions of the two factions had been raised to such a high pitch, it became necessary for the interested parties to settle the dilemma by having recourse to the legal institutions of the realm. Now each contender for the Khanship submitted his credentials to the highest judge in the Crimea, the Kāzī of Kaffa,

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<sup>1</sup>Muhammed Riza, pp. 108-109.



'Abd al Raḥman Efendi, for his decision. The Kāzī pronounced in favour of Feth Girāy on the grounds that the Haṭṭ-i Şerīf pertaining to Feth Girāy was more valid than the muḥarrername of Ġāzī Girāy because the Haṭṭ bore the signature of the Sultan. His decision, however, became subject to the opinion and confirmation of the Muftī of Kaffa, highest authority on Muslim Law in the Crimea, who, apart from being a supporter of Ġāzī Girāy, was able to throw out the decision of the Kāzī on the basis of a technicality. The Muftī, Mevlanā Azakī, brought to the attention of the Kāzī and the assembled dignitaries that while what the Kāzī had stated was correct, only the patent of Ġāzī Girāy carried the Tūgrā or seal of the Sultan and, as the Tūgrā was the great seal upon which the administration of the empire depended, anyone who failed to obey Ġāzī Girāy was committing sedition against the Sultan. This settled the issue, Ġāzī Girāy became Khan for the second time some three or four months after his dismissal (ca. February, 1597).<sup>1</sup> Now Feth Girāy, who had been summoned to the Porte, came to do homage to his brother, but Ġāzī Girāy had him executed and all of his sons put to death.<sup>2</sup> The entire affair only served to heighten the feelings of insecurity which

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<sup>1</sup> Hasanbegzāde, Tārīh-i Al-i 'Osman, Istanbul, Nūr-u Osmaniyye Ktp. Ms. No. 3105-06.

<sup>2</sup> Decsi (De rebus hungaricus), pp. 284-285) provides some interesting details about this event. He states that although Feth Girāy had been summoned to the Porte with promises that he would be re-installed as Khan, Feth actually heard that he was to be killed by order of the Sultan. He thus made plans to flee to "uscovy and it was then that he and his Hungarian wife ("e nobili Ungarorum ad Munkacsium Moricziorum gente procreata") and all his children were killed.

the Khan felt toward the <sup>P</sup>orte and indeed toward many of his own people.<sup>1</sup> The position of Kalgay now fell to the brother of the Khan, Selāmet Girāy, and that of Nūr al Dīn to a son of Saʿdet Girāy, Devlet Girāy.

It appears, also, that about the time of these political changes in the Crimea the Khan published a decree calling on each household to set aside <sup>annually</sup> twelve sheep and a certain sum of money to enable him to establish a unit of 500 arquebusiers. Perhaps this is further proof of the insecurity of the Khan; it most certainly reflects the growing <sup>awareness of the Khan concerning the</sup> importance of hand guns and other firearms in the warfare of the late sixteenth century.<sup>2</sup>

As a postscript to the warfare, the intrigues and the counter-intrigues of the year 1596, it is worth recalling that Ġazī Girāy Khan had to win and retain the respect of his overlord, the Sultan; he had also to keep in the good graces of the faction closest to the Sultan. This faction included first and foremost, Safiyye Hānum, favourite wife of the late Sultan Murād III and the mother (Vālide Sultan) of Sultan Meḥemmed III. After her, Hōja Saʿd al Dīn, the preceptor of the Sultan, and Ġazanfer Ağā, the Kapī Ağāsī of the court

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<sup>1</sup>Muḥammad Rīzā, pp. 108-109; Peçewī, II, pp. 205-206; Munejjimbāšī, III, pp. 591-594; Soranzo, L'Ottomano, pp. 91-92.

<sup>2</sup>Kazimirski, "Précis...", J.A., Ser. II/XII, pp. 431-43=.

had the Sultan's ear. While Sultan Mehemmed was on campaign, the influence of Hoja Sa'd al Dīn and Ġazanfer Ağā naturally increased. This was ominous for Ġāzī Girāy, for he had been a friend of the late Sultān Murād III and hence could be expected to retain much of his influence at court through the good offices of the Vālide Sultān.<sup>1</sup> Ġāzī Girāy Khan, of course, by refusing to go on campaign in person and by intriguing for his own benefit in the Principalities must have alienated any support he may have had among the closest advisers of the Sultān. Viewed in this light the appointment of Ġigalazāde Sinān Pasha, a protégé of the Hoja and the Ağā, to the post of Grand Vezir and the subsequent removal of Ġāzī Girāy from the post of Khan did not seem too surprising, any more than did his reinstatement under Ibrāhīm Pasha, supported as the latter was by the Vālide Sultān.

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<sup>1</sup>E. Rossi, "La Sultana 'Mūr Bānu' (Cecilia Venier-Baffo), moglie di Selīm II (1566-1574) e Madre di Murād III (1574-1595", Oriente Moderno (1953), pp. 433-441.

4. The End of the Hungarian War and of the Rebellion  
in the Tributary Principalities.

After the fall of Erlau, the war in Hungary became a series of sieges and counter-sieges. Towards the close of the war, Transylvania and Wallachia returned to the Ottoman allegiance - a factor which had a decisive effect in bringing the hostilities in Hungary to an end. The Crimean Tatars, particularly at moments when their Khan, Ġāzī Girāy, was leading them in person, continued to play a not unimportant role in the Hungarian campaigns and in the constantly changing patterns of intrigue within the three principalities.

The Prince of Transylvania, Sigismund Báthory, in a long letter to the Emperor Rudolph II, put forward a campaign plan for the Christian armies in 1597. The Imperial forces of upper Hungary and the armies in Transylvania and Wallachia should hold back until the Turks and Tatars had committed themselves. If the Ottomans chose to continue the war in Hungary, then the forces of Wallachia and Transylvania would best serve the common cause by an attack on the vital Danube line. If, however, the main attack came through the Danubian principalities, then the Christians must make a united stand against the Ottoman advance. Finally, if the Ottomans advanced on Hungary and the Tatars remained at home, then the Wallachians and the Transylvanian forces would have to maintain a separate watch on their borders.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Veress, Documente, V, pp. 57-58.

The views thus expressed by Sigismund Bathory place in low relief some of the weak and strong points of both adversaries. Neither side could provide or arm enough men to knock out the other. The line of the Danube must, at all costs, be defended by the Ottomans as the most feasible way of transporting supplies and ordinance to the Hungarian front. To the Christian powers it was essential that this route be disrupted, whenever and wherever it was possible.

The year 1597 was uneventful in the war in Hungary. The Grand Vezir, Ibrāhīm Pasha, feeling that his personal presence at the Porte was necessary, appointed Saṭūrjī Meḥemmed Pasha to be commander-in-chief of the Ottoman forces in Hungary. Saṭūrjī Meḥemmed Pasha, however, accomplished very little. He recovered Totis, a minor fortress which had fallen to the Habsburgs, and then moved in the direction of Gran. An unexpected revolt of the Janissaries brought the operation of the Serdār to an end. At this time Saṭūrjī Meḥemmed entered into negotiations with Habsburg representatives on an island in the Danube opposite Waitzen (Vac<sup>✓</sup>). The talks proved fruitless and not long afterwards the Ottoman forces returned to their winter quarters. Saṭūrjī Meḥemmed, when upbraided for his inactivity, placed the blame for the uneventful campaign upon the failure of the Tatar Khan to appear in the field.<sup>1</sup> The Sultan now deposed Ibrāhīm Pasha from the office of Grand Vezir and appointed

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<sup>1</sup>Peçewī, II, pp. 206-209; Hammer, VII, pp. 339-346.

the eunuch, Ḥasan Pasha, in his stead (23 Rabi' I, 1006/3 November, 1597). The new Grand Vezir, although aware that the Sultan Vālide was in large measure responsible for the fall of his predecessor as well as for the rise of his own star, came into conflict with another member of the faction dependent on the Vālide Sultan, Ġazanfer Agā, The Kāpi Agāsī. Henceforth, the preceptor of the Sultan, Hōja Sa'd al Dīn, Ġazanfer Agā himself and Turnākjīzāde, Agā of the Janissaries, intrigued for his removal from office. He was deposed on 8 April, 1598 and replaced by the second Vezir, Jeršāh Meḥemmed Pasha, a feat made all the easier upon the arrival of news that the Imperial forces had retaken the great fortress of Raab on 29 March, 1598.<sup>1</sup> As usual, the Ottoman forces, in this same year did not assemble until after moving in July to Beeskerek, a town 18 kilometres northwest of Tamesvar. Saṭūrjī Meḥemmed waited there forty-five days, until he was joined by the Crimean Khan at the end of August. While the Imperial forces operated against the Ottomans, at the beginning of October, began a siege of the star-shaped fortress of Varazdin (Grass Wardein) situated in Transylvania.<sup>2</sup> When it became evident to the Serdār that the Christian threat to Buda was serious, he raised the siege of Varazdin and made an effort to relieve Buda. The autumn rains, however, had begun in earnest. "Every river and

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<sup>1</sup> Hammer, VII, pp. 340-345.

<sup>2</sup> For a drawing of this fortress see Varesse, Documente, V, p. 195.

every ravine had turned into a torrent, forcing upon the Ottoman army an excessive amount of bridge building and ferrying activities. The journey from Gyula to Szolnok, which ordinarily would have taken three days, now took the army twelve. Short of rations, exhausted by the siege and the fatigue of the journey, the troops revolted at Szolnok, compelling<sup>the</sup>/Serdār to return to Belgrade and take up winter quarters there. Fortunately for the Ottomans, the inclement weather also took its toll of the Imperial forces; they too found it necessary to withdraw to their own frontiers. The Khan and his forces had to spend the winter in Zombar and Szegedin. Towards the close of the year (8 December, 1598) the Grand Vezir Jerrāḥ Meḥammed Pasha and the Serdār Saṭūrjī Meḥammed Pasha were removed from office. Ibrāhīm Pasha now became Grand Vezir and Serdār once more.<sup>1</sup>

During the spring of the following year, while the Grand Vezir was marching to Belgrade in order to assume command of his forces, word came to the Sultan and his Vezir that Saṭūrjī Meḥammed Pasha, a close friend of the Khan, had conferred upon Gāzī Girāy the governorship and revenues of Silistria. Such an appointment was subject, however, to the confirmation of the Sultan, whose reaction was immediate. He sent Ṭarnākjī Ḥasan, the Agā of the Janissaries, to the headquarters of Saṭūrjī Meḥammed at Hisarjīk near Belgrade with an Imperial decree (Ḥaṭṭ-i Şerif) for the death of the former Serdār. He was executed on the spot.

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<sup>1</sup>Peçewī, II, pp. 209-223; Hammer, VII, pp. 343-349.

When Ġazī Girāy heard of the death of his friend, throughout the remainder of the campaign season the Khan refused to enter into cordial relations with the Grand Vezir, whom he distrusted. After another uneventful season, notable only for further unsuccessful negotiations with the Imperialists, the Grand Vezir assigned his troops to winter quarters. The Khan returned to the Crimea with a considerable portion of his troops.

The year 1600 brought an important success to the Ottomans. Ibrāhīm Pasha decided in this year to besiege the swamp-encircled fortress of Kanisza and won a great prize.<sup>1</sup> The Christians in 1601 suffered heavy losses in their unsuccessful attempt to retake Kanisza. They were successful, however, in their capture of Ustūn-i Belgrād (Stuhlweissenburg) on 10 October, 1601. Ibrāhīm Pasha had entered into negotiations with the Archduke Matthias in the effort to find a common basis for peace; such progress as it had been possible to achieve in this direction came to an end with the death of the Grand Vezir on 10 July, 1601. Yemişçi (the Fruiterer), Hasan Pasha, the new Grand Vezir, reached the plain of Semlin before Buda by 6 September; but it was too late in the year to attempt to relieve Stuhlweissenburg. The Ottomans, however, regained this important border stronghold on 29 August, 1602. Yemişçi Hasan Pasha received word that Moses Székely, a former lieutenant of Sigismund Báthory who had gone over to the Ottomans, had obtained notable

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<sup>1</sup> Peçewī, II, pp. 223-235; Hammer, VII, pp. 350-361.



successes against the Imperial forces of Giorgio Basta. The Grand Vezir thus sought to render aid to this Transylvanian supporter of the Ottoman cause. As the Ottoman army crossed the Tisza, however, news that Pest had fallen to the Emperor brought the Ottomans back to the defence of Buda in four days. Too late to save Pest, the army retired to winter quarters on 2 November, 1602. At this time, Ġāzī Girāy, who had been absent from Hungary since 1599, again joined the Ottoman forces only to leave again in the spring without even fighting a campaign.<sup>1</sup>

The war in Hungary for the next two years centred on Buda and Pest. Eventually the Ottomans were able to unseat the Imperial forces from Pest in 1604; Buda, though under heavy attack, never capitulated.

Meanwhile, as one result of the increased momentum of the Counter-Reformation gaining strength from its successes in Inner Austria, the Emperor unwittingly aided the Ottoman cause by putting into effect repressive measures against Protestants in the Imperial army and in Northern Hungary and Transylvania.<sup>2</sup> The inhabitants of Transylvania, embittered by the constant ravages of war, the exactions of a fickle prince and the outright occupation, now by Imperial troops and now by Wallachian troops, sought an end to their troubles by supporting Stephan Bocskay, another former lieutenant of Sigismund Báthory. Bocskay, in

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<sup>1</sup> Peçewī, II, pp. 235-252; Hammer, VIII, pp. 5-20.

<sup>2</sup> Rothenberg, p. 61.

turn, sought support for his movement from the Ottomans. The venture proved to be the decisive stroke of the war. Stephan Bocskay, who with Ottoman support drove the Imperial forces out of Transylvania, was crowned Prince of Transylvania on 24 October, 1605, shortly after the reconquest of Gran. In this last major campaign of the war the Ottomans recovered, in addition to Gran, several lesser fortresses including Visegrad, Veszprem and Palota. The advantages, however, were not all on the side of the Ottomans. In Asia Minor the Jelālī revolt still continued to simmer and flare up intermittently and Shah 'Abbās, who had launched a new offensive against the Ottomans in 1603, had succeeded in driving the Ottomans out of most of the territory which the Ottomans had recently so dearly bought. Of particular importance to the climate for peace was the death of Mehmed III in 1603. Now Ahmed I (1603-1617), a mere boy, had assumed the reins of power.<sup>1</sup>

To understand fully the contributions the Tatars made to the events in the closing years of the Hungarian War, one must take one final look at developments in the three principalities. Michael of Wallachia was neutralized in the year 1596 by an attempt on the part of the Tatar Khan to place a rival candidate, Simeon, brother of Voivode Jeremia of Moldavia, into the voivodeship and another attempt by the Ottomans to place Radu Mihnea into the same office. Michael, in

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<sup>1</sup> Peçewî, II, pp. 252-328 passim. Hammer, VIII, pp. 21-114, passim. For a discussion of the wider implications of the Jelālī movement in Asia Minor, see M. Akdağ, "İkinci Celâli İsyanlarının Başlaması (Der Beginn der Celaliden Aufstände)", Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi, IV, pp. 23-50.

order to gain time, had held peace negotiations with the Porte.<sup>1</sup> Sigismund Báthory had joined his troops to those of <sup>the</sup> Archduke Maximilian and had consequently suffered in the slaughter of Mezo-Keresztes. As a result of the Ottoman victory, it is not surprising that both Sigismund Báthory and Michael carried on negotiations with the Ottomans in 1597. In July, Michael actually agreed to a reconciliation with the Porte which, formally at least, lasted until he swore allegiance to the Emperor on 9 June, 1598. Prince Sigismund meanwhile had given up his throne to the Emperor in May, 1598 in exchange for a dominion in the Habsburg realm, only to return to his birthright in August. But neither prince really discontinued diplomatic exchanges with the Ottomans; Michael even paid a token tribute to the Sultan during this period.<sup>2</sup>

In the year 1599, events took a different turn. On 27 March, 1599, Sigismund Báthory, while seeking from the Emperor a new dominion for himself, gave up his princely position to his cousin, Andreas Báthory, a Cardinal of the Church and the Polish Bishop of Ermeland. The new prince wasted no time in establishing diplomatic ties with Moldavia, Poland and the Porte. The Ottomans, however, were very wary of his attempts to alter agreements which had long governed the relations of Transylvania to the Ottoman State. Nevertheless, the trappings of office

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<sup>1</sup>Jorga, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches, III, pp. 319-321.

<sup>2</sup>Jorga, G.O.R. III, pp. 324-327.

for Andreas Báthory were sent by the Sultan on 7 November, but the Ottomans were already too late. Michael had recognized Cardinal Báthory as his overlord on 26 June. When it became clear that the Cardinal could not rule his land, Michael, who had already received the secret support of the Emperor, defeated the Cardinal decisively on 28 October, 1599 near Hermannstadt. The Cardinal was subsequently killed. Now Michael quickly sought and received the tacit support of the Ottomans, a fatal mistake.<sup>1</sup> The Habsburgs obviously were not pleased and soon became even less so when Michael commenced taking cruel repressive measures against the nobility and peasantry of Transylvania. Michael continued his conquests. With a thrust into Moldavia in June, he succeeded in driving Jeremia to the Polish border and having allegiance sworn to him and his son in the principal <sup>Moldavian</sup> cities.

The powers obviously could not continue to acquiesce in the seizures which Michael was making in territories vital to their own interests. Giorgio Basta, encouraged and supplied by the Emperor and drawing troops from the German and Hungarian population, defeated Michael on 18 September, 1600 at Miriszló. At the same time, Grand Chancellor Zamoyski of Poland had marched into Moldavia, re-established Jeremia as voivode and attempted to place Simeon, the brother of Jeremia, into <sup>the</sup> some ~~voivodeship~~ post in Wallachia.<sup>2</sup> After his defeat in Transylvania, Michael had

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<sup>1</sup>Jorga, G.O.R., III, pp. 327-332.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 332.

withdrawn to Wallachia only to be again defeated, this time by the Poles on the Telejean river. The Ottomans, still wishing to install Radu Mihnea, also sent a force into Wallachia and Michael, now almost ~~was forced to retreat~~. He now ~~for support from~~ devoid of troops<sup>1</sup>, betook himself to Prague to plead ~~the justice of~~ ~~his cause before~~ the Emperor. Meanwhile the Transylvanian Diet, which met in Kolozsvár, re-elected Sigismund Báthory as prince on 21 January, 1601. The Emperor Rudolph thus saw that he must patch up the differences between Basta and Michael in order to defeat Prince Sigismund. This done, Michael and Basta won a victory over Prince Sigismund at Nagy - Goroszló on 3 August 1601. Now Sigismund Báthory fled to Moldavia. Michael, hearing of a threat to his family through the machinations of Sigismund Báthory and not really keeping on good terms with Basta, wrote a letter to Sigismund assuring him that he would assist him to regain his principality. In a letter to the Ottoman camp Michael offered to work for the Muslims and reveal all of the enemy secrets. Both letters fell into the hands of Basta, who had Michael executed on 19 August, 1601.<sup>1</sup>

The death of this rebel, however, did not improve the confused situation in the Principalities. Sigismund Báthory again advanced against Basta, but this was to be his last campaign. He had vacillated between Ottoman and Imperial support to such an extent that he had lost most of his followers and could no longer obtain subsidies from anyone. Leaving

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<sup>1</sup>De Bertha, pp. 211-214.

Transylvania for the last time on 26 July, 1602, he urged the estates and the administration to cooperate with Basta. The latter threw his support behind Radu Șerban, whom the followers of Michael had chosen as voivode to oppose Simeon, Movila, the protégé of the Poles and Tatars.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile Moses Székely received an 'Ahdname investing him as Prince of Transylvania. In the Spring of 1603, the latter launched a campaign, ably generalled by Gabriel Bethlen, against Basta and drove him from the province. Upon the advice of Basta, Radu Șerban roused the Sicules population to rebellion and took as his base of operations the Saxon villages which remained loyal to the Emperor. Székely split his troops, sending one wing to suppress the revolt and the other the army of Șerban, but he died in the attempt (July, 1603). The Protestant population of Transylvania, after the difficult rigours of the war, only needed a spark to ignite its passions against the Habsburg occupation. The taking by force of the Protestant cathedral of Kaschau (Kassa) in January, 1604, by the Imperial forces followed by the anti-Protestant Article 22 decree of Emperor Rudolph on 1 May, 1604, provided just such a spark. Stephan Bocskay, maternal uncle of Sigismund Bathory and a Protestant, became the leader of the successful revolt which drove the Habsburgs out of Transylvania. Bocskay also <sup>gained the support</sup> ~~obtained the submission~~ of Radu Șerban, <sup>in exchange for Bocskay's promise to</sup> ~~on the condition that Bocskay would~~ obtain Ottoman recognition <sup>of</sup> ~~for~~ him, as hospodar of Wallachia.

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<sup>1</sup>

De Bertha, pp. 215-216 and Jorga, B.O.R., III, p. 336.

Now the Ottomans recognised Bocskay as prince of Transylvania on 24 October, 1605 and the Emperor, who had recognized Bocskay as early as June of 1605 in the Treaty of Vienna, confirmed his hereditary rights as Prince of Transylvania and also recognised the Sultan's privileged position in Transylvania in the Treaty of Zsitvatorok of 11 November, 1606.<sup>1</sup>

##### 5. The Crimean Tatars and the Final Stages of the Hungarian War

The Crimean Tatars, led by their newly reinstated Khan, Ġazī Girāy, played their own individual role in the last years of the Hungarian War. During the campaign season of 1597, Poland and the three principalities of Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia fully expected the Khan to rejoin the Ottoman forces in Hungary; consequently, they had their frontiers well-guarded and their spies well-placed to determine the direction the Khan might take. In actuality, however, the Khan had no intention of assisting the Sultan in that year.<sup>2</sup> He sent envoys to Jeremia Movila and the King of Poland in May,<sup>3</sup> to Sigismund Bathory in September<sup>4</sup> and to Michael of Wallachia,<sup>5</sup> with the intention of re-establishing personal relations and of gaining whatever advantage he could from them. To Poland the Khan offered an alliance, even perhaps

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<sup>1</sup>Jorga, G.O.R., III, pp. 332-334 and de Bertha, pp. 215-219.

<sup>2</sup>Hammer, VII, p. 341.

<sup>3</sup>Jeremia to Zamoyski (18 May, 1597), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, pp. 417-418.

<sup>4</sup>Lassota to Rudolph II (31 July, 27 August, 30 September, 1597), Veress, Documente Privatoare, V, pp. 80-81, 89, 97-98.

<sup>5</sup>Jeremia to Sigismund III (29 August, 1597), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, pp. 424-425.

an offer of <sup>1</sup>  
~~temporary~~ submission. The Khan sent an embassy to Michael expressly to determine his sincerity and to suggest that Michael send appropriate gifts to him or else suffer a raid much more devastating than the one of 1596.<sup>2</sup> The Poles could not be put at ease. From August until November rumours continued to reach the Chancellor Zamoyski from Jeremia concerning the ~~imminent attack~~ <sup>troop</sup> ~~attack~~ or movements of the Tatars.<sup>3</sup> In Transylvania, the envoys of both the Sultan and the Khan encouraged the Prince to resume his old loyalty to the Porte. The Khan also sought a subsidy. One report also suggested that the Sultan and the Khan wanted the Prince to act as an intermediary to bring about peace between the Emperor and the Sultan. The Prince of Transylvania, wishing to keep open the negotiations, now sent one of his confidential secretaries, Ioannes Bernardfius, and another of his colleagues, Georgius Racz, to the Crimea in the company of the returning Tatar envoys. The party had travelled through Wallachia and Moldavia to the Crimea in the early months of 1598 and after being well-received by the Khan, they started

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<sup>1</sup>Jeremia to Zamoyski (18 May, 1597) and Zamoyski to all Polish nobles (June, 1598). Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, pp. 417-418 and pp. 465-466.

<sup>2</sup>Jeremia to Zamoyski (29 August, 1597), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, pp. 424-425.

<sup>3</sup>Zamoyski to Radziwill (13 August, 1597) and Jeremia to Zamoyski (21 September, 4 October, 26 November, 1597), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, pp. 421, 428, 431 and 437.



again for Transylvania in May.<sup>1</sup> Accompanying Bernardfius on the return journey to Alba Julia which they reached in June were the Tatar legates, Sefer Ağā (X) and Alexander Paleologus.<sup>2</sup> The Tatar envoys stated in the name of their Khan that the letters of Sigismund Bathory had been received and that the Khan was so pleased with the friendship of the Prince that he personally would not go to the assistance of the Ottoman forces until a little before October. The Khan in his letters and through his envoys showed himself to be entirely disillusioned with the Porte. Gāzī Girāy complained that for the sake of the Ottomans he had spent years in Persia languishing in chains, the marks of which still remained on his body, and that, at the conquest of Raab, he had given an example to the rest of the troops. Yet the Ottomans had rewarded him by dismissing him.<sup>3</sup>

The Tatar envoys, in addition to their talks with Sigismund Bathory, met with two Imperial ambassadors, Stephanus Szuchay (Zuhai) and Nicolaus Isthvanfi. Clearly the Khan was already seeking a rapprochement with the Emperor. In his negotiations he appears to be playing the age-old

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<sup>1</sup>Oertelius, p. 383; Lassota, Mustermeister to Emperor Rudolph (26 September, 1597), Veress, Documente Privatoare, V, pp. 97-98; János Decsi, Magyar "istoriaja, 1592-1598 in Monumenta Hungariae Historica, Scriptores, XVII (Pest, 1866), (hereafter cited as Decsi), pp. 323-325.

<sup>2</sup>"...ad legatos Casi Querail Tartarorum Precopensium sive Tauricanorum principis nuncii, Sefersahes et Alexander Paleologus, natkone et religione Graecus,..." Nicolaus Isthvanfi, Historiarum de Rebus Ungaricus Libri XXXIV (Coloniae Agrippinae, 1622) (hereafter cited as Isthvanfi), pp. 725-726; Decsi, loc.cit.

<sup>3</sup>Isthvanfi, ibid.; Decsi, loc.cit.

double role, as go-between for the Sultan and as promoter of his own interests. The Imperial ambassadors found the proposals of <sup>the</sup> Tatar envoys so significant that they proposed to send one of the Tatar envoys on to the Emperor; however, the Tatar envoys proceeded to Wallachia accompanied by the Imperial ambassadors and, after talks with Voivode Michael, they returned to the Crimea with Ioannes Posoniensis (Posony) and Georgius Racz, who delivered a gift to the Khan.<sup>1</sup> The plenipotentiaries to the Khan received clear instructions to consult with the Khan and to urge him to send a reliable envoy to the Emperor to work out the details, if he chose to become an ally of the Christians. Thus the Khan sent Alexander Paleologus to Prague.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile, Tsar Fedor of Muscovy had died on 16 January, 1598 (~~o.s.~~),<sup>3</sup> an event which prompted the Khan to send an embassy to Boris Godunov, the

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<sup>1</sup>Isthvanfi, loc.cit. and Decsi, loc.cit.; the letters of Isthvanfi reveal that the legates had found the Khan to be so well-disposed towards the Christians and so distrustful of the Sultan that they decided to send 10,000 ducats with Posoniensis and Racz to the Khan. One of the Tatar envoys became drunk during a banquet in Wallachia and spoke quite openly of the Khan's good disposition toward the Christians. Isthvanfi to Pezzen (10 June, 1598), Szuchay and Isthvanfi to Emperor Rudolph (12 June, 1598) and Szuchay and Isthvanfi to Baron Rumff (12 June, 1598), Hurmuzaki, III, pp. 289, 292-3.

<sup>2</sup>Instructions of Szuchay and Isthvanfi to Posony and Racz (10 June, 1598), Hurmuzaki, III, pp. 291-292 and Sigismund Bathory to the Emperor (15 August, 1598), Hurmuzaki, III, pp. 300-302.

<sup>3</sup>Solov'ev, VII, p. 323.

new Tsar. The embassy of the Khan, which was headed by a certain 'Alī Mīrzā, was received by the Tsar on <sup>8 July,</sup> ~~29 June,~~ 1598 (~~O.S.~~) at Serpukhov on the Oka, south of Moscow, amidst a great assemblage of Muscovite troops. The grand muster of the army had been prompted by a series of false reports, which began as early as April and which had convinced the Tsar and his councillors that a Tatar attack was imminent. The Tatar representatives, in spite of this bellicose setting, managed to have the treaty renewed. They were then accompanied to the <sup>1</sup> Crimea by an embassy of the Tsar to receive the sworn oath of the Khan. It appears that, in part at least, the informants of the Tsar had mistaken the preparations of the Khan for his march to Hungary for preparations for a raid into Muscovy.

The moment the Khan had received satisfaction in his negotiations with the Emperor and with the Tsar, he began preparations for his march to Hungary. Already, by the end of June, Voivode Jeremia was trying to

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<sup>1</sup>

O. A. Derzhavin, ed., Vremennik Ivana Timofeeva (Moscow-Leningrad, 1951) pp. 224-225 and p. 480; one eye-witness clearly depicts the farcical preparations of the time and concludes "Mais pour finir ceste guerre, il ne se trouva autre ennemy qu'un Ambassadeur avec environ cent hommes vestus de peaux de mouton selon leur coustume, mais tres-bien montez, qui venoient pour traicter quelque accord de la part du Tartare..." Jacques Margérét, Estat de l'Empire de Russie et Grande Duchie de Moscovie (Paris, 1607), p. 8. Cf. also, Karamsin, XI, pp. 10-19 and Solov'ev, VIII, pp. 353-354.

determine the route the Khan was taking. Would he cross the fords of the Dnestr at Tehine (Bendery) or would he cross at Akkerman (Belgorod)? Zamoyski was fearful that the Khan would again pass through Poland en route to Hungary at a time when no funds were available to pay troops to oppose them.<sup>1</sup> In July, Jeremia reported to Zamoyski that the Khan crossed the Dnepr below Berezna (Berezovka?), i.e. by boat across the straits at Ochakov). The Khan had written the Voivode in a predictable fashion. He said that he was no longer pleased with the gifts which Jeremia had sent and, moreover, he was planning an attack on Wallachia. But these were just threats designed to squeeze more tribute from both Wallachia and Moldavia. The Khan was moving quickly. He crossed the Danube at Obloczyce<sup>(sic)</sup> while the Kalgay crossed with his contingent at<sup>nearby</sup> Ismail (Izmail). Quite clearly the Khan planned to go to Hungary along the southern bank of the Danube.<sup>2</sup> Voivode Michael, taking cognizance of this movement of the Tatars, sought money and troops from his nominal overlord, the Prince of Transylvania.<sup>3</sup> The Khan had passed the Danube with his forces between

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<sup>1</sup> Zamoyski to the Polish nobles (June, 1598) and Jeremia to Zamoyski (26 June, 1598), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, pp. 463-466. It is known that the Khan, disappointed with the reception his proposals for close co-operation with Poland had received, had, in turn, treated the Polish ambassador, Piasczynski, rather badly. Jan Herborth to Diet of Wisnicz (October, 1598), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, pp. 503-513.

<sup>2</sup> Jeremia to Zamoyski (11 July, 1598) and Jeremia to Voivode of Braclov (14 July, 1598), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, pp. 467-469.

<sup>3</sup> Michael to<sup>the</sup> Prince of Transylvania (6 July and 11 July, 1598), Hurmuzaki, III, pp. 294-295.

the 12th and the 16th of July. In dispatches to Jeremia and presumably to Michael also, the Khan made it clear that he intended to raid their lands on his return if their "gifts" were unsatisfactory.<sup>1</sup> That the Tatars did not hesitate to live off the land en route to Belgrade is quite clear. A Pasha in Vidin<sup>2</sup> was particularly disturbed at the passing of the Tatars. He complained that Serdār Sāṭūrjī Mehemmed had taken most of his troops for the impending campaign and therefore he was unable to prevent the Tatar depredations.<sup>3</sup> As the Khan approached the Ottoman army ~~which was assembled~~ at Beckserek he was subjected to a great amount of diplomatic pressure from <sup>an</sup> ~~the~~ envoy of Sigismund Báthory, who was in turn carefully instructed by the representatives of the Emperor. Typical of the kind of pressure the Khan received was a letter which reminded him that the Asian provinces of the Sultan were in revolt and thus the Khan had been called upon to negotiate a peace. Furthermore, the letter, pointing to the great stability of the Christian lands, spoke of the impending grand invasion of the Ottoman lands, an invasion in which the

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<sup>1</sup>

Jeremia to Zamoyski (9-10 August, 1598), Hurmuzaki, Supp. II/I, pp. 473 and 476.

<sup>2</sup>This was actually Hāfiz Ahmed Pasha, Beglerbeg of Bosnia, who was ordered to defend the Danube line during the campaign season of 1598. He suffered a significant defeat at Nikbōlī (Nikopol) at the hands of Voivode Michael. Munejjimbaşı, III, p. 598.

<sup>3</sup>Capello to the Doge (8 August, 1598), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. IV/II, p. 228.

Khan, if he joined the Christian league, would be able to keep all of the lands which he himself conquered.<sup>1</sup> The Khan of course had already gone back on his agreement to withhold assistance to the Ottomans until shortly before October. The confidential secretary of Sigismund Báthory, Bernardfius, had, during the course of the negotiations with the Tatars, gained the confidence of both parties. Therefore, in mid-August, he was again sent to the Khan. Before he departed he received detailed instructions, most likely from one of the Imperial commissioners such as Isthvanfi. In brief the Christian terms were to be as follows:

- a. Dalmatia, Croatia, Sclavonia, Transylvania and Wallachia were to come under Christian control;
- b. If the ambassador found the Khan well-disposed towards the Christians then more could be asked for such as Agria (Erlau), Szolnok, even Gyula and Temesvar;
- c. The ambassador should avoid any arrangements for tribute from the above-mentioned lands;
- d. It should be made known to the Khan that he would be rewarded for any favours;
- e. The Khan may also communicate anything he chooses to his legate Alexander Paleologus in Prague who may then communicate with the Emperor;
- f. The envoy, in a private interview with the Khan, was to show him a letter requesting him to repudiate his alliance with the Ottomans and take arms against them or else remain neutral; the longer he remained neutral, the more money the Khan would receive;

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<sup>1</sup>Anonymous to the Khan - in excellent Latin (11 August, 1598), Hurmuzaki, III, pp. 297-298.

- g. Finally, if all other means failed, then the envoy was requested to urge the Khan to use the 10,000 ducats already granted to him to bribe various Vezirs, encouraging them to disrupt the war effort by any means at their disposal.<sup>1</sup>

Prince Sigismund was now well aware of the pending danger to his own land. The Ottoman forces had bridged the Danube at Pancsova (Pančevo)<sup>2</sup> and had marched from Temesvar to Becskerek. In the eyes of Prince Sigismund all Transylvania was threatened.

Before the Khan joined the Ottoman forces near Becskerck at the end of August he had already stipulated that he would not attack the Christians until his envoy, Alexander Paleologus, whom he had sent to Prague, had returned. Sigismund Bathory, during the course of his discussions with Paleologus, had found out some valuable information. The Ottomans most likely had asked the Khan to seek a temporary peace so that they would have a free hand to deal with the rebellion in Anatolia which, by now, had got quite out of hand. The Khan, moreover, was reluctant to commit himself openly to an alliance with the Christians, although he had this inclination because of religious considerations and because he doubted if he could bring his Tatar followers over to the Christian camp. These were the principal facts which Sigismund Bathory disclosed to the Emperor in a long dispatch of 15 August, 1598. The Prince also reported his dire need for funds with which to pay off his

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<sup>1</sup>Instructions to Bernardfius (13 August, 1598), Hurmuzaki, III, pp. 298-299.

own rebellious troops and those of Voivode Michael.<sup>1</sup>

The Ottoman campaign was now at hand. If Western reports had tended to emphasize the animosity of the Khan for the Ottomans, they must at least be mitigated somewhat by the attitude of the Sultan. In a letter to the Khan, Sultan Mehemmed III expressed his pleasure that the Tatars had crossed the Danube and were hastening to join the main army in Hungary. The Sultan emphasized the importance of a campaign into Transylvania as the best means of keeping Wallachia and Moldavia within the Ottoman fold. The Sultan also demonstrated his concern for the security of the Crimea in the absence of the Khan and assured him that the Ottoman forces at Kaffa were always ready to assist in the protection of the Khanate. Finally, the Sultan urged the Khan to remain on the frontiers during the following winter to ensure that the Christians would be properly held in check.<sup>2</sup> Sāṭūrjī Mehemmed Pasha was also pleased that the Khan was coming. He facilitated the movement of the Tatar troops by ordering the Kāzīs or judges in the Ottoman towns along the Danube to have ready provisions for them.<sup>3</sup> The bridge over the Danube on the road from Belgrade to Pancsova was

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<sup>1</sup> Prince of Transylvania to Emperor Rudolph, Hurmuzaki, loc. cit.

<sup>2</sup> Feridūn Beg, II, pp. 118-119 as cited by Rypka, Festschrift Georg Jacob (Leipzig, 1932) and art. "Gāzī Girāy", I.A., IV, p. 735 (Inalcik).

<sup>3</sup> Na'īmā, I, p.



completed on 27 Zi'l Hıjje, 1006/31 July, 1598, the day the Serdār received positive information that the Khan was at Ruschuk.<sup>1</sup> When the two forces met on 26 Muḥarrem, 1007/29 August, 1598, the Khan received a regal welcome. Then, after the two commanders decided their course of action, they marched together between the Korös and Maroş (Mureş) rivers ("inter Chrysium et Marysum omnes") in the direction of Vārād (Grosswardein, Varaždin, mod., Oradea).<sup>2</sup> The fortress of Arad on the " " Moros was reduced and 140 of its defenders put to the sword. This was the fortress Sigismund Báthory had intended to hold "to inspire resistance elsewhere".<sup>3</sup> According to Hammer the siege of Vārād (Grosswardein) began on 29 Şefer, 1007/1 October, 1598; according to Isthvanfi, 4 October ("ad quartum Nonas Octobris").<sup>4</sup> It was destined to last some forty days or into early November.<sup>5</sup> Provisions were scarce in the Ottoman camp; therefore, the Tatars were sent to scour the countryside for foodstuffs. Georgio Basta with his small force moved from Kassa (Cassovia) to Tokaj upon the approach of the Ottomans, partly as he said, to protect that region from Tatar depredations. Particularly hard hit were the villages

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<sup>1</sup>Na'Imā, loc.cit.

<sup>2</sup>Isthvanfi, pp. 729-730; Munejjimbāşī, III, p. 587.

<sup>3</sup>Prince of Transylvania to Emperor Rudolph (15 August, 1598), Hurmuzaki, III, pp. 300-302; Hammer, VII, p. 345.

<sup>4</sup>Isthvanfi, pp. 729-730; Hammer, VII, pp. 546-547.

<sup>5</sup>Munejjimbāşī, III, p. 597; ~~Basta, pp. 139-140.~~

around Beçskerek and Debrecen.<sup>1</sup>

The year 1598 was grave for the Ottomans. The Imperial forces had recovered their initiative at a time when the Ottomans were beginning to suffer from want of provisions, formerly provided by the Danubian Principalities. It was also a time when the Jelālī revolt in Asia Minor was growing more acute. No sooner had the Khan and Sātūrjī Mehemmed Pasha commenced the siege of Vārād in earnest than news came that the Christians had seized Totis, Papa and Wespriem and had laid siege to Buda. Moreover, Voivode Michael had defeated Ḥāfiz Ahmed Pasha at Nikbōlī (Nicopolis).<sup>2</sup> Against such a background and considering the almost continuous rainfall that had accompanied the expedition, it is not surprising that one of Basta's lieutenants should report to him that, on 28 October, <sup>1598</sup>~~1598~~, the Ottoman and Tatar dignitaries had decided to send a Tatar relief force to Buda and to raise the siege in eight days if further efforts proved unsatisfactory.<sup>3</sup> Apart from the weather, the siege had not gone well for the Ottomans owing to their shortage of artillery pieces. The Serdār had attempted to remedy this by sending a contingent to Egrī (Erlau) to obtain more ordinance, powder and shot. The inclement weather, however, militated against what ordinarily would

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<sup>1</sup>Isthvanfi, p. 731; Dilich, p. 315; Basta György, Levezese es Iratai, ed. E. Veress, Monumenta Hungariae Historica Diplomataria, Vol. XXXIV (Budapest, 1909), (hereafter cited as Basta), pp. 43-45; Kātib Çelebī, I, pp. 110-112.

<sup>2</sup>Kātib Çelebī, ibid.; Hammer, VII, pp. 546-547.

<sup>3</sup>Peçewī, II, p. 217; Munejjimbaşı, III, pp. 597-598; Basta, pp. 105-106.

have been a simple problem of logistics. There was also a shortage of oxen to draw the cannon.<sup>1</sup> After the siege was raised, even greater hardships faced the army. An advance guard had been sent ahead to repair and to build bridges for the march to <sup>Szolnok</sup> Szobrok, but where one river had flowed before, there were several raging torrents and this condition repeated itself across the entire flood plain. The final blow to the morale of the troops came at Szolnok, the terminus on the Tisza for supplies coming from the Porte or from the lower Danube. When the supply boats did not appear, a rumour swept through the army that their provisions had been sent to Buda. Thereafter, the entire army, hungry, diseased and cold, was on the verge of rebellion. The Serdār had no choice. He now assigned his troops to winter quarters and departed for Belgrade. The Khan went to Zombar and most of his troops were divided between there and Szegedin.<sup>2</sup>

Toward the end of October and again at the beginning of November, the Khan received communications direct from <sup>the</sup> Archduke Maximilian and from Emperor Rudolph, respectively. The Archduke urged the Khan to return to the Crimea now that winter was approaching in order that he <sup>might</sup> again the eternal friendship of the Christians. Emperor Rudolph only confirmed

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<sup>1</sup> Kātib Çelebī, loc.cit.; Basta, pp. 56-57. It is interesting to note that draft animals were as scarce in the Christian camp as they were in the Muslim camp. Basta complains of not being able to bring all of his artillery from Kallo to Tokaj for the same reason. Basta, p. 135.

<sup>2</sup> Peçewī, II, pp. 215-223; Kātib Çelebi, I, p. 113; Munejjimbāşī, III, p. 598.

in vague terms his desire for peace along the lines suggested by the envoy of the Khan. It is significant, however, that the Sultan, fully aware of the Khan's desire to return to the Crimea, exerted his own pressure on the Khan to remain on the frontier.<sup>1</sup> On 18 November, the Emperor issued passes which permitted the Tatar envoy, Paleologus, and his own legate, Georgio Racz, to leave the Habsburg realm.<sup>2</sup> Negotiations continued during the winter. Basta reported to Archduke Matthias from Vārād his good treatment of <sup>the</sup> Tatar ambassadors, who proceeded to Kassa (Cassovia) to meet with representatives of the Archduke.<sup>3</sup>

Two important developments in 1598 - the defeat of Hāfiz Aḥmed Pasha at Nicopolis and the negotiations between the Khan and the Emperor - set the scene for the following year. Even as the Serdār had sent a contingent of Tatars to aid in the relief of Buda, so also he must have acquiesced in the sending of a strong contingent of Tatars to the Danube during the Autumn of 1598. In any case, one specific report in European sources supports the conjecture that, by the autumn or early winter of 1598, the Khan already had one of his own Tatar dignitaries commanding a

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<sup>1</sup>Ferīdūn, II, pp. 138-139.

<sup>2</sup>Archduke Maximilian to Ġāzī Girāy (17 October, 1598), Emperor Rudolph to Ġāzī Girāy (1 November, 1598) and Issuance of Passes (18 November, 1598), Hurmuzaki, III, pp. 303-305 and p. 314.

<sup>3</sup>Basta Matyás (18 December, 1598), Basta, p. 154.

body of men at Silistria.<sup>1</sup> This conjecture receives further support from an undated letter in Italian which Ġazī Girāy sent to Voivode Michael. In this letter the Khan clearly stated that he had been permitted to winter in the Sanjak of Silistria and that he was placing Ahmed Ağā<sup>2</sup> in command. He further chastised Michael for breaking his truce by conducting raids across the Danube.<sup>3</sup> The Khan then proceeded to threaten the Voivode with an invasion if he violated his agreement again.<sup>4</sup> These documents <sup>show</sup> ~~then prove~~ that the Khan <sup>had</sup> already by the end of 1598 ~~had, so to speak,~~ staked a claim to Silistria, de facto if not de jure. But official confirmation in Ottoman sources that Ġazī Girāy had been assigned the revenues of the Sanjak of Silistria by Saṭurjī Meḥammed Pasha did not reach the ears of the Grand Vezir, Ibrāhīm Pasha, until some time in June, 1599.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>In one instance the commander is spoken of as "Ahmed Pasha ... general of the Tatar Khan". Cf. Relation of Ambassador of Wallachia (8 October, 1598), Hurmuzaki, II/I, p. 486.

<sup>2</sup>This is the Ahmed Ağā whom Peçewī describes as the Kapū Ağāsī of the Khan, an individual occupying a position among the Crimean Tatars comparable to that of the Grand Vezir of the Ottomans. Peçewī, II, pp. 251-252.

<sup>3</sup>Ġazī Girāy Khan to Voivode Michael (ca. 1598-1599), Hurmuzaki, III, p. 422.

<sup>4</sup>Quite possibly he refers to the treaty which confirmed Michael as Voivode of Wallachia, 21 July, 1597. Hammer, VIII, p. 2.

<sup>5</sup>One must suspect here a kind of double game on the part of the Porte. A report from Istanbul dated 16 March, 1599 informed the Doge that "... Micali avesse vicevuta una gran rotta dal Bei di Silistria fratello del Tartaro..." If one were to make a conjecture on the basis of this report, one might say that the Porte was glad enough to receive the protection of the Tatars at Silistria when Michael presented a serious threat but, when the Tatars began to gain successes against the rebellious

When  
~~As~~ Sāṭūrjī Meḥemmed Pasha had been replaced as Serdār by Ibrāhīm Pasha, the Khan had sent his envoy 'Abdul 'Azīz Agā to seek ~~his~~ confirmation from the new Grand Vezir<sup>for his possession of Silistria.</sup> While not refusing the confirmation for fear that the Khan might depart from the frontier, the Grand Vezir immediately informed the Porte but advised caution until Sāṭūrjī could be separated from the protection of the Khan. The reaction of the Sultan and the dignitaries advising him was immediate. The Khan could not be permitted to retain such an important Sanjāk, nor could Sāṭūrjī Meḥemmed be excused for this gross violation of Ottoman policy. The Janissary Agā Ṭurnākjī Ḥasan Pasha received orders to execute the former Serdār. He was killed at Hisarjīk near Belgrade on 12 Zī'l Hījje, 1007/6 July, 1599.<sup>1</sup> The tragic outcome of this incident was not surprising in the light of the previously cool reception which had been given at the Porte to the ambitious schemes of Ġāzī Girāy Khan. The Khan must have suspected such a negative reaction for he refused to attend the banquet of Sāṭūrjī Meḥemmed Pasha at which the latter was executed. Furthermore, the Khan

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(cont.)

voivode, the Khan was chastised and Sāṭūrjī Meḥemmed executed. Capello to the Doge (16 March, 1599), Hurmuzaki, IV/II, p. 229.

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<sup>1</sup>Na'imā, I, pp. 213-218; Peçewī, II, pp. 224-226.

even warned his friend to be wary of the Janissary Ağā, but his words were to no avail.<sup>1</sup>

Upon hearing of the execution of his master, Ibrāhīm Ağā, Kethudā (~ aide-de-camp) to Sāṭūrjī, fled to the camp of Ġāzī Girāy at Sombor. The shock of the news, in spite of the suspicions he had held earlier, made the Khan immediately think of his own safety. His first reaction was to return to the Crimea but, when the Khan took up the matter with his own Tatar dignitaries, they opposed his plan on the grounds that to leave at the beginning of a campaign season was merely inviting trouble for the Khanate.<sup>2</sup> The Grand Vezir Ibrāhīm Pasha, having received word from the Khan that he wished to depart, helped placate him by sending him gifts and by showing great deference to him whenever they met. Thus, although the Khan remained in Hungary that year and although he gave important assistance to the Ottoman camp by bringing the Ottomans and Christians to the conference table, he never really became reconciled to Ibrāhīm Pasha. Whenever they met, they carried on their conversation on horseback and, as if to emphasize the rift, the Khan always had a large group of armed retainers close at hand. Moreover, as the Grand Vezir proceeded in the direction of Buda on the left bank of the Danube, the

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<sup>1</sup>Munejjimbāšī, III, p. 599; Kātib Çelebī, I, pp. 117-118; Na'imā, loc.cit.

<sup>2</sup>The Mīrzās, moreover, would not wish to leave a campaign which gave every promise of bringing them rich booty. Munejjimbāšī, III, p. 599; Na'imā, I, p. 217.

Khan remained on the right bank and marched towards Pest.<sup>1</sup> In passing it is interesting to note that the Christians had not failed to observe the coolness between the Vezir and the Khan. In a report to the Doge, however, the Sāṭūrjī affair was not mentioned. The reason given for the "diffidentia" between the Khan and the Vezir was that the Vezir distrusted the negotiations which the Khan was carrying on with the Emperor and with Transylvania.<sup>2</sup> There appears little doubt, however, that the death of Sāṭūrjī caused Ġāzī Girāy to distrust the Grand Vezir and the Ottoman system which he represented. On 11 Şefar, 1008/2 September, 1599, the Grand Vezir, while moving with his army in the direction of Buda, received letters from Ġāzī Girāy which stated that the Khan had been contacted by the Emperor for the purpose of opening direct negotiations between the two sides.<sup>3</sup> The contacts between the ambassadors of the Khan and Archduke Maximilian in Vienna had continued into 1599. The Khan had done all he could to squeeze funds <sup>for himself</sup> out of the Archduke. In one letter the Khan suggested that the Emperor build him a fortress to ensure that the Tatars remain "friends of his friends and enemies of his enemies". The Khan sent gifts to the Archduke and then asked him

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<sup>1</sup>Munejjimbāṣī, III, p. 600; Na'īmā, I, pp. ——— ; Kātib Çelebī, I, pp. 123-125.

<sup>2</sup>Capello to the Doge (4 September, 1599), Hurmuzaki, IV/II, p. 238.

<sup>3</sup>Na'īmā, I, pp. 221-222.



to <sup>n</sup>send him a beautiful clock.<sup>1</sup> In a letter of 5 February the Khan informed the Archduke that he was sending to him Bālji Mehemmed Agā (Spino<sup>a</sup>) and an agent who was known as Antonio. Once again the Khan, wishing to pressure the Archduke, made it clear that he would spend the entire winter in Hungary and that "...wie Euch bewusst ist, das die Tarttarn nich wallen in einem ort ruehig bleiben, sondern alles verwössten..."<sup>2</sup> Alexander Paleologus, whom Isthvani describes as having charge of all the revenues of the Khan, by land or by sea,<sup>3</sup> was at the time still negotiating in the Habsburg realm.

Archduke Matthias now took charge of the probes for peace. He immediately sounded a note of caution by asking the Khan to produce his authority for acting on behalf of the Sultan. The Archduke also informed the Khan that he was sending him two clocks and that his own stables were filled with horses sent by the Khan.<sup>4</sup> By July, the details of a possible peace were already becoming known. In reply to some queries made by the Khan, presumably through the Grand Vezir, the Sultan sent a letter to Gāzī Girāy. It was clear that, as a preliminary

<sup>1</sup>Gāzī Girāy to Archduke Maximilian (January, 1599), Hurmuzaki, III, p. 323.

<sup>2</sup>Khan to the Archduke (5 February, 1599), Ibid., pp. 324-325.

<sup>3</sup>"Is Tartarorum principi charus et consiliorum particeps, eius vectigalibus et portoriis tam terra quam mari praeerat." Isthvani, pp. 742-744.

<sup>4</sup>Two letters from Archduke Matthias to Gāzī Girāy Khan (8 February, 1599), Hurmuzaki, III, pp. 325-327.

basis for negotiations, the Christians had suggested that Gran, then held by the Emperor, be exchanged for Erlau, the cork so to speak in the Transylvanian bottle. The Sultan rejected such a proposal out of hand, by reminding the Khan that the ancestors of the Sultan had never restored any territory which had been taken by the sword.<sup>1</sup>

The first negotiations took place on an island in the Danube between Buda and Gran on 24-26 Rabī' I, 1008/14-16 October, 1599. The chief representatives of the Ottomans included Murād Pasha, Kethuā of Ibrāhīm Pasha, Ahmed Agā, the Vezir of the Khan, and the Kāzī of Buda, Mevlānā Hābīl Efendī, whom Isthvanfi described as an old man of great authority. It appears also that Alexander Paleologus was present. For the Emperor, the Archbishop of Gran, Jan Kutassi, the generals Nadazdi and Palfi and the special representative of the Emperor, Dr. Pezzen. But the talks were broken off by the Grand Vezir when the Christians insisted on an exchange of fortresses.<sup>2</sup> Once more, as the Ottoman army approached Gran, the two sides again tried to come to terms, but the attempt was in vain.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Sultan Mehemmed to the Khan (July, 1599), Hurmuzaki, III, pp. 332-333.

<sup>2</sup>Na'īmā, I, pp. 223-225; Peçewī, II, pp. 296-297; Isthvanfi, pp. 742-744.

<sup>3</sup>Na'īmā, loc.cit.; During and after the peace negotiations, the Tatars raided the Hungarian and Austrian countryside almost continually, a factor which greatly disturbed the progress of the talks. These depredations appear to have taken place against the wishes of the Khan and the Grand Vezir. Even strife broke out between Ottoman and Tatar over the <sup>meagre</sup> ~~shortness~~ of the rations. The Tatars even described themselves as "Cossacks" to dupe the peasantry. Ortelius, pp. 447-457 and passim.

The Grand Vezir had crossed the Danube from ~~the~~ Buda to Pest with his army and had proceeded up the coast to a point opposite the fortress of Gran. The Imperial army, which had also been on the same side of the Danube, built a bridge across the river at Gran and withdrew in the direction of that fortress. At this time the Khan and his men harassed the enemy withdrawal incessantly but, according to the account of Şolâkzâde, with little appreciation shown on the part of the Grand Vezir.<sup>1</sup> The Khan, at the end of the season, took his leave of the Ottoman camp with few regrets. He complained of the shortage of rations among his men and argued that it would serve no useful purpose to keep them any longer in Hungary. He departed in late October.<sup>2</sup>

The events in the Principalities moved quickly in 1599. The Khan, however, played only a subordinate role. The third Vezir, <sup>"</sup>Güzelyî Mehemmed Pasha, led a successful foray into Wallachia with the aid of Tatar troops. Voivode Michael, however, having his eye on the weak position of Cardinal Báthory in Transylvania, made peace overtures to the Sultan and the Khan. At the same time, he received the permission of the Emperor to drive the Cardinal out of Transylvania. He was a menace to the Christian cause because of his family and personal ties with the Movila

<sup>1</sup>Şolâkzâde, Tarih (Istanbul, 1297), p. 651 ff.

<sup>2</sup>Peçewî, II, pp. 226-228; Kâtib Çelebî, I, pp. 123-125.

dynasty of Moldavia and the royal family in Poland.<sup>1</sup> After Michael had taken control of Transylvania he petitioned the Emperor urgently for funds with which to placate the Khan. The Christian powers still hoped to wean the Khan away from the Sultan.<sup>2</sup>

Giorgio Basta, the military commander for the Emperor in Transylvania, assisted Michael in his conquest of Transylvania, only to take arms against him in the succeeding years. Basta, a keen tactician, as early as February of 1599 wrote to the Emperor that the best weapon against the Turks and Tatars was the arquebuses because they feared them so much. Later, in the same year, Basta became more specific in another letter. To be effective against the Tatars, his troops required the arquebuses "di longhezza di cinque palmi" because the Tatars in particular could cause so much damage among cavalry which were equipped with the short arquebuses. The Tatar bow, in other words, still appeared to have a longer range than the ordinary arquebus.<sup>3</sup>

As the Khan withdrew from Hungary, he again created anxiety in Poland and Moldavia regarding the route he would take to the Crimea, but the Khan returned the way he had come, <sup>south of</sup> by the Danube route and through

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<sup>1</sup> Munejjimbāşī, III, pp. 600 and 605-606; Jeremia to Zamoyski (10 November, 1599) and Radibrad to one of the Archdukes (29 November, 1599), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, p. 558 and XII, pp. 518-9.

<sup>2</sup> Voivode Michael to Emperor Rudolph (29 November, 1599), Hurmuzaki, III, pp. 363-364.

<sup>3</sup> Basta to the Emperor (February, 1599) and Basta Miksa (Michael) (13 April, 1599), Basta, pp. 169 and 191.

Ismail into lower Moldavia about mid-December.<sup>1</sup> The Khan continued to seek a peace treaty with Poland. Jeremia reported to Zamoyski in September that Jantemir (Jāntīmūr) Āgā, an envoy of the Khan, was proceeding through his territory with the interpreter Kossekowski on a mission to the Polish king. The mission of Jāntīmūr Āgā was successful. The treaty between Poland and the Crimea which had been drawn up at Teŭora (Cecora) was reconfirmed at this time.<sup>2</sup> The years 1597 to 1599 served to confirm the importance of the Tatar Khan to the Ottomans in the Hungarian war. Hereafter, his significance, at least in Hungary, gradually declined. This development was partly brought about by his absence from the front and partly because the internal and external position of the Ottoman state gradually improved. The revolt in Anatolia was <sup>soon to be</sup> partially suppressed <sup>at a time when</sup> while the former cooperation among the rebelling tributary principalities of Wallachia and Transylvania <sup>was on the verge</sup> broke <sup>down</sup>. The Khan, also, had other interests closer to home than Hungary.

In answer to letters urging him to join Ibrāhīm Pasha in Hungary, the Khan excused himself to the Grand Vezir and Hōja Sa'd al Dīn by sending them lyric poetry (ġazels) of a sarcastic and moralistic quality which he himself had composed.<sup>3</sup> The following extracts from ġazels

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<sup>1</sup> Zamoyski to King Sigismund (10 November, 1599), King Sigismund to Zamoyski (23 November, 1599), Jeremia to Zamoyski (18 December, 1599), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, pp. 559, 563 and 569.

<sup>2</sup> Jeremia to Zamoyski (16 September, 1599) and King Sigismund to Ġazī Girāḡ Khan (24 July, 1600), Ibid., pp. 546 and 627.

<sup>3</sup> Hammer, VII, pp. 358-359.

composed by Ġazī Girāy during this period of bitterness reflect his attitude. In the first poem the Khan addresses the Sultan; the second <sup>expresses</sup> is the timeless complaint of the warrior against all of those people who do not care about his sacrifices (in this instance, at Sombor during the winter of 1598-1599):

We (i.e., I) are one of your slaves fighting for the faith  
 We sacrifice our life (lit. soul and head)  
 My Sultan, what should I say  
 Later you will hear the news (of my sacrifice)  
 Do not flee from the sword and the arrow  
 Busy thyself on the pathway of righteousness....

— — — — —  
 Is it any wonder that we are tasting bitterness?  
 Just look at our plight.  
 By Heaven, even the bitter waters of Sombor  
 Have come through our nostrils.  
 The infidels have plundered the lands of Islam  
 (While) you (people) with no fear of God  
 Take your bribes and take your ease.  
 We shall pour out (our) blood and weep blood  
 On the field of battle  
 (While) you enjoy the (blood-red) cup of delight  
 In the valley of (pleasant) dissipation.....<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Bir mujāhid k̄ulunuz terk eyderiz j̄an-u seri  
 Pādīshāhim ne diyem sonra duyārsin haberi  
 Kaçmañiz tığ ve tirden çalışın dīn yoluna....

— — — — —  
 Telh-i kām olsak 'ajeb mī hālīmizni bir görün  
 Burnumuzdan geldi bi'llah ajī şuyi şonburun  
 Ehl-i İslām illerin kuffar garet eyledi  
 Ey Huda nātersler siz ruşvet alin oturun  
 'Arşayi rezm içere biz kanlar tōkub k̄an āglariz  
 Vadi-ye 'eşratte siz j̄am-i şafa-i zevkni surun...

Copies of these poems and further comment can be found in O. Burian, "Bozuk Idareden Şikayetçi iki Şair", Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi, VIII/4 (1950), pp. 675-681. (I am grateful to Dr. V. Ménage, Lecturer in Turkish, School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, for checking my translations and making helpful suggestions.)

The Khan did send a contingent of Tatars to Hungary which gave valuable service to the Grand Vezir in his siege of Kanisza.<sup>1</sup> At the end of the year the Khan was still receiving letters from representatives of the Emperor asking him to persist in his approaches to the Porte for the purpose of bringing about a peace in Hungary.<sup>2</sup>

Poland in the year 1600 found itself in an equivocal position with the Khan and the Sultan. Voivode Michael, who had seized Transylvania late in 1599, had been recognized by the Sultan.<sup>3</sup> Voivode Michael, knowing well that Poland did not view with satisfaction his venture in Transylvania, nor his design on Moldavia, sought to instigate the Ottomans and the Tatars against Poland. The King, however, by sending embassies to the Porte and to the Crimea, dispelled any doubts he had about his relations with the Sultan and the Khan.<sup>4</sup> The King in his letter to Ġāzī Girāy also gave notice that Zamoyski was now being sent to Moldavia to combat the invasion of Michael and he expressed the wish that the Tatar Khan would also render assistance.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Na'ima, I, p. 235; the Tatars, at a critical point during the siege, were able to cut off the supplies being brought to the tabur of the enemy relief force, thus rendering their position untenable. Munej-jimbaşı, III, p. 604; Sagredo, V, pp. 167-168.

<sup>2</sup>Letter to the Khan from Transylvania (6 December, 1600), Hurmuzaki, IV/I, p. 199.

<sup>3</sup>Jeremia to Zamoyski (29 March, 1600), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, p. 589. The son of Michael was also confirmed as voivode of Wallachia.

<sup>4</sup>King Sigismund to Adrian Rembowski, ambassador to the Porte (6 July, 1600), Zamoyski to Radziwill (20 July, 1600) and King Sigismund to the Khan (24 July, 1600), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/I, pp. 616-617, 625 and 627, respectively.

<sup>5</sup>King Sigismund to the Khan, *ibid.*

Voivode Michael had in fact invaded Moldavia in May. During the month of April, the Poles, the Tatars and the Moldavians had been planning an attack into Transylvania against Michael in support of Sigismund B<sup>1</sup>áthory, who had taken refuge in Moldavia.<sup>1</sup> Before these plans came to fruition, however, and before the Khan sent any troops, Michael attacked Moldavia,<sup>2</sup> seized the principal towns and forced the Voivode Jeremia and possibly also Sigismund B<sup>1</sup>áthory to take refuge in the Polish border fortress of Khotin. Now Michael exacted homage for himself and his sons from the Moldavian population and sent the appropriate annual tribute from Moldavia to the Khan in the hope of gaining the latter's support.<sup>3</sup> But Michael had over-extended himself and had made himself unpopular in Transylvania. The Ottomans also withdrew their support and ordered the Khan to invade Wallachia. Poland, after the defeat of some of her forces which had been sent to support Jeremia, mobilized a large force and drove Michael's forces out of Moldavia. Meanwhile, in Transylvania, the Wallachian forces of Michael were soundly defeated by Basta, who, after the excesses Michael had taken against the nobility in Transylvania, had

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<sup>1</sup>Anonymous reports from Transylvania (24 April and 29 May, 1600), Veress, Documente, VII, pp. 90-91 and 112-113, respectively.

<sup>2</sup>Voivode Michael to Dr. Pezzan, representative of the Emperor (28 April, 1600) and Michael to King Sigismund (21 May, 1600), Hurmuzaki, IV/I, p. 43 and Supply. II/I, p. 602, respectively.

<sup>3</sup>This included money, sheep, honey and horses. Anonymous reports from Moldavia (29 May, 25 June and 12 July, 1600), Veress, Documente VI, pp. 113-114, 132-133 and p. 144, respectively.



been ordered by the Emperor to clip his wings.<sup>1</sup>

These events prepared the way for the final demise of Michael in 1601. Sigismund Bathory made an attempt to enter Transylvania from Varazdin. Apart from local support, his field commander, Moses Székely, had received reinforcements from a mixed Ottoman and Tatar force estimated at twelve thousand, which had been sent by Lālā Mehemmed Pasha, Beglerbeg of Buda. This thrust into Transylvania was stopped by Basta in early August near Goroszlo and shortly thereafter Basta ordered the execution of Michael for an alleged conspiracy with the enemy.<sup>2</sup> For the time being, Basta was left in control of Transylvania. The year 1601 also marked the final withdrawal of Sigismund Bathory from the Transylvanian scene.<sup>3</sup>

The Poles had brought their protégé, Jeremia Movila, back into Moldavia in the autumn of 1600. Now once again Moldavia became the centre of an attempt to put the brother of Jeremia, Simeon Movila, on the throne of Wallachia. The Ottomans still preferred Radu Mihnea,

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<sup>1</sup>Anonymous report from Moldavia (5 August, 1600), Veress, Documente, VI, p. 154; Bailo Capello to the Doge (12 August, 1600), Hurmuzaki, IV/II, pp. 26-27; Ortelius, pp. 480-482.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Basta to Archduke Matthias (9 July, 1601), Basta, p. 562; Mehemmed Pasha to Andrei Negroni, Imperial Dragoman (1 August, 1601), Hurmuzaki, IV/I, p. 264; Anonymous from Transylvania (30 June, 1601), Constantini to Chancellor of Mantua (23 July, 1601) and Anonymous from Transylvania (13 August, 1601), Veress, Documente, VI, pp. 389, 403 and 423, respectively.

<sup>3</sup>Jorga, G.O.R., III, pp. 330-333.

but finally made up their minds to support Simeon at a time when Radu Șerban, a lieutenant of Michael, had begun to make a successful bid for the control of Wallachia.<sup>1</sup> As if the Danubian Principalities had not suffered enough during the winter of 1600-1601, they were subjected to severe raids by the Dobruja Tatars in 1601. Both the Sultan and the Khan, however, took strong measures to stop these depredations.<sup>2</sup>

During the summer of 1601, Gāzī Girāy Khan faced a serious threat to his rule in the Crimea. His Nūr al Dīn, Devlet Girāy, the son of the Sa'ādet Girāy, plotted with the mīrzas of the most prominent Crimean tribe of the Şirin/ğullarī (sons of the Şirin) to murder the Khan and to make himself Khan. To some extent, this revolt can be considered a sequel to the previous movements opposing Ottoman domination in the Crimea, which were led by Mehemmed Girāy Khan in 1583-1584 and by his son, the aforementioned Sa'ādet Girāy in 1584-1585. Devlet Girāy, the son of Sa'ādet Girāy and the grandson of Mehemmed Girāy Khan, was following a well-established precedent in his family. The Khan learned of the

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<sup>1</sup> During this confused period, it appears that the Ottoman hospodar, <sup>Radu Mihnea</sup> was in possession of Silistria and Giurgiu while supporters of either Simeon or Radu Șerban held other areas. Jorga, loc.cit.; anonymous reports of events in Transylvania (23 December, 1600 and 18 March, 1601), Veress, Documente, pp. 285 and 339. Nani to the Doge (7 October, 1601), Hurmuzaki, IV/II, p. 256.

<sup>2</sup> Jeremia to Zamoyski (5 January, 1601, and 1 March, 1601), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/II, pp. 2-3 and 21. It is interesting to note that the Khan sent a force of Circassians to discipline these Tatars and to arrange for the release of captives.


plot shortly before the important feast day of the *Ḳurbān Bayramī* of 10 *Zī'*1 *Hijje*, 1009/12 June, 1601 and invited the *Nūr al Dīn*, Devlet Girāy, and some of the principal dignitaries of the *Şirin* tribe to a banquet. Gāzī Girāy then secretly assembled his arquebusiers, as a counterforce to the armed retainers of the visiting dignitaries, and then, during the banquet, had Devlet Girāy and two of the *Şirin* Bēgs - one of whom was his own son-in-law - executed. Two other *Şirin* Bēgs escaped to Kaffa. The Khan now sought out the younger brothers of Devlet Girāy, Mehemmed Girāy and Şahīn Girāy, to eliminate them also. They were warned of the Khan's intentions, however, and managed to escape.<sup>1</sup> Mehemmed Girāy took refuge in Circassia and his brother, Şahīn Girāy joined a *Jelālī* uprising in Anatolia. The flight of these two *hānzādes* was shortly followed by that of the *Ḳalgay* and brother of the Khan, Selāmet Girāy, who escaped to Akkermān and then also took refuge with the *Jelālīs* in Asia Minor. The Khan had, meanwhile, taken ill

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<sup>1</sup>The details of this incident are found in a letter of the Polish ambassador, Laurin Piaszczinski, to King Sigismund III (3 July, 1601), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/II, pp. 45-47. In the same letter, the ambassador also describes how the Khan recruited his arquebusiers; they were drawn from the villages (of the Khan) facing those which were in the lands of the Polish king.

THE LINE OF DEVLET GIRAY

Devlet Giray Khan  
(1551-1577)



Art. "Giray", Islam Ansiklopedisi, IV, p. 788 (Inalcik)  
[Şafâ Giray is an addition, not found in I.A.]

and had, therefore, in his place, sent his nephew, Batir Girāy, to the Hungarian front with a contingent of Tatars.<sup>1</sup>

Ġāzī Girāy Khan had been forced to put his own realm in order in the year 1601, but by the following spring, the Sultan once more ordered the Khan to the Hungarian frontier. Ġāzī Girāy, however, had learned that Selāmet Girāy had fallen into the hands of the Sultan;<sup>2</sup> he was, therefore, very reluctant to leave the Crimea for he feared that he might be deposed in his absence. When the Khan voiced these fears in his correspondence with the Porte, he received firm assurances from the Sultan that, although Selāmet Girāy would not be executed, as the Khan had requested, he would be exiled to a place where he would be unable to intrigue against Ġāzī Girāy. The Sultan warned, however, that the Khan would be expected to carry out his obligations to the realm and to serve on the Hungarian front.<sup>3</sup>

After this, his chief preoccupation, was settled; Ġāzī Girāy, in a burst of activity, prepared himself for the campaign season. He renewed

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<sup>1</sup>Peçewī, II, pp. 250-252; Mehemmed Riza, pp. 108-110; Munejjimbāşī, III, pp. 591-594; Soranzo, L'Ottomano, pp. 91-92; Kazimirski, "Précis...", J.A., Ser. II/XII, pp. 431-432; Jeremia to King Sigismund III (26 July and 30 September, 1601), Hurmuzaki, II/II, pp. 54 and 65-66, respectively. Cf. the accompanying geneological chart.

<sup>2</sup>When the Jelālī leader, Delī Hasan was pardoned, Selāmet Girāy, a member of his rebel force, also made his peace with the Sultan and sought his own appointment to the Khanship of the Crimea. Cf. Peçewī, II, pp. 250-251.

<sup>3</sup>Letter of the Sultan to Ġāzī Girāy Khan (ca. June, 1602), Ferīdūn, Munse'at, II, p. 166 ff. In a report of 12 March, 1602, Jeremia told the King of Poland that the Kalgay (Selāmet) had already been banished by the Sultan. Cf. Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/II, p. 115. Augustino Nani in a report to the Doge (3 November, 1602) actually states that the Kalgay was banished to the island of Rhodes. Cf. Hurmuzaki, IV/II, p. 269.

the existing peace agreement between himself and Boris Godunov, Tsar of Muscovy.<sup>1</sup> A series of Zaporozhian Cossack raids along the Dnepr and the coast of the Black Sea during the spring of 1602 had forced the Khan to make retaliatory raids into the Polish borderlands. These incidents became the principal reason for a series of diplomatic exchanges between the King of Poland and the Khan.<sup>2</sup> By August, however, it became clear from a series of dispatches sent to the King of Poland by John Potocki, Starost<sup>a</sup> <sup>(Holder of a crown estate)</sup> of Kamieniac, and M. Sobieski, the Voivode of Lublin, who were stationed on the southern frontier of Poland, that the Khan had received the tacit support of Poland in a new attempt to establish Simeon Movila in the voivodeship of Wallachia. The Khan apparently had received orders from the Sultan to march into Transylvania and Ġāzī Girāy, ever alert to an opportunity to advance his own interests, took it upon himself <sup>to attempt the placing of Simeon in the voivodeship of Wallachia en route to Hungary</sup> ~~to establish Simeon en route to Transylvania.~~ This appeared to be an easy task because it was generally known that Radu Șerban, who was at the time Voivode of Wallachia, had a very shabby army of about 10,000 men.<sup>3</sup> By the middle of September, 1602, the Khan was

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<sup>1</sup>Karamsin, XI, p. 32.

<sup>2</sup>Letters of Lawrin Piaseczinski, Polish ambassador, to the King of Poland (17 May and 16 June, 1602), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/II, pp. 153 and 167; also, despatch of Contaut Biron, French Ambassador to Villeroy (2 May, 1602), "Ambassade en Turquie..." Archive Historique de la Gascogne, Fasc. 19-20 (Paris, 1889-90), p. 43.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Potocki to the King of Poland (18 August, 1602), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/II pp. 196-197; Sobieski to an unknown (22 August, 1602), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/II, p. 204; Sobieski, in another despatch to the King (18 September, 1602) suggests that Jeremia actually called in the Tatars to assist him in establishing his brother in order to be <sup>free</sup> ~~aid~~ of the Polish influence; Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/II, p. 217.

advancing rapidly on the forces of Radu Șerban, who had been forced to withdraw into the mountains of Northern Wallachia. Unknown to the Khan, however, Georgio Basta, although he was occupied in Transylvania with an Ottoman invasion from Temesvár, which was led by Moses Szekely, had been able to reinforce Șerban with some regiments of seasoned Walloon infantry. After some tough fighting on 23 and 24 September near the town of Telzayn, the Khan withdrew with heavy losses which had been inflicted by the entrenched Walloons and four well-placed cannon (Falconi). As the Khan withdrew, he placed the body of his brother-in-law, who was slain in the battle, on a horse in front of him, according to Tatar custom, and covered him with beautiful rugs. The Khan was so grieved by this mishap that he was moved to tears.<sup>1</sup> The Khan~~now~~ sent out scouts to find ~~another~~ pass to Hungary, but all were blocked by Basta's men; thus, the Tatars withdrew to Silistria and proceeded<sup>1</sup> on their way to Hungary. As the Khan withdrew, he received a dispatch from the Porte ordering him to send Simeon Movila to Istanbul for the Sultan had now, once more, appointed Radu Mihnea to the position of Hospodar of Wallachia.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Zucconi to the Duke of Mantua (2 September, 1602), Veress, Documente, VII, pp. 75-76; Cavriolo to Piero Duodo, Venetian Ambassador at Prague (2 September and 1 October, 1602), Hurmuzaki, VIII, pp. 250 and 252-253; Basta to Venetian Ambassador (18 September, 1602), Hurmuzaki, VIII, p. 251. Cf. also, John Smith, Travels (London, 1630), pp. 19-28. This appears to be the battle after which Smith was captured and sold into slavery.

<sup>2</sup>Jeremia to the King of Poland (21 October, 1602) and Sobieski to the King of Poland (4 November, 1602) Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/II, pp. 235 and 241-242, respectively.

The Khan reached Belgrade at the end of Rabī' II, 1011/mid-October, 1602 just as the Grand Vezir, Yemīṣṣī Ḥasan Pasha, was entering Belgrade from the north. The Grand Vezir received the Khan with every honour and made arrangements for him to stay in the palace of the Defterdār Etmekjizāde. After several days of feasting, Ġazī Giray took up winter quarters in the town of Peč (Funfkirchen) as a guest of the historian Ibrāhīm Peçewī. It was during this winter that the Khan lived what Von Hammer has described as an epicurean life, writing poetry, instructing Ibrāhīm Peçewī in the Persian language and script, hunting wild game, ~~and~~ feasting and walking in the gardens of the Peçewī lands. There were also frequent receptions and entertainments for visiting dignitaries. As the spring of 1603 drew near the Khan went on raids into neighbouring enemy territory. Upon the arrival of Lālā Meḥmed Pasha, who had been appointed Serdār for the campaign season of 1603, he, too, paid a visit to Peč and spent several days with the Khan and Peçewī.<sup>1</sup> But in spite of this conviviality, Ġazī Giray was fearful for his position as Khan. and, After viewing the large retinue of Delī Ḥasan, the former Jelālī leader under whom his brother, Selāmet Giray had served, <sup>and who had been pardoned by the Sultan,</sup> the Khan became even more uneasy and resolved to return to the Crimea. Apparently

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<sup>1</sup>Jeremia to the King of Poland (9 January, 1603), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/II, p. 245; Peçewī, II, pp. 251-252; Kātib Çelebī, I, pp. 183-184; Na'imā, I, pp. 305-306; Dilich, Ungarische Chronika, pp. 351-352; Hammer, VII, pp. 20-21.



the Khan considered that it was not only risky but beneath his dignity to serve on the front with these former rebels; moreover, he did not wish to take orders from anyone less exalted than the Grand Vezir, who had in this year been sent against the Jelālīs in Asia Minor. Lālā Mehemmed Pasha, upon learning of the Khan's intention to depart, sent Peçewī and Etmekjizāde to the Khan in the hope that they might persuade the Khan to remain, but their efforts were in vain. The Khan once more complained about the presence of the rebels and also mentioned how poor<sup>1</sup> the rations were for the Tatars. There is no doubt that Selāmet Girāy, when he fell into Ottoman hands after the capitulation of Delī Hasan, had revealed to the Sultan all of the information he possible could about the secret negotiations of Ġāzī Girāy with the Emperor and other Christian rulers. Thereafter, the Sultan appears to have granted an amnesty to Selāmet Girāy at the end of Zī'l Hıjje, 1011/ beginning of June, 1603, just at the time when Ġāzī Girāy was leaving the Hungarian front. This amnesty may well have increased the doubts of the Khan about his retaining control of the Khanate. In a letter to the Sultan, the Serdār Lālā Mehemmed Pasha did not hesitate to complain about the withdrawal of the Khan, nor did Peçewī withhold a bitter comment on the

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<sup>1</sup>Peçewī, II, pp. 267-270; Munejjimbāşī, II, p. 703 and III, p. 711; Jeremie to the King of Poland (28 November, 1603), Hurmuzaki, Süpl. II/II, pp. 319-320; Hammer, VIII, p. 35.

utter uselessness of the Khan on this campaign. The Khan had laid waste six sanjāks and had only gone on one raid. Moreover, he had come at the end of one campaign season and had left at the beginning of another.<sup>1</sup>

While the Khan marched in the direction of Wallachia along the southern route leading through Nicopolis, Moses Szekely, to whom the Khan had given some Tatar forces, now launched an attack into Transylvania from Temesvar. During the siege of Alba Julia, these same Tatars set fire to the city with flaming arrows and firebrands.<sup>2</sup> This thrust into Transylvania kept Basta occupied while the Khan, meantime, entered Wallachia and completely devastated the countryside. Radu Șerban sought aid from Vienna, but as the Ottomans had launched an offensive in upper Hungary and as Basta was fighting Szekely he could expect little help. This was the position in which Ġazī Girāy <sup>wanted to</sup> ~~hoped he could~~ place Radu Șerban. The Voivode became very amenable to negotiations with the Khan and was only too happy to agree to pay him an annual tribute. The Tatar envoy, during his negotiations with Șerban, made it quite apparent that a new rupture had taken place in the relations between the

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<sup>1</sup>Peçewî, II, pp. 269 and 292; Jeremia to the King of Poland (23 July, 1603), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/II, pp. 293-294; Na'īmā, I, p. 325.

<sup>2</sup>Venetian Ambassador in Prague to the Doge (5 and 19 May, 1603), Hurmuzaki, VIII, pp. 266 and 1603-1604; Veress, "Annuae Litterae Societatis Jesu", Fontes Rerum Transylvanicarum, V (1921), pp. 83-84.

Khan and the Sultan. The Khan seemed prepared to accept the fact that Şerban owed his ultimate allegiance to the Emperor.<sup>1</sup>

In the year 1603, the Khan had been able to collect gifts and subsidies, not just from Moldavia, Wallachia and the Porte, but also from Poland.<sup>2</sup> During 1603 and 1604 Ahmed Ağā, envoy of the Khan, was sent to Clausenburg in Transylvania to negotiate a separate peace between the Khan and the Emperor. The Khan sought a subsidy of 40,000 ducats a year as a form of ransom to keep the cities of the Emperor free from Tatar raids.<sup>3</sup>

The Khan did not return again to the Hungarian front after 1603 but, in 1604, he continued negotiations with Şerban and with the representatives of the Emperor. The Khan came to an agreement with Şerban in 1604 and, during the same year, Şerban received the standards and other trappings of his office from the Sultan. Thus, it would appear that the Khan, while gaining his own ends, also persuaded the Sultan to recognise Şerban as the Voivode of Wallachia.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Radu Şerban to Vienna and letter of Wallachian Boyars to Vienna (24 October, 1603), Hurmuzaki IV/I, pp. 346-347; Report of Vimercato to General Basta (25 December, 1603), Hurmuzaki, IV/I, p. 353; Contarini, Bailo to the Doge (29 December, 1603), Hurmuzaki, VIII, p. 273.

<sup>2</sup>‘Alī Mīrza to the King of Poland (24 January, 1603) and Jeremia to the King of Poland (28 November, 1603), Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/II, pp. 249 and 319-320; Contariui, Bailo, to the Doge (6 December, 1603), Hurmuzaki, IV/II, p. 275.

<sup>3</sup>Hammer, VIII, pp. 78-79.

<sup>4</sup>Basta to the Archduke Matthias (5 January, 1604), Hurmuzaki, IV/I, p. 361; Imperial Commissioner Paul Krausenegg to Radu Şerban (2 August, 1604),

Ğāzī Girāy had sent his son and Kālgay, Tōktamiş Girāy, to the Hungarian front in 1604. The Khan himself had been ordered to Ochakov by the Sultan to build a strong fortress there. The Imperial representatives negotiating with Ahmed Ağā in Clausenburg were particularly interested in having the Kālgay Tōktamiş recalled from the Hungarian front. While these negotiations were reaching an advanced stage—the Emperor had offered the Khan 20,000 ducats a year — Stephan Bocskay was beginning to drive the forces of the Emperor out of Transylvania.<sup>1</sup> As the offensive of Bocskay gained momentum, the balance of forces in Hungary and in Transylvania and Wallachia shifted sharply in favour of the Ottomans.<sup>2</sup>

Apart from reports of isolated raids by the Tatars and the assistance Tōktamiş Girāy continued to render to Bocskay and the Ottoman army during the years 1605 and 1606 the contributions of the Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman war in Hungary were virtually at an end. The Ottoman

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(cont.)

Veress, Documente, pp. 218-219; Venetian Ambassador in Prague to the Doge (20 September, 1604), Hurmuzaki, VIII, p. 284; Octavian Bon to the Doge (13 December, 1604), Hurmuzaki, IV/II, p. 279.

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<sup>1</sup> Instructions of Rudolph II. to his commissioner, Krausenegg (6 and 20 January, 1604), Hurmuzaki, IV/I, p. 362; Munejjimbāşī, III, pp. 619-620; Hurmuzaki, Suppl. II/II, p. 336; Venetian ambassador in Prague to the Doge (19 July, 1604), Hurmuzaki, VIII, p. 276; Krausenegg to Radu Şerban (2 August, 1604), Veress, Documente, VII, pp. 218-219;

<sup>2</sup> Peçewī, II, p. 300; "Annuae Litterae Societatis Jesu", Veress, Fontes Rerum Transylvanicarum, V, p. 120; Sagredo, V, pp. 253-257; Von Pastor, XXIII, pp. 304-308.

and Crimean Tatar lands were now faced with a serious shortage of food. Ġāzī Girāy Khan had sent a sizeable contingent to the front each year of the War, and during the thirteen years of the Ottoman struggle, he had spent seven on campaign either in Hungary or in the tributary principalities. Occasionally also during the Hungarian War, rumours had circulated through the capital that the Sultan would<sup>1</sup> be replaced by the Tatar Khan or that the Khan had placed his personal supporters in high places at the Porte - rumours which attest to the great influence of the Khan at the time. In the few years remaining in his life, the Khan now turned once more to the task of making his own borders safe from his ever-encroaching Polish and Muscovite neighbours to the north and east.

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<sup>1</sup> Isthvanfi, p. 830; Anonymous report (8 January, 1605), Hurmuzaki, IV/II, p. 280; Peçewī, II, p. 309; N. Barozzi and G. Berchet, Le Relazioni degli Stati Europei (Venice, 1856-1878), Ser. V/I, pp. 203-204; Sagredo, V, pp. 132-133; Hammer, VIII, pp. 94-95.

## Chapter IV

### THE LAST YEARS OF ĠĀZĪ GIRĀY KHAN

Information on the activities of Ġāzī Girāy in the last years of his life is relatively scarce. Such materials as are available, however, indicate that the Khan remained vigilant to his death in the defence of what he considered the best interests of the Khanate in his relations with Persia, Muscovy, Poland and the Porte.

Ġāzī Girāy Khan had spent four years on campaign in the Caucasus during the Persian War (1578-1590). When he was captured by the Persians in 1581, he spent some two or three years in prison before the Safavids had decided that it might be profitable to cultivate the friendship of the Crimean Tatars. Thereafter, Ġāzī Girāy was treated in a manner worthy of a hānzāde until his escape in 1585. Isthvanfi, who was in a position to find out intimate details of the Khan's life during his negotiations with the representatives of the Khan, even states that the Khan was married, during his captivity, to one of the sisters of Shah 'Abbās.<sup>1</sup> Whatever the reasons - and Ġāzī Girāy certainly had many more reasons than most of his contemporaries - the Khan maintained amicable relations with Shah 'Abbās. Even after the Shah had opened hostilities with the Ottomans in 1603, the Khan remained on good terms

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<sup>1</sup>Isthvanfi, pp. 637-638.

with the Shah. After capturing a friend of the Khan, Çerkes Hāndān Ağā - doubtless the very same Muteferriḳa Bāṣī who had brought the Muḳarrernāme to Ġāzī Girāy in 1597 - Shah 'Abbās sent him on an embassy to the Khan. The Shah, it appears, was uneasy lest the Crimean Tatars might come to the assistance of the Ottomans in the Caucasus as they had in the past. But Ġāzī Girāy assured the Shah of his desire for peace and friendship through an embassy to Persia which arrived in Isfahan during the year 1607. At that time, the Khan sought the release of two sons of Hāndān Ağā. These exchanges of embassies continued until the Khan's death in 1608. When the news of these embassies reached the Porte the Khan was naturally viewed with even greater distrust than before.<sup>1</sup>

Relations between the Tsar and the Khan in the last years of the life of Ġāzī Girāy were virtually at a standstill. Boris Godunov, Tsar of Muscovy (1598-1605) consistently sought to maintain peace between his realm and the Crimean Khanate by the regular payment of subsidies. Towards the end of the short reign of Boris Godunov, however, amicable relations between the Khan and the Tsar were disturbed by incessant Don Cossack raids on the territories of the Khan. Moreover, the diplomatic activity taking place between Poland and the Crimea gave the Tsar just cause for concern. Shortly before his death in 1605, Boris Godunov was able to deter the Khan from assisting the Polish-supported movement in favour of False Dmitri (1605-1606);<sup>2</sup> nevertheless, at a time when the

<sup>1</sup> Iskandar Beg, Tārīh-e 'Alām, II, pp. 686 and 753; L. L. Bellan, Chah 'Abbās I (Les Grandes Figures de l'Orient, Vol. III) (Paris, 1932), pp. 163 and 169; Gontaut Biron au Roy (de France) (20 June, 1607), Arch. Hist. de la Gascogne, 19, p. 150. A. de Govvea, Relation des guerres et victoires obtenues par le roy de Perse Cha Abbas (Rouen, 1646), p. 326.

<sup>2</sup> S. Th. Platonov, ed. "Pamyet, Diplomats. Snosh. Moskov. Gosudarst s Polsko-Litovski, 1598-1608", Sbornik I. R. I. O., 137 (1912), pp. 179 and 249-250.

Pretender, Dmitri I, was gaining support on the Western borderlands of Muscovy, other signs of the disintegration of central authority in Muscovy became evident on the Terek. The voivode at this outpost reported that the Kabardinians no longer wished to serve the Tsar and that they were making common cause with the Little Nogays and the Kumucks to drive out the Muscovite garrisons. In 1604 the voivode was actually forced to withdraw from the fort on the Sunzhu and, although a Muscovite force had defeated the Şamhal of Tarku in the same year, a garrison stationed in Tarku was besieged and ultimately massacred by a combined Ottoman and Kumuck force in 1605.<sup>1</sup> The Pretender, who entered Moscow in triumph in June, 1605, at first pursued a conciliatory policy towards the Khan<sup>2</sup> but, shortly before his murder in 1606, False Dmitri had made preparations for a campaign against the Crimea.<sup>3</sup> During the reign of Vasiliy Shuiskiy (1606-1609)<sup>10</sup> it became no longer safe for couriers, not to mention embassies, to pass between Muscovy and the Crimea; consequently, ties between the two states were broken until 1613.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Belokurov, Snosheniya, pp. cxi-cxii.

<sup>2</sup>Karamsin, XI, p. 335.

<sup>3</sup>I. I. Smirnov, Vosstanie Bolotnikova, 1606-1607 (Leningrad, 1951), p. 147. the attack was to be launched from Eletsk in the spring, cf. Obolenskiy, ed., Novyy Letopisets, p. 73.

<sup>4</sup>Novosel'skiy, pp. 51-52.



Relations between the Khan and the King of Poland deteriorated seriously in the summer of 1606. During the winter months of 1606-1607 the French ambassador at the Porte reported that Ġāzī Girāy personally led a raid into the Polish borderlands.<sup>1</sup> These incursions led to the signing of an agreement between the Sultan and the King of Poland in 1607 in which the Sultan undertook to restrain the Crimean Tatars from raiding Poland. The King, on his part, agreed to continue the payment of the traditional subsidies to the Khan. The Khan, in return, would be expected to assist the King, if need be, against his enemies.<sup>2</sup>

From the foregoing scraps of evidence and a few sparse statements in the Ottoman and Tatar sources, it is possible to piece together the general outlines of the last few years of the life of Ġāzī Girāy Khan. The series of negotiations with Poland between 1601 and 1605 had resulted in an arrangement, if not an agreement, for the Crimean Tatars to assist Poland in an attack on Muscovy. Such an understanding, of course, could not have become operative had not the Hungarian War taken a decided turn in favour of the Ottomans. As the Russian sources boldly described the situation, King Sigismund paid the Tatars to assist him in an attack on Muscovy.<sup>3</sup> The Muscovite attack on the Şamhal of Tarku in

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<sup>1</sup>Gontaut-Biron, Baron de Salignac au Roy (de France) (26 July, 1606, 24 February, 1607), "Ambassade en Turquie, 1606 a 1610", Comité d'Histoire et d'Archeologie de la Province Ecclésiastique d'Auch (Paris, 1888-89), Fasc. 16, 19, 2 vols., Fasc. 19, pp. 65 and 120.

<sup>2</sup>Hammer, VIII, pp. 146-147.

<sup>3</sup>See above, p. 354, fn 2.

1604 may actually have forced Ġāzī Girāy into the Polish camp. The death of Zamoyski (d. 1605), an old adversary of the Khan, may also have temporarily eased relations between Poland and the Crimea. Ġāzī Girāy, however, once he learned of the rise of False Dmitri and of the support the latter was receiving from Poland, could not forego the temptation to reap a double harvest of "gifts" and, consequently, sent an envoy to Boris Godunov. He informed the Tsar that it was growing increasingly difficult to keep his Tatars at home as a result of the favourable incentives which he was receiving from King Sigismund to make common cause with him. Boris Godunov, already facing a serious threat to his position at home, hastened to appease the Khan with appropriate "gifts". The Khan was quite content to remain aloof from any Polish involvement because, if Muscovy were humbled by Poland, then the Crimea could no longer expect assistance from Muscovy if Poland attacked the Crimea. But by the middle of 1605 Boris Godunov was dead and False Dmitri, a friend of Poland, was in control in Muscovy. It does not seem surprising then that by 1606 plans for an attack on the Crimea - to be launched from Elets - were already far advanced. Moreover, Polish troops had been mobilized in preparation for an attack on the Crimea as a result of an incursion into the Polish borderlands which had been led by Ġāzī Girāy. One must suspect that a measure of collusion was planned between Muscovy and Poland for an attack on the Crimea in 1606. At this point, however, the Pretender was killed by the faction <sup>which</sup> ~~led by~~ Vasiliiy Shuiskiy <sup>led</sup> and better relations again developed between Muscovy and the Crimean Khanate.

As the war in Hungary also dragged to an end in this same year, negotiations between the Porte and Poland leading to the treaty of 1607 relieved the pressure on the Khanate from Poland. The Sultan now turned to the Khan with new demands for assistance against the Jelālī uprising, against the Shah of Persia, and against the son of Jeremia Movila who, with Polish support, was attempting to unseat the son of Simeon Movila, the Sultan's selection for the voivodeship of Moldavia. The Khan did send a token force to assist in quelling the rebellion. He did not, however, wish to interfere in the Moldavian affair and, in the light of previous assurances to Shah 'Abbās, he must have excused himself from sending a force to Persia.<sup>1</sup> The Khan knew that the young and impetuous Sultan Ahmed I (1603-1617) would, as a result of his disobedience, want to remove him from the Khanship; therefore, he took steps to entrench himself for the inevitable conflict in a manner reminiscent of the defensive measures he had taken during his struggle with the pro-Feth Girāy faction in 1596-1597. At that time he apparently had begun building the fortress of Ġāzī Kermān on the Kuba river in Circassia.<sup>2</sup> Between 1607 and 1608 Ġāzī Girāy completed the construction of Ġāzī Kermān and,

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. art. "Gazi Girāy Khan II", I.A., IV, pp. 334-6; Ferīdūn, Munše'at, II, pp. 119-120; and Report on Moldavia (8 January, 1608), Hurmuzaki, IV/II, p. 292.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Kātib Çelebī, Fezleke, I, p. 96 and Belokurov, Snosheniya, p. cxiv, citing Nogayskiya Dela, 1608, doc. no. 1.

at the same time, taking advantage of the internal dissention in Muscovy, exacted allegiance to the Khanate from the Şamhal and the (Kabārdai) Circassians.<sup>1</sup> It was while the Khan was returning from a visit to his "eastern domain" that he fell ill with the plague (Ta'un) in the spring of 1608 and died in the fortress of Temruk near the Straits of Kerch.<sup>2</sup> Töktāmis Girāy, son of the late Khan, who had led the Tatar forces in Hungary during the closing years of the war, was now chosen for the position of Khan by the assembled dignitaries of Şīrīn, Bārin, Sijavut (Sijavīt) and Maṣṣur tribes of the Crimea and the Sultan was then petitioned to recognise him. The Sultan, however, chose to make Selāmet Girāy the new Khan. The long and exceptional rule of Gāzī Girāy was at an end.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Belokurov, loc.cit.

<sup>2</sup>Meḥemmed Riżā, Al Seb' al Seyyār, .p. 111. There is some disagreement in the sources about the date of Gāzī Girāy's death. Meḥemmed Riżā (ibid) reported that the Khan died in Sa'ban, 1016/November-December, 1607; Kātib Çelebī (I, p. 300), 16 Zi'l Ka'de, 1016/3 March, 1608; Munejjimbāşī (III, p. 629) concurs with Kātib Çelebī. The French ambassador, in a despatch of 9 April, 1608, reported to his king that the Khan had died (Arch. Hist. de la Gascogne, Fasc. 19, pp. 208-209) and that Selāmet Girāy had been designated the new Khan.

<sup>3</sup>Meḥemmed Riżā, p. 126.

As the Tatar ambassador, Antonio Spinola, a descendent of the famous Genoese house of that name, related to William Bruce in 1597, the Sultan (Meḥemmed III) had sought to do away with Ġāzī Girāy but, as he was much respected by his own people, all his efforts had come to nothing. The Khan, he added, was a ruler of great wisdom and prudence such as<sup>1</sup> Tatory had not seen for a long time.

Although the Crimean Tatars first came into close contact with the Ottoman State in 1475, the nature of the authority which the Sultan exercised over the Crimean Khans thereafter was always rather ill-defined. At first the relationship between the Khanate and the Ottoman Empire was more in the nature of an offensive-defensive treaty. The good faith of the Tatar Khan was assured by a practice requiring the Khan to send a close relative to the Porte as a hostage. Early in the sixteenth century, the Tatar Khans, particularly Meḥemmed Girāy I (1514-1523), had acted in a manner contrary to the best interests of the Ottoman state. The Ottoman Sultans thus felt it necessary to control more closely than previously the appointment and dismissal of the Khans. At the same time the Sultans provided funds to enable the Khans of their choosing, for example Ṣāḥib Girāy (1532-1551), to enable them to establish a reliable personal guard (Sekbān) in order that their personal position vis-a-vis the tribal dignitaries of

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<sup>1</sup> William Bruce, De Tartaris diarium (Frankfurt a/M, 1598), pp. 3-5.



the Crimea might be more stable. The Crimean Tatar Khans were also granted regular subsidies which came, in part, out of the customs dues levied by the Ottomans at Kaffa. While participating in an Ottoman campaign, the Khans could expect to receive additional subsidies and on occasion even grants of land as had Mengli Giray after the Moldavian Campaign of 1484.<sup>1</sup>

During the late 16th century, the exact nature of the vassalage of the Crimean Khanate had not yet been finally determined. Much of the friction between the Porte and the Khanate must be considered in relation to this problem. The Khanate, as a Muslim state within the Empire and also as a buffer state to the north of the Black Sea, had to be handled with extreme tact. Thus, if the Porte wished to bring about a change in the Khanate, it preferred, except in cases of extreme urgency, to work with the ever-present conflicting factions inside the Khanate.

The Porte generally had its way with such Khans as İslâm Girây (1584-1588) who had spent much more time as a hostage in the Ottoman milieu at Istanbul than he had as a hanzade accustomed to the more spartan way of life among the Tatars. It was another matter with such Khans as Devlet Girây (1551-1577), the "taker of the capital" (Moscow), Mehmed Girây II (1577-1584) and Gazi Girây II (1588-1608). During the reigns of these Tatar Khans, the best interests of the Khanate, as construed by the Khan himself, were often placed ahead of considerations relating to the Ottoman empire as a whole. Thus, Devlet Girây saw in the Astrakhan campaign of 1569 a threat to his own position and opposed it. Mehmed Girây II, after stripping the provinces of Shirvan and Genje of whatever booty was to be found there, felt no longer obliged to serve in Transcaucasia, particularly as he

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1. Cf. H. İnalcık, "Yeni Vesikalara göre Kırım Hanlığının Osmanlı Tabiliğine Girmesi ve Ahidname Meselesi", Belleten VIII/30 (Ankara, 1944) pp.185-229; and by the same author, art. "Girây", I.A. IV, pp.786-788.

had good reason to view with some alarm the intentions of so active a Polish king as Stephan Bathory at home. On this occasion, the Porte found it necessary to deal directly with his insubordinations. This would have been difficult, however, in wartime had not the powerful Sirin Begs given their support to the new Ottoman candidate, Islām Girāy.<sup>1</sup> Mehemmed Girāy Khan had also wished to perpetuate the Khanship in his own family, a desire which the Ottoman Sultans certainly did not wish to encourage.

During the khanship of Gāzī Girāy the tension between the Sultan and the Khan again became acute largely because Gāzī Girāy was an intelligent and capable Khan. The power groups which influenced the Crimean political scene had not altered appreciably since the days of Devlet Girāy, the illustrious father of Gāzī Girāy. Within the Khanate one can differentiate between four groups at any one time: the Khan and his household, the other Girāy Hānzādes and their followers, the Mirzas of the principal Crimean Tatar tribes, and finally, the dignitaries of the Nogay and Circassian tribes which had family alliances with the other three groups. There were of course traditional alignments within and between these various groups as well as more transient and changing alliances. The Ottoman Sultans and their vezirs maintained contacts with the various factions which developed out of these four main groups.

In view of his great services to the Ottoman State at the time of the Persian conflict (1578-1590), Gāzī Girāy, when he was chosen to become Khan, enjoyed excellent relations with the Porte. The Khan, after assisting the Ottomans in the Polish affair of 1589-1590, was able to settle the immediate problems facing the Khanate on the steppe in time to comply with the Sultan's wishes that he join in the Hungarian campaign in 1594. Very early in this conflict, however, Gāzī Girāy came to feel that,

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<sup>1</sup> See above, p. 192 ff.



in the light of the contribution which the Khanate was making to the prosecution of the war and in view of the poor showing of the Ottomans, the Tatars ought to be compensated with better rations, greater subsidies and possibly even territories--even as his illustrious ancestors had been. It was natural that the Khan should seek to extend his sway in the direction of Wallachia and Moldavia. He already controlled portions of Bessarabia; moreover, within Moldavia there was a sizeable community of Tatar agriculturists and merchants.<sup>1</sup> When Gāzī Girāy refused to go in person on campaign in 1596, the Sultan, as in the earlier case of Mehemmed Girāy II, took the necessary steps to bring about his dismissal. Here again there is evidence that the Şirin tribe, as in the time of Mehemmed Girāy, sided with the Ottomans against the ruling Khan.<sup>2</sup> But at this juncture, Gāzī Girāy was too well-respected, by the rank-and-file of the Tatar army as a warrior of the faith and by the learned community of the Ulema<sup>3</sup> as a man of culture and learning, to be easily removed permanently from office--particularly while the Ottomans were directing their energies elsewhere.<sup>3</sup> Upon his return to power in 1597, the Khan eliminated systematically the various threats to his independent position. First, he eliminated the family and the supporters of Feth Giray (1597). When the Şirin Mirzas--even including his own son-in-law--attempted to replace him with a hanzade from the Mehemmed Girāy line, Gāzī Girāy took the occasion to bring vengeance on the Şirinogulları (1601). When his brother, Selāmet Girāy fell into the hands of the Ottomans in 1602, the Khan refused to go on campaign again without proper subsidies and firm assurances that he would not be dismissed from the Khan/ship.

The question now arises: how was the Khan able to take such an independent position towards the traditional elements of power within the Khanate and towards the Ottoman Sultan? The answer to this question

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. La Terza Parte del Tesoro Politico (Frankfurt<sup>a</sup>/M, 1612), p. 197.

<sup>2</sup> Kātib Çelebī, Fezleke, I, p. 96.

<sup>3</sup> See above, p. 297 ff. and p. 360.



<sup>1</sup> Cf. K.N. Bestyazhev-Ryusin, ed., "Pamyatniki Diplom. Snosh. Moskov. Gosud. s Angliyei 1881-1604", Sbornik I.R.I.O., Vol. 38(1883), p. 376 and A. Tarnowski, Dzialalność Gospodarcza Jana Zamoyskiego, Kanclerza i Hetmana w Kor.(1572-1605), (Lvov, 1935), pp. 415-427.

must be sought in the internal and external policies of Gāzī Giray. At home, he had strengthened his personal power by maintaining a retinue of Circassians loyal to him personally. Moreover, he had built up a contingent of arquebusiers, chiefly drawn from his villages bordering on Poland. Finally there is some evidence that he was able to maintain a better surveillance over his own territories than previous khans had done, by devoting considerable care to the older, and by building some new fortifications in the region stretching from the Dnepr to the Kuban. The relations of Gāzī Giray with foreign powers also helped to enhance the independent position of the Khanate. It was through his contacts with the Tsar of Muscovy, the Kings of Poland and Sweden and with the Holy Roman Emperor that Gāzī Giray, in a manner somewhat reminiscent of his Golden Horde ancestors, obtained subsidies and perquisites which aided him to further his own ambitions in the Khanate and to provide him with funds which he could use to bribe the great dignitaries at the Porte. These revenues, of course, were supplements to his normal grants from the Sultan and the tribute which he was able to squeeze out of Wallachia, Moldavia and also out of the Nogays and the Circassians. During the last years of his life, owing to the "Time of Troubles" in Muscovy and to the pressure placed on the Ottoman State by Shah 'Abbās I, the Khan was able even to extend his rule into the Northern Caucasus to such an extent that the ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~am~~ <sup>am</sup> ~~hal~~ <sup>hal</sup> of Tarku paid him tribute. It is doubtful whether Gāzī Giray could have maintained himself as Khan as long as he did, had there not been a "Time of Troubles" in Muscovy, a long war on the Danube and also serious internal troubles in Poland. But in some measure at least, the Khan had been successful because he had been able to project a favourable impression of himself upon his subjects, upon his supporters at the Porte and upon the representatives of various foreign powers.

Although Gāzī Giray solved temporarily the problem of political survival for himself, he was unable to grasp the importance of the steppe as something more than an environment for the raising of livestock and for protection against enemies. The lessons that Gāzī Giray and his successors might have learned from the colonies established by Jan Zamoyski in Poland or by the Don Cossacks to the east of the Khanate or from the settlements of the Tatars in Moldavia seem to have gone unheeded by the Khan

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